SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS 
DIVISION OF ST. CROIX 
 
CASE NO.: SX-11-CV-091 
 
ACTION FOR DAMAGES 
 
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 
LINDEL WILTSHIRE, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
WYATT V.I., INC., 
 
Defendant 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
 
BEFORE THE COURT is Defendant Wyatt V.I., Inc.’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Wyatt V.I. moves the Court to dismiss Plaintiff Lindel Wiltshire’s complaint with 
prejudice, claiming no material dispute remains regarding Wyatt V.I.’s negligence because 
the facts show that Wiltshire’s own negligence caused his injuries. (Def. Wyatt V.I.’s Mot. 
and Mem. of Law in Support of Summ. J. Mot., filed Dec. 3, 2012 (hereinafter “Summ. J. 
Mot.”).) In opposition, Wiltshire claims that Wyatt V.I.’s motion is a “nonstarter,” arguing 
that whether his own negligence contributed to his injuries is “a class[ic] jury question” not 
appropriate for courts to resolve in a summary judgment motion. (Pl.’s Mem. of Law in 
Opp’n to Def.’s Summ. J. Mot. at 1, filed Dec. 20, 2012 (hereinafter “Summ. J. Opp’n”).) For 
the reasons stated below, the Court finds that fundamental facts remain in dispute and 
therefore Wyatt V.I.’s summary judgment motion must be denied. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The record before the Court establishes the following. Lindel Wiltshire was employed 
by HOVENSA, LLC and worked at the oil refinery on St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands. 
(Compl. ¶ 2, filed Feb. 24, 2011; Answer ¶ 2, filed Apr. 4, 2011.) On February 9, 2011, 
shortly before midnight, Wiltshire showed up for work, got onto a bicycle, and began riding 
down along a “pedestrian/bicycle walkway.” (Wiltshire Dep. 25:13 & 76:2-3, Mar. 1, 2012, 
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Ex. 2 to Def. Wyatt V.I.’s Stmt. of Undisputed Material Facts in Supp. of Summ. J. Mot. 
(hereinafter “Wyatt V.I. Stmt of Facts”), filed Dec. 3, 2012.) HOVENSA allows its 
employees to use bicycles to move around the refinery. (Wiltshire Dept. 30:15-24; Cadette 
Dep. 10:4-5 & 12:3-7, Oct. 30, 2012, Ex. 10 to Wyatt V.I. Stmt of Facts.) As Wiltshire was 
riding toward the walkway southeast of Gas Turbine 13, Ira Hobson and Jerson Cadette, 
employees of Wyatt V.I., Inc., were driving their forklifts toward the same area. (Hobson 
Personal or Witness Stmt., Feb. 10, 2011, p. 1 (hereinafter “Hobson Feb. 10, 2011 Stmt.”), 
Ex. 6 to Wyatt V.I. Stmt of Facts; Cadette Dep. 9:12-25, Oct. 30, 2012.) Hobson and other 
Wyatt V.I. employees had been parking their forklifts in the area for the past few weeks so 
they could walk up the walkway to a repair room they used as a lunch room. (Hobson Feb. 
10, 2011 Stmt at Attachment;1 Cadette Dep. 9:19-25.) Wiltshire began coasting down the hill 
approaching the walkway when he “saw some lights in the distance” and then pressed on the 
brakes to slow down. (Wiltshire Dep. 25:15-18.) About halfway down the hill, Wiltshire 
realized that the lights were from a forklift “coming up the pedestrian walkway,” so he 
“slammed” on his brakes, “skidded,” and turned to avoid hitting the forklift. (Wiltshire Dep. 
25:20-22; Cadette Dep. 10:12-15.) Wiltshire was approximately ten to twenty yards away 
from the forklift when he first saw its headlights. (Wiltshire Dep. 32:23-33:7.) While there 
was nothing blocking his line of sight to the forklift, the only lighting in the area was from 
the forklift’s headlights. (Wiltshire Dep. 40:2-5 & 30:1-4.) Unable to stop in time, Wiltshire 
and the bicycle collided into the forklift Hobson was driving. (Compl. ¶¶ 4-5; Answer ¶¶ 4-5; 
Wiltshire Dep. 33:19-21; Cadette Dep. 10:14-180.) Wiltshire was not wearing a helmet at the 
time of the collision. (Wiltshire Dep. 58:8-9.)  
