IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS

DIVISION OF ST. THOMAS AND ST. JOHN



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MERCHANTS COMMERCIAL BANK, ) CASE NO. ST-2011-CV-0000653

)

Plaintiff, ) ACTION FOR BREACH OF

vs. ) CONTRACT (3), DEBT, NFORCEMENT

) OF GUARANTY (2), FORECLOSURE

OCEANSIDE VILLAGE, INC., JUAN ) OF REAL PROPERTY MORTGAGE,

CARLOS CACCIAMANI, JUAN ) AND VIOLATIONS OF THE VIRGIN

FRANCISCO FUENTES, CUBICA ) ISLANDS CRIMINALLY INFLUENCED

GROUP, LLLP, and HEAVY MATERIALS, —)) AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS

LLC, ) ACT (4)

)

Defendants. )

)

OCEANSIDE VILLAGE, INC., JUAN ) BREACH OF LOAN AGREEMENT,

CARLOS CACCIAMANI, JUAN FRANCISCO ) FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION,

FUENTES, and CUBICA GROUP, LLLP, ) IMPROPER USE AND MIS-

) MANAGEMENT OF LOAN FUNDS,

Counter-Plaintiffs, ) FRAUDULENT DEMAND FOR

) PAYMENT OF LETTER OF CREDIT,

VS. ) AND BREACH OF DUTY OF GOOD



) FAITH AND FAIR DEALING

MERCHANTS COMMERCIAL BANK,



)

) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Counter-Defendant. )

)



MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER



THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs’ Emergency

Motion to Set Aside Receivership and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and

Preliminary Injunction (the “Motion”), which was filed on November 29, 2018. Plaintiff/Counter-

Defendant Merchants Commercial Bank (“MCB”) filed an Opposition on December 7, 2018. On

December 14, 2018, a hearing was held on the Motion. Based upon the moving papers, the

testimony of the parties and evidence admitted at the hearing, the Motion will be denied because

Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs failed to make a showing that they are entitled to a temporary

restraining order or a preliminary injunction. Oceanside also failed to satisfy the requirements to

set aside the Order appointing Michael Lampe as Receiver.



Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs Oceanside Village, Inc., Juan Carlos Cacciamani, Juan

Francisco Fuentes, and Cubica Group, LLLP (collectively referred to as “Oceanside”) seek a

temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and preliminary injunction restraining and enjoining the

Court-appointed Receiver, Michael Lampe, from “selling the property or otherwise alienating it or

Merchants Commercial Bank v. Oceanside Village, Inc. et al.

Case No. ST-2011-CV-653



Memorandum Opinion and Order



Page 2 of 10



controlling it, described as: Consolidated Parcel No. 1-13 Estate Donoe, No. 2A New Quarter, St.

Thomas, United States Virgin Islands, as shown on A9-699-T-007 and Parcel No. K Estate

Raphune, No. %B [sic] New Quarter, St. Thomas, United States Virgin Islands, as shown as A9-

692-T006, to any person or entity[.]”! Oceanside also moved to remove Lampe as Receiver, and

set aside the January 23, 2013 Order appointing Lampe as Receiver.



By Order dated January 23, 2013 (the “Receivership Order”), this Court ordered that

Lampe is “authorized, empowered, and directed, without further leave of the [C]ourt, to liquidate

and convert into money all of the Receivership Property by selling, conveying, and disposing of

any portion of the Property, either at public or private sale, on terms and in the manner that the

Receiver deems most beneficial to the persons entitled to the proceeds, and with regard to the

realization of their true and proper value[.]” Because Lampe is clearly authorized by this Court to

sell any portion of the Property “with due regard to the realization of their true and proper value”,

and because Oceanside has failed to make a showing on the first two of the four injunction factors,

Oceanside’s Motion will be denied with respect to its request fora TRO. In addition, the Court

will deny Oceanside’s Motion to remove Lampe as Receiver and set aside its Receivership Order

because Oceanside failed to provide any legal authority for its request or to otherwise satisfy the

elements required to set aside an Order.



L LEGAL STANDARD.



With respect to temporary restraining orders, Rule 65 of the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil

Procedure provides in pertinent part:



(b) TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER.



