1
1
i
1
1
?
1
1
I
1
1
Q 
.3-b 
_ 
‘
V 
’ 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440
R 
' 
_ SS Historical Paper 
I 
No 
QTR—3 
__ 
____ 
__ 
4 
_ W 
V: 
W 
V, 
V 
V
7 
SUPPORT SERVICES 
HISTORY 
(mus or PAPER) 
HISTORY OF THE OFFICE OF TRAINING 
MARIT IME TRAINING 
(PERIOD)
A 
1949 — 1954 
DO NOT DESTROY 
Controlled by =___QE_IL___._...._._._-- 
* 
' 
Dofe prepared =_.M._a-l_L._._69 ____._.._l 
7 
_
l 
__ 
_ 
__ 
ii 
W
I 
Wrmen by 
, 
Robert B. Shafj {X 
"*-../' 
;
l 
Q 
L 
SE(%1/ET
’ 
_-._Appr0ved for Release: 2019/ole/f1'§§6§§4l44'¢" T
‘
‘
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
NOTICE 
This historical paper is a permanent part of the Support Services History and 
may not be destroyed. 
It is included in the “Gatalog of Support Services Histories” maintained by the 
Support Services Historical Board. 
If this document is moved from the ofiice of control appearing on the front of 
this cover, the Chairman of the Support Services Historical Board should be 
notified of the new ofl-ice of control. 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
_’___
\
1
1
i
i
i
1 
-J
1
Q
Q
uni 
Id 
-d 
-4 
-I
i 
all
i
a
—
I
1
Q 
an 
-
,
i
1
I 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
SEGBET 
HISTORY 
of the 
OFFICE OF TRAINING 
';5ARITII1fl11 TRAINING (19’+9 - 1951+) 
Prepared by: 
Robert B. Shaffer, May 1969 
Approved. by: 
07“/3 
KSEGREI 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
(b)(3) 
(b)(6
5
i
i
i 
-T
1
1
i 
1|
a
1 
I’
c 
in 
Q
i 
uni 
1' 
INTRQDUCTION 
CHAPTER I 
- The
I
2 
»~ 
'5 
-4' 
lg. 
Approved f0r_Re|ease: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
htbfllzl 
CONTENTS 
Beginnings of Maritime Training 
Early Attempts to Identify Requirements 
The First Organization and Staff 
The First Training 
The Search for a. Maritime Training, Base 
CHAPTER II 
- Project‘
\
1
2
3 
First Interest 
Chronology of the Acquisition 
The Termination of Interest in 
CHAPTER III - Project‘
\
l 
‘.3 
L- 
‘DJ 
- The Search for Another Training Site 
- The Development 
The Termination of Interest 
CHAPER IVI 
- The Development of Alternatives: 
CHAPTER V 
- The Human Side 
CONCLUSION 
APPENDIX A - A Note on Source Material 
‘SECRET. 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
Page
1 
- 2
2
5
9 
ll 
11+ 
11> 
16 
27 
31 
31 
31¢ 
38 
71:-2 
1+2 
la-8 
55 
(b)(1 
(b)(3) 
(b)(1) 
/h\/'2\
I 
1\b)(1) 
1'b‘><'3‘> 
>b< >1< 
1‘ A ,> 
(b\(3\ 
I 
\
I 
1\b,n\1) 
I 
\ 
I
\ 
1\b,n\3,>
I 
1\b)(1 
I 
\
I 
1\b,><\3 
WM
I 
(b)(3,
\
)
\
)
\ 
)
I
\
I 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3)
Approved f0[ Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
Mllililll 
-d 
_-d 
INTRODUCTION
i 
The efforts made during the period l9l+9-1953+ to 
d 
establish a training program in support of clandestine 
maritime operations are worth relating in some detail
1 
because they provide an excellent illustration of the 
.1 
difficulties that were encountered at that time in what 
was essentially a pioneering effort. 
It so happens that 
the files of that period are almost intact, thereby pro- 
viding a well documented case history of the problems of
u 
establishing a new training program in those early days 
_ 
of the Gffice of Training. 
Although OSS had used swimmers and small boats for 
" 
some clandestine operations, the know-how was largely 
lost with the ‘break-up of OSS in 19%-5. 
The OSS instructors
i 
and training sites were likewise lost, and such training 
d 
materials as survived were out of date and not entirely 
pertinent to the post-war situation. 
As a result, opera- 
i' 
tions officers as well as training, officers were faced 
with formidable problems in terms of requirements, per-
1 
sonnel, and facilities when it began to seem in l9!#9 
_ 
that some kind of maritime training would be needed.
1
1 
1 
, 
._ 
e, 
2‘; 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440
d
II 
Ii 
Id 
-.4 
4-I 
-1
3
— 
Ii
d 
.(b)(3)
‘ 
3‘
1
—
1 
3'
i 
Approved 
f§rE 
Release: 2019/06/12 002344440 
CHAPTER I. 
The Beginnings of Maritime Training 
l. 
Danhgfidfiempts to Identify Regyirenents 
By March, l9h9, the new Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) 
had an Acting Chief of Training‘ 
‘and two 
Training Officers {::::::::::::land James Cross). 
There is 
evidence that some thought was already being given to maritime 
training: in a memorandum.of 23 February l9h9 to£:::::::::::::::] 
Mr. Cross reported his researches on the OSS Maritime Unit Train- 
ing Programs, sumarizing the content of a six-weeks Basic Course 
and an eight-weeks Advanced Course.
0 
By August 19b9,‘ 
@ad.been hired as 
Chief of a proposed UPC "Advanced Course," which would be primarily 
paramilitary in nature. 
Shortly after, the training units of OSO 
and OPC were amalgamated to form the Training Division (TED) under 
\ 
On 25 May 1950, the Deputy Chief of 
3011164 
in 8» mere with we-eds 
Charles Smith (USN) 
Staff II, OPC, ‘GO learn 
the extent of a so-called amphibious program that they had heard 
about, and to find out what would be expected of TED. 
Nothing further seems to have happened until 5 July l950, 
when[:::::::::::::]wrote a significant memorandum to the Chief of 
Staff II, OPC[:::::::::::::::::]asking for a conference to provide 
guidance to TRD on anticipated maritime training requirements and 
effective training methods. £:::::::::::::]POinted Out thfit a Year
2 
- 
ISEGRET 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
(b)(3) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(3) 
/'\/\ 
O'D- 
\/\/ 
/'\/\ 
0000 
\/\/ 
/'\/\ 
O'D- 
\/\/ 
/'\/\ 
0000 
\/\/ 
(b)(3)
Id 
ni 
Id 
_d 
al
i
1
T
i 
1‘
I
T 
1'
i 
1
I
i
i 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
SEIJBEI 
would be needed to recruit and train personnel for a maritime 
unit, and suggested that ten men he recruited as soon as possible, 
to be trained as an expandable nucleus which could be used for 
training and research in mritime techniqpes. 
TED had only two 
positions for naval personnel; 
‘USN, was 
being processed against one of them to conduct a maritime orien- 
tation of about six hours, in the so-called Area Training Program. 
[:::::::::::::1emphatically pointed out that TED badly needed 
to find out the following: 
a. 
OPC reqpirements in the maritime field (both for 
peace and for war); 
'b. 
TRD's responsibility for maritime equipment; 
c. 
staff relationships and procedures; 
d. 
the requirements for facilities and equipment; 
e. 
the requirement for use of Navy training facilities. 
The Training Division was still searching for definitive answers 
to these questions a year later. 
[::::::::::::::1reported for duty in August l950. 
He was 
assigned the responsibility of getting maritime training started. 
It was clearly a frustrating experience for him. TRD asked OPC in 
December 1950 to give[::::::::::::::]authority and approval to hold 
discussions with the Navy on maritime training matters. 
Approval 
was granted the following February. 
TED prepared a set of proposals 
for training which it submitted to Staff II, OPC on 27 December l950. 
A reply dated 27 January l95l indicated that Staff II was engaged in 
computing over-all requirements for services support of OPC training 
'3 
__l 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440
1 
R
I 
(b)(3) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(3)
d
d
6
i
i
i 
an
a
1
5 
-1
I 
in 
\-
d
i 
Approve? for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440
g 
SEBBET
’ 
programs, and expected to complete this study by 1 March; it
U 
stated that[:::::::::::::::pstimate 
of ten Naval personnel for 
maritime training was reasonable and suggested he start procure- 
ment action. [::::::::::::::]spent 
this period preparing various 
studies for the organization and employment of a maritime training 
/\ CT )(3 
(b)(3) 
branch, and aired his frustration in several "progress" reports to 
On 25 January 1951, for example, he wrote that he had learned 
(DX3) 
that OPC had taken no positive action and that it had no concrete 
ideas regarding either the use of maritime operations or of the 
related training. 
He felt that to delay the commencement of the 
creation of a training program until after over-all requirements 
had.been established would be a serious error because of the loss 
of lead time as well as the unfounded guesswork on which the estimates 
"would'be based. He doubted that anyone in OPC appreciated the poten- 
tial of maritime operations, and showed his irritation with bureau- 
cratic delays by quoting from a memorandum submitted by a naval 
officer to General Donovan under similar circumstances: “This office 
has suffered a great deal by having to go through a large number of 
channels, none of which had any experience in our field and merely 
delayed the prosecution of our work." 
[::::::::::::::]spelled 
out the problems in detail in a.memo- 
b
3 
randum of 13 April l95l to Chief, TED. As of that date, no estimates 
( X
) 
of training requirements had been received. 
There still was no 
answer from OPC regarding the comprehensive proposals of 27 December 
1950. He had been unable to determine the situation regarding the
M 
. 
1! 
" 
as 
Approved for Reliiz/‘e:g,g%1€/i(-)6/12 C02344440
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
_ 
tbrbfitl 
5 
procurement of the military personnel requested for his unit.
— 
He could not find out what maritime operations had been conducted 
-' 
in the recent past, what ones were contemplated, where and with 
what kind of equipment , personnel, or targets. 
He was forced to 
— 
conclude that a 
"deplorable condition of ignorance, indifference, 
"" 
lack of coordination, and ineffectiveness with regard 
to maritime operations prevails throughout the operating; 
=6 
divisions. 
All efforts on my part to solve and improve 
Q 
the situation have resulted only in a circuitous return 
to my office confused and empty handed. " 
‘I 
He felt that the lack of communication and coordination 
within the Agency represented an impossible situation, and recon- 
III 
mended in effect that the maritime training program be abandoned 
unless some concrete positive actions were taken to determine the 
-1' 
_
_ 
requirement and to procure tne necessary personnel. 
_- 
2. 
Z'l‘_he_ First Or_g_a_nization_ and Staff 
(b)(3) 
Z 
proposal for the establishment of at
" 
/\ CT 
\\_/ 
//\ 
00 
i 
"Maritime Training Branch" had called for 
S 
\" 
') 
of which were to be filled by Navy officers on active duty. 
This 
i 
group was to conduct research, get trained, prepare to give train- 
_ 
ing, and establish an organization that could be readily expanded
d 
.4: 
of a unit of mpeople. As the situationcontinued to change, other 
\/ /\ 00 
\/ 
tables of organization were prepared. 
