DISTRICT COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS 
DIVISION OF ST. THOMAS AND ST. JOHN 
IDA SMITH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ALL PERSONS CLAIMING A PRESENT OR 
FUTURE INTEREST IN ESTATE 13, 
FRIIS, LINDA V. SMITH-FRANCIS, 
WILLIAM E. SMITH, ELOISE V. SMITH-
HENDRICKS, BAB FRIIS NO. 1, PAUL 
HOFFMAN, JANE HOFFMAN-WALKER, 
ELEANOR ADAMS HOFFMAN, MAXWELL 
ADAMS HOFFMAN, GLORIA FRANCOIS 
MCGOWAN, DAVID A. BORNN AS TRUSTEE 
TO THE GAF TRUST ESTATE 14 JOHN’S 
FOLLY EXCLUDING ALL HEIRS AT LAW, 
ESTATE 15 CONCORDIA A, CORAL BAY 
QUARTER, ST JOHN UNITED STATES 
VIRGIN ISLANDS, NATIONAL PARK 
SERVICE, LAND RESOURCES DIVISION, 
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA, STANLEY 
SELENGUT, WILLIAM B. POPPELTON, 
LORRAINE A. POPPELTON, KEVIN M. 
WALSH, MARIA K. STURATIS, SCOTT E. 
WILMOSKI, CHARLES M. PERDUE, 
MONICA PERDUE, JOZSEF NEMETH, 
NANCY NEMETH, FRED S. PATTERSON, 
MARGARET D. PATTERSON, JOHN R. 
PERGOLIZZI, TREASURE VIEW LLC, 
GEORGE PILLORGE, DEBORAH PILLORGE, 
SCOTT L. HARTSHORN, CLAUDETTE C. 
HARTSHORN, HEINZ G. FISHER, LINDA 
G. BURDET TRUSTEES OF THE HEINZ G. 
FISHER TRUST, DONALD DURANTE, 
SAFIA B. DURANTE, CRAIG E. 
MITCHELL, ALAN MARTIN KAUFMAN, 
RACHELLE KAUFMAN, JEFFREY J. 
McCRAVE, ANN McCRAVE, DOROTHY K. 
JANOSKO, WILLIAM R. KINCER, SUSAN 
B. KINCER, SUSAN GREER 
LITTLEFIELD, WAYNE CHESTERFIELD, 
MONIQUE FRANCOIS, PEDRITO 
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Case: 3:11-cv-00041-RAM-GAT     Document #: 351     Filed: 10/28/14     Page 1 of 9
Smith v. All Persons Claiming a Present or Future Interest, et al. 
Civil No. 2011-41 
Order 
Page 2 
 
FRANCOIS, SALT POND VISTA LLC, 
V.I. JOSEPH PALMINTERI, CARRIE 
GLENN, MARC KAVE, EMILY J. 
BRATTON, RICK HATHAWAY, RENE A. 
SERVANT aka RENE H. SERVANT, MARIE 
THERESE L. SERVANT, LORI JANE 
SNACK, BRIAN K. WALDEN, 
MINISTER ISHMAEL R. MUHAMMED, 
MICHAEL CARPER, REUBEN WHEATLEY, 
et al. 
Defendants. 
 
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APPEARANCES: 
 
Ida Smith 
New York, NY 
 
Pro se plaintiff, 
 
Maria Tankenson Hodge, Esq. 
Hodge & Francois  
St. Thomas, U.S.V.I. 
For Paul Hoffman; Jane Hoffman Walker; and David A. Bornn, 
Trustee of the GAF Trust, 
 
Rafael F. Muilenburg, Esq. 
Morrisette & Muilenburg 
St. John, U.S.V.I. 
For William E. Smith; Eloise V. Smith; Deborah Pillorge; 
Claudette C. Hartshorn; Scott L. Hartshorn; Linda V. Smith-
Francis; and George Pillorge, 
 
Gloria McGowan 
 
Pro se, 
 
Wayne Chesterfield 
 
Pro se, 
 
Monique Francois 
 
Pro se, 
 
Pedrito Francois 
 
Pro se, 
 
Joseph Palminteri 
 
Pro se, 
Case: 3:11-cv-00041-RAM-GAT     Document #: 351     Filed: 10/28/14     Page 2 of 9
Smith v. All Persons Claiming a Present or Future Interest, et al. 
Civil No. 2011-41 
Order 
Page 3 
 
 
W. Mark Hillsman, Esq. 
Law Offices of Norman P. Jones, P.C.  
St. Thomas, U.S.V.I. 
For Carrie Glenn; Lori Jane Snack; William B. Poppelton; 
Lorraine A. Poppelton; Maria K. Sturaitis; Charles M. 
Purdue; Monica Purdue; Salt Pond Vista, LLC; Heinz G. 
Fisher; Linda G. Burdet, Trustee of the Heinz G. Fisher; 
Safia B. Durante; Donald Durante, 
 
Marc Kave 
 
Pro se, 
 
Emily J. Bratton 
 
Pro se, 
 
Rick Hathaway 
 
Pro se, 
 
Rene A. Servant 
 
Pro se, 
 
Marie Therese Servant 
 
Pro se, 
 
Brian K. Walden 
 
Pro se, 
 
John H. Benham, III, Esq. 
Watts, Benham & Sprehn, P.C. 
St. Thomas, U.S.V.I. 
 