(1) Issuing Without Notice. The court shall consider and rule upon an application

for a temporary restraining order as soon as practicable, and may issue a temporary

restraining order without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney

only if:



(A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate

and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse

party can be heard in opposition; and



(B) the movant's attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and

the reasons why it should not be required.’



(2) Contents; Expiration. Every temporary restraining order issued without notice

must state the date and hour it was issued; describe the injury and state why it is

irreparable; state why the order was issued without notice; and be promptly filed in

the clerk of court's office and entered in the record. The order expires at the time

after entry - not to exceed 14 days - that the court sets, unless before that time the



| The Court will refer to the Consolidated Parcel as “the Property.” Defs./Counter Pls.” Emergency Mot. to Set Aside

Receivership and Appl. for TRO and Prelim. Injunction 2.



2 The Certificate of Service filed with the Motion satisfies the notice requirement pursuant to V.I. R. Civ. P.



65(b\(1)(B).

ere



Merchants Commercial Bank v. Oceanside Village, Inc. et al.

Case No. ST-2011-CV-653



Memorandum Opinion and Order



Page 3 of 10



court, for good cause, extends it for a like period or the adverse party consents to a

longer extension. The reasons for an extension must be entered in the record.



Part of the injunctive relief sought by Oceanside is the setting aside or vacating of the

Receivership Order. Rule 60(b) of the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure provides:



(b) Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or Proceeding. On

motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative

from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:



(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;



(2) newly discovered evidence that could not, with reasonable diligence, have

been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);



(3) fraud (whether in a form previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),

misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;



(4) the judgment is void;



(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an

earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively

is no longer equitable; or



(6) any other reason that justifies relief.



In addition to the requirements of V.I. R. Civ. P. 65(b), the Court must consider “four

factors in deciding a motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction: (1)

whether the movant has shown a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) whether the

movant will be irreparably injured by denial of the relief; (3) whether granting preliminary relief

will result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) whether granting the preliminary

relief will be in the public interest.”? “To prevail on a motion for preliminary injunction, the

moving party bears the burden of ‘making some showing on all four inj unction factors,’ which the

Superior Court must evaluate ‘under a sliding-scale standard.’



Il. THE RECEIVERSHIP ORDER WILL NOT BE SET ASIDE OR VACATED.



A. The Court Will Not Set Aside the Receivership Order on the Grounds That It Was

Issued on An Ex Parte Basis.



Oceanside asserts that it was “not served in this case until sometime between the Order of

February 28, 2013, and April 24, 2013, when the Answer to the Amended Complaint was served.”°

Oceanside further asserts that it has never had an opportunity to respond to or defend the Motion



3 VI Taxi Ass'n v. W. Indian Co., Super. Ct. Civ. No. ST-16-CV-551, 2016 WL 5468370, at *2 (V.I. Super. Sept. 28,

2016).



4 Gourmet Gallery Crown Bay, Inc. v. Crown Bay Marina, L.P., 68 V.1. 584, 596 (V.1. 201 8) (quoting Yusuf v. Hamed,

59 V.I. 841, 849 (V.I. 2013)).



5 Id. at 5.

Merchants Commercial Bank v. Oceanside Village, Inc. et al.

Case No. ST-2011-CV-653



Memorandum Opinion and Order



Page 4 of 10



to Appoint Receiver.® Because it was filed ex parte, Oceanside argues that the Motion to Appoint

Receiver was improper and that the Receivership Order should be set aside.’



However, Oceanside’s argument requesting the Court to set aside the Receivership Order

fails to provide any legal authority for its position. All motions must state with particularity the

grounds for seeking the order, including aconcise statement of reasons and citation of

authorities[.!”? “{S]imply stating a principle of law without any argument or explanation of how

it applies to the case at hand is not sufficient to fairly present [an] issue to the Superior Court.”!°

“The rules that require a litigant to brief and support his arguments . . . before the Superior Court,

are not mere formalistic requirements. They exist to give the Superior Court the opportunity to

consider, review, and address an argument ....”'' Here, Oceanside fails to cite any legal authority

to support its argument that the Receivership Order should be set aside.