On ll» November 1951, 
(b 
-W3) 
<b><8> 
b
3 
of Personnel to allocate 
additionalj Naval officers anda 
-v 
enlisted men to the Maritime Training Unit in addition to thej 
(b)(3 
|-I
5 
SEBRET 
... 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440
t 
if nee<3-<"3‘<1- 
l 
BY February 
was planning in terms 
(b)(3) 
X3) 
1
(b
--u 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
_ 
'§tbi'itl 
officers already authorized. 
further 
stated that this number represented about 
the total 
II 
number of men who would be required for the training program 
which was expected to begin in Ngvember 1952. 
But two months 
‘I 
later, in January 
that the T/O 
‘ 
be reduced tom
i 
In any case, the acquisition of qualified individuals pro- 
ceeded slowly. 
in June 
(b)(3) 
_» 
USN, 
USNR, both underwater de- 
_ 
molitions instructors, reported in September 1951, andz 
arrived in October 1951. 
In a memorandum of 
an 
mid-October 1951, 
out that the shortage of 
-, 
personnel in the Branch was becoming an "exceedingly acute" problem. 
As for any training to be conducted before a full staff was 
“' 
assembled, 
found out by February 1951 that the 
= 
Navy Department was willing to help, 
it received a statement
G 
of requirements, including either a list of Navy courses the 
_, 
trainees were to complete or the skills the trainees were ex- 
pected to acquire. 
the Naval Amphibious 
i 
Base at Little Creek, Virginia during 21+-26 April 1951, and 
learned that the Base had been instructed by the Commander-in-
d 
Chief, Atlantic Fleet, to be prepared to provide training as 
if 
requested by CIA, and that this had been authorized by the Chief 
of Naval Operations. Base personnel indicated their willingness 
to implement any training requests within their capabilities; 
they could integrate Agency people into regular courses, or let 
=-I 
,
6 
"" 
¥SEl!BET 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
(b)(3) 
;(b)(3) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(3 
/'\/\ 
O'D- 
\/\/ 
/'\/\ 
0000 
\/\/ 
(b)(3) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(3)
Approved for Rielease: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
Athiilzl 
them attend selected portions of regular courses, or conduct 
special courses if necessary. 
They could not, however, accept 
any one who was not a U.S. citizen. 
They reiterated their need 
for a statement of requirements. 
In a memorandum dated ls June 1951 and addressed to the 
Staff and Division Chiefs of OS0 and OPC, Rolfe Kingsley (acting 
Chief of the Training Division) summarized the maritime training 
situation up to that date. 
Four kinds of training seemed to be 
needed: 
a. 
small boat handling and operation; 
b. 
underwater demolitions and swimming; 
c. 
amphibious and beach intelligence; 
d. 
general orientation. 
For the time being, he said, this need would be met through use 
of the facilities at Little Creek, where arrangements had been 
made to enter a few Agency people (under cover) in a two-week 
course which was being run.every few months for Naval Reservists. 
This course, (which was later 
by OPC/FE) 
had trainees from the Agency in June and September 1951 and in a 
few subsequent runnings. 
In view of the confusion regarding requirements and actuaggggg 
field operations, first-hand knowledge was obviously desirable. 
[laccordingly spent the period 25 July - 30 August 
(b)(3 
(b3 
1951 visiting several field installations in[:::::land£:::::]to 
(bX1) 
observe some actual maritime operations. 
His trip report pointed 
out what he considered to be woeful deficiencies both in the
T 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
(b)(3)
an 
Ii 
an
i 
'-' (b)(3) 
-I
Z
a 
Ii
w 
C 
ii 
Approved 
{oar_Ei£¢i€1Ee|: 
2019/06/12 C02344440 
support and in the conduct of aritime operations. 
He recommended 
changes in headquarters organizations, and called again for a 
survey of present and future requirements for training and equip- 
ment, as well as for the assignment of experienced officers to(EX;) 
Training Division. He also had taken positive action while on(t¥ig 
trip. While in[::::::1he had gotten two maritime case officers 
[:::::::::::}nd[::::::::::::1 interested in joining the Maritime 
Training Branch, which they later did. 
After[::::::::::::::::]return, most of the rest of 1951 was 
devoted to the planning and installation of maritime facilities 
at the new domestic training base[::::::::::::]which was expected 
to be ready for occupancy by November 1951. Here was a different 
kind of problem; in this instance, the requirement had been made 
clear. The plans called for‘ 
‘to receive 
general paramilitary training by 30 June 1952; some kind of mari- 
time training was to be included. [::::::::::::::1pointed out in 
a memorandum of T November 1951 that[:::::::::]was not suitable 
for some aspects of maritime training, and that decisions had to 
be made as to the best way to meet the requirements not only for 
this training but for research and development as well. 
In reality, this huge group of students never materialized. 
Nevertheless, the requirement had been presented, and it consti- 
tuted a strong argument for the establishment of a maritime training 
base. 
Other maritime training requirements were beginning to come 
in at this time. 
The Maritime Training Branch received firm
8 
QIIIEEFT 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
( 
)(
) 
(b)(3)
l 
(b)(3) 
(b)(3) 
b
1 
(b)(3 
(b)(3) 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3)
"“(b)(3) 
Approved for Release: 201_9/06/12 C02344440 
_ 
muntl 
requests from OSO and OPC for the following training in 1952: 
ui 
1) 
underwater sabotage
- 
< 
> 
\
\ 
II 
(3) 
maritime operations 
-[:::::::::::::::::] 
3. 
The First Training 
One specific requirement had emerged by this time from a 
/\ 
CTCT 
\/ /\
I 
series of discussions between representatives of the covert 
‘I 
Offices and of Training. 
This was for a "Maritime Operations 
Staff Course" for case officers who would have to plan, direct, 
in April 1951. 
It was to be a one-week course, given at Headquarters. 
On 30 September 1951, the OPO Training Officer signified that OPC 
‘C 
had a requirement for such a course; on 16 October 1951 the OSO 
II 
Training Officer asked that such a course be developed. 
On 30 
; 
October:{::::::::::::::]dire¢tE#MMMMMMMMMMMMMMHwho had just joined 
‘I 
the Maritime Training Branch, to develop and present this course. 
The pilot running (one-week duration) began on 21 January 1952
C 
forE:::]se1ected OSO and OPC staff officers. 
Three years had 
qr 
elapsed since James Cross had researched mritime training for 
_ 
the Chief of Training, OPC. 
Staff Maritime Operations Course #1 
'5 
then was presented 17 March 1952. 
Another specific request occupied much of the time of Messrs. 
‘ 
iandtéééééiduring January and February 1952. 
_i 
[:::::]case officers from Foreign Division S (FDS) of OSO were 
given training in the techniques of clandestine infiltration and 
Ind
9 
-1 
[SECRET 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
/T/T 
/T/T 
o'cr 
o'cr 
QZQZ 
QZQZ 
/T/T 
/T/T 
on-A 
o>-= 
QZQZ 
QZQZ
( 
or support maritime operations, rather than actually participate. 
(bxs) 
had submitted a detailed proposal for such a course 
b)(3) 
(b)(3)
3 
/\ CT \/ /\ 
(b)(3)
an
i 
ii 
an 
'§ 
I-I 
II
H 
Approved 
2019/06/12 C02344440 
exfiltration. 
This involved a week of tutorial orientation in 
Washington, two weeks at Little Creek, followed by a week of 
training on a PT boat. 
The PT boat was a reconditioned one 
belonging to FDS; when representatives of the Maritime Training 
Branch saw it, their reaction was one they later described as 
"hopeful but somewhat skeptical." Arrangements had to be made 
for renovation and shakedown trials, as well as for temporary 
Navy ownership of the boat; special financial and requisitioning 
procedures had to be set up. 
The Navy provided a boat crew, 
equipment, a base at Little Creek, and cover; the training was 
successfully accomplished by mid-February. 
But[:::::::::::::::] 
concluded from this experience that the severe problems imposed 
by conducting such training on an active Navy base were too 
limiting. 
On the other hand, the Agency did not have the staff, 
the equipment, or the training areas to do a proper job. 
Some training requirements caused problems at this time 
by leading other elements of the Agency to take action without 
the kn°Wled8@ 0f[::::::::::::::1or anyone else in the Office of 
Training. 
In a memorandum of 2 January 1952 to the Acting Director 
(bX3) 
of Trail"-ins 
said that several months pre- 
viously, FE/OPC had initiated independent negotiations with the 
Naval Amphibious Base at Little Creek for special training (i.e. 
[:::::::::::::::::] for some of its people. 
This venture had re- 
sulted in considerable confusion and embarrassment before the 
situation was rectified. 
In another instance, at the instigation of this same unit 
10 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
(b)(3) 
(b)(3 
(b)(3
8'
d 
"C
1
E 
-1' 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
iSEGRET 
(FE/OPC), the Military Personnel Division (MED) had persuaded 
(bxg) 
the Navy to agree to put[lNavy officers through Underwater
T 
Demolitions Team (UDT) training at Little Creek, after which 
they would be assigned to CIA. 
The time, place, and nature of 
/\ 
00 
EV 
the training happened to conflict with other arrangements which 
(bx 
had been made by[::::::::::::::]independently. 
In his memorandum, 
(3) 
[:::::::::::::1made a strong plea for the coordination of training 
requests through one focal point, particularly where Navy assistance 
was needed, to avoid duplications of requests and over-commitments. 
h. 
The §earch for a Maritime Training;Base 
These events and situations, as they developed in the latter 
part of 1951, plus the expanding estimates of the number of students 
to be trained, led to serious consideration of the acquisition of 
a site where maritime training, tailored to the needs of the Agency, 
could be conducted effectively and securely. 
This move was almost 
inevitable as a precedent had been set. 
The Training Division, 
faced with a similar problem in the staging of paramilitary train- 
ing, had selected a site for this activity in May l95l[::::::::::::1 
Egggg 
and begun construction in the following October. 
This site, however, 
was not considered suitable for maritime training; it lacked, for ex- 
ample, surf conditions and suitable beaches. 
The identification of a suitable site proved to be difficult. 
An undated study of the problem, compiled at about this time, listed 
the requirements which a suitable site had to meet, and discussed 
possible locations. 
Northeastern United States was considered basically unsuitable 
ll 
Appr0vedf1‘()srE|?Q§§s.!-I 2019/06/12 C02344440
d 
II 
Approved for 
R§<i1‘sj<-iii E0‘1 
9/06/12 C02344440 
by this study because of climatic and hydrographic conditions. 
The Chesapeake Bay area offered no location which even came 
close to meeting the needs. 
Several bases in Virginia and 
North Carolina were seriously considered, but again the physical 
conditions were not right. 
Jacksonville, Fort Pierce, and Key 
West, as well as the west coast of Florida,were all considered, 
but ruled out not only for physical reasons but also because of 
the overcrowded beaches and towns. 
The Bahamas were rejected because the fact that they were 
British territory would mean international negotiations and in- 
creased security hazards. 
Cover and logistics would also pre- 
sent severe problems. The Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay did not 
have sufficient space, and the weather was too good to be con- 
sidered favorable. 
