THE DANISH COLONIZATION 
OF 
ST. JOHN, 1718-1733 
by 
Lief Calundann Lareen 
A Publlcatlon of the Virgin Islands 
Resource Management Coope~ative 
St. Thomas 1986 
This publlcatlon was funded in part by the Virgin Islands 
Humanities Council, Division of State Programs, 
National Endowment for the Humanities 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Acknowledgements 
Introduction 
Chapter 1 : 
Background to Colonization 
Chapter 2: 
The Colonization 
Chapter 3: 
Establishing the Colony 
Chapter 4: St. John Plantations 
Chapter 5: 
The Planters of St. John 
Chapter 6: 
The Adnlnistratlon of St. 
Conclusion 
Appendix: 
A Note on Sources 
Footnotes 
Bibliography 
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1 
ACKNOWLBDGME NTS 
This study is a revised version of a Master's Thesis completed in 1980 in partial 
fulfillment of a degree in history at the University of Copenhagen. It has benefited from 
the advice and constructive suggestions of some of my fellow students and close friends. 
Of course, I Am solely responsible for the fa.cts and interpretations presented. 
I cannot be too grateful to Steen M. Andersen, who generously tooK up the enormous tasl< 
of preparing the English trAnsla.tion. Being both An excellent historian and student of 
English, he has done this worK better th1.n I could h1.ve myself. 
I am &lso indebted to Susanne Hauschildt Jensen, who tool< & great interest in my worK 
from the beginning. Though busy with her own studies, she spent much time critiquing the 
manuscript as it left my hand, discussing, offering constructive suggestions, and, not the 
least, being a source of much encouragement when the work at times seemed too 
overwhelming. I a.m obliged to Franz Krogh Jnpersen, who also reviewed the final 
manuscript. 
I ha.vt bendited grutly from the a.dvice &nd suggestions of Professor Ove Hornby of the 
Institute of Economic History at the University of Copenhagen, who, being an experienced 
scholar of West Indian history, tooK a positive interest in my project at an urly st1.ge and 
supervised its progress. 
This study would not have appeared in this revised, English version if not for the agency 
of my friend George P'. Tyson of St. Thomas, who provided considerable ttditoria.l 
assistance and Arranged for its publication. 
finally, I am grateful to the Virgin Islands Resource Management Cooperative <VIRMC>, 
the Virgin Islands Humanities Council and the Island Resources Foundation of St. Thomas, 
whose financial support made this publication possibltt. 
2 
INTRODUCTION 
This study grew out of a history course entitled "The Danish West Indies" taught by 
Professors Ove Hornby and Ole Justesen at the University of Copenhagen in 1975-1976. 
The course worK involved the study of primary sources in Danish a.rchives1 a.s well a.s 
fieldworK in the Virgin Islands during February-January 1976 (1), 
The idea of the worK emerged during our visit to the ruins of Fort FrederiKsva.ern <now 
called "Fortsb,1erg"l at Cora.l Bay, St. John. Here we found an imposing historic site1 built 
by the Danes to command a. large and beautiful natural harbor. As the physical conditions 
very much favor the development of a naval and/or commercial maritime establishment1 one 
naturally wondered why Denma.rK wanted St. John when such evident possibilities were 
never pursued. Under the Danish fla.g St. John wa.s always subordinate to St. Thomas a.nd 
St. Croi:<1 lea.ding a rather anonymous life. 
This peripheral status has influenced historical scholarhsip, which has neglected St. John, 
treating it primarily a.s an a.ppendage to St. Thomas. A characteristic feature of the 
general historical surveys of the Danish West Indies is that St. John is seldom mentioned 
a.part from the slave rebellion of 1733-34. For example, the subject index of the major 
history of the Danish West Indies <2> does not contain a single entry for St. John. 
Influenced by these considerations l set out to research why the Da.nes colonized St. John, 
and how this colonization was carried out. This study is the result of that investigation. 
It ha.s been limited chronologically to the period between 1710 and 1733. However, lines 
ha.ve been drawn bacK to 1675, when it is possible to ascertain the first Danish interest in 
St. John. The relation to foreign powers has also been discussed in order to understand 
the occupation of St. John within the genert1.l frameworK of European colonial rivalry in the 
West Indies. 
The year 1710 is a natural starting point, bect1.ust permanent Danish possession began 
then. The delimitation of 1733 has been selected because a musive slave rebellion 
erupted in that year that paralyzed the economic development of St. John for some time 
thereafter. Before the island could fully recover from this cataclysmic event DenmarK 
started the occupdion of St. Croix, which created new interests 1.nd rela.tions. 