For Stanley Selengut, 
 
 
Mark D. Hodge, Esq. 
Hodge & Francois 
St. Thomas, U.S.V.I. 
 
For Kevin M. Walsh and Treasure View LLC, 
 
Scott E. Wilmoski 
 
Pro se, 
 
Jozef Nemeth 
 
Pro se, 
 
 
Case: 3:11-cv-00041-RAM-GAT     Document #: 351     Filed: 10/28/14     Page 3 of 9
Smith v. All Persons Claiming a Present or Future Interest, et al. 
Civil No. 2011-41 
Order 
Page 4 
 
Nancy Nemeth 
 
Pro se defendant. 
 
Fred S. Patterson 
 
Pro se, 
 
Margaret D. Patterson 
 
Pro se defendant. 
 
John R. Perqulizzi 
 
Pro se, 
 
Terryhill Enterprises, II 
 
Pro se, 
 
Missouri LLC 
 
Pro se, 
 
Craig E. Mitchell 
 
Pro se, 
 
Michael E. Fitzsimmons, Esq. 
Stryker, Duensing, Casner & Dollison  
St. Thomas, U.S.V.I. 
 
For Alan Martin Kaufman, 
 
Ann McCrave 
 
Pro se, 
 
Jeffrey J. McCrave 
 
Pro se, 
 
William R. Kincer 
 
Pro se, 
 
Susan B. Kincer 
 
Pro se, 
 
Susan Greer Littlefield 
 
Pro se, 
 
Kurt Shore 
 
Pro se, 
 
Suzanne L. Shore 
 
Pro se, 
Case: 3:11-cv-00041-RAM-GAT     Document #: 351     Filed: 10/28/14     Page 4 of 9
Smith v. All Persons Claiming a Present or Future Interest, et al. 
Civil No. 2011-41 
Order 
Page 5 
 
 
Dorothy Janosko (also known as “Dorothy K. Janoko”) 
 
Pro se. 
 
 
ORDER 
 
GÓMEZ, J. 
 
Before the Court is Defendant Wayne Chesterfield’s 
(“Chesterfield”) motion to disqualify Judge Curtis V. Gómez.  
 
Plaintiff Ida Smith (“Smith”) initiated this action on 
March 24, 2011. On April 1, Smith filed an amended complaint.  
On two subsequent occasions, she attempted to further amend her 
complaint. The Court denied Smith leave to amend her complaint 
on both occasions.  
 
Thereafter, on October 17, 2013, the Magistrate granted 
Smith leave to amend her complaint on or before October 31, 
2013. The Court extended that deadline nunc pro tunc to November 
1, 2013. On November 1, 2013, Smith filed a second amended 
complaint naming a number of defendants, including Chesterfield. 
 
Subsequently, on March 25, 2014, Chesterfield moved to 
disqualify the undersigned, alleging bias and asserting that the 
undersigned’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.  
 
Chesterfield makes several allegations in support of his 
motion. Generally, Chesterfield complains: that the Court failed 
to take certain actions such as holding a hearing on this case; 
that the undersigned has some financial interest in the property 
Case: 3:11-cv-00041-RAM-GAT     Document #: 351     Filed: 10/28/14     Page 5 of 9
Smith v. All Persons Claiming a Present or Future Interest, et al. 
Civil No. 2011-41 
Order 
Page 6 
 
at issue; and that the Court failed to properly apply the 
relevant laws.  
 
Section 455 of Title 28 of the United States Code 
(“Section 455”) outlines the circumstances that 
require disqualification of a judge. Section 455, in 
pertinent part, provides that: 
 
(a) 
Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the 
United States shall disqualify himself in any 
proceeding in which his impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned. 
 
(b) 
He 
shall 
also 
disqualify 
himself 
in 
the 
following circumstances:  
 
(1) 
Where he has a personal bias or prejudice 
concerning a party, or personal knowledge of 
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the 
proceeding;  
 
(2) 
Where in private practice he served as 
lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a 
lawyer with whom he previously practiced law 
served during such association as a lawyer 
concerning the matter, or the judge or such 
lawyer 
has 
been 
a 
material 
witness 
concerning it; 
 
(3) 
Where 
he 
has 
served 
in 
governmental 
employment and in such capacity participated 
as counsel, adviser or material witness 
concerning the proceeding or expressed an 
opinion 
concerning 
the 
merits 
of 
the 
particular case in controversy . . . . 
 