The rest of the Caribbean--Puerto Rico, the 
Virgin Islands, and Vieques were considered but rejected because 
of the difficult logistic problem, poor security conditions, un- 
favorable weather and hydrographic features, as well as the 
problems relating to local labor. 
The Gulf of Mexico was not seriously considered because of 
known undesirable features. 
The coast of California was scrutini~~d 
(b)( 
closely, but suitable places were too built up and too heavily 
(bX 
OO—\ 
\/\./ 
populated. 
The one place that came closest to meeting all the re- 
quirements was‘
‘ 
Not only did 
the right conditions; the owner 
(b)(1 
(b)(3 
was known to be willing to make the land available at reasonable 
cost, and already existing structures and utilities would reduce 
12 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440
a
d 
ti
1
1
i 
the cost of necessary construction. 
Furthermore, it would appear 
that activation of a ‘base would materially improve the local 
economic situation and promote a favorable reaction from the 
local populace. 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
$|IUl'i|Z| 
13 
IRFIIRFT 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440
Id
J
i
m
Q
T
C
1
T 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
SEGRET
i 
CHAPTER II. 
Project‘ 
‘ 
(b)(1) 
First gigfdsere st j.n__
\ 
31+ 
ISFIERFT 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
(b)(3)
; 
/\/-/\/'\ 
CT 
CU 
CT 
\_/\_.\_/\/ 
/\/-/\/'\ 
00 
-00 
—\ 
\_/\_.\_/\/
_____ 
ul 
ul
Z
i
- 
'4
f
1
6 
-i
1 
Appr0ved_f0r_Re|ease: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
Li§IflJfilLl 
The Office of Training then proceeded to take the steps 
necessary for acquiring this site as a training area. 
It first 
ascertained that a requirement for training actually existed. 
On 19 February 1952, the Acting Assistant Director for Special 
Operations reported that OSO expected to have[:::ktudents in 
1953 andgin 1951+. 
On 18 February 1952, the Acting Assistant 
Director for Policy Coordination reported an expectation of[:::] 
students in 1953, and[:::]in 195% (this included both agents and 
staff employees).* 
The case for acquiring a specialized site was strengthened 
by a requirement of the Technical Services Staff (TSS). 
Its 
Research and Development Division wanted a site it could use in 
connection with the development of special equipment and operational 
techniques. 
£:::::::::]visited St. Thomas in the Virgin Islands in early 
March 1952 to acquaint himself with the UDT equipment being used 
by the Atlantic Fleet and to survey that island as a possible site 
*These forecasts were to change many times in the next two years-- 
generally downward. The papers relating to numbers of students to 
be trained are confused and inconsistent. 
Two years after the 
aboveestimates were made the Clandestine Services Training Committee 
(on R February 195%) hadT::]“prospective" students available for 
maritime training before 1 June 195k. 
15 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
( 
)(
) 
(b)(3) 
b 
1
1 
(b)(3) 
/'\/\ 
CTCT 
\/\/ 
/'\/\ 
0000 
\/\/ 
(b)(3) 
(b)(3 
(b)(3)
fl
f 
uni
a 
0 
I 
I 
an
M
a
d 
no 
uni 
mi 
ml
3 
Approved’ 
f£rElEal|iaE§le: 
2019/06/12 C02344440 
for maritime training. 
It was judged undesirable because the 
weather did not present a variety of conditions and adequate 
security could not be established- 
2' 
Chr°_nQ,l_9j!{Y. 2?.§b?<?r£¢:9.“i€itil9nn 9.5 
On 2l March 1952, the proposal for a maritime training base 
was presented to the Project Review Comittee. According to the 
report to the DCI dated 2% March 1952, the Committee raised three 
questions during the presentation: 
a. 
What is the overgall need for special maritime 
training? 
The Committee recognized that clandestine mari- 
time operations play an important role in supporting certain 
activities, and concluded that the line divisions of OSO and 
OPC had submitted realistic requirements. 
b. 
Are trainees available? The Committee determined 
that a sufficient number of headquarters employees and re- 
turnees would be available to justify the establishment of 
the planned training area.
( 
In light of these considerations, the Project was approved. 
It 
16 
1SEGlETr 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
b)(1 
b)(1 
(b)(3)
) 
b)(3)
nu 
mi
3 
ml 
Inn‘ 
-a 
Q" 
an
1 
uni
1
i
I
Q 
Approved 
RE 
Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
would'be necessary, of course, to secure appropriate support from 
the Navy, which had not yet been approached (the first contact was 
on 1+ April 1952)
. 
The history of the Project, which was assigned the code name 
best reviewed by drawing the sequence of events from 
(b)(1) 
b
3 
the weekly reports compiled within the Office of Training. 
( 
)(
) 
26 May lQ§2 
- The Deputy Director for Administration 
(DDA) has signed the letter to be sent to the Department 
of Defense, detailing the support that will be needed from 
the Navy Department. 
16 June 1252 - 
The office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) 
is still studying the statement of support needed by the Agency. 
An official reply from CNO will have to wait for a policy de- 
cision hy the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) on the training of 
aliens. 
23 June 1252 - 
Rolfe Kingsley (the Deputy Director of Training, 
Special) has met at length with officers in the office of the 
CNO to work out an agreed basis for the Navy to provide cover 
and logistics support. 
The JCS have approved the inclusion of 
aliens in the project. A lengthy discussion has led to an 
agreement that the project can he established within the 
framework of thd 
h July 1252 
- 
The CNO has directed the Comandant of[:::::::::::] 
[::::::::::::::]to provide cover and su port. 
lb July l952 - 
Messrs. Kingsley,[2i](Chi@f Of the 
CTR Support Staff at that time) leave for the West Coast for a 
17 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
/-\/~/\/\ 
CT 
UCT 
CT 
\/\_¢\_/\_/ 
/-\/~/\/\ 
00 
J00 
—\ 
\/\_¢\_/\_/ 
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
ldliblilil 
conference with the Commandant of 
21 Jug 1952 - A memorandum to the Director of Training 
(Mr. Baird) from Mr. Kingsley summarizes the accomplish- 
ments of meetings in 
on 16 and lT July. 
8 August 195g - A memorandum formalizing the Agency position 
and requesting certain actions is transmitted to the ONO. 
8 Angst 1952 - 
on his participation in a
( 
maritime training project staged by the SR Division in Um 
for some agents (the so—called 
feels that the effort was poorly planned, quite confused in 
the execution, and carried out under the wrong conditions 
with the wrong equipment. 
He had previously written (on 
26 June 1952} a lengthy and detailed account of a running 
battle with SR Division over this training and his participa- 
tion in it, where the confusion over who was responsible for 
what was so great that the Chief of the SR Division finally 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
$3513 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
(b)( 
(b)( 
OO—\ 
\/\./ 
>(f>> 
b)(3 
decided it should do the training 
(b)(3) 
is convinced as a result of this experience that training of 
this kind must be done under Maritime Training Branch control, 
18 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440
L 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
§€flfl¢fltfl 
and in an HEB area. 
1% August 1952 - A meeting is held with ONO and Bureau of 
Ordnance (BuOrd) representatives, at which it is agreed 
that CNO will designate BuOrd to control the provision of 
support for the Project. 
15 Aurrust 1952 - A meeting is held 
8, repre- 
sentative of the owner, to discuss arrangements for the 
lease of the property. 
2T August 1952 
5 September 1952 - Further conferences have been held with the 
owner regarding the lease, and with the‘
‘ 
[:::::1on procedures. 
12 September 1952 - The Office of Training (Special) and BuOrd 
have worked out cover arrangements for the architectural 
and engineering survey which BuOrd expects to conduct during 
the last week of September attl 
lT September 1952 -‘ 
‘enters on duty as prospec- 
tive Officer-in-Charge oftiiiiiiiiil 
September 1952 - An undated Project Outline which appears to have 
been drafted in September 1952 describes the objective of 
[:::::::]to be 
H 
..'.. 
to provide a program for training and development 
in the clandestine maritime field so that CIA will 
‘ii 
Approved fL$F\Fe|eEsE9‘:r201 9/06/12 C02344440 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
(E)? 
( 
)( (W3 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3)
i
¢ 
-d 
Id 
ad 
I1 
.1
5
§ 
uni 
if 
xi 
ii 
Id 
i 
I
Z 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
QEUHEI 
have the capability for effective prosecution 
of clandestine maritime executive and support 
operations. 
This objective is in direct 
furtherance of the mission of the Office of 
Clandestine Services (sic) and the related 
responsibility of the Office of Training and 
the Technical Services Staff." 
This paper estimates the cost for FY1953 ae[::::::::::] 
and for rYi95h at[:::::::::] It calls for a staff @r[:::] 
including[::1civilian instructors and£::]military instructors. 
l October 1952 -[::::::::::::::::1enters on duty as prospective 
chief instructor. 
3 October 1952 — The table of organization is approved in part. 
Approval of remainder is withheld, pending final approval 
of the project.
l 
2O October 1952 - A one-week Maritime Orientation Seminar begins 
forfliiijindividuals from NE Division andE:::::lfrom.Air- 
Maritime Division (AM). 
3l October l952 - An architectural and engineering survey of 
[:::::::]was conducted during the period 13-22 October by 
Navy Public Works officers accompanied by the following 
Agency representatives‘
‘ 
and 
of OTR, accompanied by 
Mr. Chandler, the Chief of Real Estate and Construction. 
Their cost and time estimates for the rehabilitation of the 
base have been submitted. 
The Air-Maritime Division is 
making a re-study of the requirements of the operating 
divisions of the Clandestine Services. 
The Secretary of 
the Navy has approved the establishment of the Navy activity 
20 
SEGRB 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
(bX3 
(bX3 
(bX3 
(bX3) 
(bX1) 
(bX3) 
(bX1) 
(bX3) 
(bX3 
)
) 
(bX3)
"'2 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
IQIZUIIEI 
at the site as requested. 
" 
- Efforts to obtain data from AM on require- 
M Novembei 1952 
i 
ments are reported "unfruitful." 
The Project is to be sub- 
mitted to the Director for a final decision on 26 November, 
inasmuch as the owner of the site has requested a decision 
by 1 Dcember 1952. 
20 November 1252 - A group of PP, PM, and FI officers meet to 
determine the extent of a requirement for[::::::::1 Some 
TR officers attend as observers. 
21 November 1252 - On this date Mr. Walter Reid Wolf, the Deputy 
Director for Administration, addresses a memorandum to the 
Director of Training requesting that no further expenditures 
be made in connection with the acquisition of the[:::::::1 
site without his approval. 
As a result of the survey party’s 
findings in October 1952, he is convinced that a complete 
restudy would be advisable, in view of the difficulties re- 
garding staff housing in the area and other problems surfaced 
by the survey. 
21 November 1252 - The Director of Training airs his frustration 
in his weekly report to the Director: 
"The Office of Training feels that it has done 
about all it can in attempting to meet CIA 
requirements for a Maritime training site. 
At 
the request of authorized operating office 
officials, and based upon firm requirements for 
maritime training, OTR has spent nearly two years 
in locating and negotiating for a suitable training 
site and developing courses of training, in recruit- 
ing a specialist corps of instructors, and in con- 
ferences with Navy Officials from the CNO down. 