3 
CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND TO COLONIZATION 
Motives to Colonization 
Before dealing with the Danish colonization of St. John, it must be a.sKed why Denm&rK 
ventured into the tropics after 1650 when there was risK of conflict with stronger 
European nations, &nd when she had problems enough in the Baltic. 
The answer clearly relates to the prospect of economic gain. This motive is explicitly set 
forth in the West India Company's Charter of 1671, wherein King Christi&n V mt.de it Known 
that he found it beneficial to found a Company in "the interests of commerce and the 
dependence thereof to general continuation and incruse" (1). The Comp&ny was allowed 
"both the island of St. Thomas in the Caribbean islands, and other isl&nds there, or the 
mainl&nd of America, on which they want to plant colonies .... " The Dt.nes mt.de no pretense 
that they regarded themselves as bearers of the Christi&n message, l.S did the Iberian 
nations. It is mentioned in p&ragraph 5 of the Charter that the Indians should be taught 
Christianity, but this point had rather low priority, as it was Known by 1671 that few, if 
1.ny, Indians still inh1.bited the islands to be colonized. 
'Nhen considering the establishment of trans-Atlantic colonies attention must also be 
drawn to nation&listic motintions. Sweden, O.nmarK's Baltic rival, h&d begun to t&Ke an 
interest in West Indian and Afric&n colonies <2>. From a politic&! point of view Denmark 
was being outdistanced by the Swedes by 1650, and because of competition &nd prestige 
she could not sit bacK and watch c1.lmly as they got ahead in the race for the riches from 
foreign parts of the world. Still, from tither a materialistic or & political point of view, 
there is no disputing that the desire for economic gain provided the primary incentive 
btthind Dt.nish exp&nsion into the Caribbean, and for the colonization of St. John. 
Anteced•nts 
Jn March 1718, thirty-six y11rs aft•r establishing a permanttnt colony on St. Thomu, 
Denmark formally occupied th• island of St. John. The succnsful occupation of this 
uninhabited island, loc&ttd j.Jst two milts ust of St. Thomu, climaxttd almost five 
dttcades of effort by the Danes <a>. 
In accordance with the Company's 1671 Chartttr, authorizing the colonization of other 
islands along with St. Thomas, Governor Jorgen Iversen sent two men with munitions and 
provisions to St. John on July 27, 1675. Denm1.rK viewed this action a.s an official 
possnsion, and it became the basis of subsequent Danish claims to the island. The first 
settlers appear to have engaged in agriculture, as seventy-nine pounds of tobacco were 
delivered from St. John to St. Thomas in 1680. 
Governors Adolf and Nicola.i Esmit continued Iverun's initiative, despite persistent 
protests from both the English and the Spanish. By 1684, according to Governor Adolf 
Esmit, the English had driven Danish subjects from St. John on three separated occuions 
<4>. However, these punitive raids did not discourage the Danes, because in 1686 
provisions were sent to St. John from St. Thomas, indicating a continuing prestnce. 
In 1686 a high ranking Company official, Commissioner Mil<l<el MiKKelsen, advised that 
•fforts to settle St. John should b• abandoned until a later date. Prnumably this retrut 
4 
was necHsita.ttd by the chaotic conditions preva.iling in St. Thomas, together with strong 
protests from foreign powers. Adolf Esmit's new instructions of 1687 recommended that 
he populate St. John with four to six persons "when time and occasion a.re favorable" <5>, 
but nothing further h&ppened, and the plan receded into the bacl<ground until being revived 
in 1715. In the interval St. John was mentioned only in connection with timber cutting, 
while offici•.lly DenmarK maintained her claims to the isl&nd (6), 
Whilt unsettled conditions in St. Thomas contributed to the failure to colonize St. John 
between 16 71 and 171 S, another important deterent was fear of foreign repriul. 
Denmarl<'s tardy entry into the race for West Indian colonies had brought her into conflict 
with those European powers already established in the region. To understand the 
circumstances surrounding DenmarK's occupation of St. John in 17181 her relations with her 
colonial neighbors must be considered, for the timing of the colonization, u well as its 
successful outcome, were partially dictated by international factors. 
Nominally, the Spaniards exercised sovereignty owr a.11 American areas in accordance with 
four Papal Elulls issued by Pope Alexander VI m. Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies 
ended when the North-West European nations began to colonize the smaller islands during 
the first half of the 17th Century. As a m&tter of fact, thert wu ample room, as the 
Sp&nish concentr&ted on the Gre&ter Antilles. But they would not allow others to tal<e 
possession of islands which might be used H military or smuggling buts for undermining 
the Spanish Empire. Spanish efforts to prevent other nations from settling in the West 
Indies proved vain. By tht time of the Danish colonization of St. John they had begun to 
accept the presence of other luropea.n nations C8>, while still formally maintaining their 
claim to the entirt rtgion <9>. 
