SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS 
DIVISION OF ST. THOMAS AND ST. JOHN 
PAUL PICmERRI, 
VS. 
DENNIS CROWLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
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) CASE NO. ST -08-CV -340 
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 
Pending before the Court are (1) Defendant Dennis Crowley'S January 7, 2010, 
Renewed Motion to Dismiss I and (2) Plaintiff Paul Pichierri's December 29, 2009, 
Motion for Extension to Conduct Jurisdictional Discovery. For the following reasons, the 
Court will deny Plaintiffs motion, will grant Defendant's motion, and will dismiss this 
case with prejudice. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In June, 2005, Inter-Island Pharmacies, Inc. ("Inter-Island"), d/b/a Doctor's 
Choice Pharmacy ("Doctor's Choice"), hired Plaintiff to be its Director of Operations. 
Inter-Island is a corporation organized under the laws of the Virgin Islands. In November, 
2005, Inter-Island was sold to PNC Capital Group Ltd. ("PNC"), which is incorporated 
under the laws of the state of Florida. As a result of the sale of Inter-Island to PNC, 
Defendant, a citizen and resident of Florida, became President of Doctor's Choice. On 
April 5, 2006, Plaintiff tendered his resignation to his employer, Inter-Island. On July 9, 
I Plaintiff filed an Opposition on February 4, 2010, and Defendant filed a Reply on February 22, 2010. 
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Pichierri v. Crowley, ST-08-CV-340 
Memorandum Opinion, May 20, 2010 
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2008, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendant alleging breach of contract, breach of 
the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and tortious interference with contract. 
ANALYSIS 
a) Plaintiff's Motion for Extension 
In a June 29, 2009, Order, this Court granted Plaintiffs request for jurisdictional 
discovery and permitted Plaintiff ninety (90) days to conduct discovery on these issues. 
On November 17, 2009, the Court ordered Plaintiff to supplement his submission 
regarding Defendant's original motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction by 
November 30, 2009. On December 29, 2009, Plaintiff filed a motion for extension to 
conduct jurisdictional discovery until April 15, 2010, on the basis that Plaintiff was 
unaware of the June 29, 2009, Order. Plaintiff concedes, however, that his lack of notice 
of the June 29, 2009, Order was due to his own fIrm's technological error. (Affidavit of 
Ryan Green, Esq., at page 2). 
Foremost, Plaintiffs counsel has a duty to keep himself apprised of the status of 
his client's case. See Edward H Bohlin Co., Inc. v. Banning Co., Inc., 6 F.3d 350, 357 
(5th Cir. 1993); Tartaglia v. Del Papa, 48 F.R.D. 292, 293 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Gibson-
Michaels v. Bair, 255 F.R.D. 306, 307 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (finding that failure to receive 
notice of fIling did not absolve counsel of his "affirmative duty to stay apprised of the 
status of the case"); Easley v. Kirmsee, 382 F.3d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that a 
attorney's "inattentiveness to litigation is not excusable, no matter what the resulting 
consequences the attorney's somnolent behavior may have on a litigant"). 
In addition, Plaintiffs counsel has demonstrated a pattern of dilatoriness through 
out this proceeding, failing to comply with this Court's November 17, 2009, Order; this 
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Pichierri v. Crowley, ST-08-CV-340 
Memorandum Opinion, May 20, 2010 
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Court's October 27, 2008, Order;2 and this Court's January 21, 2009, Order.3 Moreover, 
the record does not reveal that Plaintiff has conducted any jurisdictional discovery since 
the time he learned the initial extension was granted. The second discovery extension 
period requested by Plaintiff would have expired a month ago, and Plaintiff has still not 
provided additional evidence regarding jurisdiction. Under these circumstances, the Court 
can conclude only that the request for an additional extension was filed merely for the 
purpose of delay. As a result, this Court will deny Plaintiffs December 29,2009, motion 
for extension as moot. Consequently, the Court will determine whether it may exercise 
jurisdiction over Defendant based on the previous submissions of the parties. 
b) Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
Defendant submits a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), 
12(b)(4), 12(b)(5),4 and 12(b)(6). 