                                                 
1 Inserted between pages “1 of 2” and “2 of 2” of Hobson’s February 10, 2011 Statement is a blank sheet of 
paper, designated by Bates number WYATT-000012, with a handwritten question and answer. Although the 
February 10, 2011 Statement does not reference an enclosure or attachment, the Court will refer to the blank 
sheet of paper as an attachment. 
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When Hobson heard the impact, he stopped and noticed someone on the ground. 
(Hobson Feb. 10, 2011 Stmt. at 1.) He approached and found Wiltshire lying on the ground 
and the bicycle Wiltshire was riding on the blades of the forklift he was driving. Id. Hobson 
“did not see anyone riding on the walk way” before the collision. Id. Wiltshire was taken 
away in an ambulance to receive medical treatment and Hobson was later given a drug-
alcohol screening test. Id. at 2.  
Wyatt V.I. employee Norman George, in an email sent shortly after the collision, 
reported that a traffic incident had occurred involving a HOVENSA employee “riding a 
bicycle and a Wyatt V.I. employee parking a Fork Lift Truck.” (E-mail from Norman George 
to Gil Black et al. (Feb. 10, 2011, 2:53 AM) (hereinafter “George Email”), Ex. 5 to Wiltshire 
Dep.) George wrote that Wiltshire said he was “riding a bike down the hill and came in 
contact with the side of a [f]ork [l]ift . . . . [H]e saw the fork lift and tried to stop the bike but 
the bike started to skid, he lost control and [then] slid between the forks of the fork lift truck   
. . . being parked by a Wyatt V.I. employee.” Id.  
HOVENSA Security Officer Lazarus Joseph also appeared on the scene to investigate 
the traffic accident between Wiltshire and Hobson and later issued a citation to both Wiltshire 
and to Hobson. (HOVENSA Stmt. Form, Mar. 3, 2012, p.1, Ex. 8 to Wyatt V.I. Stmt of 
Facts.) HOVENSA regulations prohibit vehicles from being operated on pedestrian 
walkways. (Lugo Dep. 41:9-12, Mar. 1, 2012, Ex. 9 to Wyatt V.I. Stmt. of Facts.) Joseph 
submitted his investigation report to his supervisor, William Harvey, who in turn forwarded 
the report to Antonio Emmanuel, a superintendent. Id. at 1. Harvey phoned Joseph on 
February 10, 2011, the day after the collision, to inform him that he should not have given 
Wiltshire a citation because a bicycle is not a motorized vehicle. Id. (See also HOVENSA 
Supp. Report, Mar. 7, 2011, Ex. 4 to Summ. J. Opp’n.) Joseph then “checked and conducted 
more investigations” and found that company regulations require that all bicycles be 
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equipped with lights and reflectors and if not the rider must have a light “affixed to his or her 
helmet.” (HOVENSA Stmt. Form at 1-2.) Because “none of these conditions existed,” Joseph 
determined that Wiltshire “should have received the citation” and concluded that based on 
“all [of] the evidence available,” Wiltshire was “the reason why the accident occurred and he 
[was] the main contributor.” Id.  
A HOVENSA Incident Evaluation Summary Report prepared regarding the collision 
between Wiltshire and Hobson noted that the area where the collision occurred was a 
“pedestrian walkway” and concluded, based on the drag marks left behind, that Wiltshire 
“was traveling very fast” (See HOVENSA Incident Evaluation Summ. Report at 1 
(hereinafter “Incident Report”), Ex. 3 to Summ. J. Opp’n.) The Incident Report also 
concluded that “[t]here was poor lighting in the area,” no signs “to prohibit any type of 
traffic” and—partially in conflict with the materials submitted in the record—explained that 
there was “no established procedure for Bicycle Safety in the facility. The procedure is 
currently being developed.” Id.  
