IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS DIVISION OF ST. THOMAS AND ST. JOHN ) PEOPLE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS, ) ) Case No. ST-15-CR-415 Plaintiff, ) vs. ) ) JASON B. COULTER, ) ) Defendant. ) ) MEMORANDUM OPINION THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Jason B. Coulter’s “Motion to Dismiss Criminal Complaint” filed April 20, 2018 (the “Motion to Dismiss”).! For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss will be denied and the People will receive one last opportunity to bring Coulter to trial. Relevant Background Defendant Jason B. Coulter (“Coulter”) is charged with First Degree Murder, Second Degree Murder, First Degree Assault, Third Degree Assault and related weapons offenses. Coulter was arrested in Florida on July 5, 2015 and eventually extradited to the Virgin Islands. He was arraigned on December 38, 2015. The People allege that at some point between November 28, 2014 and November 29, 2014, Coulter murdered his roommate, William Ray Bennett, at the apartment they shared in St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands and then attempted to 1 The People filed an opposition on April 24, 2018 (the “Opposition”), and Defendant filed a response on May 1, 2018 (the “Reply”). OOOO People v. Jason Coulter Case No. ST-15-CR-415 Memorandum Opinion Page 2 of 17 destroy evidence associated with the crime. Coulter has been in custody since his arrest on July 5, 2015. Coulter argues that the charges against him should be dismissed pursuant to the Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial guarantee. He asserts that the nearly three-year delay, caused primarily by acts and omissions of the People, has resulted in oppressive confinement and favors dismissal. The People take no responsibility for the delays, instead arguing that the factors contributing to said delays were “unintentional, unavoidable, not in bad faith” and that Coulter himself shares responsibility for the time elapsed between his arrest and his trial. Opp. 2. The People ask that the Court allow this matter to proceed to trial during the next trial period (in August 2018) and state they will move to dismiss without prejudice if they cannot proceed to trial at that time. Legal Standard “A criminal defendant is guaranteed a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which is applicable in the Virgin Islands pursuant to the Revised Organic Act of 1954.” Francis v. Virgin Islands, 63 V.I. 724, 744, 2015 V.I. Supreme LEXIS 35. Discussion In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972), the United States Supreme Court identified four factors a court should assess in determining whether a defendant has been deprived of their Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. As weighed by the Virgin Islands Supreme Court, the four “Barker factors” are “(1) the length of delay; ——————————— =< ll CY People v. Jason Coulter Case No. ST-15-CR-415 Memorandum Opinion Page 3 of 17 (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his rights; and (4) prejudice to the defendant.” Carty v. People of the V.I., 56 V.I. 345, 364, 2012 V.I. Supreme LEXIS 15. “The most important factor to evaluate is whether the defendant suffered prejudice from the delay.” Rivera v. People of the Virgin Islands, 64 V.1. 540, 582, 2016 V.I. Supreme LEXIS 16. The Court will address each Barker factor in turn. (1) Length of Delay “The length of delay is measured from either the date of arrest or the date a defendant is indicted, whichever is earlier.” People of the V-I. v. Hakim, 2014 V.I. LEXIS 67, at *8 (V.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 21, 2014). The length of delay in bringing a defendant to trial “is a ‘trigger’ that, if found to be ‘presumptively prejudicial,’ requires a court to consider and weigh the remaining three Barker factors.” Brown v. People of the V.I., 55 V.1. 496, 503, 2011 V.I. Supreme LEXIS 13 (citing Doggett v. United States, 505 U-S. 647, 652-53 (1992)), overruled in part on different grounds by Williams v. People of the Virgin Islands, 56 V.1. 