When reviewing a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) defense, a court may only exercise 
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant in compliance the long-arm statute of the 
forum and the Due Process Clause of the u.s. Constitution. Terranova, Inc., v. Zellner, 
2003 WL 1712516, at ... 1 (D.V.1. 2003). Due process requires that a defendant have 
"minimum contacts" with a forum state. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 
(1945). "Minimum contacts" may be met if a plaintiff can demonstrate general or claim-
specific jurisdiction. See Remick v. ManJredy, 238 F.3d 248, 255 (3d Cir. 2001). General 
2 Plaintiff failed to comply with this Court's October 27,2008, Order, which had granted the parties' 
stipulation to extend this Court's deadline for Plaintiff to file a response to Defendant's motion to dismiss 
from October 27,2008, to November 11,2008. On November 21,2008, Plaintiff requested ten (10) days to 
respond to Defendant's motion, which this Court granted on December 15, 2008. 
3 On January 21,2009, the Court ordered Plaintiff to respond to Defendant's motion within ten (10) days of 
the Order. On February 9, 2009, Plaintiff filed another request for an extension, requesting ten (lO) days to 
respond to Defendant's motion, although Plaintiff filed his Opposition the same day. 
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Pichierri v. Crowley, ST-08-CV-340 
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jurisdiction is based upon "continuous and systematic contacts" with the forum and exists 
even if a plaintiff's cause of action does not arise from the defendant's forum related 
activities. Metcalfe v. Renaissance Marine, Inc., 566 F.3d 324,334 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing 
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984». Specific 
jurisdiction exists if a plaintiffs cause of action arises out of the defendant's forum-
related activities, such that the defendant would anticipate being subject to the laws of 
that forum. Gerald Chamales Corp. v. Oki Data Americas, Inc., 557 F.Supp.2d 494, 498 
(D.N.J.2008). 
Generally, a court does not have personal jurisdiction over an individual when his 
or her contacts with a forum are made only in his or her corporate capacity. Urgent v. 
Technical Assistance Bureau, Inc., 255 F.Supp.2d 532, 538 (D.V.I. 2003). However, a 
corporate officer may be personally liable if he or she engages in tortious conduct in his 
or her corporate capacity. Id; see also 5 V.I.e. § 4903(a)(3)5 (the Virgin Islands long arm 
statute). Additionally, a court may "exercise personal jurisdiction over a corporate officer 
when there is a basis for piercing the corporate veil." Urgent, supra, at 538 (citing PSC 
Professional Services Group, Inc. v. American Digital Systems, Inc., 555 F.Supp. 788, 
792 (E.D. Pa. 1983». A plaintiff bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, facts that demonstrate that a court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant. 
Horton v. Martin, 133 Fed.Appx. 859,860 (3d Cir. 2005). 
4 For purposes of this Opinion, the Court will decline to address Defendant's Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(4) and 
12(b)(5) arguments as this decision is based on Rules 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6). 
5 "A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim 
for relief arising from the person's (sic) ... causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this territory." 
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Pichierri v. Crowley, ST-08-CV-340 
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Here, Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit stating that Defendant "came to St. 
Thomas every month for at least a week, and sometimes more than once a month to 
further exercise control over the business operations." (Pichierri Affadavit, at page 2). In 
addition, Plaintiff submits a series of emails Defendant sent to Plaintiff between 
November 7, 2005, and January 18, 2006, in which Defendant appears to be directing 
Plaintiff on certain issues. (plaintiff s Opposition, Exhibits 3-11). Plaintiff alleges that, 
through these contacts with the Virgin Islands, Defendant tortiously interfered with 
Plaintiff s employment contract with Inter-Island. 
In Gehling v. St. George's School of Medicine, Ltd., the Third Circuit found that a 
court had jurisdiction over a defendant that allegedly committed a tort in the forum state 
because defendant's agent had traveled to the forum state, the defendant had availed itself 
of acting within the forum state, and the cause of action arose from defendant's in-state 
activities. 773 F.2d 539, 544 (3d Cir. 1985). As a result, it would appear that this Court 
has personal jurisdiction over Defendant in this case as well. 
Notwithstanding, in his original motion to dismiss,6 Defendant asserted a statute 
of limitations defense with respect to the tort claim. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), made applicable to the Superior Court through SUPER 
CT. R. 7, provides that upon motion by the pleader, a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or 
third party claim shall be dismissed when there is a "failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted" to the claimant. Furthermore, FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d) states that "if, 
on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) matters outside the pleading are presented and 
6 Defendant filed this motion on October 2, 2008, and the motion was his first appearance in the case. 
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Memorandum Opinion, May 20, 2010 
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not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment 
under Rule 56." 
Defendant submitted matters outside the pleadings in support of its Motion. 