28 U.S.C. § 455 (“Section 455”).  
 
Case: 3:11-cv-00041-RAM-GAT     Document #: 351     Filed: 10/28/14     Page 6 of 9
Smith v. All Persons Claiming a Present or Future Interest, et al. 
Civil No. 2011-41 
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The Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of Section 
455 is “to promote public confidence in the integrity of the 
judicial process.” Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 
486 U.S. 847, 860 (1988). “A party seeking recusal need not show 
actual bias on the part of the court, only the possibility of 
bias.... Under § 455(a), if a reasonable man, were he to know 
all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about the judge's 
impartiality under the applicable standard, then the judge must 
recuse.” In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 283, 343 (3d Cir. 
1998) (internal quotations omitted); see also Massachusetts 
School of Law at Andover, Inc. v. American Bar Ass'n, 107 F.3d 
1026, 1042 (3d Cir. 1997) (“The standard for recusal is whether 
an objective observer reasonably might question the judge's 
impartiality.”)  
“[T]he responsibility for deciding a Section 455 motion to 
recuse lies with the judge to whom the motion is directed.” In 
re Kensington Intern. Ltd., 353 F.3d 211, 223 n.12 (3d Cir. 
2003) (citing Bernard v. Coyne, 31 F.3d 842, 843 (9th Cir. 
1994). The Court is not required to take the movant’s argument 
at face value. See United States v. Martorano, 866 F.2d 62, 68 
(3d Cir. 1989) (“Motions to recuse under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) must 
rest on the kind of objective facts that a reasonable person 
would use to evaluate whether an appearance of impropriety had 
Case: 3:11-cv-00041-RAM-GAT     Document #: 351     Filed: 10/28/14     Page 7 of 9
Smith v. All Persons Claiming a Present or Future Interest, et al. 
Civil No. 2011-41 
Order 
Page 8 
 
been created, not on ‘possibilities' and unsubstantiated 
allegations.”). Rather, the Court must determine for itself 
whether there exists an adequate basis for recusal. See 
generally Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 351 (10th Cir.1995) 
(explaining that “a judge has as strong a duty to sit when there 
is no legitimate reason to recuse as he does to recuse when the 
law and facts require.”).  
 
Chesterfield makes conclusory allegations that take issue 
with the Court’s rulings, express displeasure with the Court’s 
scheduling, and accuse the undersigned of having a financial 
interest 
in 
the 
property 
at 
issue 
in 
this 
case. 
Those 
allegations are insufficient for several reasons.  
 
First, 
judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a 
valid basis for a bias or partiality motion. In 
and of themselves (i.e., apart from surrounding 
comments or accompanying opinion), they cannot 
possibly show reliance upon an extrajudicial 
source; and can only in the rarest circumstances 
evidence the degree of favoritism or antagonism 
required . . . when no extrajudicial source is 
involved. Almost invariably, they are proper 
grounds for appeal, not for recusal. 
 
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (assessing a 
claim of bias pursuant to Section 455). Here, to the extent 
Chesterfield alleges bias based on the undersigned’s judicial 
rulings, Chesterfield’s allegations of bias are fatally 
deficient.   
Case: 3:11-cv-00041-RAM-GAT     Document #: 351     Filed: 10/28/14     Page 8 of 9
Smith v. All Persons Claiming a Present or Future Interest, et al. 
Civil No. 2011-41 
Order 
Page 9 
 
 
Second, Chesterfield’s allegation that the undersigned has 
a financial interest in the case is similarly unavailing. In 
Chesterfield’s affidavit attached to the motion, he alleges that 
Dudley, Topper and Feuerzeig, LLP “holds an interest in this 
action by means of title insurance in the subject properties.” 
(ECF No. 302-1.) Regardless, the undersigned retains no 
financial interest in Dudley, Topper and Feuerzeig, LLP.   
 
In Chesterfield’s motion, he also alleges that Ogletree, 
Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, PC “may have issued title 
insurance” on the relevant properties. (ECF No. 302)(emphasis 
added). Because Chesterfield’s allegation relies on 
“possibilities” and is an “unsubstantiated allegation[],” this 
allegation is deficient. United States v. Martorano, 866 F.2d at 
68. 
 
The premises considered, it is hereby  
 
ORDERED that Chesterfield’s Motion to Disqualify is DENIED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S\ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    CURTIS V. GÓMEZ               
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
    District Judge 
 
Case: 3:11-cv-00041-RAM-GAT     Document #: 351     Filed: 10/28/14     Page 9 of 9