Generally speaking, relations between the various luropean nations in the Caribb11.n were 
ch&racterized by an intense struggle for power. This wu ttspecially the can during the 
second hi.If of the 17th Century when Dtnma.rK, the last of the colonial powers, uta.blishtd 
a permanent colony on St. Thomas in 1672. This settlttmttnt brought the Danes into a. clash 
M intertsts with th• Spaniards, who w•re nominally sovereign, as wttll as th• British, who 
claimed 1.ll the Virgin Islands <tO>. 
The British Governor M the Ltttward Islands wu hostile tow1.rd the Danish occupation of 
St. ThomH. But King Christian V complained to the Inglish King, who reactttd by 
dismissing tht offending Oovttrnor. The new Governor, William Staplttton, wu instructed 
not to do anything th&t might crtatt hostility btttwetn DttnmarK and lngland. Rathttr, 
Staplttton was instructed to "tt><ttrcise all 1.cts of friendship to the inhabitants of St. 
Thomas, and all that King's sub.ilcts in thtt West Indies" U t>. Thus, the English initially 
accepted Danish possession of St. Thoma.s. 
In the 1680's new issues emerged to cause friction between the Danes and their neighbors. 
First, St. Thomas rtachtd a state of social anarchy under the governorships of the 
brothtrs Esmit and G&briel Mila.n. The Esmits did not hesitate to buy goods from pirates, 
which gave the colony the r•putation u a pira.tes' nut. This outlaw society particularly 
angered the British, who were making a major effort to destroy the pirates &nd priva.teers 
then swarming about the West Indies. Although thty protested rtputedly <12>, the British 
continued to toler&te the Danish colony. 
The Danes on St. Thomas also crosHd British interests by claiming and trying to settle 
the neighboring isla.nds of St. John and Crab Island <Vieques>. By 1684, according to 
Governor Adolf Esmit, the inglish had driven the Danes off St. John three timts <13>. 
Crab Island belonged to the Spanish, but the British also ha.d claims to it. In 1698 the 
Danes actually founded an outpost <called "Kronberg"> there under the leadership of Claus 
5 
Hansen <14>, but this settlement, protested by Great Britain, proved short lived, 
TherHfter, although the Danes refrained from further colonization attempts, they 
maintained their claims to this island, as well as to St. John <15>. 
When tht Danes r1vived their effort to colonize St. John a.round 1715 land had become 
scarce on the neighboring British islands, causing upiring planters to look for new 
settlment opportunites. In 1716 Governor Hamilton of tht Leeward Islands informed the 
Council of Trade and Plantations in London that several planters in Anguilla. and St. Kitts 
wanted to settle on St. Croix, then owned by tht French. Hamilton opposed any such 
population dispersal, as it would wea.l<tn the ma.in isl~nds <16>. During a. drought in 1717 
the planters on Anguilla aga.in asl<td Hamilton's permission to colonize St. Croix or other 
Virgin Islands. Hamilton requested specia.l instructions from the Council of Tra.de and 
Plantations <17>; but before ht received a reply a group of planters departed for Crab 
Island to establish a. colony <18). Again, in 1718, pla.nters in Anguilla., Tortol1.1.nd Spanish 
Town <Virgin Gorda> pressed for allowanct to settle in St. Croix because of the persistence 
of the worse drought in living memory (19), In January 1718 the Council decl1.red itself in 
a.ccord with Hamilton's point of view, and instructed him to prtvent an occupation of Crab 
Isla.net a.nd a.ny further emigration. Discontented pla.nters w.re to be tncour.aged to settle 
on lands rectntly ta.ken from the French on St. Kitts C20). 
Thus, there w&s restlessness in the British colonies a.t the very time the D.anes were 
considering colonizing St. John. British planters wanted to colonize unoccupied isli.nds, 
primarily St. Croix and Cr.ab Island. Apparently they h.ad little interest in St. John, which 
wu s.aid to h.ave little .agriculturi.l vi.lue <21>. Nonetheless, St. John must h.ave held some 
1.ttr.action for British 1.uthorities, who needed to p1.cify their discontented planters, but 
worried that the colonization of either Crab Isl.and or St. Croix might lud to .a 
confrontation with the Spanish or the French who h&d strong claims to them <22>. Thus, it 
is underst1.nda.ble that the British would w1.nt to prevent the Danes from spruding into 
St. John. 