821, 832 n.8, 2012 V.I. Supreme LEXIS 54. The Supreme Court has recognized that “a delay over 12 months is presumed to be sufficiently prejudicial to require evaluation of the three remaining factors.” Rivera, 64 V.I. at 582 (citing Carty, 56 V.I. at 365). Coulter was arrested on July 5, 2015, just shy of three years ago. Thus, the delay easily passes the prejudicial threshold and is sufficient to require the Court to consider and weigh the remaining Barker factors. ae | People v. Jason Coulter Case No. ST-15-CR-415 Memorandum Opinion Page 4 of 17 (2) Reason for the Delay Once the Court has determined that a delay is sufficiently lengthy to trigger a speedy-trial analysis, the Court must then determine which party is responsible for the delay and why. Francis, 63 V.I. at 748. “Delays attributed to the People weigh in favor of a defendant's speedy trial claim, while delays attributed to the defendant do not.” Rivera, 64 V.I. at 582. “The reason for the delay impacts the weight given a particular delay.” Francis, 63 V.I. at 748. “A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the government.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. “However, ‘[a] more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government... .” People of the V.I. v. Tlarraza, 2013 V.I. LEXIS 70, at *9 (VI. Super. Ct. Dec. 5, 2013) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 531). Many factors have contributed to the delay in this matter. The Court will examine them separately. (i) Extradition On February 2, 2015, the People issued a warrant for Coulter’s arrest. Coulter was subsequently arrested in Florida on July 5, 2016; he was returned to the Territory on or about November 12, 2015 and arraigned on December 3, 2015. According to Coulter, the delay between his arrest and his return to the Territory was due to the People’s failure to provide the State of Florida with the necessary warrant to initiate extradition proceedings. The People do not address this four-month delay —— People v. Jason Coulter Case No. ST-15-CR-415 Memorandum Opinion Page 5 of 17 nor challenge Coulter’s assertions. Therefore, those four months will be counted against the People, even if the delay was not deliberate. (ii) Recusals The matter was initially assigned to Judge Adam Christian, but he left the bench sometime during the summer of 2016 and the Honorable James S. Carroll, I], Senior Sitting Judge, temporarily assumed responsibility for the departing judge’s caseload. Ata bail hearing on August 19, 2016, Judge Carroll noted a possible conflict with Coulter’s potential third-party custodians. The People asked that Judge Carroll recuse himself from further proceedings and by an Order dated August 22, 2016, he did so. The case was re-assigned to Judge Renee Gumbs-Carty, but she too had a conflict. As a result, on September 8, 2016, Judge Gumbs-Carty also recused herself. The matter was reassigned to the undersigned judicial officer on September 15, 2016. This one-month delay is minor, unintentional and does not weigh against either party. Upon reassignment to the undersigned judicial officer she issued an amended scheduling order, setting a pretrial conference for January 24, 2017 and jury selection for February 13, 2017. The bail hearing was also rescheduled for November 21, 2016. The delay caused by the reassignments is minimal and is not weighed heavily against the prosecution. People v. Rivera, 54 V.I. 116, 125 (Super. Ct. 2010) (delays caused by the retirement of one judge and reassignment to another are generally not weighed heavily against the prosecution). ee sié.é.e..#. lee People v. Jason Coulter Case No. ST-15-CR-415 Memorandum Opinion Page 6 of 17 (ii) Discovery Coulter asserts that the People substantially delayed this proceeding by not providing initial discovery in a timely manner. The original Scheduling Order stated that discovery was to be completed by December 31, 2015.2 On February 23, 2016, Coulter filed a Motion to Compel or Dismiss for People’s Failure to Provide Discovery (the “Motion to Compel”). By Order issued May 16, 2016, the Court ordered the People to produce initial discovery by May 26, 2016; the People ultimately produced the discovery on May 27, 2017. The People fail to address this delay. This unexplained six-month delay weighs against the People. (iv) Continuances At a pretrial conference on January 24, 2017, Coulter moved to continue the trial date in order to locate a witness. The request was not opposed by the People. The Court granted the motion, rescheduled the pretrial conference for April 18, 2017 and rescheduled jury selection for May 8, 2017. On February 24, 2017, the Office of the Territorial Public Defender moved to withdraw from representing Coulter. The Court granted the request and new counsel was appointed on March 20, 2017. Coulter subsequently moved for additional continuances on April 18, 2017 (asking to continue the May 8, 2017 trial date) and July 19, 2017 (asking to continue 2 The Court notes that Coulter did not submit a demand for discovery to the People until December 23, 2015. 