The 
PRC approved the project in March 1952. 
21 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
( 
)(
) 
(b)(3) 
b
1 
(b)(1 
(b)(3
C
C 
an
G 
-1 
In 
Id 
Id 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
Blblilil 
The DCI authorized further exploration and 
negotiation.* 
"We have received complete Navy approval and 
cooperation. We have the site; we have detailed 
cost figures on construction, equipment and opera- 
tion. 
But as of 20 November 1952, there still seems 
to be no clear out basic policy decision on: 
(1) 
Whether CIA is to engage in Maritime 
operations; 
(2) 
Whether CIA will train personnel to 
man such operations; 
(3) Whether CIA will establish and maintain 
a maritime training school. 
OTR cannot ake these decisions." 
26 November 1952 - Navy officers in the Maritime Training 
Branch ask to be released for return to the Navy. 
Request 
granted. 
9 December 1952 - On this date, the DDCI meets with the DDP, 
the DDA, the Chief of PM, the Director of Training, and 
members of their staffs. 
There is no disagreement as to the 
need for a maritime training school in CIA. 
The site already 
selected is confirmed, and in view of the urgent need to get 
the lease negotiated as soon as possible, the DDCI directs 
that this be done. 
Procurement of personnel is to be 
recommenced. 
Lists of costs and equipment are to be re- 
viewed by the DD/A in preparation for submitting the 
*Other memoranda make clear that the DCI not only authorized this, 
but ordered it. 
The cost estimates in the original OTR proposal 
were rough figures only; for lack of suitable cover, OTB officers 
had not been able to look at the site in detail, but had to rely 
on a general statement from the owner as to charges and length of 
occupancy. 
The DCI had therefore made his approval contingent upon 
the answers to two questions: (1) the extent to which the Navy will 
support the project; (2) how much money is actually required, based 
on estimates obtained by an on-the-spot survey. 
22 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440
lni 
-d 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
flllflflil 
project to the DCI. 
The DD/A raises several questions: 
Is there a better site somewhere else? Can this activity 
he located at[:::::::::::lWill the use of£:::::::1present 
a critical housing problem to the staff and dependents? 
The Director of Training states 
not 
provide the required water conditions, and that extensive 
surveys have not found any better location than[::::::::1 
12 December 1952 - A lengthy meeting is held on this date by 
members of the Office of Training and of the Office of 
Procurement and Supply. 
The Chief of Procurement and 
Supply (James Garrison) says that he has been given this 
project and told to proceed with the leasing of the 
property, so he wants to hear what it is all about. 
Mr. 
Kingsley reviews the entire history of the efforts to 
date. 
‘ 
‘ He also says that there are a number 
of sticky problems coming up in connection with proposed 
construction. 
T January 1953 - A memorandum of this date from DIR to DCI, 
concurred in by the Chief of Administration for H§E>and 
by the DD/A, requests approval to go ahead with[:::::::] 
(bX 
(b 
at an estimated cost 0f[::::::::::]for FY53 and[:::::::1 
for FYSM, subject to review of all construction contracts 
23 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440
I
| 
(bX1) 
(bX3)
L 
(bX1) 
(bX3) 
(bX1) 
(bX3) 
(bX1) 
(bX3) 
\/
@
6 
/\ 
O“ )(QX3)
H 
Ii
1
1 
‘i
Z 
-'
T
1
1
1 
Approved 
ifirilfiefiéfisei 
2019/06/12 C02344440 
and other major expenditures by the DDQJ Implementation 
of Pr0ject[:::::::1is approved by the DCI (Gen. Smith) on 
7 January l953. Navy is informed that CIA expects to be 
ready to accept previously selected Navy personnel as 
they become available. 
The first increment is due to 
report about l February. 
16 January 1953 - A memorandum for the record of this date, 
signed byfilof 
the Office of the General Counsel, 
describes the lease which has been signed on 8 (or 9?) 
January. 
It was negotiated in[:::::::1by the Chief of 
Procurement and Supply with officials of[:::::::::] 
‘ 
‘ 
It now needs the signature of 
a representative of the Navy Department, but first it must 
receive the routine approval of the Armed Services commit- 
taxaof Congress. 
The lease begins on l March l953 and is 
renewable from year to year at the option of the govern- 
ment. The annual rental will be[:::::::] 
16 January 1953 - A meeting is held in the Office of the Chief 
of Procurement and Supply (Mr. Garrison) before a proposed 
trip to[:::::::1to study costs at the site. 
It is agreed 
best to go ahead with a minimum amount of construction to 
get the job under way, with expansion taking place later if 
necessary. Housing is being planned for[:::]people. 
In 
answer to{]qpestion about housing for 
families, Mr. Garrison states that no survey of this has 
2% 
SEGBET 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440
7 
(b)(1)d 
(b)(3) 
(b)(3 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
.(b)(3) 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(3)
'1
C 
'fi
§ 
8' 
an
I
1
1 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
SEBBET 
been made. 
19 Januarz 1953 - DTR initiates requests for the communica- 
tions and medical personnel deemed necessary fori::::::::] 
Logistics and security officers are also being sought for 
the project. 
23 Januarl l§53 - The Navy Department is making plans to handle 
the public relations aspect of this project when the lease 
is approved by the Congressional Comittees. 
- Mr. Baird, Colonel White and Mr. Garrison 
January 1953 
have returned from[:::::::] where they spent two days ex- 
amining the site. 
On-the-spot agreement was reached on 
construction problems affecting housing and messing; it 
appears that the original Navy estimates can be considerably 
reduced. 
The House Armed Services Committee is expected 
to approve the lease shortly; the Senate Committee is not 
yet ready to consider it.
' 
6 February 1953 - A TDY of about four months in the[::::::1 
area is being arranged f0r[::::::::::::1t0 give him first’ 
hand experience in current clandestine maritime operations. 
Only one instructor assigned to Maritime Training has Eng 
clandestine operational experience, and his experience is 
not recent. 
9 Februagz l953 - On this date, Senator Saltonstall notifies 
the Secretary of Defense that the Senate Armed Services 
Committee is withholding its approval of certain real estate 
25 
SECRET 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
(b)( 
(b)( 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
OO—\ 
/\ 
O- 
\/ /\ 3)
f
3 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
bliblilll 
transactions until the new administration has indicated 
that it considers them essential. 
10 Februarl 1953 - The Navy has been advised that the Agency 
does not want nominations of regular Navy officers to fill 
the vacant job of Commandant,E::::::::1and to provide a 
replacement for the Chief of Maritime Trainingi:::::1will 
have served three years by July l953). Action is being 
taken instead to find qualified persons within CIA. 
16 Februarv 1953 — Logistics problems are forecast at[:::::::::1 
The existing pier is not suitable for loading or unloading 
supplies. The project does not yet have an assigned supply 
officer. 
18 Februarx 1953 - Word has been received that the House Armed 
Services Committee has approved the lease. 
2h Februarz 1953 - The Navy disapproves the request that Lt. 
USNR, be recalled to active duty 
for assignment to[::::::::] 
3 March l253 - On this day, Mr. Dudley of the Bureau of Yards 
and Docks and Captain flixon of the Bureau of Ordnance, meet 
with Congressman King of California, at the request of the 
House Armed Services Comittee. Mr. King needs an explanation 
of the nature and necessity for the BuOrd installation, because 
he has been receiving mail from his constituents that requires 
an answer. 
Mr. King shows no interest in the classified as- 
pects of the project, and does not intend to oppose it. 
He 
has been considering holding public hearings, however. 
26 
A 
seam 
pproved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
(b)( 
(b)( ))(3) 
’(,O-\ 
£/ 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(3) 
<b><1>
r 
<b><8>
~
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
étlililll. 
h March 1953 - The Chairman of the Senate Comittee on the 
Armed Services sends a letter to the Chief of the Bureau 
of Yards and Docks telling him that the Subcommittee on 
Real Estate and.Military Construction has approved the 
Project, notwithstanding some reservations as to the 
maintenance of adequate security. 
"The Subcommittee 
accepted the assurance of Navy Department representatives 
that adequate security can be provided under the contem- 
plated arrangement, hut it is desired that you he fully 
advised of the Suhcommittee‘s concern over the project." 
This communication has been signed by Senator Saltonstall. 
5 March 1953 - The Navy Department signs the lease. 
3- 
The T@T@§?@tiQE_9§;§9EEE?§iilE 
The men in the Office of Training who had worked so long 
to acquire a training site may well have thought for a brief moment 
that their troubles were over. 
Not soI* 
At the same time that the lease was signed, the Navy Depart- 
ment made a public announcement to the effect that a Naval in- 
stallation was to be activated in one specified part of[:::::::::] 
[::::::]for experimental ordnance work of a classified nature, with 
some restrictions to be imposed on contiguous waters. The following 
day (6 March) the Under Secretary of the Navy, Charles S. Thomas, 
informed Colonel White that the press announcement had caused a 
*The story of the following hectic days can be pieced together 
from the DTR's weekly reports to the Director and from a memorandum 
for the record by Colonel White, dated lO March l953. 
27 
SECRET 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
(b)(1 
(b)(3 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3)
C
C
Q
3
C 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
SEBRET. 
violent reaction from Congressmen and individuals on the West 
Coast. 
He said that he did not like to yield to pressure, 
and if it was absolutely essential for this project to be 
initiated, the Navy would do so. 
But it could hurt the Navy 
badly on the West Coast, and he requested that the Agency posi- 
tion be re-examined and that there be absolute certainty that 
no other location would be suitable. 
Colonel White agreed to 
this re-examination. 
The same day, an officer from the Navy Office of Information 
came to Mr. Dulles’ office with a proposed press release, saying 
that Mr. Thomas felt that he must issue another press release 
without delay, inasmuch as there had.been such a violent reaction 
from fishermen and yachtsmen who would have no place to anchor in 
that area. 
Colonel White then worked out a press release with the 
press officer. 
This announcement appeared the next day, T March, 
saying in effect that no further development of the property at 
that location would be undertaken pending a re-examination for 
absolute necessity. 
On 9 March, Mr. Baird and[::::::::::::::]met with the Secre- 
tary of the Navy, Mr. Anderson, and with the Under Secretary, 
Mr. Thomas. 
Mr. Anderson strongly urged that the Agency not 
proceed with the project. He said that he would appoint an officer 
imediately to assist the Agency in every possible way to find a- 
nother site and to develop it. 
Mr. Anderson also said that if the 
Navy went ahead with the present project, it would be forced to 
hold public hearings in at least five towns, including Los Angeles. 
28 
SFIERFT 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
This might even lead to a full-scale Congressional investigation. 
The public reaction had been unprecedented, and even if all obstacles 
could be overcome, the hostile attitude of the local citizens would 
make successful operation of the project extremely difficult. 
As 
an interesting footnote to this situation, it should be mentioned 
that, during the meeting, Secretary Anderson indicated that neither 
his office nor that of the Chief of Naval Operations had any prior 
knowledge of this project! 
