Not For Publication 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS 
 
JIMMY DAVIS, 
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S. Ct. Crim. No. 2014-0036 
Re: Super. Ct. Crim. No. 028/2014 (STX)  
 
 
          Appellant/Defendant, 
 
v. 
 
PEOPLE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS, 
 
          Appellee/Plaintiff. 
 
 
) 
 
 
On Appeal from the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands 
Division of St. Croix 
Superior Court Judge: Hon. Robert A. Molloy 
 
Considered: August 14, 2014  
Filed: August 14, 2014 
 
BEFORE:  
RHYS S. HODGE, Chief Justice; MARIA M. CABRET, Associate Justice; and 
IVE ARLINGTON SWAN, Associate Justice. 
 
APPEARANCES: 
 
Carl A. Beckstedt, Esq. 
Beckstedt & Associates 
St. Croix, U.S.V.I. 
 
Attorneys for Appellant, 
 
Kimberly L. Salisbury, Esq. 
Assistant Attorney General 
St. Thomas, U.S.V.I. 
 
Attorney for Appellee. 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
PER CURIAM. 
Appellant Jimmy Davis appeals from the Superior Court’s May 22, 2014 Order denying 
his “Emergency Motion for Request for Renewed Bail Hearing.”  For the reasons that follow, we 
reverse. 
Davis v. People 
S. Ct. Crim. No. 2014-0036 
Opinion of the Court 
Page 2 of 4 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
On January 23, 2014, the People of the Virgin Islands charged Davis with corruptly 
influencing a juror.  At an advice of rights hearing that same day, a Superior Court judge set bail 
at $10,000.  Davis filed his emergency motion on April 16, 2014, which stated that the bail set at 
the advice of rights hearing was too high and should be reconsidered. 
A different Superior Court judge held a hearing on May 15, 2014.  At this hearing, the 
second judge invoked this Court’s decision in Rieara v. People, 57 V.I. 659 (V.I. 2012), stating 
that it stood for the proposition that one Superior Court judge cannot set aside a bail decision 
issued by another Superior Court judge “unless [there are] changed circumstances or new 
evidence,” (Hr’g Tr. 36), and accordingly denied the motion because “there’s no evidence of any 
additional evidence” and “the proper avenue was to file an appeal with the Supreme Court and 
not to file a renewed motion when there’s no additional evidence or different proffers to another 
judicial officer of the Superior Court.”  (Hr’g Tr. 42).   
The Superior Court memorialized that decision in a May 22, 2014 Order, and Davis filed 
his notice of appeal with this Court on June 12, 2014.  This Court, in a June 26, 2014 Order, 
issued an abbreviated briefing schedule in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 9(a). 
II. DISCUSSION 
“Because . . . an order denying a motion for reduction of bail is reviewable under the 
collateral order doctrine,” a limited exception to the final judgment rule embodied in 4 V.I.C. § 
32(a), this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal. Rieara, 57 V.I. at 64-65.  Although decisions 
relating to the amount of bail are ordinarily reviewed only for abuse of discretion, id. at 665, we 
engage in plenary review if the decision is based on application of a legal precept.  Phillips v. 
People, 51 V.I. 258, 280 (V.I. 2009). 
Davis v. People 
S. Ct. Crim. No. 2014-0036 
Opinion of the Court 
Page 3 of 4 
 
Here, the Superior Court clearly denied Davis’s motion based on an incomplete analysis  
of the Rieara decision.  While the Superior Court stated that Rieara compels one Superior Court 
judge to defer to the bail decision of a different Superior Court judge in the absence of changed 
circumstances or new evidence, this Court in Rieara made clear that  
The fact that [the prior judge] had already reduced [the defendant]’s bail is not a 
sufficient basis on which to deny the Renewed Motion for Reduction of Bail.  
When the court resolves a motion to modify bail and release conditions, it must 
make an individualized determination in order to ensure that the bail is not 
excessive.  Any bail or conditions of release that are not tailored to achieve the 
purpose of bail are considered excessive and therefore unconstitutional. . . . The 
mere fact that another judge, presented with another motion, had set those 
conditions is an insufficient basis on which to refuse to modify the conditions, 
particularly where the defendant’s new motion includes additional evidence or 
new and different proffers. 
 
57 V.I. at 666-67.  In other words, while the defendant in Rieara did, in fact, present additional 
evidence, unquestionably the submission of new or different evidence or proffers is not a 
prerequisite to have an earlier bail decision reconsidered. Accordingly, it is reversible error for a 
judge to summarily deny such a motion simply because it had been denied by another judge.  See 
also In re Q.G., __ V.I. __, S. Ct. Civ. No. 2013–0099, 2014 WL 807875, at *4 n.8 (V.I. Feb. 28, 
2014) (“[T]he decision of a single Superior Court judge . . . is not binding precedent on other 
Superior Court judges.”) (collecting cases).  Thus, since the Superior Court denied Davis’s 
renewed motion solely based on the mistaken belief that one Superior Court judge cannot 
overturn another Superior Court judge, we reverse the May 22, 2014 Order.1 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the May 22, 2014 Order, and remand the case to 
                                                 
1 Given the decision to reverse the May 22, 2014 Order, we express no opinion on any of the other issues raised in 
Davis’s notice of appeal or his brief, including his claims that (1) the decision rendered by the first Superior Court 
judge, whose decision the current Superior Court judge improperly granted deference, itself fails to comply with 
Rieara and Supreme Court Rule 9, and (2) that he did, in fact, present additional evidence or new and different 
proffers to the second Superior Court judge. 
Davis v. People 
S. Ct. Crim. No. 2014-0036 
Opinion of the Court 
Page 4 of 4 
 
the Superior Court so that it may rule on Davis’s emergency motion without affording any 
deference to the prior judge’s January 23, 2014 ruling. 
Dated this 14th day of August, 2014. 
 
ATTEST:  
 
 
 
 
 
VERONICA J. HANDY, ESQ. 
Clerk of the Court