When the question about the D1.ni5h oc~tion of St. John wu first raised in London, the 
King asked the Council of Trade and Plantations for .an opinion on the matter. The Council 
was presented with the D.anish envoy's memori1.l of August 91 1717 debiling Denmarl<'• 
cla.ims in the West Indies. In this document the envoy referred to the 1672 letter from 
King Ch.arles II that ordered Governor Stl.pleton to show resptct to tht D.arws. The envoy 
did not think that the letter limited D.anish sovereignty to St. Thomas <23>. 
The Council natur.ally did not agree with his interpretation. They claimed that the 1672 
letter did not allow for further Danish expa.nsion. Instead, the Council pointed out that in 
1682 Charles II had ordered Sta.pleton to prevent the Danes from colonizing any of the 
other Virgin Islands. Consequently, affirming that the British King held an "undoubted 
right" to all the Virgin Islands, the Council advised the King th.at •uitable precautions 
should be ta.ken against a Danish occupation of St. John C24>. However, as will be seen, the 
British were unwilling to support this "right" with power. 
The Spanish had also been hostile to the Danish occupation of St. Thomas against which 
they protested in 1673 and 1675 <25). However, thty reluctantly tolerated its existence 
<26>. At the time the Danes revived their pla.n to colonize St. John relations between the 
two powers were strained by disputes over fishing rights <Danish subjects were fishing 
and taking tortoisn near Crab Island a.nd Puerto Rico> and smuggling between St. Thomas 
1.nd Puerto Rico. Rel&tions were further soured when Spa.nish colonial authorities found 
out that their Governor in Puerto Rico wu trading illegally with Governor Mil<l<el Crone of 
St. Thomas <27>. 
6 
The Spanish answer to these illegal activitits was privateering. By 1719, a.ccording to 
Governor Bridal, a total of tight Danish vessels had been ca.ptured by the Spanish since 
Governor Crane's administration <28>. In their complaint to the Spanish a.ga.inst thtse 
seizures the Company Directors a.dmitted that illegal tra.de ha.d been ca.rried on from St. 
Thomas, but maintained that it was not the Company's responsibility <29>. 
From the foregoing it can be seen that when Denma.rk r1viv1d her pla.n to colonize St. John 
her rela.tions with Great Britain and Spanin were far from ha.rmonious. Under the 
circumsta.nces, why then did Denmark risk further provoking these m1.,ior powers by 
colonizing the relatively small island of St. John? 
CHAPTER 2: THE COLONIZATION 
Incentives to Colonization 
Governor Crone appears to have revived the pl1.n to colonize St. John 11.rly in 1715 when ht 
wrote to the Company that before ht resigned he would: 
view Crab Island and St. John and immediately 
give a complete report of their situation, u 
this island est. Thomas] becomes meager and 
worse every day. Furthermore, it is a shame 
to let such islands lie deserted since, as far 
as I can ascertain, they could yield great pro-
fits, [and I l presume that the noble gentlemen 
will find my proposition founded on such ground 
that they will have these islands populated 
and inhabited m. 
Nonethtl1ss, it was the planters of St. Thomas who took the initiative. In July 1715 Crone · 
Nported that •Johan Heinrich Sieben had ma.de a proposal to d1v1lap St. John, explaining 
tha.t there weN 15 persons who contemplated going there if pttrmit1d• C2>. In November 
1716 Gov1nor Bridal reported th1.t •the isl1.nd of St. John tempts many dtiz1ns of this 
island [St. Thomas] to go and build", but that ft1.r of British Npriuls discouraged them 
from the attempt. Bred1.l believed th1.t if it could be made certain that there would bl no 
British attack, St. John could quickly be made useful to the Company <3>. 
What prompted this initia.tive? For one thing, St. Thomas wu 1xperi1ncing 1.gricultural 
difficulties. Governor Crone observed that its soil was becoming exhaust1d. Moreover, 
there was a severe drought in 1715, which necessitated the repl1.nting of sugar cane and 
drove up the price of provisions <4>. Thest conditions not only explain the timing of the 
initiative, but also why it originated in the West Indies rather than from the Company in 
Copenhagen. 
But the planters had other problems. Bridal reported 1.n internally induced growth of 
population in St. Thomas <5>, which meant that plantations with a tendency to fa.lling 
profits had to feed more people. Furthermore, f1.lling suga.r prices were reported in 
mid-1716 <6>, a serious situation, especi1.lly for those pl&nters who during the prosperous 
y11.rs of the War of Spanish Succession <1702-1713> had invested huvily in sugar works m. 
7 
T11e individual pla.nter !"lad only one solution to sa.ve the situation: increaseo producuon. 
The possibilities of accomplishing this, however, were limited. First, the pla.nta.tions on 
St. Thomas were not large <8>. Secondly, arable land was limited, and was a.lready being 
cultiva.ted intensively <9>. Third, St. Thomas was almost completely occupied by the 
plantations <10>, so the problems could not be solved by further acquisitions on the isla.nd. 