The Receivership Order was entered before Oceanside filed an answer to the Amended

Complaint. The Court further notes that Oceanside was served by publication of the Summonses

on May 3, 10, 17, and 24, 2012 in The Virgin Islands Daily News; by publication of the Summonses

on May 1, 8, 15, and 22, 2012 in the Puerto Rico Daily Sun’; and by publication of the Summonses

in the Community Newspaper, published in Miami-Dade County, Florida on February 25, March

4, 11 and 18, 2013.'3 The need to serve the Oceanside Defendants by publication is consistent with

MCB’s inability to locate the Oceanside Defendants for personal service of the Summons and

Complaint or the Receivership Order.



On May 31, 2013, after Oceanside filed its Answer to the Amended Complaint, MCB filed

its Notice of Filing Report of Receiver that “gives notice and files the May 24, 2013 Report of

Receiver, Michael Lampe, with Profit and Loss Detail for the period March | through May 3, 2013

for Oceanside Village, Inc. (Raphune Vista), St. Thomas, VI.” This Notice of Filing Report of

Receiver was served on Oceanside’s counsel of record. Therefore, as of May 24, 2013, Oceanside

was on notice that a Receiver had been appointed.



On December 29, 2014, Oceanside filed its Amended Answer to Amended Complaint,

which contained a counterclaim, and alleged that “Counter Defendant [Merchants Commercial

Bank] improperly had a receiver appointed who admitted that at the price points, Counter Plaintiff

would have been able to sell twenty (20) units a year but Counter Defendant refused to allow



6 Id.

"Id.



8 Id. at 5-6.

9 VIR. CIV. P. 6-1(a)(2) (emphasis added).



10 Bertrand v. Mystic Granite & Marble, Inc., 63 V.I. 772, 782 (V.1. 2015); Yusufv. Hamed, 59 V.1. 841, 851 n.5 (V.1.

2013) (“To preserve an objection on appeal, a party must object on the specific grounds raised on appeal, and a general

objection or an objection on other grounds will not suffice.”)



' Simpson v. Golden, 56 V.1. 272, 280 (V.1. 2012).

!2 Notice of Filing Proof of Publication (May 31, 2012).

'3 Notice of Filing Proof of Publication (April 3, 2013).

Merchants Commercial Bank v. Oceanside Village, Inc. et al.

Case No. ST-2011-CV-653



Memorandum Opinion and Order



Page 5 of 10



Counter Plaintiffs to do so.”'* Paragraph 41 of Oceanside’s Counterclaim alleged that “[w]hen the

receiver was appointed, it, at the direction of Counter Defendant, misappropriated and took

$500,000 of equipment owned by Cubica that was on the job site and refused to account for same.”



These allegations required a review of the motion for appointment of a receiver and the

Receivership Order in order to allege that the appointment was improper or that the Receiver acted

improperly.'> At a minimum, Oceanside’s counsel was on notice that a receiver had been

appointed and his identity. Once counsel for Oceanside received MCB’s Notice of Filing Report

of Receiver and the attached report, counsel had an obligation to exercise due diligence and review

the Court file for the Receivership Order, if not sooner.



During the course of the hearing, Juan Carlos Cacciamani testified that he had never been

served with a copy of the Receivership Order and that he has never read it. The Certificate of

Service states that the May 31, 2013 Notice of Filing Receiver Report was directed to Attorney A.

Jeffrey Weiss, former counsel of record for Oceanside. Cacciamani’s claim that he was never

served with a copy of the Receivership Order must also fail because, as his agent, his attorney’s

knowledge is imputed to him.'® In spite of this knowledge, Oceanside did not move to set aside

the Receivership Order until November 2018. There is no explanation for this 4 4 year delay.

Therefore, Oceanside’s argument that it only recently became aware of the Receivership Order

when it learned about the upcoming sale of the Property is without basis in law or fact. Further,

Oceanside has not demonstrated that the Receivership Order must be set aside due to any of the

bases set forth in V.I. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).



B. The Receivership Order Authorizes The Receiver To Be The Selling Agent.



Oceanside claims that the failure of the Receiver to disclose the fact that he was selling the

Property resulted in it just recently learning about an impending sale to V.I. Housing Finance

Authority in August 2018. Oceanside stopped this sale. However, if it had exercised due diligence

from when it first learned of the appointment of a Receiver, Oceanside would not have been caught

by surprise when it learned that the Property was being sold. The Receivership Order clearly details



14 Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs’ Amended Answer to Amended Complaint, counterclaim J 39.