Plaintiff s Opposition also contained matters outside the pleadings. Therefore, this Court 
must consider Defendant's Motion under a summary judgment standard. Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c)(2) requires that summary judgment may be granted only if the "pleadings, the 
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter oflaw." 
The statutory period of limitations for a tort in the Virgin Islands is two years. 5 
V.I.e. § 31. Pursuant to the doctrine of equitable tolling, however, the statutory 
limitations period: 
for a second action may be equitably tolled by the filing of an earlier 
action dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction if: (1) the first action 
gave the defendant timely notice of plaintiffs claim; (2) the lapse of time 
between the first and second actions will not prejudice the defendant; and 
(3) the plaintiff prosecuted the first action in good faith and diligently filed 
the second action. 
Island Insteel Systems, Inc. v. Waters, 296 F.3d 200, 204-205 (3d Cir. 2002). The 
doctrine "avoids the unfairness to plaintiffs that would occur if plaintiffs who diligently 
but mistakenly prosecute their claims in a court that lacks personal jurisdiction find their 
claims time-barred when they refile in a proper jurisdiction." Williams v. Government of 
Virgin Islands, 2009 WL 1649752, at *9 (V.1. Super. Ct. 2009) (quoting Waters, supra, at 
205). See also Hypolite v. Marriott Ownership Resorts (St. Thomas), Inc., 2009 WL 
3497119, at *4 (V.1. Super. Ct. 2009) ("equitable tolling not available if the claimant has 
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Pichierri v. Crowley, ST-08-CV-340 
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failed to exercise due diligence in preserving his or her legal right whether the delay is 
attributable to the plaintiffs attorney"). 
In Plaintiffs original opposition to Defendant's original motion to dismiss, 
Plaintiff concedes that the statutory limitations period for a tort claim lapsed in this case, 
given that Plaintiff tendered his resignation on April 5, 2006, and that the Complaint in 
this case was filed on July 9, 2008. (Original opposition, at pages 18 and 19). 
Nevertheless, Plaintiff argues the statutory limitations period should be tolled because 
Plaintiff effected service upon Defendant on March 15, 2008, in a related case, Case No. 
ST-06-CV-515, in which Defendant is a named Defendant. Although the complaints in 
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ST -06-CV -515 and in this case are virtually identical, each including a claim of tortious 
inference with contract against Defendant Crowley, Plaintiff did not serve Defendant 
Crowley within 120 days of filing his complaint in the ST-06-CV-515 case as prescribed 
by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). In fact, Plaintiff concedes that he "agreed to dismiss his claims 
against [Defendant Crowley in the ST-06-CV-515 case] based upon lack of timely 
service." (Plaintiffs April 2, 2009, Opposition to Proposed Order in the ST-06-CV-SI5 
case). 
Notwithstanding, Plaintiff argues that Defendant evaded service until March 15, 
2008, and received notice of the claims against him personally when his company PNC 
was served with the complaint in the ST-06-CV-515 case, Plaintiff has provided no 
evidence justifying the late service upon Defendant or that Defendant actually or 
constructively received notice when PNC was served. See Catalano v. TWA., Inc., 1978 
WL 4970, at *2 (Del. Ch. 1978) (officer not deemed to be personally served simply 
because valid service was made upon the corporation). Plaintiffs failure to diligently 
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prosecute his claims against Defendant in Case No. ST -06-CV -515 makes the doctrine of 
equitable tolling inapplicable in this case. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claim against 
Defendant for any and all torts in this matter, including the claim of tortious inference 
with contract, will be dismissed. 
In addition, Plaintiff also alleges claims of breach of contract and breach of the 
duty of good faith and fair dealing7 in his Complaint. Plaintiff asserts that this Court has 
jurisdiction over Defendant with respect to the contract claims because, although 
Plaintiffs contract is with Inter-Island, Defendant is allegedly the alter ego of Inter-
Island and there is a basis to pierce the corporate veil to find Defendant liable on these 
claims. 
When reviewing a request to pierce the corporate veil, the following factors are to 
be considered: 
(1) whether the corporation suffers from gross undercapitalization; (2) 
failure to observe corporate formalities; (3) non-payment of dividends; (4) 
insolvency of debtor corporation; (5) siphoning of funds from the debtor 
corporation by the dominant stockholder; (6) nonfunctioning officers; (7) 
absence of corporate records; and (8) whether the corporation is merely a 
facade for the operation of the dominant stockholder. 