Therefore, it was an obvious solution for many planters to thinK of new cultiva.tion on 
nea.rby St. John. 
The Company did not rea.ct to Crone's letters of 1715. However, they did respond quicKly 
to Breda.l's letter of November 1716. The Directors found it desireable tha.t some St. 
Thomas residents should began the occupa.tion of St. John. However, a. written agreement 
should first be concluded containing conditions "which would be agreeable to both the 
Company and the planters". The proposed conditions were to be sent to the Company 
without delay for review and approval <11). The Company thus gave Breda.l permission to 
proceeo witl"I the pla.n. Concurrently, the Directors requested King FrederiK IV to asK the 
British Government to respect the Order of 1672 issued by King Charles II <12>. 
Unfortunately, no documentary sources have been found which can explain the Company's 
decision. However, Mariager, the Company historian, cited both internal and external 
considerations <13>. He claimed the Company was set on the colonization due to the 
complaints received from the planters in 1715. This seems credible, for it is certainly 
liKely that the Company might have regarded colonization as a way of pacifying the 
discontented planters. 
As for the external factor, the Company, according to Mariager, was worried because of the 
English threats to occupy St. John and Crab Island, both of which the Company claimed <14>. 
The Directors Knew that in the spring of 1716 the English had been on both islands to 
inspect them <15>. It is probable, that the Directors saw this interest as a challenge to its 
claims, which they resolved to assert. This might expl1.in why the Company did not react 
to the colonization ini tia ti ve until 1716. 
The Company's approval was not immediately followed by action in the West Indies. In the 
summer of 1717 Breda.I wrote that none of the inhabitants would go to St. John before 
being assured that "the English would not do any dam1.ge to them there" <16), By 1.utumn 
interest 1.mong the planters was waning. Bredal nonetheless observed that if the planters 
were guar1.nteed that they would not be &ttacKed St. John "would be popula.ted within a 
short time". Breda.l also reported that some British subjects had recently tried to settle 
Crab Island. However, he believed tha.t it would be fruitless to protest to Governor 
Hamilton, who supposedly had nothing to do with it <17>. 
Interest in colonizing St. John may ha.ve been further discouraged in November 1717 when 
Governor Hamilton himself arrived in St. Thoma.s ha.rbor a.board a British ma.n-of-wa.r 
during a. circular tour of all the Virgin Islands. Ha.mliton used the occa.sion to reiterate to 
Breda.I that the British would not tolerate even timber cutting on St. John by Danish 
subjects <HO. 
Meanwhile, unaware of Ha.milton's intimidating visit, the Compa.ny Directors had written to 
Bredal reprimanding him for inactivity in connection with the occupation of St. John, and 
for his reluctance to protest to Ha.milton over the attempted occupation of Cra.b Isla.nd. 
They ordered him "if possible" to send a ship to St. John with a.s many soldiers as could be 
spa.red from the St. Thomas garrison, some slaves and a.s many of the poor and "idle" 
inhabitants as could be impressed (19). 
8 
Since the Directors were fully a.ware that the colonization of St. John might provoKe a 
British reprisal, they ordered Bredal to organize the expedition in secret to prevent the 
British from preemptive action. Once a.shore, the landing party were to build "an 
a.dva.nta.geous post", which they were to "maintain with extreme effort" if attacKed. If a. 
British force a.ppea.red, the expedition's leader wa.s to present them with a. formal protest 
ma.de out in a.dva.nce by Breda.I. The Company further ordered that a vessel should always 
be on hand in ca.se the people of St. John needed to save themselves. For their pa.rt, the 
Directors would a.sK the King to bring a protest before the English Court against the 
occupation of Cra.b Island C20>. 
It would be incorrect to thinK that Bredal was pleased when he received the Company's 
instructions. He responded by warning the Directors that St. Thomas faced dangers enough 
without attempting the colonization of St. John. British good will was necessary to 
protect St. Thomas from the pirates that "swarmed" throughout Virgin Islands' waters. He 
reported that the Spanish had sent a.n army of 1500 men to expel the British from Crab 
Island, a.nd he ha.d information that after they ha.d dealt with the English they intended to 
a.tta.cK St. Thomas <21>. 
St. Thomas, Breda.I pointed out, was a weaK colony due to lacK of manpower. Sicl<ness had 
thinned the ra.nKs of the garrison to such an extent that they could not muster more tha.n 
thirty able men. If he occupied St. John, Bredal worried that St. Thomas would not only be 
exposed to external enemies, but to "ill-disposed men" residing there. In addition to 
manpower deficiencies, Bredal was concerned a.bout logistics. He explained that St. 