At the conclusion of this meeting, Mr. Baird called‘:::::::::::] 
‘::::::::::‘to let‘ 
‘know about these 
developments and express the Agency*s willingness to make any reason- 
able settlement, since it would now be unwise to proceed with the 
project. After talking to[:::::::::::]Mr. Baird then called 
Colonel White to convey the news that‘ 
were not inclined to accept this turn of events and in fact had 
prepared a rather strong press release of their own which they 
proposed to issue the next day. Under Secretary Thomas then took 
his turn at trying to explain the situation to‘::::::::::::‘Mr. Baird 
later reported that‘:::::::::::‘was extremely disappointed and had 
completely failed to understand the Navy's position. 
He seemed to 
feel that it was the Navy and not CIA which had caused this un- 
pleasant and undesirable turn of events. 
The records show that numerous other telephone calls were 
flying hack and forth on this particular day. 
Among others, Mr. 
Thomas advised Colonel White that the White House was putting on 
pressure to get the matter settled. 
He therefore requested 
. 
29 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
/\/\/\/\ 
CTCT 
CTCT 
\/\/\/\_/ 
/\/\/\/\ 
(.0—\ 
(,0-\ 
\/\/\/\_/ 
/T/_/T/T 
o'ccr<r 
\/\..\/\/ 
/T/_/T/T 
(D 
-co-A 
\/\..\/\/ 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(1 
(b)(3
Approved for Re|ea_se: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
btblitl 
permission to.issue a statement that the project would be 
located elsewhere. 
This was agreed to. 
And the final call 
of the day was one to Mr. Frank Wisner fron[::::::::::::]who 
(bX1) 
indicated that he believed that the public would resent the 
(DX3) 
yachtsmen and fishermen who were putting pressure on the Navy 
to cancel the lease. 
He hoped that the Navy‘s press announce- 
ment of the cancellation of the project could be delayed for 
several days. 
Colonel White summarized the situation for the DCI in a\ 
memorandum of this same day, 9 March. 
He pointed out that it 
would be unwise to proceed without the willing support of the 
Navy, and that insistence on holding to the original agreement 
might seriously jeopardize the Agency's over-all relations with 
the Navy. 
But any further delay in this project (18 months 
having already gone by) would cause not only a serious curtail- 
ment of planned operations but would also create a morale problem 
to the Naval personnel on duty with the Agency and working on this 
project. 
The Navy press release of lO March 1953 said that the Navy 
would not use‘ 
tnd that "the 
Egg; 
ordnance project previously planned there will be transferred to 
another site."
- 
30 
RFIERFT 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440
If 
-at 
ud
@ 
at
3 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
csnrwss :11. 
Project‘
\ 
1- 
Ellsifioersclishiforc Assiher Qiieinins $1396 
The following day, ll March l953, Navy and Agency 
representatives (from Training and Logistics) met to dis- 
cuss alternate sites. 
Only one location appeared to be 
reasonably suitable. 
Plans were made for a party to survey the area 
about l9 March. 
[:::::::::::i:::1was surveyed 23-26 March by the 
following team: 
Capt. E. E. Saunders from the Office of 
the Chief of Naval Operations, 
and 
from Maritime Training Branch of OTR, and[:::::::::::::::] 
from the Coordination and Requirements Staff of the Office 
of Logistics. 
This group's attention was also given to 
‘ This group 
specifically recommended the acquisition of[:::::::::::::::] 
fort 
By mid-April l953, the decision was made in OTR to locate 
¥A§‘6§"ffi%§r@n; the basic reqnirements was a nss1@s5a"‘*"***“ 
training site had been given not only to the Navy, but to 
the Army and the Air Force as well, and all three services 
were presumably trying to identify a suitable base from 
among those under their control. 
31 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440
!
1 
(b)(1)
~ 
(b)(3) 
(b)(1)
_ 
(b)(3) 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(3 
(b)(3) 
(b)(1) 
(b\(3\
e 
(b)(1)
i 
(b)(3) 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3)
id
H
1 
nu 
Ifi 
av
Z 
mi
i 
uv
w 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
Stfififil 
the maritime training in[::::::::::::]and the DCI's approval 
was asked by the DTR in a memorandum dated 13 April 1953. 
Col. White (the Assistant DD/A) replied to this on 17 April, 
stating that the Director had approved in principle, but 
would withhold final approval until after the proposal had 
been fully staffed out to show feasibility, costs and other 
data, in comparison with the costs ofK:::::::::1 This memorandum 
directed the Office of Logistics to develop detailed cost 
estimates in conjunction with the Office of Training. 
The next two months were occupied with the assembly of 
cost figures and with the making of a choice between[:::::::::] 
and[::::::::::::::::1 The Office of Logistics favored the latter, 
(basing this view on the survey made in March), but OTR wanted 
the former. 
The Acting Chief of Logistics, in a memorandum of 
5 May 1953 to the Director of Training, specifically recommended 
The DTR's reply on 8 May presented numerous arguments for 
[:::::::::::] Contrary to the opinion of the Office of Logistics, 
he said, there should be no difficulty inK 
K 
K 
The DTR did not believe that the 
additional costs of using[::::::::::]would be as great as the 
Office of Logistics had implied. 
Furthermore, the TR experience 
with conducting training atK::::::::::::]had been a convincing 
demonstration of the undesirebility of operating a CIA facility 
32 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
(bX1) 
(bX3) 
(bX1) 
(bX3) 
/'\/\/\/\ 
CTCT 
CTCT 
\/\/\/\_/ 
/'\/\/\/\ 
0O—\ 
0O—\ 
\/\/\/\_/ 
fb\ f1\ 
K M
) 
fb\ f3\ 
K M
) 
(bM1) 
/I-\\/")\ 
I 
\I
\ 
KbM1) 
I 
\I
\ 
KbM3) 
fb\ f1\ 
K M
) 
fb\ f3\ 
K M
) 
(bX1 
(bX3)
i
1 
Approved f0r_ Release: 2019/06/12 002344440 
<bIJbfifiil 
within a military installation, and the proposed arrangement 
at[:::::::::::::::1would be even less favorable than the one 
at{:::::::::::::] In conclusion, the DTR urged that[::::::::::] 
be confirmed as the location of the project, and that the
X 
implementation proceed as quickly as possible. 
' 
At this same time, OTR was also evidently having a little 
_ 
difficulty with the Clandestine Services over the site selection, 
as evidenced by a memorandum written by DTB to the DD/P, Mr. 
Wiener, on 29 April 1953» 
The DTR expressed surprise to hear
C 
that the DD/P was unaware of recent developments on Project 
[::::::::]inasmuch as both the DCI and the DD/A were fully 
informed and[:::::::::::1(DD/P Administrative Officer) had 
attended meetings on this subject. 
The DTR described the 
negotiations being conducted with the Navy to acquire the site 
as approved by the DCI, and pointed out that the acquisition of 
the site as well as the subsequent modification and construction 
were the specific responsibility of the Office of Logistics, 
with which the Office of Training was in daily communication. 
He said that the training requirements which had been firmed up 
by[::::::::::1(the Chairman of the Clandestine Services Training 
CO‘z'n1T1i'i3’Ge€) had been given to the Office of Logistics- 
The DTR also said in this memorandum that[:::::::::::1had 
recently made a presentation urging that a site[:::::::::::::1 
(
( 
considered for maritime training, but that this had
1 
been rejected as being less suitable for staff officer training 
LU LU 
SFl‘.R£'l‘ 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
ti!
I
l 
/\/\/\/-\ 
CT 
UCT 
CT 
£/\-/£/£/ 
/\/\/\/-\ 
00 
-\<,o 
-\ 
£/\-/£/£/ 
(A); 
)
) 
<b><1> 
<b><:=\b
3 
()() 
(b)(3) 
(b)(3) 
eegi 
XX 
99-‘ 
(AM£/£/ 
£/£/
-an 
-nu 
nu" 
ml 
ta 
-v
a 
Z 
i
1
1 
an 
nu 
1
I 
Approved f0r§e|e_ase; i019/06/12 C02344440 
0O—\ 
/\ 
O_\/\/ 
\/ /\ 
than‘ 
‘ 
(bx 
(b)( 
Several days later,E:::::::::::1had suggested a site in 
3) 
E::::::1which was being used at the time for other purposes. 
(bX1) 
(b)(3) 
This suggestion had been rejected because it was deemed un- 
suitable from the hydrographic viewpoint. 
The DTR ended his 
letter by apologizing for not having kept the DD/P informed 
and said in conclusion: 
"May I take this opportunity of suggesting that
I 
would be glad formally to inform your Office of 
all training developments, and in turn hope that 
you will inform me of any training requirements 
from the offices under your jurisdiction." 
2. 
The Development of 
(bX1)
1 
(b)(3) 
[:::::::::]was officially replaced as Chief of Maritime 
(OX3) 
Training on 18 May 1953 by‘ 
‘a civilian 
(bX3) 
employee of CIA with a Navy background, who reported to OTB
‘ 
(b\(3\ 
in[::::::::::::] About the same time, the Navy agreed to 
(bX1) 
_ 
<b><8>
3 
recall his right-hand man,[:::::::::::::::::1to active duty 
KDX
) 
with the rank of Commander, effective 1 July 1953- 
He was to 
just in time to take on the problem of establishing[:::::::] 
(bX1)
1 
be the Commanding Officer as well as the Senior Instructor at 
[:::::::]as soon as the project received final approval. 
(bX1) 
(b)(3) 
During the week of 18-22 May 1953, an inspection party 
which included Messrs. 
and 
(Security 
(b)(3) 
Officer) from OTB, 
the Real Estate 
(b)(3) 
Division of the Office of Logistics, met with Navy representatives 
3% 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440
1 
-i 
I-I 
-a 
uni
T 
wn
Q
C 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
$ECi'§E\i{ 
in [:::::::::::Kwhere they examinedK_444444444landK444444444l 
maritime training base. 
Their findings were reported to the 
DD/A on 8 June. 
The cost of establishing a base at[::::::::::] 
1@@ 
was estimated atK::::::::]which was about half of what the 
(bX3) 
';;>><8> 
the estimate for[::::::::::::::::]The cost, after establishment, 
KB%§g, 
1@@ 
\U)\') 
1@@ 
[::::::::1base would have cost initially, but[:::::::Kmore than 
would be about the same for[::::::::1and forK::::::::::::] 
Of the three sites,K::::::::::Kwas felt to be clearly 
superior for training purposes. [:::::::::::::::]WaS Hn&¢CePtab1e 
for security reasons; only classroom work could be done there. 
The inspecting party felt thatE::::::::::]could also be used 
for Agency activities other than maritime training, and in 
their opinion, the area was superior toK:::::::::]for training 
purposes. 
On the basis of cost, suitability for training pur- 
poses, and security,K::::::::::]was recommended by the inspecting 
party. 
It offered beaches and other geographic features, a pier, 
dependent housing, and buildings suitable for instruction, admin- 
istration, and recreation. 