'S In December 2014, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applied to proceedings in the Superior Court of the



Virgin Islands. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (b) provides, in part:

By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper--whether by signing, filing,

submitting, or later advocating it--an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the

person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the

circumstances: (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause

unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal

contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or

reversing existing law or for establishing new law...



16 Arlington Funding Servs., Inc. v. Geigel, 51 V.I. 118, 131 (V.1. 2009) (“It is well established that “the attorney-



client relationship is an agent-principal relationship.” McCarthy v. Recordex Serv., Inc., 80 F.3d 842, 853 (3d



Cir.1996). Accordingly, information an attorney receives during the scope of his representation of a client will be



imputed onto that client even if the client does not have actual knowledge of that information. See Lempert, 26 V.I. at



341 (imputing attorney's knowledge of an easement to his client).

Merchants Commercial Bank v. Oceanside Village, Inc. et al.

Case No. ST-2011-CV-653



Memorandum Opinion and Order



Page 6 of 10



the Receiver’s authority “to liquidate and convert into money all of the Receivership Property by

selling, conveying, and disposing of any portion of the Property, either at public or private sale,

on terms and in the manner that the Receiver deems most beneficial to the persons entitled to the

proceeds, and with due regard to the realization of their true and proper value.” The Receivership

Order authorizes the Receiver to be “the exclusive disposition agent of the Lots.” This language

authorizes the Receiver to act as a broker and sell the Property, which Lampe was authorized to

do until 2017. Most importantly, Oceanside was on notice that the Receiver was completing the

construction of and selling the homes built in Raphune Vistas Phase I. Any surprise as to the

actions of the Receiver is due to Oceanside’s failure to learn more about the precise authority of

the Receiver appointed to manage the Property.



C. The Receiver Is Not Required To Reside On St. Thomas.



In addition to the foregoing complaints, Oceanside seeks to have the Receiver removed

because he does not live on island. The Court finds that this is not grounds to remove the Receiver.

The Receivership Order does not require that the Receiver live on island.



As required by V.]. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3), Oceanside failed to prove that the Receivership

Order was the product of fraud, misrepresentation or misconduct by an opposing party. Further,

Oceanside has not shown that the Receivership Order is void in any way.



D. The Receiver’s Alleged Failure to Market the Property as Improved Land.



Oceanside also presented evidence in support of its argument that the Receiver improperly

marketed the Property by failing to described it as “improved land” due to the existing

infrastructure such as: storm water management system consisting of a water retention pond, storm

drainage and culverts; electrical generator and panels for the back-up sewer system; main water

valve from the water tank to the entire community, cut roads and underground conduits for

electricity. According to Cacciamani, the improvements to the Property included the main gazebo

club house, basketball court, and children’s park, all of which benefit the lots located on the

Property that were yet to be built and sold.



In support of its claim as to the extent of the improvements, Cacciamani testified that

Oceanside spent $6-7 million on infrastructure. Lampe testified that he personally inspected the

Property on several occasions and observed the infrastructure but the conduits carrying electrical

lines were “stubbed out” or ended at the boundary of the Property that was slated for the next phase

of development. Kerstin McConnell, a Realtor since 2005, and owner of Seaglass Properties,

testified that she very familiar with the Property and knows it like the back of her hand and has

flown over the Property in a helicopter. McConnell further testified that the Property is all bush

and the road are so overgrown that it is difficult to tell where to get in or get out. In short, the

Property was “a hard sell”.



The Court finds that it was not practicable to identify every feature of the Property on the

Multiple Listing Service. Any interested buyer could request more detailed information from the

Receiver through the real estate broker or the Receiver’s listing agent. Further, Lampe testified

Merchants Commercial Bank v. Oceanside Village, Inc. et al.

Case No. ST-2011-CV-653



Memorandum Opinion and Order



Page 7 of 10



that by placing the Property for sale on the Multiple Listing Service, every real estate agent in the

Virgin Islands would have knowledge that the Property was for sale and could, therefore, solicit

potential buyers for the Property.



E. The Receiver’s Failure to Provide Reports to Oceanside.



Third, Oceanside contends that Lampe has not fulfilled his duties as required by the

Receivership Order because he has not filed a report with the Court since May of 2017. While the

Court has not received a copy of the report since June 8, 2017, Lampe testified that he had an

agreement with MCB’s attorneys to distribute the Reports because he was not familiar with the

process. Reports 1 through 9 and Report No. 12 were filed without incident. According to MCB,

due to a miscommunication between the Receiver and MCB’s counsel of record, Reports 10 and

11 were not distributed. Territory-wide destruction caused by Hurricanes Irma and Maria in

September 2017 compounded the distribution problem.