3 Defendant also stated he was still awaiting certain documents from the prosecution, but the prosecution stated they had turned over all documents. I __— eee | People v. Jason Coulter Case No. ST-15-CR-415 Memorandum Opinion Page 7 of 17 the August 7, 2017 trial date). The People did not oppose either request and both were granted, with pretrial conference ultimately rescheduled for October 3, 2017 and jury selection rescheduled for October 23, 2017. This eight-month delay is attributable to Coulter.‘ (v) Hurricanes On September 6, 2017 and September 20, 2017, St. Thomas was devastated by Hurricanes Irma and Maria. When the matter came on for pretrial conference on October 3, 2017 (in preparation for the October 23, 2017 trial date), neither Defendant nor his counsel appeared. The Bureau of Corrections had transferred Coulter to St. Croix as a result of the hurricanes and it had not yet returned him to St. Thomas. In light of the aftermath of the hurricanes, the Court recognized that it was unlikely that a jury array could be assembled during the October 23, 2017 trial period, and as a result the Court sua sponte cancelled that trial date. But in an effort to move the case forward, the Court rescheduled the pretrial conference for October 25, 2017 and jury selection for October 30, 2017. At the pretrial conference on October 25, 2017, the People stated that as a result of the hurricanes they were having difficulty reaching their witnesses and would be unable to proceed as scheduled. Coulter's counsel stated that he had been unable to reach his client due to the storms® and that his office had been destroyed. The Court also noted that assembling a jury array so soon after the storms was still impossible. For all of these reasons, the Court was 4 The delay created by the People’s late production of discovery is off-set by the delay attributed to Coulter, here. 5 Coulter was still housed at the Bureau of Corrections in St. Croix. nT People v. Jason Coulter Case No. ST-15-CR-415 Memorandum Opinion Page 8 of 17 forced to remove the matter from the October 30, 2017 calendar and moved the pretrial conference to January 9, 2018 and jury selection to January 22, 2018. This unavoidable delay following the hurricanes is neutral and weighs against neither party. (vit) Witnesses At the January 9, 2018 pretrial conference, the People announced to the Court that they had been unsuccessfully attempting to contact certain key witnesses since April 2017 and thus were not prepared to go to trial on January 22, 2018, and moved for a continuance. Coulter objected. The Court granted the motion to continue but warned the People that there would be no more continuances.® The matter was rescheduled for pretrial conference on March 20, 2018 and jury selection on April 8, 2018. At the March 20, 2018 pretrial conference, the People assured the Court that they were prepared to go to trial and the Court scheduled a final pretrial conference for April 5, 2018 — the Thursday preceding jury selection. Incredibly, at the April 5, 2018 conference the People informed the Court that several of their witnesses were unavailable and they again moved for a continuance. Coulter objected to a continuance and reminded the Court it had warned the People they would not be afforded any more continuances. The Court removed the matter from the April 9, 2018 calendar and placed it on the August 13, 2018 trial calendar (with pretrial 6 This warning was rendered on the record in open court on January 9, 2018 and in a written order dated January 10, 2018. ree People v. Jason Coulter Case No. ST-15-CR-415 Memorandum Opinion Page 9 of 17 conference on July 24, 2018), but instructed Coulter’s counsel to draft a motion to dismiss so that the matter could be fully briefed (resulting in the instant Motion to Dismiss and additional filings). The People assert that they will move to dismiss if they cannot proceed on August 13, 2018. The People are unquestionably responsible for the delays in locating and securing their witnesses, both before and after the hurricanes. Therefore, this factor weighs against the People. As illustrated above, some of the delays are attributed to the People and some to Coulter, and others were unavoidable. But most are attributable to the People. However, the Court finds no deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense. Nevertheless, overall, this