Approximately six weeks before the collision, however, HOVENSA had prepared a 
new procedure to “establish minimum requirements for the safe use of bicycles/tricycles 
within the HOVENSA refinery.” (HOVENSA, L.L.C. Procedure # 0000, Subject: 
Bicycle/Tricycles Safety, Dec. 31, 2010, p. 1 (hereinafter “Bicycle Safety Procedure), Ex. 4 
to Wyatt V.I. Stmt of Facts.) The Bicycle Safety Procedure required all personnel, including 
employees of contractors, to “obey all Traffic Signs and conduct themselves in a safe manner 
so as not to increase risk of injury to themselves or others.” (Bicycle Safety Procedure at 1; 
see also Lugo Dep. 41:13-15 (noting that HOVENSA regulations require bicycle-riders 
follow the same rules and regulations as motorized vehicles).) The new bicycle safety 
procedures also directed that  
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[a]ny bicycle/tricycle used within the refinery shall be outfitted with the 
following safety equipment: 
a. Front and rear wheel reflectors. 
b. A properly functioning braking system as supplied by the 
manufacturer. 
c. Front and/or Rear mounted basket(s) if small personal or plant 
materials (no hydrocarbon samples) or tools are transported. 
d. Orange warning bicycle flag mounted on front wheel. 
e. When riding at night an intrinsically safe headlight must be 
either mounted on the bicycle/tricycle or on the user’s hardhat. 
 
Bicycle Safety Procedure. at 3. Similarly, all employees were required to wear hard hats with 
a chin strap, safety eyeglasses, flame retardant clothing, and steel-toed safety boots when 
riding bicycles within the refinery and be trained by their departments about the new safety 
procedures. Id. at 2.  
 
Following the accident, Wiltshire filed this lawsuit, claiming that Hobson was 
negligent in operating the forklift and that Wyatt V.I. was liable for Wiltshire’s injures 
because Hobson was acting within the scope of his employment when he injured Wiltshire. 
(Compl. ¶¶ 5-9.) Wyatt V.I. appeared and filed an Answer in which it “admit[ted] that the 
forklift was operated by Wyatt V.I. employee Ira Hobson.” (Answer at 1.) Wyatt V.I. denied 
liability and asserted, among other affirmative defenses, that Wiltshire’s own actions 
contributed to whatever injuries he sustained. Id. at 3. After conducting discovery and 
attempting to resolve this dispute through mediation, Wyatt V.I. now moves for summary 
judgment.  
DISCUSSION 
In moving for summary judgment, Wyatt V.I. claims that the material facts show that 
Wiltshire’s own negligence “so clearly exceeded any alleged negligence of Wyatt” that 
Wiltshire cannot recover and the Court should dismiss his claims with prejudice. (Summ. J. 
Mot. 1.) Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party “shows that there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
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law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (applicable via Super. Ct. R. 7.) “Because summary judgment is a 
‘drastic remedy,’ it is only appropriate where ‘the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure 
materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Chestnut v. Goodman, S. Ct. 
Civ. No. 2011-0082, 2013 WL 4133013, *3 (V.I. Aug. 12, 2013) (quoting Williams v. United 
Corp., 50 V.I. 191, 194 (V.I. 2008)). Here, because Wyatt V.I. has moved for summary 
judgment, Wyatt V.I. must show—by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, 
including depositions, documents . . . admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)—that there is no “genuine issue of material fact, at which point 
the burden shifts to the non-moving party to present ‘affirmative evidence’ from which a jury 
might reasonably return a verdict in his favor.” Chapman v. Cornwall, S. Ct. Civ. No. 2012-
0032, 2013 WL 2145092, *2 (V.I. May 15, 2013).  
In reviewing a summary judgment motion, the Superior Court must view all of the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and also draw all reasonable 
inferences in that party’s favor. Joseph v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 54 V.I. 657, 668 (V.I. 2011). 
“Facts that could alter the outcome are ‘material facts’ and disputes are ‘genuine’ if evidence 
exists from which a rational person could conclude that the position of the person with the 
burden of proof on the disputed issue is correct.” Clark v. Modern Group, Ltd., 9 F.3d 321, 
326 (3d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). “A defendant meets this standard when there is an 
absence of evidence that rationally supports the plaintiff’s case. A plaintiff, on the other hand, 
must point to admissible evidence that would be sufficient to show all elements of a prima 
facie case under applicable substantive law.” Id. (citations omitted). “Therefore, to survive 
summary judgment, the nonmoving party’s evidence must amount to more than a scintilla, 
but may amount to less (in the evaluation of the court) than a preponderance. Williams, 50 
V.I. at 195.  