Matheson v. v.I. Community Bank, Corp., 297 F.Supp.2d 819, 833 (D.V.I. 2003) (citing 
Pearson v. Component Technology Corp., 247 F.3d 471, 484-85 (3d Cir. 2001)). Because 
piercing the corporate veil is an equitable remedy, it requires "clear and convincing 
evidence" 8 that the corporate structure is being used to perpetuate fraud or similar 
injustice. Wallace ex rei. Cencom Cable Income Partners IL L.P. v. Wood, 752 A.2d 
1175, 1184 (Del. Ch. 1999); see also Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Kenneth R. 
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Pichierri v. Crowley, ST-08-CV-340 
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Ambrose, Inc., 727 F.2d 279, 284 (3d Cir. 1983) (alter ego concept is a tool of equity to 
be used to "prevent fraud, illegality or injustice, or when recognition of the corporate 
entity would defeat public policy or shield someone from public liability for a crime"); 
Anderson v. Lorck-Schierning, 20 V.1. 200,206-207 CD.V.I. 1983) (the corporate shield 
may not be used to evade a legal obligation or perpetuate an injustice). Mere conclusory 
allegations that a shareholder is the "alter ego" of a corporation, however, are insufficient 
to pierce the corporate veil. Matheson, supra, at 833. 
Plaintiff argues that Defendant is the alter ego of PNC, and, by extension, of 
Inter-Island, which is owned by PNC. (Plaintiffs Opposition, at page 3). As a 
consequence, to find Defendant liable under the contract claims, the Court would need to 
pierce the veils of both PNC and Inter-Island. Generally, "the local law of the state of 
incorporation will be applied to determine the existence and extent of a shareholder's 
liability to the corporation ... and to its creditors for corporate debts." In re Tutu Wells 
Contamination Litigation, 909 F.Supp. 1005, 1009 (D.V.1. 1995) (citing Restatement 
(Second) of Conflicts § 307). Considering that PNC is a Florida corporation, this Court 
would be required to apply the law of Florida to determine whether to pierce the 
corporate veil of PNC. Plaintiff, however, has neither provided the elements of law with 
respect to piercing the corporate veil in Florida, nor has Plaintiff presented the requisite 
facts to show that Plaintiff has met these elements to demonstrate that this Court should 
exercise jurisdiction over Defendant. 
7 Considering these two claims are intertwined, the Court will treat these claims as one for the purposes of 
the jurisdictional inquiry. 
8 Matheson, supra, at 833. 
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In addition, although Plaintiff cites case law concerning piercing the corporate 
veil in the Virgin Islands and has presented some evidence indicating Defendant's level 
of control over Inter-Island, Plaintiff has provided no evidence of the injustice that would 
arise if this Court declined to disregard Inter-Island's separate corporate existence. 
Nevertheless, it is incumbent upon Plaintiff to demonstrate a link between the abuse of 
the corporate form and the fraud or injustice to which he is subject. See Fontaine Trust v. 
P & J Resources, Inc., 2010 WL 1529399, at *7 (E.D. Ky. 2010). "Absent evidence of 
,some fraud or injustice resulting directly from the abuse of the corporate form, the 
specific, unusual circumstances necessary to justify piercing the corporate veil are 
lacking." Hodak v. Madison Capital Mgmt., LLC, 348 Fed.Appx. 83,95 (6th Cir. 2009). 
Here, Plaintiff has a suit against Inter-Island pending before another Superior 
Court judge for the same breach of contract claims. Considering Plaintiff is pursuing 
breach of contract claims against the corporation, there is no reason to pierce the 
corporate veil with respect to Inter-Island to determine whether this Court may exercise 
jurisdiction over Defendant in this case. As a consequence, this Court does not have 
jurisdiction over Defendant concerning Plaintiffs breach of contract and breach of the 
duty of good faith and fair dealing claims, and this case will be dismissed with prejudice. 
An Order consistent with this Opinion shall follow. ~ 
Dated: May!£.,2010 
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HON. MICRA 
. DUNSTON 
ATTEST: Venetia H. Velazquez, Esq. 
Clerk~/ 
__ 
By 
~ 
R~lie Griffith 
Court Clerk Supervisor 6 / /8. /-&-
JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT 
OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS 
10 
CERTIF.fFl) A TRUJi COPY 
Date: TW1c:=.- 22-1 20{() 
Venetia H. Vel~quez, Esa 
Clerk of the Court ' . 
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