At this point in time, events speeded up, as indicated by 
the weekly reports and various memoranda. 
l5 June l953 - DTR submits a staff study to the DUI recom- 
mending the establishment of the base at[:::::::::::Kwith 
an estimated initial cost of[:::::::::Kbased on the
5 
8E0:”%E€ 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
Kb)K1 
mm 
wfl 
wfl 
Ib\ I3 
KM 
wfl 
Ib\ I3 
KM 
[:::::]to obtain an estimate of the cost of setting up a 
'""" 
fb\ I1 
K M 
fb\ f3\ 
K M
) 
fb\ I1 
K M 
fb\ I3 
K M 
@W 
@@ 
§33E FQQQ 
fb\f1\§ 
K M
)
v 
)
\
\
)
\
)
\
)
0
@@
_ 
.3 
Ifl
K
5 
Approved 
f§r Rejefisia: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
instruction of[::1staff personnel twice a year and a 
holding area for[::)indigenous agents. 
The base would 
furnish facilities for three purposes: 
(1) to train 
staff and indigenous personnel in clandestine maritime 
in-exfiltration and sabotage; (2) to test and develop 
specialized equipment and doctrine; (3) to conduct dry 
runs of projected maritime operations- 
June 1953 - The Clandestine Services Training Committee 
presents a substantially reduced estimate of the number 
of students to be trained in Fiscal Year 195k. 
The 
expectation is now for[::1staff employees aniE:::tgents. 
23 June 1953 - TSS reaffirms to OTR its urgent need for a 
facility where it can test maritime devices. 
2% June 1953 - The DTR, in a memorandum to the Assistant DD/A, 
presents a revised cost estimate of) 
\for) 
in view of the latest, but drastically lowered, require- 
ments for training. 
26 June 1953 - General Balmer, Chief of the Planning and 
Program Coordination Staff, informs DTR that the Project 
Review Committee has given tentative approval to the 
revised project, and that he is personally convinced.that 
[:::::::1is justified- 
2 Jv-1r;Lo953. 
devarr PCS for 
2A July 1953 - rro3e¢t[:::::::)1s approved by the DCI. 
36. 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
(
( 
(b)(3) 
l
1 
bl)(3 
b)(3
\ 
/\/ 
(b)(1)>)(3) 
(b)(3) 
/\/—/\/\ 
ee§§§§ 
)(3)
)
)
-J
i
-
f 
la 
Approved [or Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
MEGHEI 
9 August 1953 - Messrs. Baird and[:::::::] accompanied by 
two members of the DD/A's staff, leave for a week's visit
“ 
28 August 1953 -Llmen have now left for£::::::::]PCS. 
ll September l953 
#444444444444Wis 
leaving soon for£:::::::] 
to confer with local Army and Navy authorities. 
The 
Commandant of‘ 
‘and the local 
Comanding General have been informed of the establish- 
ment ofiiiiiiiiiland that the Army is to grant a use 
permit for this site. 
17 September 1953
- 
30 September 1953 - Support of the Project is encountering 
prOblemS because of existing federal legislation. 
Civilians are required to pay for the shipent of their 
privately owned automobiles, and for the storage of 
household effects in the U. S. 
The feasibility of 
integrating civilian employees into the Navy is under 
discussion. 
- The Assistant Secretary of the Navy has 
October 1953 
approved the additional Navy and Marine positions 
Rims? 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
(b3 
I
\ 
(b)<\1,> 
I
\ 
(b)<\1,> 
I
\ 
(b)<\3,> 
Ib\ I1\ 
K M
) 
Ib\ I3\ 
K M
) 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
(b\(3\
) 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
(o)(1go
3 
(b)(3)
Approved 
ffir Releasi: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
requested f0r[::::::::]bringing the authorized military 
strength up to[::::::]officers and[::lenlisted men. 
5 October 1953 -[:::::::::::]meets with members of the 
principal staffs of the Clandestine Services to review 
the proposed.training program and insure its responsive- 
ness to training requirements. 
3. 
Ehe Termination of Interest in 
As in the case of the attempt to set up the project at 
[:::::::::]the fatal blow to the plans came just as it must 
have seemed that the desired end was about to be reached. 
The Director of Training, Matthew Baird, had left Washington 
On 11 September 1953 for a visit (his first) te[::::::]eha 
other training installations[::::::::::::::::1accompanied by 
\ 
tChief of the Resistance Training Branch 
of ora) end[:::::::::::](Tfeihihg Gfficer of the FI Staff of 
DD/P). 
After his return on 5 October, he discussed the use of 
[::::::1with Gen. Cabell, the DDCI. 
On 8 October the DDCI suggested to the DD/P an immediate 
re-examination of maritime requirements and the physical 
establishments on 
and 
with a view to the 
possible abandonment of[:::::::::::1and the concentration of 
maritime training ih[:::::::# Mr. Wiener, the DD/P, in 
i 
[seems te have been etgsgeeeteti first 
April 1953. 
See above,page 33. 
38 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
(bX1) 
(bX3? U 
\\_/ 
//\ 
00 
\\_/ 
(bX3) 
(bX1) 
(bX3) 
(bX1) 
(bX3)
s 
/-\/K/-\/\ 
U 
UU 
U 
\/\./\/\./ 
/-\/K/-\/\ 
i
Q 
X3) 
(bX3) 
(bX1) 
(bX3) 
/\/'\/\/\\/'\ 
U 
UU 
UT 
U 
\_/\/\/\_//\/ 
/\/'\/\/\\/'\ 
00 
—\0O 
—\|O 
—\ 
\_/\/\/\_//\/ 
(bX1)(bX3) 
(bX3)
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
dtblilil 
reporting this to his Chief of Operations, Mr. Helms, on 
l2 October, recalled that[:::::::1was recommended to the 
DCI "before the recent developments of drastically lowered 
personnel and financial ceilings." Because of these sharp 
reductions, Mr. Wiener felt thatu 
‘would 
be found unduly expensive and that it would not be used to 
the extent originally contemplated. 
He said that this was 
also the view of the Director of Training. 
At the request of the Director of Training; the 
Clandestine Services Training Comittee went to all the 
Staffs and Divisions to get their views on the choice of 
a base for maritime training. 
The results were reported to 
the Chief of Operations, DD/P, by the Committee Chairman on 
lh October. 
It was the Committee's understanding that the 
proposal to use[::::::1for this training stemmed from the 
fact that Zwas 
not being fully utilized at this time. 
According to the Committee report, the FE Division 
felt that£::::::1provided not only a "convenient" (sic) 
location, but also excellent climatic and hydrographic 
conditions. 
As for the other Divisions of DD/P, their 
requirements for maritime training as presented in June 1953 
had been wiped out by the recent reductions in available 
money and personnel, as well as by the more relaxed inter- 
national situation. 
The Staff Chiefs were against moving 
39 
Approved for Releasg: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
/T/T/T/T 
o'o'o'o' 
QZQZQZQZ 
/T/T/T/T 
oa-=o>—= 
QZQZQZQZ 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3)
i
5
I
Ii 
I1
1
1
1
1
1 
Approved ?o? fielease: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
*ULafliLI 
the program.toE:::::::]because of security problems, the 
limited facilities, and the high cost in time and money. 
The CS Training Committee therefore came to the conclusion 
that[:::::::::::]was the best place for the program, taking 
into consideration the need for a place for research and 
development and for the acquisition of training experience 
in this field by OTB. 
The Committee's findings were of no avail. 
On the 
same day, 1% October l953, a long meeting was held, with 
Richard Hehms,[:::::::::::::]esmond Fitzgerald, and[:::] 
epresenting DD/P, and Matthew Baird,[l 
ore. 
The following 
conclusions were reached: 
in view of the recent ceilings 
and the reduced threat of war, there are not sufficient 
requirements for maritime training outside the FE area to 
justify.setting up an Agency-wide maritime training facility; 
FE Division requirements can be met[::::::::::]the Office of 
Training will have no further responsibility for maritime 
training other than that which can be offered in Washington 
and at[::::::::::] The following day, l5 October 1953, the 
DDCI directed Mr. Baird to cancel[:::::::]and to study the 
feasibility of offering limited maritime training in 
Washington, at[::::::::::]with the addition of advanced 
maritime training at[::::::1when needed. 
MO 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3)
I 
(b)(1)
l 
(b)(3) 
(b)(3) 
<b><P§§’)(3) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
/TI/T/T 
o'<o'cr 
£/\£/£/ 
/TI/T/T 
oa-oa-= 
£/\£/£/ 
(b)(1) 
(b\(3\ 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
IILJJIHLI 
A few days later 2-J-Ir. Baird took off 
where he had the unenviable job of breaking the news of the 
cancellation of the project to the Commandant 
to theimen andjwives who were 
already at work at the site. 
He reported on his return 
that, although the disappointment was generally severe, 
several. of the Navy enlisted men said that they had gone so 
far already with the program that they would like to continue 
in it in whatever way they could serve. 
By 19 December 1953, 
able to report that he had successfully 
terminated all activities at thesite, with re- 
maining personnel released and with all supplies and equip- 
ment enroute to Headquarters. 
14-1 
Approved for Re|ease:2019/06/12 C02344440 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3\ 
(b3 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3)
an 
In 
-ail
i
Q
I 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
SEBEET 
CHAPTER IV. 
The Development of Alternatives: 
The Maritime Training Branch lost no time in 
adjusting to the new situation. 
On l6 October 1953, the 
Branch Chief,[::::::::::::]forwarded to the DTR a propo- 
sal for a new curriculum to replace that which had been 
planned for[::::::::1 His plan called for a four-week 
course which could be given by four instructors, with 
classroom work in Washington, followed by exercises and 
problems at[::::::::::1 Field instruction in underwater 
swimming and maritime sabotage would not be attempted. 
OTB should continue to develop maritime doctrine along 
with training materials.
_ 
By the end of November 1953, arrangements had been 
made for the release of most of theE::::::::@ersonnel. 
The Maritime Training Branch had been slimmed down to
\ 
During this same period, October-November 1953, Mr. 
Baird was deeply involved in the planning of maritime 
training atE:::::::] Many conferences and memoranda were 
necessary to reach a consensus regarding the responsi~ 
bilities and relationships of all the interested parties --- 
The DDCI, the Director of Training, the DD/P, the Chief of 
#2 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440
I 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(3 
<b><1>
— 
<b><8>
1 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
<b><1>
i 
<b><8>
T 
(b)(§’>))(s) 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
VI-UIIL I 
FE Division, the Chief of Tss, the Chief of[:::::::::] 
[:::::::::::::]and the Chief of the Training Base. 
The 
result of this work was a DDCI memorandum.of lT November 
1953 to the Chief of‘ 
‘spelling out 
the relationships and announcing that maritime training 
was to be conducted at[:::::::] 
Following this announcement,[:::::::::::1was promptly 
sent to[::::::]for several weeks to survey the maritime 
training facilities and the instruction being given at that 
location. 
His findings were reported to the DTR on 
9 December 1953. He found that a maritime training section 
as such did not exist. 
Two instructors taught a course 
entitled "Beach Reconnaisance" when there were students who 
needed this particular subject. He felt that conditions on 
[::::::1permitted training in small boat handling through 
surf, underwater sabotage, underwater swimming, seamanship, 
navigation and the like. 
He concluded that maritime training 
could be given on[::::::lbut it would be limited for a number 
of reasons, and he suggested that basic instruction be given 
in Washington and[::::::::::‘using[::::::1as an area for 
advanced training. 
[::::::::::::]discussed his findings with the Chief, FE 
Division and the Chief,[:::::::::::]on l6 December 1953. 