factor weighs against the People. (3) Coulter’s Assertion of his Right. A defendant, represented by counsel, shows that he has asserted his right to a speedy trial when “he can identify a motion or evidence of direct instructions to his counsel to assert that right at a time when a formal assertion of his rights would render some chance of success; . . .” Carty, 56 V.I. at 367. The People allege that Coulter has not offered “any kind of proof of [sic] that he asserted his right to a speedy trial at any time prior to the filing of his instant motion.” Opp. 4. In point of fact, Coulter asserted his right to a speedy trial at his People v. Jason Coulter Case No. ST-15-CR-415 Memorandum Opinion Page 10 of 17 arraignment on December 3, 2015. R. of Proceeding (Dec. 3, 2015).7 In his Motion to Compel, Coulter again invoked his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. Mot. to Compel 2. Further, in his opposition to the People’s Motion for Continuance and Date Certain, filed January 8, 2018 (the “Motion for Continuance”), Coulter pointed out the duration of his detention and stated explicitly that he “demanded a speedy jury trial and has not waived his Constitutional right to a speedy trial.” Def.’s Opp. To People’s Mot. for Continuance and Date Certain, filed January 8, 2018 {{] 5-6. Ata pre-trial conference before this Court the following day, Coulter’s counsel reiterated his objection to the Motion for Continuance and reminded the Court of how long Coulter had already spent incarcerated. Finally, as noted above, at what was to have been the final pre-trial conference for this matter on April 5, 2018, when the People again announced that they were having difficulty locating witnesses and needed more time, Coulter’s counsel objected any further continuance, resulting in the instant Motion to Dismiss. Bizarrely, the People suggest that Coulter's previous assertions of his right to a speedy trial are without merit, as they are not in the actual form of “motion[s] to dismiss based on speedy trial [sic]”. Opp. 5. The People go so far as to cite to Carty in making this claim, but they misstate the law. To reiterate, in Carty, the Supreme Court determined that 7 Coulter claims that he first asserted his right to a speedy trial in his appearance before the Magistrate Judge on November 16, 2015. Reply 6. However, the first example this Court has of such an assertion of right is at Coulter’s arraignment on December 3, 2015. People v. Jason Coulter Case No. ST-15-CR-415 Memorandum Opinion Page 11 of 17 [a] defendant shows that he has asserted his right to a trial (1) when he is represented by counsel and he can identify a motion or evidence of direct instructions to his counsel to assert that right at a time when a formal assertion of his rights would render some chance of success; ... Carty, 56 V.1. at 367. In their Opposition, the People choose to emphasize the words, “he can identify a motion” and point to the fact that “the file in the instant matter reveals no motions to dismiss based on speedy trial other than defendant’s instant underlying motion” as sufficient reason for Coulter to fail on the third Barker factor. This reasoning inexplicably ignores the relevant case law. The Supreme Court has held that a defendant can prevail on the third Barker factor simply because he “asserted his right to a speedy trial at his arraignment, and because he objected to at least one continuance” prior to filing a formal motion to dismiss. Francis, 63 V.I. at 753. In People of the Virgin Islands v. Rivera, the Superior Court found that while not doing so would make it difficult to establish the third prong of the Barker test, “a defendant does not waive her or his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment by failing to make a specific demand therefor... .” 54 V.I. 116, 130, (Super. Ct. Nov. 17, 2010). Here, Coulter asserted his right to a speedy trial at his arraignment, has repeatedly objected to the People’s continuances on the same grounds and properly filed the instant Motion to Dismiss pursuant to the Sixth Amendment and Coulter’s right to a speedy trial. This factor weighs strongly in favor of Coulter. —_— People v. Jason Coulter Case No. ST-15-CR-415 Memorandum Opinion Page 12 of 17 (4) Prejudice. “The most important factor to evaluate is whether the defendant suffered prejudice from the delay.” Rivera, 64 V.I. at 582. Even if a defendant has suffered from delays attributed to the government, her or his speedy trial motion may still be denied if