Not For Publication 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS 
 
GLORIA FRANCOIS McGOWAN, PAUL 
HOFFMAN, and JANE HOFFMAN 
WALKER, 
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S. Ct. Civ. No. 2013-0018 
Re: Super. Ct. Civ. No. 340/1988 (STT) 
 
 
          Appellants/Plaintiffs, 
 
v. 
 
INEZ MATHIAS HODGE, CYNTHIA 
MILLER, and all other persons claiming an 
interest in the property known and 
described as Parcel No. 14-1 Estate John’s 
Folly Coral Bay Quarter, St. John, United 
States Virgin Islands, 
 
          Appellees/Defendants. 
 
 
) 
 
 
On Appeal from the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands 
Division of St. Thomas & St. John 
Superior Court Judge: Hon. Harold W. L. Willocks 
 
Considered and Filed: June 20, 2017 
 
BEFORE:  
MICHAEL C. DUNSTON, Designated Justice; DOUGLAS A. BRADY, 
Designated Justice; and DENISE A. HINDS ROACH, Designated Justice.1 
 
APPEARANCES: 
 
Maria T. Hodge, Esq. 
Hodge & Francois 
St. Thomas, U.S.V.I. 
 
Attorney for Appellants, 
 
Joseph B.W. Arellano, Esq.  
Arellano & Associates 
St. Thomas, U.S.V.I. 
 
Attorney for Appellees. 
 
                                                 
1 Chief Justice Rhys S. Hodge and Associate Justices Maria M. Cabret and Ive Arlington Swan are 
recused from this matter.  The Honorable Michael C. Dunston, Douglas A. Brady, and Denise A. 
Hinds Roach, all judges of the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands, have been designated in their 
place pursuant to title 4, section 24 of the Virgin Islands Code. 
McGowan v. Hodge 
S. Ct. Civ. No. 2013-0018 
Opinion of the Court 
Page 2 of 6 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
PER CURIAM. 
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to a motion for full panel review of the denial 
of two motions to dismiss, filed by Cynthia Miller, on grounds that Gloria Francois McGowan, 
Paul Hoffman, and Jane Hoffman Walker (collectively “Appellants”) purportedly filed their notice 
of appeal 69 months late.  For the reasons that follow, we re-affirm the denial of the motion to 
dismiss, and—because disposition of that motion is inextricably intertwined with the merits of the 
appeal—vacate the underlying Superior Court orders and remand the case for further proceedings.  
I. BACKGROUND 
 
The instant appeal relates to a nearly fifty-year dispute over land located on St. John, the 
facts of which were previously stated by this Court in its November 10, 2008 opinion.  Hodge v. 
McGowan (McGowan I), 50 V.I. 296, 299-304 (V.I. 2008).  Almost three weeks before Miller and 
her co-defendant, Inez Mathias Hodge, filed the notice of appeal in McGowan I with this Court on 
April 12, 2007, Appellants filed a motion for attorney’s fees and costs with the Superior Court on 
March 23, 2007.  While the McGowan I appeal was pending, the Superior Court signed an order, 
dated May 17, 2007, denying that motion. 
 
After this Court issued its decision in McGowan I on November 10, 2008, Appellants filed 
a renewed motion for an award of costs and attorney’s fees with the Superior Court on January 7, 
2009, which re-stated the original clam for attorneys fees and did not reference the May 17, 2007 
order.  After the death of the judge assigned to the matter, the case was re-assigned to a different 
Superior Court judge, who held a hearing on March 22, 2012, and permitted further filings from 
the parties.  During this period, Appellants discovered that the May 17, 2007 order had been 
entered on the docket, but advised the Superior Court that they had never received a copy of it.   
McGowan v. Hodge 
S. Ct. Civ. No. 2013-0018 
Opinion of the Court 
Page 3 of 6 
 
The Superior Court held a hearing on October 29, 2012, and issued an opinion and order 
on February 6, 2013.  First, the Superior Court concluded that although “it is possible that an error 
occurred during distribution” of the May 17, 2007 order, it “does not excuse the almost two-year 
lapse in action,” since Appellants “should have made a good faith effort to determine if an order 
had been entered on the original motion.”  (J.A. 316.)  The Superior Court then construed the 
January 7, 2009 motion as a motion for reconsideration of the May 17, 2007 order, and denied it 
on the basis that the original determination was not clearly erroneous.  (J.A. 318.) 
Appellants timely filed their notice of appeal with this Court on March 7, 2013.  Although 
the parties filed merits briefs, Miller concurrently filed two motions to dismiss the appeal for lack 
of jurisdiction, the first on June 11, 2013, and the second on August 16, 2013. Due to the recusal 
of the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of this Court, the motions were referred to the only 
Designated Justice who had been appointed to hear this case at the time.  After the Designated 
Justice denied both motions, and two additional Designated Justices were appointed to the panel, 
Miller filed a motion on November 4, 2013 requesting that the entire panel review that decision de 
novo.  See V.I.S.CT.R. 24(c). 
II. DISCUSSION 
In her motions to dismiss, Miller maintains that this Court should dismiss this action 
because (1) Appellants’ appeal is untimely since it seeks to challenge the May 17, 2007 order; and 
(2) the February 6, 2013 opinion and order is not a final judgment because Miller’s motion for 
attorneys fees, filed on February 21, 2013, remains pending in the Superior Court.2  With respect 
                                                 