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According to Wyatt V.I., the facts in the record establish that Wiltshire “drove a 
bicycle directly into an orange forklift (which was illuminated by headlights and for which he 
had an unobstructed view)” and therefore Wyatt V.I. is not responsible. (Summ. J. Mot. 1.) In 
opposition, Wiltshire claims that “[t]he only evidence that Wiltshire was contributorily 
negligent is that his bike did not have a light.” (Summ. J. Opp’n 1.) Rather, it was Wyatt V.I., 
through its employee Hobson, Wiltshire argues, who was negligent, noting that if not for 
Hobson’s forklift being in the pedestrian walkway, he would not have collided into it. Id. at 4. 
Wiltshire further argues that Wyatt V.I. has not shown that he was more at fault than Wyatt 
V.I. and therefore “this is not a summary judgment case,” but rather should be submitted to a 
jury to determine the parties’ percentages of fault. Id. at 6, 1. In reply, Wyatt V.I. claims that 
“[b]efore Wyatt V.I. has any burden to assert an affirmative defense, such as contributory 
negligence, [Wiltshire] must first establish that Wyatt V.I. was negligence [sic] and that such 
negligence was the proximate cause of his alleged injuries,” a burden Wiltshire has not 
carried here. (Def. Wyatt V.I., Inc.’s Response to Pl.’s Summ. J. Opp’n 3, filed Jan. 8, 2013.) 
The sole claim Wiltshire plead against Wyatt V.I. is for negligence. (See Compl. ¶¶ 7-
9.) Therefore, in order to establish a claim of negligence, Wiltshire must  
demonstrate that the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty, that the 
defendant breached that duty, and that the defendant’s negligence caused 
the plaintiff’s injury. Causation includes cause in fact and legal causation, 
which is often referred to as proximate cause. In order for the negligent act 
to be regarded as the cause in fact of the injury, it must be shown that the 
injury would not have occurred but for the act. If there are multiple 
negligent acts that could have caused the injury, then the negligent 
conduct must be shown to have been a substantial factor in causing the 
harm. 
 
Brady v. Cintron, 55 V.I. 802, 824 (V.I. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). In his Complaint, Wiltshire alleges that Wyatt V.I. and its employees had a duty of 
care to operate forklifts in a safe manner. (Compl. ¶ 7.) Wiltshire also alleges that Wyatt V.I. 
“had been previously warned not to operate” forklifts on pedestrian walkways. Id. ¶ 6. When 
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Hobson operated a forklift in the walkway, Wyatt V.I., as Hobson’s employer, breached its 
duty and that breach resulted in his injuries. Id. ¶¶ 8-9. Thus, Wiltshire has adequately stated 
a claim for negligence, namely that Wyatt V.I. had a duty to operate its trucks safely, Hobson 
breached that duty, and that but for Hobson operating the forklift in an area where he should 
not have been, Wiltshire would not have been injured.  
Wyatt V.I. does not attempt to show that the material facts are not at issue as to the 
duty of care Wyatt V.I. owed or whether Hobson breached that duty of care. Instead, Wyatt 
V.I. hones directly in on causation, arguing that the undisputed facts in the record show that it 
was Wiltshire’s own actions that caused his injuries. Specifically, Wyatt V.I. points to 
HOVENSA’s Bicycle Safety Procedure and claims that the record makes clear that Wiltshire 
violated this Procedure on the night of the collision because Wiltshire was not wearing a 
helmet (and therefore could not have had a headlight on the helmet), was riding a bicycle that 
was not equipped with an orange flag or reflective lights on the wheels, and was riding a 
bicycle at an excessive rate of speed.  
Wiltshire does not dispute in his Opposition that he was not wearing a helmet, 
something he admitted in his deposition. (See Wiltshire Dep. 58:8-9.) But he does dispute 
that he was speeding and that his own actions caused his injuries. Attached to his Opposition 
is an Incident Report HOVENSA prepared regarding the collision between Wiltshire and 
Hobson. While the Incident Report found that Wiltshire “was traveling very fast,” the Report 
also found that “[t]here was poor lighting in the area.” (Incident Report at 1.) More 
importantly, however, the Report concluded that “[t]here is no established procedure for 
Bicycle Safety in the facility. The procedure is currently being developed.” Id.  