they fail to identify prejudice. See Brown v. People of the Virgin Islands, 55 V.I. 496, 504, 2011 V.I. Supreme LEXIS 13 (overruled in part on different grounds by 56 V.I. 821) (“although Brown did assert his right to a speedy trial and there were some delays ... which were attributable to the government . . . the Superior Court did not err in finding that the Barker factors, when weighed and balanced, did not justify dismissal of the information.”) In assessing whether a defendant suffered prejudice as a result of a delay, the Court considers three interests that the right to a speedy trial is designed to protect: “(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” Carty, 56 V.I. at 367 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532). Although the courts have established that a delay of at least one year is sufficient to trigger analysis of the remaining three Barker Factors, “[t]he last prong of the Barker test still requires the defendant to prove the actual prejudice he suffered caused by the delay in order to substantiate his claim.” Ventura v. People of the Virgin Islands, 64 V.I. 589, 611, 2016 V.I. Supreme LEXIS 15 (citing Francis, 63 V.L.at 754-755). People v. Jason Coulter Case No, ST-15-CR-415 Memorandum Opinion Page 13 of 17 (i) Oppressive Pretrial Incarceration Coulter has been incarcerated since July 5, 2015 and argues that this pretrial incarceration of now nearly three years is oppressive in that it has interfered with his ability to earn an income or go to school during this time. The Barker court recognized that “[i]nterruption of a defendant's family life, employment and financial resources is indicative of prejudice suffered by a defendant.” People of the V.I. v. Rodriguez, 2012 V.I. LEXIS 102, *18 (Super. Ct. Feb. 16, 2012) (citing Barker; Gov't of the VI. v. Pemberton, 813 F.2d 626 (3d Cir. 1987)). Certainly, Coulter has been unable to work or study for advanced degrees during the time he has been incarcerated, but “[a]s discussed in Francis, a defendant must prove specific prejudice caused by the post-information delay.” Rivera, 64 V.I. at 585. Coulter has provided hypothetical potential earnings and educational aspirations here, not specific prejudice. (ii) Anxiety and Concern Next, Coulter argues that the incarceration has caused him great anxiety and concern. As he is not a Virgin Islands resident, Coulter has been separated from his family and friends and does not have frequent visitors. He alleges that his detention has caused him to delay his wedding date and has prevented him from spending time with his son. However, the Supreme Court has pointed out that the prejudice suffered from being apart from family while incarcerated is common and does not rise to the level of a speedy trial violation. “We do not mean to diminish the hardships incarceration causes both the incarcerated and his or her family. But this type of People v. Jason Coulter Case No. ST-15-CR-415 Memorandum Opinion Page 14 of 17 prejudice is insufficient to prove a Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation.” Rivera, 64 V.I. at 585 (citing Francis, 63 V.I. at 754 (citing Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655)). Coulter further alleges that the restrictions and conditions of his detention have resulted in multiple adverse medical conditions, including depression and anxiety. As evidence, Coulter provides medical records showing the numerous medications he has been prescribed while incarcerated, as well as psychiatric notes and a self-assessment of his psychiatric symptoms. Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 1— 4. While it does appear that Coulter is suffering from certain medical issues, other courts have recognized that a certain amount of anxiety is a part of any criminal prosecution. Rodriguez, 2012 V.I. LEXIS 102, *17 (citing Government of the Virgin Islands v. Burmingham, 788 F.2d 933, 936 (3d Cir. 1986); People of the Virgin Islands v. Francis, 64 V.I. 149, 156 (Super. Ct. Apr. 21, 2016) (citations omitted); People of the Virgin Islands v. Walters, 2016 V.I. LEXIS 168, *8 (Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 2016). “Under this standard, a defendant must show that his or her anxiety extended beyond that which ‘is inevitable in a criminal case.” Id. (citing Hakeem v. Beyer, 990 F.2d 750, 762 (1993)). Coulter has not shown how the anxiety and concern he is experiencing is more severe than what any other prisoner might experience. (itt) Defense Impairment Coulter asserts that he is concerned that due to his medical issues (as described above), he will not be physically or mentally fit to participate in his own defense. Moreover, Coulter claims that he fears his ongoing incarceration may actually impair his ability to defend himself, in that he fears for his life while confined to the Bureau EEO eEeEeaeorororeoroeeeeee | People v. Jason Coulter Case No. ST-15-CR-415 Memorandum Opinion Page 15 of 17 of Corrections on St. Thomas (the “St. Thomas BOC”). He offers specific evidence of two instances where he conveyed his fears to a Bureau of Corrections Mental Health Coordinator on St. Croix. Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 6. Further, Coulter alleges that he has been assaulted by other inmates at the St. Thomas BOC on three separate occasions. While he does not submit any documentation for the first two named incidents, Coulter has provided substantial documentation of an attack by two fellow inmates that took place on April 4, 2017 and resulted in his transport to Roy Lester Schneider Hospital for treatment. Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 7 — 10. Coulter alleges that both the Bureau of Corrections and the Department of Justice are intentionally turning a blind eye to these assaults and that he truly fears for his life, should his incarceration continue for much longer. In response, the People gallingly suggest that, “[p]rison violence, while always unacceptable, is an unfortunate reality of the consequences ” one faces when you murder people... .” Opp. 5.8 “Although a certain amount of anxiety and other forms of personal prejudice to the accused is inevitable in a criminal case, [a defendant should not be] forced to suffer an unacceptable degree of damage by reason of... inordinate delay ....” United States v. Dreyer, 533 F.2d 112, 116, (3d Cir. 1976). “[T]he threshold set out by the Court in Hakeem, Dreyer, and Burkett? requires the Defendant to produce specific evidence that his condition has been directly affected by his excessive pretrial incarceration, and that his condition is ® The Court notes that this is the most egregious display of the dismissiveness shown in the People’s Opposition. As Coulter points out in his Reply, the filing is conspicuously lacking in legal citations and heavily weighted with indifference and condescension to the Defendant and to Opposing Counsel. ° Burkett v. Fulcomer, 951 F.2d 1431 (3d Cir. 1991). People v. Jason Coulter Case No. ST-15-CR-415 Memorandum Opinion Page 16 of 17 serious enough to warrant medical concern.” People of the V.I. v. Hakim, 2014 V.I. LEXIS 67, *16 (Super. Ct. Aug. 21, 2014). Coulter has produced sufficient specific allegations of abuse that substantiate his concerns about his well-being. However, the Court is not persuaded that the potential for defense impairment is at the level that requires immediate dismissal, particularly in light of a trial date less than two months away. Weighed together, while Coulter’s financial and health concerns are valid, the Court finds that they are not sufficient to establish that he has suffered prejudice as a result of the delay that rises to the level that requires dismissal. Therefore, Coulter has failed his burden of showing the most important factor — prejudice. Conclusion This matter has been delayed for a variety of reasons but much of the delay can be attributed to the People and their inability to contact primary witnesses in their case. However, the Court finds no deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense. The Court also finds that the Barker Factors, when weighed and balanced, do not justify dismissal of the information, particularly since Coulter has not established the level of actual prejudice necessary to justify immediate dismissal. Therefore, Defendant Coulter’s Motion to Dismiss will be denied. The Court will allow the People one last opportunity to bring Coulter to trial. They must be prepared to advise the Court at the pretrial conference on July 24, 2018, People v. Jason Coulter Case No. ST-15-CR-415 Memorandum Opinion Page 17 of 17 whether they have found the witnesses and can proceed to trial on August 13, 2018. No other continuances will be granted due to unavailability of witnesses. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be entered. DATED: June a , 2018 per 2 Iejpatien Kathleen Mackay Judge of the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands ATTEST: EST. ee . GEORGE PTerk of the Cot l, BY LW MN ) WN ORI BQ YSG Court C rk Supervisor & b ME.