His report of 29 December on this conference indicates that 
M3 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
(b)( 
(b)( 
/68: 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(3) 
)(3)
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
\'H&flWLJ 
the Chief, FE agreed that maritime training should be 
conducted at[:::::::]saying that there were[:::::::::::] 
staff employees at various field posts who should have 
this training and whom.he would arrange to send to[::::::] 
as soon as a course was ready for them. 
He did not know 
if there would be any other requirement. He thought that 
maritime equipent needed for[::::::::]operations should be 
stored in[::::::] His students could be trained in the use 
of this equipment and then request that it be shipped to 
their posts as needed. He asked the Chief,[:::::]to find 
out how many other trainees the Division could make avail- 
able for this training. 
On the basis of this conference, 
[:::::::::::]recommended to the DTR that the Maritime 
Training Branch be directed to prepare a course for presen- 
tation at[::::::1by the end of May l95h. 
He proposed that 
it be five weeks in length, have a maximum of[:::htudents, 
and emphasize in-exfiltration and maritime sabotage. 
As a result, a "Field Maritnne Operations Course" was 
prepared and actually conducted at[::::::1from 6 July l95h 
to 6 August l95h, by 
and 
[:::::1with the assistance of base personnel. 
It was intended 
primarily for field case officers, but as late as the middle 
of June, only[::::]had been nominated, with an additional 
E::::::krom Headquarters. 
Because of the obvious lack of 
Iii]. 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
(b)(b)(3) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(1) 
(b\(3\ 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(3) 
(Em 
( )(‘<b><8> 
‘E"l2 
‘ )“<b><@> 
(b)(3) 
(b)(3)
1' 
i
i
i 
1'
$ 
-i
T 
Z
Z
1 
1
1
1 
Approved 
SE 
Em-zklim-:€ie: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
requirement, as well as the unsuitability of[::::::1for 
this type of training, the course was never given again 
for Americans at that location. 
During the first three months of 195E, the Maritime 
Training Branch was busily engaged in writing training 
materials for theE::::::1course, and otherwise preparing 
for "Maritime Operations Course %l," which began in 
Washington on 5 April with[::]students. 
In addition, 
‘andI 
‘spent some time assisting TSS 
in a testing program, while instructors[:::::]and[::::1took 
the Air Operations Course and[:::::::::::]helped instruct 
in a CE Course. 
The second Maritime Operations Course began on l June 
195% witQUUUU%tudents, a number of whom were from the per- 
manent staff of[::::::::::] At the end of this running, it 
was decided that the third presentation (scheduled for 2T 
September) would be conducted entirely at[::::::::::]rather 
than trying to do half of the course in Washington. 
This 
course then became the prototype of all maritime training 
W0 
The meager demand for the Operations Courses and the 
E::::::]Course was a confirmation of long-standing OTB con- 
cern over requirements. The DTR had addressed a lengthy 
memorandum to the DDCI on T December l953 (just at the time 
[:::::::::::]wes surveying the potential of[::::::] on the 
l|.5
“ 
Gkfi 
I1 
re";-*1 Cf:fi 
-*4 
Approved fo 
elease: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
<b><1> 
<b><8>
; 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(3) 
(b)_(3) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3))(3)
1
I
1
Z
T
€ 
Approved f0r_Re1ease: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
.§l:blil:l 
subject of "Maritime Training." He noted certain expensive 
failures that had taken place in mritime operations because 
they had been run by inexperienced individuals who had had 
no training in this field. And he pointed out that the 
entire OTB training effort in the maritime field in the 
previous two years had consisted of a classroom orientation
1 
provided toE::]staff employees and[::1fbreign nationals. 
(b)(oX3) 
He called attention to the apparent inability of the Clandes-
L 
tine Services to project accurate training requirements or to 
release their people to meet these requirements. 
Before OTB could proceed with a maritime training program, 
said Mr. Baird, it needed answers to certain fundamental 
questions: 
a. 
the extent to which the Agency is engaged in 
clandestine maritime operations, and the extent to which 
it will be engaged in the future; 
b. 
how many individuals in each of the foreign 
divisions are presently qualified to undertake the task 
of planning} directing, or participating in clandestine 
maritime operations; 
c. 
does this pool of trained maritime operators 
constitute the entire Agency requirement for such 
personnel? 
The DTR came to the conclusion in this paper that “it may be 
assumed" that the Agency would be engaged in maritime operations 
and would need personnel trained in that field. 
The memorandum 
M6 
SEBRET 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440
i 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
iéliblilil 
ended with the recommendations that the DD/P be requested 
to provide OTB with a statement of the number of employees 
to be trained for maritime operations, and that the DD/P 
establish a procedure to make sure that these people would 
get the needed training. 
General Cabell promptly sent Mr. Baird's memorandum to 
the DD/P with a request for recommendations for Agency action. 
He stated that Mr. Baird's assumption about the Agency's en- 
gaging in maritime operations was correct, in his opinion, 
and he specifically requested that the DIR be provided with 
an estimate of reqnirements for training. 
The DD/P responded 
on 30 January 195k by saying that the Chief of the Paramilitary 
Operations Staff had been asked to prepare a comprehensive 
analysis of the maritime operational situation by l May 195b, 
with this survey providing the base for specific and meaning- 
ful requirexnents. 
The extant files do not indicate that OTB 
received much significant information as a result of this 
effort. 
1+7 
SFBRFT 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440
_ 
-i
fi 
nd
Z 
an 
.4
a 
an
_
Q 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440
E 
£1 BRET 
CHAPTER V. 
The Human Side 
In reconstructing the history of this period, it is 
easier to find plans, costs, requirements and estimates in 
the files than to learn much about the people involved -- 
their frustrations, their contributions, their conflicts. 
But the attitudes and reactions of the people working on 
[:::::::]were an important part of that Project, and this 
human side was set forth in a number of documents. 
The understandably low state of morale in March l952 
is reflected in two papers dated lb March. 
On this date 
E:::::::::::]requested a transfer to operations (later ex- 
plained as based on professional considerations, not 
personal dissatisfaction), [::::::::::::::]endorsed this re- 
quest favorably, saying that[:::::::::::::1talent5 were being 
misused, and the expectation that they would ever be used was 
remote. He added darkly, “The recent default of certain 
officials with regard to their responsibilities in the mari- 
time field further accentuates this conclusion." 
[::::::::::::::]also requested on the same date his own 
reassignment in the Agency or else a return to the Navy. 
Addressing his memorandum to the DCI, with a copy to the 
Bureau of Naval Personnel, he stated that "responsible 
officials have been unable to reach a decision" about establish 
ing an adequate program, and that he had not been properly 
#8 
REGRET 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
<b>(8> 
(b)(3) 
(b)(3) 
<,b><8
-
—
1 
[jmembers of the Branch be returned to the Navy or to other 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
il)§U|ml 
employed. 
He did not see how any progress in the develop- 
ment of this training could be expected in the foreseeable 
future. 
,, 
(b)(3) 
noted on one of these papers, 
In the 
light of the whole situation, I believe that the Maritime 
Training Branch should be transferred to the Air-Maritime 
Division (of nnP)." But the Branch remained in on-2 and so 
didsd 
on 23 
<b><8> 
£::::::1again requested release either to the Navy or to 
(DX3) 
Agency field operations, citing his dissatisfaction with the 
progress of the[:::::::]project, and pointing out that he, a 
Egggg
I 
specialist in under-water operations, was doing nothing but 
planning and administrative work. 
By some means or other, both men were persuaded to stay 
until the summer of 1953. 
But a greater personnel crisis 
developed in November 1952 than any that had gone before. 
On 
26 November (the day the Director had been expected to make a 
final decision about[::::::::]and just after Mr. Wolf had 
Egggz 
called for a complete re-study),[:::::::::::::::]the Acting 
(bxg 
Chief of MTB, wrote a memorandum to the DTR, recommending that
( 
parts of the Agency, that all personnel being processed for the 
Branch be cancelled, and that the remainder 
‘ 
(bxg 
‘ 
‘he the only ones retained. 
He stated that 
he had prepared this memorandum after consultation with[:::::::::1
" 
b
3 
[::::::::] The reason he gave was the lack of adequate support 
( X 
’+9 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440
) 
b)(3
)
)
i
I 
Id 
If 
ifi 
-f
C
1 
ls
1
1 
Approved for Belease: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
MLHEI 
within the Agency for an effective maritime training program. 
On the same day, 26 November,[:::::::::]submitted a 
separate memorandum.requesting release on the grounds that 
neither his time nor his abilities had'been used effectively 
since he first reported in August 1951, and that "It has been 
repeatedly demonstrated that there is no recognized require- 
ment for maritime training in general, to say nothing of a 
specific requirement for instructors" with highly specialized 
skills. 
£::::::::::::::1also wrote a personal memorandum on the 
same day, in which he stated that he had been thoroughly 
disillusioned after three months in the Agency, citing as 
factors such bureaucratic problems as: unclear missions, de- 
lays in obtaining decisions, lack of long-range planning, and 
1*“ 
Z11 
paralysis of operations by administrative procedures. 
Th 
memorandum.probably reflected accurately the reaction of 
regular Navy officers to the Agency's way of doing business at 
that time. 
It is obvious that on this particular day, emotions 
were at a dangerous point, and OTB officials did not lose any 
time in dealing with the situation. 
‘and 
(b)(3 
at leastflkther officers were given written releases the 
same day, November 26. 
[:::::::::::::::%ummed up his views two months later in 
a memorandum of 21 January 1953, written to the Director of 
Training. 
In this letter, he pointed out that he had been 
ordered to duty with CIA in July l95O at CIA's request, in 
50 
IRFRRET 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
(b)(3) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(3)
) 
(b)(3
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
Atblitl 
spite of his objections for professional and personal reasons. 
But once assigned, he had attempted to perform his duties to 
the best of his ability. 
He had wanted to terminate the re- 
lationship on several occasions, but each time felt obliged 
to subordinate his own desires to the best interests of the 
government. 
He did not concur with a recent suggestion that 
his services could now be dispensed with, feeling that to 
leave before his mission was accomplished might alienate the 
Navy's support of the program. Allegations had been made that 
his way of carrying out this program was not compatible with 
the organization and functioning of CIA; while these allega- 
tions were not without foundation, he did not consider himself 
completely inflexible in his methods if the achievement of 
results required some modification of his ways. 
[::::::::::::::1cited the "frequent shuffling“ of Armed 
Services personnel into and out of the Agency as having caused 
him great difficulty. 
He stated that of the[:::::]officers of 
various ranks, both regular and reserve, from three separate 
services who were assigned to his own office,[::::]requested 
release and return to the parent service within a short time 
after reporting. 
He claimed that he personally dissuaded 
for their leaving, but he evidently felt that the Agency was 
dissipating its fund of good will in the military establishment; 
thenais an implication that the men who left could not tolerate 
the Agency's way of handling the Project. 
In conclusion, he 
51 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
b)(3 
(b)(3 
(b)(3 
I 
<b<’> 
others from leaving. [:::::::::::::1did not specify the reason 
(bX3)
! 
_
4 
:14
_ 
is 
la 
1...‘ 
Ii 
In
S 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
Jibflil 
questioned the advisability of requesting Navy personnel for 
this and comparable programs. 