This evidence Wiltshire brought forth directly contradicts the December 31, 2010 
Bicycle Safety Procedure Wyatt V.I. provided to prove the absence of any factual dispute 
regarding Wiltshire’s own negligence. Whether the Bicycle Safety Procedure was still “being 
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developed,” as the Incident Report contended, is now a material fact in dispute between the 
parties.  
Even assuming that the Bicycle Safety Procedure was adopted on December 31, 2010, 
the record currently before the Court does not show that Wiltshire was trained on the new 
procedures. (See Lugo Dep. 41:1-5.) The Procedure itself mandated that all employees be 
trained regarding the new safety measures. (See Bicycle Safety Procedure at 2 (“All 
personnel who may operate a bicycle/tricycle shall be trained and documented by their 
respective department according to this procedure.” (emphasis added).) If he was never 
trained, Wiltshire could not have known what the Bicycle Safety Procedure required. His 
failure to follow the Procedures would not have contributed to his injuries.  
The record before the Court is also unclear whether HOVENSA supplied its 
employees with bicycles to use at the refinery or whether the company merely allowed its 
employees to bring their own bicycles to work. Assuming HOVENSA did supply its 
employees with bicycles, then individual employees might not have been responsible for 
ensuring that their bicycles had reflectors, headlamps, and orange flags along with the other 
safety equipment required under the Bicycle Safety Procedure. In his deposition, Cadette 
implied that HOVENSA supplied bicycles to its employees. (See Cadette Dep. 10:4-5 (“the 
HOVENSA guys, they got bicycles they ride.”).) Similarly, during his deposition, when 
Wiltshire was shown a photograph of the bicycle he was riding on the night of the collision, 
he testified “[t]hat’s my bike,” which then prompted Wyatt V.I.’s attorney to ask, “When you 
say it’s your bike, did you own that bicycle?” (Wiltshire Dep. 30:14-16.) Wiltshire answered 
no but then explained that the bike was one “HOVENSA provided us with . . . or allowed us 
to ride.” Id. at 30:19-21. The Bicycle Safety Procedure—again assuming that it was 
adopted—reads as though HOVENSA supplied the bicycles. Area managers must conduct 
“annual bicycle safety inspection for there [sic] respective area[s]” and bicycles that are 
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“determined inoperable, in condition of disrepair or a state the [sic] compromises the 
manufacturer requirement for safety operation shall be immediately removed from service.” 
(Bicycle Safety Procedure at 3.) If employees brought their own bicycles, i.e., their own 
personal property, to work for use in getting around the refinery, HOVENSA would not have 
authority to “remove” such personal property from them.  
Likewise, whether Wiltshire was speeding remains in dispute. First, nothing in the 
record before the Court establishes whether HOVENSA had established a speed limit for 
bicycles at the oil refinery, and if so what that limit was. Without knowing the speed limit for 
bicycles, the Court cannot determine whether Wiltshire exceeded that limit. Similarly, the 
record does not establish the precise speed Wiltshire was riding at, but instead contains only 
observations of different individuals. For example, the Incident Report concludes, based on 
the drag marks left in the gravel road, that Wiltshire “was traveling very fast.” (Incident 
Report at 1.) But the Report does not identify what constitutes “very fast” and whether the 
speed Wiltshire was traveling at was in violation of the refinery’s regulations. Similarly, 
Cadette stated that Wiltshire “was riding at an enormous amount of speed.” (Cadette Personal 
Stmt., Mar. 2, 2012, Ex. 11 to Wyatt V.I. Stmt of Facts.) But Cadette never explained how 
fast he thought Wiltshire was going, something he could have done given that he recalled, in 
his deposition, that two other “HOVENSA guys” had passed him on a bicycle just before 
Wiltshire collided into Hobson’s forklift. (See Cadette Dep. 10:4-15.) Cadette could have 
explained how fast Wiltshire was going compared to the two other guys who rode by just 
before Wiltshire. Lastly, George’s email indicated that Wiltshire had “lost control” of the 
bike after trying to break. (George Email at 1.) And while Wiltshire was not asked directly—
at least according to the portions of his deposition the parties submitted—whether he was 
speeding, he did deny George’s claim that he said he lost control of the bicycle. (Wiltshire 
Dep. 42:5-8.) “‘Contradictory testimony on fundamental facts may not be resolved as a 
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matter of law and presents a bar to summary judgment.’” Joseph, 54 V.I. at 667 (quoting 
Carty v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 78 F. Supp. 2d 417, 421 (D.V.I. App. Div. 1999)).  