Thomas had a. shortage of foodstuffs and that the residents ha.d to "worK very ha.rd .-.ist to 
produce enough food for the soldiers a.nd ships" <22>. Additional food would be needed to 
support the occupation of St. John. Moreover, the British might react by stopping the 
supply of food from "their countries", which would mean tha.t they could starve St. Thomas 
within a month <23l. For all of these reasons Breda.I wanted to adhere to "our principle not 
to pla.y with the island we ha.ve in sa.fe possession because of &nether one which is less 
safe" <24>. 
Yet, despite his many misgivings, Breda.I could not &Hord to ignore the Company's 
instructions to occupy St. John. Consequently, he set a.bout organizing the colonizing 
expedition. His first concrete step was to purchase a boat and ten cannons <25>. 
Provisions were &cquired from a. visiting ship <26>. The next step was to define the 
priviltges &nd duties of the planters. Fina.Hy, the Governor, five solditrs, twenty 
planters &nd sixteen Negroes went uhore a.t Cora.I Ba.yon March 25, 1718. 
What happened &f'ter the l&nding is reported by Brtda.l <27>: 
I planted our most gracious King's fla.g a.nd 
fired a. salute. We feasted and dra.nK the 
health of our most gracious King and then of 
the honorable Company •••• ! chose a. field for 
the Company's plantation at a distance of 
one gunshot from where the fortress is to be 
built •••• ! ha.ve permitted the planters to in-
dicate which pieces of ground they prefer. 
The ceremonies over, Breda.I a.nd the planters returned to St. Thomas out of fear of the 
British, leaving it to the soldiers a.nd slaves to get on with the practical and risKy 
business of establishing a. settlement. Everyone a.waited the British response (28l. 
9 
The Foreign Reaction 
The British reaction came a few weel<s after the occupation. That it was 10 prompt wu 
due to an English informant, John Phillips, on St. Thomas. Phillips sent a. detailed letter 
to Governor Hamilton on March 29th, which the Governor presented to his Council on March 
31st C29>. It was immediately decided to send a ship under Captain Hume's command to St. 
Thom&s to protest the occupation and to reiterate Britain's claim to St. John C30>. 
Ca.pta.in Hume arrived in St. Thomas harbor a.boa.rd the HMS SCARBOROUGH on April 23rd. 
He had a personal interview with Governor Bredal, in which he presented a. letter from 
Governor Hamilton demanding that the Danes should under no circumstances continue the 
colonization Di St. John. Hamilton informed Bredal "that he had no doubt that this demand 
would be met, as the Danes had uncertain claims, even to St. Thomas. If, however, the 
Dann refused to evacuate St. John, Hamilton would have to follow his orders to prevent 
the colonization <31>. 
Brtdal re,itcttd the British dtmands. He told Hume that ht ent1rtain1d no doubts about 
the legality of Denmarl<'s claim to St. Thomas, and he insisted that the occupation of St. 
John was legal and ~stified by the fact that it was an unpopulated island that had been 
peacefully in Danish possession for many years C32l. After hearing this response, Captain 
Hume sailed oH, but not before threatening tha.t the D&nes would soon be drivtn out by 
force <33). 
Despite Hume's threat, Governor Hamilton tool< no immediate 1.ction, except to send Bredal 
several "insolent" letters, which were answered with moderation (34>. The British threats 
proved empty because H&milton's orders to "obstruct &nd hinder them (the Danesl from 
proceeding" &lso rtstricted him from the use of power C35>. This prohibition meant that his 
possibilities were exhausted onct Bridal refused his demand to leave St. John. Unwilling 
to exceed his powers, Hamilton had to asK the Council of Trade a.nd Plantations for further 
orders C36l. 
' 
Appartntly, the Council decided to rtstrain Hamilton, because no furthtr British action 
occurred before 1722, when the warship HMS HECTOR anchored in St. Thomas to reasurt 
Brit&in's cl&im to St. John <37>. Once more Bredal rejected the dem&nd, after which the 
British threatened that the Danes would lost St. Thomu if they persisted <38l. Nothing 
furthtr h&pptned however, &nd a few days l&ttr the HECTOR uiled oif quietly <39). 