2 Miller also notes that motions filed by various non-parties, who never sought, nor received, 
permission to intervene, are also pending in the Superior Court.  However, collateral motions filed 
by non-parties—to the extent they are even properly before the Superior Court, see In re Simon, 
490 Fed.Appx. 488, 488 (3d Cir. 2013)—do not affect the finality of a judgment.  See Moorhead 
McGowan v. Hodge 
S. Ct. Civ. No. 2013-0018 
Opinion of the Court 
Page 4 of 6 
 
to the first claim, Appellants have not appealed from the May 17, 2007 order; rather, they state in 
their notice of appeal that they “hereby appeal . . . from the order of the Superior Court entered 
February 6, 2013.”  While Appellants maintain that this order should be reversed because it gave 
effect to the May 17, 2007 order, it is well-establisehd that February 6, 2013 represents the time 
from which the 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal began to run.  Accord, Ernest v. Morris, 
64 V.I. 627, 636 (V.I. 2016) (notice of appeal was timely filed on August 23, 2013, when appellant 
appealed from a July 24, 2013 order denying a motion to set aside judgments entered on August 
14, 1997, and January 24, 2008 as void).  Consequently, Appellants timely filed their notice of 
appeal of the February 6, 2013 order on March 7, 2013. See V.I.S.CT.R. 5(a)(1) (a party may file 
a notice of appeal in a civil case within 30 days of the order appealed from). 
Miller’s contention that the February 6, 2013 order is not a final judgment because her own 
attorneys’ fees motion remains pending in the Superior Court raises a more critical question.  In 
one of its earliest decisions, this Court has held that “[t]he ripeness doctrine applies to motion[s]” 
and that “[a] ruling on a motion for attorney’s fees must be vacated on ripeness grounds when the 
presence of ongoing litigation”—such as an appeal—“precludes an informed determination of 
whether the moving party is in fact entitled to attorney’s fees under the relevant law.”  V.I. Gov’t 
Hosps. & Health Facilities Corp. v. Gov’t of the V.I., 50 V.I. 276, 280 (V.I. 2008) (emphasis 
added).  This Court has repeatedly re-affirmed this principle in more recent decisions as well.  See, 
e.g., Mahabir v. Heirs of George, 63 V.I. 651, 665 (V.I. 2015); Hodge v. Bluebeard’s Castle, Inc., 
62 V.I. 671, 700 (V.I. 2015); Simon v. Joseph, 59 V.I. 611, 629 (V.I. 2013).  Because the Superior 
Court cannot rule on Miller’s attorney’s fees motion while this appeal is pending, the pendency of 
                                                 
v. Mapp, 62 V.I. 595, 598 (V.I. 2015) (“a final appealable judgment” is one that “resolve[s] all 
claims between the parties”). 
McGowan v. Hodge 
S. Ct. Civ. No. 2013-0018 
Opinion of the Court 
Page 5 of 6 
 
an attorney’s fees motion does not defeat the finality of an otherwise final judgment.  See Khalil 
v. Guardian Ins. Co., 59 V.I. 892, 897 (V.I. 2013); Simpson v. Golden, 56 V.I. 272, 274-75 (V.I. 
2012); accord, V.I.S.CT.R. 5(a)(4). 
But just as our precedents provide that the Superior Court cannot rule on Miller’s February 
21, 2013 motion for attorney’s fees during the pendency of this appeal, the Superior Court also 
could not have ruled on Appellants’ March 23, 2007 motion for attorney’s fees while McGowan I 
remained pending with this Court.  Rather, the Superior Court should have “refus[ed] to exercise 
jurisdiction” over the motion.  Hodge, 62 V.I. at 700 (quoting V.I. Gov’t Hosps. & Health Facilities 
Corp., 50 V.I. at 280-81).  Thus, the Superior Court’s May 17, 2007 order constitutes a nullity—
regardless of whether or not it was duly served on Appellants—in that it was issued despite an 
effective notice of appeal having been filed with this Court.  See In re Rogers, 56 V.I. 325, 342 
(V.I. 2012) (“[A]n effective notice of appeal of a final order typically divests the trial court of 
jurisdiction.”).  Yet even though the May 17, 2007 order lacked legal effect, the Superior Court, 
in its February 6, 2013 opinion, granted it deference, and expressly stated that it would only issue 
a different attorney’s fees determination if necessary to correct a manifest error.  (J.A. 317.)  In 
doing so, the Superior Court applied the incorrect legal standard, since the May 17, 2007 order, as 
a nullity, was without legal effect.  Vanterpool v. Gov’t of the V.I., 63 V.I. 563, 572 (V.I. 2015).  
Consequently, this appeal presents no substantial question, in that the disposition is wholly 
controlled by prior precedent, see Mustafa v. Camacho, 59 V.I. 566, 570 (V.I. 2013) (citing V.I. 
S.Ct. I.O.P. 9.4), and we thus summarily vacate the February 6, 2013 opinion and order and direct 
the Superior Court, on remand, to adjudicate Appellants’ March 23, 2007 motion without reference 
to or deference towards the May 17, 2007 order. 
 
McGowan v. Hodge 
S. Ct. Civ. No. 2013-0018 
Opinion of the Court 
Page 6 of 6 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we deny both of Miller’s motions to dismiss because Appellants 
filed a timely notice of appeal from a final judgment.  However, since the Superior Court applied 
a heightened manifest error standard to Appellants’ March 23, 2007 motion, even though the May 
17, 2007 order denying their earlier motion for attorney’s fees constituted a nullity, we vacate the 
Superior Court’s February 6, 2013 opinion and order and direct it, on remand, to instead consider 
Appellants’ motion under the correct legal standard.   
Dated this 20th day of June, 2017. 
 
ATTEST:  
 
VERONICA J. HANDY, ESQ. 
Clerk of the Court