Lastly, the record is also unclear as to what Hobson was doing with the forklift just 
before the collision occurred. In his February 10, 2011 Statement, Hobson claimed that he 
was going to park the forklift and then “walk up the hill to the lunch room.” (Hobson Feb. 10, 
2011 Stmt at Attachment.) However, in his deposition, Wyatt V.I.’s representative, Carlos A. 
Lugo, testified that Hobson was driving “the forklift to the lunch area and he was attempting 
to park it.” (Lugo Dep. 8:25-9:1, Ex. 5, Summ. J. Opp’n.) Lugo explained that a year before 
the collision between Wiltshire and Hobson, Wyatt V.I. had “an incident” where the vice-
president of operations “saw a guy driving a forklift up a very steep grade to the HOVENSA 
administrative building and then go and use the little convenient store they have” inside. Id. 
at 9:4-9. According to Lugo, Hobson knew that Wyatt V.I. had “made it a policy” to prohibit 
employees from taking forklifts “to the gate to go and pick up [their] lunch” because Hobson 
was the union president. Id. at 9:17-22 & 10:7-12. Lugo discussed this incident during his 
deposition immediately after stating that Hobson was driving the forklift to the lunch area, 
presumably because he believed Hobson was violating Wyatt V.I.’s policies. That contradicts 
Hobson’s February 10, 2011 Statement that he was parking the forklift before walking up the 
hill to get lunch. However, in his February 11, 2011 personal statement—when asked 
whether he was “aware that the forklift should not be used for personal transportation”—
Hobson responded, “No I am not aware of that.” (Hobson Personal Stmt., Feb. 11, 2011, p. 1, 
Ex. 7 to Wyatt V.I. Stmt of Facts.) That contradicts Lugo’s testimony that Hobson knew 
about the policy because Hobson was the union president.  
Based on the discussion above, the Court finds it clear that all of the fundamental 
facts remain in dispute. Here, Wyatt V.I.’s argument in support of summary judgment is that 
Wiltshire’s own actions led to his injuries. Wyatt V.I. claims that  
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Plaintiff was operating a black bicycle at night without any of the required 
reflective equipment or the required headlight. Plaintiff’s operation of the 
subject bicycle was in direct violation of his employer’s written policy. In 
addition, Plaintiff was driving his bicycle down a decline at such a high 
rate of speed that he was unable to stop his bicycle with between 45-90 
feet of space to do so. Plaintiff’s alleged injuries were the direct and 
proximate consequence of his own negligence, not that of Wyatt V.I.. 
 
(Summ. J. Mot. 5.) This entire argument is based, however, on the assumption that the 
Bicycle Safety Procedure was adopted, that Wiltshire was given training on that procedure, 
and that it was his responsibility—not HOVENSA’s—to outfit the bicycle with the required 
safety equipment. These facts remain in dispute. The record is contradictory as to whether 
HOVENSA adopted the Bicycle Safety Procedure. Assuming HOVENSA did adopt the 
Procedure, the record does not indicate whether Wiltshire received training on that Procedure. 
The record similarly does not make clear whether HOVENSA supplied its employees with 
bicycles or whether the employees brought their own—a point that might determine who was 
responsible for outfitting Wiltshire’s bicycle with the required safety equipment. 
Additionally, while the record shows that Wiltshire was riding his bicycle fast, it does not 
show the speed he was traveling at or whether HOVENSA had set a speed limit for bicycles. 
Likewise, whether—as Lugo testified—Hobson knew that Wyatt V.I. explicitly directed its 
employees not to use forklifts for personal reasons or whether—as Hobson indicated in his 
February 11, 2011 statement—he was unaware of that policy is contradicted by the record 
before the Court. The record is also contradictory as to whether Hobson intended to drive up 
the hill to the lunch room in violation of Wyatt V.I.’s policy or whether Hobson merely 
intended to park the vehicle and then walk up the hill to the lunch room.  
As noted above, the Court cannot resolve such contradictions in a summary judgment 
motion. See Joseph, 54 V.I. at 667. Given that the Court must “view the inferences to be 
drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,” 
Williams, 50 V.I. at 194, the Court cannot conclude that the fundamental facts at issue in this