Cacciamani testified that his attorney never gave him copies of the Reports filed with the

Court. If this is the case, this failure is not something within the control of the Receiver or of MCB.



The Court finds that the failure of the Receiver to provide Reports directly to Oceanside

and the failure of MCB to distribute certain Receiver Reports directly to Oceanside is not grounds

for the removal of Lampe as Receiver.



F. The Receiver Did Not Undervalue the Property.



Lastly, Oceanside contends that “the Receiver has substantially undervalued the subject

property and has listed the property for sale for substantially less than it could be sold for.”!” At

the hearing, Ocean presented a letter of intent from a possible buyer who “interested in offering

$1,300,000.00 for the acquisition.” There was nothing preventing Oceanside from obtaining a

Buyer earlier while the Property was listed for sale with little activity. Lampe testified that at

MCB’s insistence, the Property was listed at $2 million. Then, as time passed, the listing price was

lowered to $1.5 million due to lack of interested Buyers. In August 2017, the Property was

appraised at $1.095 million. The Receiver entered into a contract with the Virgin Islands Housing

Authority to sell the Property for $1.1 million—the appraised value. However, the V.I. Housing

Authority elected not to proceed with the transaction after receiving threatening letters from

Cacciamani and Oceanside’s attorney.



There is now a fully executed contract for the sale of the property for $945,000. McConnell

testified that the Property was initially listed at a higher price but when the Property did not sell,

the broker asked for a price reduction. After conferring with Lampe, the listing price was reduced

to $1.5 million. The offer for $945,000.00 was accepted because it was close to $1 million, it was

exempt from stamp taxes and McConnell lowered her commission. Oceanside cannot blame

anyone but itself for the current situation.

Merchants Commercial Bank v. Oceanside Village, Inc. et al.

Case No. ST-2011-CV-653



Memorandum Opinion and Order



Page 8 of 10



The Court finds that all actions taken by Lampe were authorized by the Receivership Order.

Given Oceanside’s failure to cite any legal authority to support its position for removing Lampe

as the Receiver, the Court’s Receivership Order will remain in effect.!* Accordingly, Oceanside’s

Motion to Set Aside Court Order will be denied.



Il. OCEANSIDE HAS NOT MET ITS BURDEN THAT IT IS ENTITLED TO A

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER OR A PRELIMINARY INJUCTION.



A. Oceanside Has Not Shown A Reasonable Probability On The Merits.



As discussed above, the Receivership Order authorizes Lampe to list the Property for Sale

and to sell the Property with due regard to the realization of its true value. Testimony at the hearing

explained how lack of interested buyers and other market factors resulted in the Receiver accepting

an offer to purchase the Property for $945,000.00. Oceanside has not demonstrated that it is entitled

to have the Receivership Order set aside.



B. Oceanside Has Not Met Its Burden That It Will Suffer Irreparable Harm By

Denial Of The Requested Relief.



Even if Oceanside were to establish a prima facia case for a reasonable probability of

success on the merits, the Court would still be required to find that Oceanside faces an immediate

irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief.'? “Irreparable harm is certain and imminent

harm for which a monetary award does not adequately compensate.””° “A moving party will satisfy

this test if it can demonstrate that its monetary damages are either ‘difficult to ascertain or are

inadequate.”*! “Accordingly, when ‘the record indicates that [a moving party's loss] is a matter of

simple mathematic calculation, a plaintiff fails to establish irreparable injury for preliminary

injunction purposes.””?



Here, in a three-sentence unsupported assertion, Oceanside initially states that it “will be

irreparably harmed if [MCB] is allowed to sell the property as it will be impossible to recover.”

Thereafter, Oceanside states “that the Receiver has significantly undervalued the property and

merely seeks to obtain whatever he can for it.””? Oceanside finally states that “property that

[Oceanside] contend is rightfully [Oceanside’s] may be sold out from under them and once it is

sold . . . [Oceanside] would not be able to get the property back and the damage would be

irreparable.”*4 Oceanside was on notice of a contract for sale of the Property as early as June 8,



'8 VIR. Civ. P. 6-1(a)(2) (emphasis added); Simpson, 56 V.I. at 280.