Why, after four years of silence, which had allowed the Danes to consolidate thtir colony 
on St. John &nd which implied t&cit 1.ccepta.nce of its existence, did the British resume 
their protests? The answer might be that Governor Ha.rt, who had replaced Hamilton in 
Dectmber 1721, wanted to demonstrate his abilities &nd authority. As soon as he arrived 
in the West Indies Ha.rt inquired whether citizens of other nations ha.d settled in those 
Virgin Islands within his provinct. He thus ltarntd that the D&nes h&d occupied St. John 
four years earlier. Since the HECTOR was already cruizing the Virgin Islands in search of 
pirates, Hart "laid hold of the occasion to write to the Governor of St. Thomas for the King 
of Denma.rl< to reclaim the Island of St. John" (40>. But, Ha.rt, lil<e Hamilton, did not have 
orders to exerciH txtreme authority. Brtdal auspected this, and so disregarded his 
protests <41>. 
Hart tried aga.in in June 1724. He wrote Otto Jacob Thambsen, who had ~st 1ucc11d1d 
Breda.l a.s Governor, demanding that the Danes leave St. John <42). Hart's letter ma.y be 
interpreted as & fteltr to see if the new Danish Governor was less resolute and 
uncompromising than his predecessor. He got a.n answer within the month, when Tha.mbsen 
sent a firm rejection <43). Nor did the Company show much concern with Hart's new demand 
10 
<44>. The rejection prompted Ha.rt to asl< the Co!,Jhcil of Tra.de a.nd Plant&tions for 
1.llow1.nc1 to drivt the Da.nes out of St. John C45l. Tht Council waited several months 
before informing Ha.rt tha.t an answer would a.rrive later <46>. But nothing further 
happened, a.nd no more is hurd from the British during the period of our study. 
It is clear that the British Governors of the Leewa.rd Islands wa.nted very much to drive 
the Danes from St. John, 1.nd even St. Thomas. However, despite their 1.ppuls the 
Government in London did not want to resort to force. Its relucta.nct may be t><plained by 
its concern that from a global perspective St. John could ha.rdly ha.ve bHn worth a. conflict 
with DenmarK. 
The Spanish a.lso repeatedly protested a.gainst the Danish occupa.tion of St. John C47>. The 
matter wa.s brought to the attention of the Council of the Indies in Seville, which 
rtcommtndtd to the King that the Dann bt immedia.t1ly drivtn out of both St. Thomas and 
St. John. Tht King approved of an expulsion from St. John, a.nd in 1720 orders to this 
effect wert stnt to tht West Indits C48> But the Victroy did not ruct. A scout wa.s 
despatched from Puerto Rico, but the Admiral of the West Indian fleet doubted an a.ction. 
In the Spring of 1721 the King repeated his order, but once a.ga.in it produced nothing 
concrete (49>. 
Spa.nish priva.tttrs did &tt&cl< St. John in 1729 <SO>, but this a.ction ca.mot be considered a. 
direct response to tht occupa.tion of 1718. From St. Thomas complaints were fr9quently 
hurd tha.t Sp1nish priv&tttring wa.s 1great1.nnoya.nc1 (51), but this too c1.nnot be 
considertd a. ruction, H Dt.nish vtssels wert being stiztd for yea.rs prior to tht 
occup1tion, &nd Inglish vessels were 1.lso being t•n <:S2>. 
Thus, while the local a.uthoritits in the British West Indies vainly prtssed their Mother 
Country for permission to expel the Da.nes from St. John, thtir caunterp1.rts in the Spa.nish 
colonies twice ignored orders from Spa.in ta 1.tt1.cl< St. Jahn. Bea.ring this in mind it can be 
concluded tha.t the DI.Mish occupation of St. John wu suc:ceHful in l&rge pt.rt bec1.use local 
and intern&tiON.l f1.ctors combined to limit the foreign respona. 
~. Choice af St. Jahn 
It might bt askad why the small, mountainous, rtlativtly inftrtilt island of St. John was 
preferred H an ab,itct of Danish coloniution over Crab Island, which wu 11.rger, flatter 
1.nd more 1.ra.ble. Several factors may h1.v1 contributed to this choic1. 
Firstt many yea.rs of timber cutting on St. John lnioubttd made the Da.nes familiar with 
the resource potenti1.l1 of that isla.nd. Secondly, geographical consider&tions were 
certa.inly important. Cra.b Isla.nd is located nearly thirty milH southwest of St. Thoma.s. 
During wartime &ncl othtr periods of unrest it would have been extr1m1ly difficult, if not 
impossible, to ma.inta.in communications with tha.t island. Even in times of puce it would 
be hard to ma.inta.in connections without lossn to the piratH that still infested th1 sea 
lanes between the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. Indeed, 1. colony on that remote island 
would have bttn a tempting target for piratn, who had previously shown themselves 
una.fra.id to a.ttacK even fully established colonies. 