On 2 February 1953, the Military Personnel Division was 
advised by OTB that it was willing to release[::::::::::::::1 
to the Navy for reassignment in June or July l953.* His three- 
year tour was due to end on A August. 
Before the end of Feb- 
ruary,[::::]received orders detaching him in June 1953. 
The 
fitness report written on him by Matthew Baird on 16 April 
1953 gave him highest marks, stressing his courage, leadership, 
loyalty and tenacity, and saying that£::::lhad completed an 
important project "under conditions of stress and frustration 
which would have broken the spirit of a lesser officer." He 
had worked under four Chiefs of Training --[:::::::::::::1 
Liar. 
Kingsley, and Mr. Baird -- at a time when 
the Office of Training as well as the rest of the Agency was 
going through a series of rapid organizational changes. 
Soon after{::::::::::::::]1eft, OTB also lost[::::::::::::] 
who had been with Maritime Training since September 1951. He 
was released to the Navy Department on 1 July 1953, upon his 
return from his TDY in‘
‘ 
¥This willingness to releaseillwas ex 
O 
' 
the
‘ 
time when it appeared that t.e ease offlplfisfiedlusiaij 
property was practically settled. 
S2 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
(b)(1) 
( 
)(
) 
(b)(?f) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(3) 
/\/\ 
O'D- 
\_/\_/ 
/\/\ 
0000 
\_/\_/ 
(b)(3) 
\~/\~/ 
b
3
3 
/\ 
(,0—\U' 
\/\_/\/ 
(b)( 
(b)(
i
K
Z
i
i
Z 
ad 
an
C
i 
-6 
Approved foklit-let-3fiSEt%]I_2019/06/12 C02344440 
His report to the DIR, dated 25 June 1953, presents a rather 
appalling description of the way the maritime operations 
which he saw were being conducted; apparently conditions 
had not changed much in the two years that had elapsed since 
in 1951, as he had described them in 
an equally critical report. According to [::::::::::] the 
organization for the maritime support of covert operations 
£::::::::1presented a "sad picture," and he expressed great 
concern over the lack of men trained in maritime activities. 
Many of the points he made in his lengthy report were in- 
corporated in subsequent training lectures. 
Just at the 
time he returned, the new site ofE:::::::]was finally selected 
At about the same time,[:::::::::::::::::1gave some in- 
sight on the human side in a memorandum which he wrote to the 
Deputy Director of Training (Special) on 12 June 1953, while 
waiting for the approval of the use of[::::::::::] and move 
to it. 
On that date there were[::::]civilians andE::::::::] 
Navy men on board, with[:::::1more civilians and[:::]Navy men 
in process. 
He described all of these men as highly qualified 
and highly motivated, having made personal and financial sacri 
fices in the interest of[::::::::] The Navy men had had more 
inconvenience than the others; they had lost their incentive 
pay, had trodble about housing, run into security problems, 
and suffered by being out of touch with the Navy environment. 
Nevertheless, they and the civilians professionally recognized 
"the pathetic lack of maritime thinking within the Agency" and 
53 
RFIERFT
i 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
/'\/\ 
O'D- 
\/\_/ 
/'\/\ 
0000 
\/\_/ 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
(b)( 
(b)( 
0O—\ 
/\\_/\/ 
U 
\/ /\ 3) 
(b)( 
(b)( 
00 
—\ 
’_/\\/ 
\/ 
U 
\\/ 
//-\ 00 
s 
-2 
<b><3>»<3> 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
$EBRET 
stood ready to develop a waterborne capability. Their morale 
remained high. 
The setback sustained when[::::::::::::::::] 
was cancelled was miraculously survived, according toE:::::::::1 
[::::::::1hut he predicted that if this should happen a second 
time, the people on board as well as those in process would 
all be lost. The high degree of cooperation shown by the 
Bureau of Personnel in making requested persons available could 
hardly'he expected to continue indefinitely. 
Furthermore, the 
assistance rendered by a number of Navy Department bureaus and 
offices had been of the highest value to CIA, and as an asset 
could not be treated lightly. 
These remarks were made a few months before the use of 
[::::::::::]was cancelled. 
The entire history of[:::::::]was 
characterized by such a high degree of frustration that it is 
a tribute to the men concerned with it that they maintained 
any morale at all. 
The tensions and personal problems that 
went with much of the Agency work in this period have been 
documented and illuminated to an unusual degree in the records 
of Project[::::::::] 
SLL 
SECRET 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
(b)(1)
I 
(b)(3) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3)
-J 
ad 
i
5
d 
~i 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
£$EUBH 
CONCLUSION 
The problems encountered during the effort to establish 
a maritime training program have been related in detail be- 
cause they provide an excellent case history to illustrate 
what the Office of Training was facing in its formative peri- 
od, l950-195%. 
Some of these difficulties would not have 
occurred in a later and more sophisticated period; they arose 
because the Agency and the Training Office did not have either 
the people with the needed specific experience or the organi- 
zation with established procedures, duties and responsibilities 
to cope effectively with the problems. 
In retrospect, it is 
hard to believe that as late as 1952 the Director of Training 
and his staff were independently negotiating a lease for 
[:::::::::::::::]and working out cover arrangements with the 
Navy Department with very little guidance or support from 
security, logistics, or cover specialists. 
But the prob1em.of providing administration and support 
for the Project was not as significant a factor as two other 
problems which were basic in the[:::::::1case. 
The first of 
these was the question of reguirenents (which actually con- 
sisted of three questions):
' 
a. 
Was the training needed? 
[:::::::::::::]in November l9M9 asked operating 
officials if there was a requirement for Agency people 
55
y LSEGBEI 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3)
i 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(3
-C 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
SEGBEE 
to be trained in maritime activities. Three years 
later, in November 1952, Mr. Baird was officially 
asking the same question. 
He asked it again in 
November 1953- 
But during this entire period (l9h9- 
195%), no authoritative answer to this question was 
forthcoming, nor could it be, given the lack of long- 
range planning and policy direction which evidently 
prevailed at this time. 
The files of this time sug- 
gest that the DDCI, the DD/A, and the DTR were more 
concerned with maritime training than the Deputy 
Director for Plans, who was not personally aware, for 
example, of the steps being taken by these others to 
acquire another site after the loss 
of[:::::::::] 
The Chiefs of Training had to depend on 
Stan? elements (Sta-ff II, The as Training Committee, 
AME) to answer the basic question. 
Using the available 
data, OTR made the assumption that the training was 
needed. 
It then became essential to get the answer to 
another question. 
b. 
How many people needed the training? 
The number of trainees to be expected was 
critical for this Project, but from the beginning it 
was impossible to get meaningful figures. 
The estimates 
which were provided changed so frequently that there is 
no way now to tell from the records what the basis for 
OTB planning was at any particular time. 
All of the 
56 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C0234444Q 
- 
sums
| 
"" 
Chiefs of Training kept raising the question of 
numbers to be trained, and went ahead, using the 
estimates provided. 
But these estimates seem to 
have had a flimsy basis. 
On the day 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3)
i 
was cancelled (lh Gctober l953) , the CS Training 
" 
Committee reported that the area divisions were E- 
able to furnish specific requirements or estimate 
the number of students to be trained. 
‘ 
c. 
ifhat did thetrainees need to learn‘? 
What skills did they need to acquire? What 
'1' 
would they be called upon to do‘? 
Who was to provide 
the doctrine? 
Most of the OSS experience and know-how
C 
seemed to have been lost; it was of doubtful applica- 
bility, in any case. 
OPC offered to prepare training 
manuals, but found that it was not able to do so. 
The 
II 
1*€avy's approach was not primarily geared to the support 
of clandestine operations. 
In July l95l, OTB organized 
its own "Doctrine Development Staff ," ‘out ‘the job of 
devising doctrine and preparing manuals still fell to 
the individual instructors, who in the case of maritime 
u 
operations were unable to find out what operations were 
being run or contemplated, with what equipment. 
The Maritime Training Branch did its best at 
1 
the outset to fill in its own gaps in knowledge and ex- 
ur 
Navy schools, and by observing 
But 
perience by observing training 
the U.S.
( 
\.Ti 
-4 
/T 
§s%§ 
\- 
A 
osvv 
£/£/ 
" 
SFBRET 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C0234444Q
Approved f0r_Re1ease: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
étbfltl 
the operating elements of the Agency were unable to
I 
provide any substantial guidance as to what their people 
should be taught. 
The second critical problem presented to OTR by£:::::::1was 
the procurement of qualified instructors. 
Ideally, an instructor 
should have had in his background both operational and teaching 
experience. 
Hopefully, he should have had one or the other. 
Some 
OTR instructors have had neither. 
For[::::::::]the Navy and Army 
seemed to be the only source of supply of instructors. 
But this 
arrangement left much to be desired, as[::::::::::::::1recognized 
in January 1953 (after more than two years in the Project), when 
he questioned the advisability of requesting Navy personnel for 
Project. 
After l952, support problems gradually became manageable, as 
Agency routines became established and as specialists in such fields 
as logistics and security became more available to OTB to provide 
the assistance needed. 
The procurement of instructors in the field 
of clandestine operations continued to be a basic problem until 
1968, when a workable solution seemed.to be reached after years of 
frustration for OTR. But the problem of requirements, so well 
illustrated by the[:::::::1history, has never been solved, although 
appearing possibly less critical in 1969 than in l950-Sh. 
Through 
the years, it has had a direct impact on every part of OTR. 
In retrospect, the history ofE:::::::]and the early days of 
maritime training gives an over-all impression of an aggressive 
and eager young Office of Training, under the leadership of men 
58
I 
Approved for R§EPsE:E!)-19/06/12 C02344440 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(1)
2 
(b)(3) 
(b)(3 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3) 
(b)(1) 
(b)(3)
i
Q 
ii
f
€ 
--e 
Ii 
If
i 
Approved for R_e|ei1se:_2Q19/06/12 C02344440 
mtblilzl 
with OSS experience, convinced. that it should be offering 
maritime training for the support of clandestine operations, 
pushing a reluctant (or maybe confused) Agency in the direction 
of providing trainees and a site for a program for which there 
was no really recognized requirement, and no model to go by. 
'59 
Approved ir§EaE|EsE¢! 2019/06/12 C02344440
ii 
ii
1
‘ 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
SECRET 
APPENDIX A 
A NOTE ON SOURCE MATERIAL 
The information in this historical paper has been 
d.re.wn almost entirely from documents in the Office of the 
Director oi‘ Training or on deposit at the Record Center. 
In all cases, they he-ve been identified in the narrative. 
‘Fnere has been a minimum reliance on interviews, 
other than the checking of details with lmowledgeable 
individuals
. 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440
_ 
H 
.,...__: L 
4;-1.“, 
.- 
.,';"7'{f7" 
w 
-'1 
: 
_,-::- 
::; 
' 
P 
~—A
~ 
,_ 
_ 
_,__‘_.
_ 
- 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
SECRET 
SECRET 
* 
Approved for Release: 2019/06/12 C02344440 
' 
,,,... 
L-1
1
i 
-6
1 
1‘ 
mi 
‘ o{F