'° VI F.F.O., LLC, 2018 WL 4586346 at *3.



2° Gourmet Gallery Crown Bay, Inc. v. Crown Bay Marina, L.P., 68 V.1. 584, 597 (V.I. 2018).



21 ld.



22 Id.



?3 Defs./Counter Pls.’ Emergency Mot. to Set Aside Receivership and Appl. for TRO and Prelim. Injunction 8-9.

24 Id.

Merchants Commercial Bank v. Oceanside Village, Inc. et al.

Case No. ST-2011-CV-653



Memorandum Opinion and Order



Page 9 of 10



2017.2 This factor weighs against Oceanside suffering an imminent and immediate irreparable

harm considering that the instant Motion was filed November 29, 2018. Aside from its confusion

as to who is authorized to sell the Property, Oceanside fails to offer any evidence of certain and

imminent harm in the event that the Property is sold.”© Instead of articulating that its losses would

be unascertainable, Oceanside generally states that the damage of the Property’s sale would be

irreparable.” However, the money damages can be ascertainable based upon Oceanside’s

testimony that the Property is worth more than $950.000.00.



C. The Public Interest Weights Against Granting Oceanside’s Motion for Injunctive

Relief.



The Court finds that granting a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction will

result in greater harm to MCB in that it will lose the opportunity to reduce the debt owed to it by

Oceanside and disturb the current status quo, i.e. the authority of the Receiver to sell the Property.

Of even greater concern is the harm to the public interest. The public and in the case the, current

buyers, have an interest in being able rely upon the validity and authority of the Receivership

Order. The Court finds no reason to disturb the current contract of sale to purchase the Property

and every reason to permit it to proceed. The Court also finds that Oceanside waited an

unreasonable length of time to challenge the Receivership Order.



IV. CONCLUSION



Having heard the testimony of the parties, the Court finds that Lampe did not violate the

Receivership Order and there is no basis for the removal of Lampe as Receiver due to the manner

in which the Property was marketed. The Court finds that Oceanside failed to meet its burden of

making any showing on all four injunction factors to prevail on their motion for preliminary

injunction, Further, the Court finds that the public interest weighs against granting a temporary

restraining order and preliminary injunction.2® Therefore, Oceanside’s motion for a temporary

restraining order and a preliminary injunction must be denied.



Accordingly, it is hereby



ORDERED that Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion to Set Aside

Receivership and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction

(“Motion”), filed on November 29, 2018, is DENIED to the extent it requests the Court to remove

Michael Lampe and set aside the Order establishing Receivership; and it is further



> Notice of Filing of Report of Receiver (June 8, 2017).



6 Gourmet Gallery Crown Bay, Inc., 68 V.1. at 597.



28 3RC & Co., 63 V.I. at 560 (“And while the Superior Court did not make findings on the remaining factors in ruling

on the injunction—the likelihood of irreparable harm to Boynes Trucking and the public interest—because we agree

that 3RC failed to make any showing at all on the first two factors, that omission was harmless under the

circumstances.”). V/ F.F.O., LLC, 2018 WL 4586346 at *3.

Merchants Commercial Bank v. Oceanside Village, Inc. et al.

Case No. ST-2011-CV-653



Memorandum Opinion and Order



Page 10 of 10



ORDERED that Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion to Set Aside

Receivership and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction

(“Motion”), filed on November 29, 2018, is DENIED to the extent it requests the Court to enjoin

the Receiver Michael Lampe from selling Consolidated Parcel No. 1-13 Estate Donoe, No. 2A

New Quarter, St. Thomas, United States Virgin Islands and Parcel No. K Estate Raphune, No. 5B

New Quarter, St. Thomas, United States Virgin Islands; and it is further



ORDERED that a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order shall be directed to

Attorney Susan Moorehead, Attorney A.J. Stone, III, Attorney Mark A. Kragel of BoltNagi PC,

and Attorney Lee J. Rohn.



pate: (2.414 {2018 RYU ™M, Hauwwy)



DENISE M. FRANCOIS

Judge of the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands



ATTEST:

Estrella H. George



T i Boyyes-¥

Loni Bovtwteon 1990) 1S