St. John, on tht contrary, was situated only two milts from St. Thomas, ma.King defense, 
logistica.l support &nd inter-island communication/ transportation f&r 1a.si1r. Moreover, 
this proximity madt it fir more attnctive to Stttltrs and investors, who demanded 
protection from foreign aggression and sla.ve unrest. 
11 
Thirdly, foreign policy considerations probi.bly influenced the choice. Crab Island was 
close to Puerto Rico and fell into what might be called Spain's "intimate sphere". The 
Spanish would not even toler1.te foreigners fishing in its waters. Certainly they could be 
expected to react violently to any settlement that might engage in illegal trade or menace 
the navigational routes of their arma.da.s <53). They hi.d driven an English settlement from 
the island during the 17th Century, and h&d brutally smuhed a.nether English effort in 
17 i 7. This la.tter expulsion ha.d strongly impressed Bredal, who reported that those who 
had resisted the Spanish were "ma.ssacred" 1 while the remainder were ta.l<en prisoner <54). 
Thus, Danish &uthorities recognized that if they occupied Crab Island they would provol<e 
both Engla.nd 1.nd Spa.in. Tht situation was somewhat different with St. John, because 
there was some reuon to believe that the Spanish had only marginal interests there. St. 
John was r1l1.tively disti.nt from Puerto Rico, &nd St. Thomas stood between the two 
islands. Moreover, St. John had little economic potentia.1 for the Spanish, who ha.d 
1.bundant 1.r&blt la.nd in tht Gruter Antilles, a.nd abundant r&w m1.teria.ls on the Continent. 
Thus, while the Danes rather expected a. strong English ruction to the coloniza.tion of St. 
John, thty hoped that the Spa.nish rtsponse would be less serious. It is therefore 
incorrect to spea.I< a.bout a •choice" between St. John a.nd Cra.b Isl&nd, because from a. 
geopolitici.l ptrspective only St. John offered & rulistic &lterna.tive. 
Str&tegic Motive: Fort Frtdtriksvaem 
As soon u the Da.nu inv&ded St. John in 1718 they immedia.tely set a.bout constructing & 
defensive situ&tion a.t Cor&l Bi.y <55>. Governor Breda.I chose to build & small fort on the 
top of a. hill 133 meters high <the Fortsb,itrg>, which j.Jts out into Coral Bi.y, dividing Cori.l 
Harbor on tht west from Hurricane Hole on the east. From this strategic position the fort 
commanded a.11 of Cora.1 Bay. Since the fort wu founded during the rtign of Frtderil< IV, it 
was only natura.1 to name it Frtderil<svurn dter the king whose interuts it would defend 
&mong othtrs. 
Of course, foreign policy consider&tions were important in tht foundation of this fort, but 
they were not dtcisive, u Frederil<sva.ern was ntver strong enough during our period to 
resist &n 1.tt1.cl< by th1 Inglish or Spa.nish. Its prim&ry function wu psychclogica.l rather 
tha.n military. With respect to tht outside world, it was intended to serve H & symbol that 
the island had been occupied and btlcnged to the Da.nish Crown. Domutica.lly, it 
functioned as an usertion of politica.l authority in what wa.s ba.sically a.n undisciplined 
frontier society. 
The fort facilitated the colonization cf St. John by reassuring apprehensive settlers that 
they would be protected from rebellious slaves a.s well as foreign aggressors. Slave 
unrest wa.s commonplace in the isl1.nds (56), and a rebellion was dreaded by 1.uthoriti11 and 
pla.nters alil<e, as it threat1nd both their lives and property (57>. Tht fort was intended to 
awe the slaves, &nd to provide a pl&ce cf rtfuge in case awe gave wa.y to &nger. In 
addition, the fort served as an administrative center and a prison <58>. 
It is somtwhat misluding to ca.11 the origin&l Fr1d1ril<sva.ern a fort, because actually it 
was little more than a fieldwcrl<. Gerard de Keulen depict1d it on his map of circa 1719 (59> 
u a rather stout stone building, which he grandiosely t1rmed a "citadel". In Ftbruary 
1720 Anders Sorensen Duus ma.de another dra.wing <Figure 1), which, although more reliable 
th&n van Keulen's, &lso contl.ins ma.ny ina.ccl.l"acits <60>. The best picture of the actual 
&ppearance of Frederil<svaern during this period comes from information found in the 
inventorits of 1724, 1727 &nd 1733 (61>. 
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13 
According to the inventories the fort was situated with its length running east and west. 
It was surrounded by a para.pet "gathered together of loose stone, sand and earth". The 
elaborate stone structure found on the site today, therefore, does not date from our 
period. According to Peter Oxholm it was built after the slave rebellion of 1733-1734, and 
then abandoned and dynamited in the 1760's when the Danes built a. new battery and 
administrative center a.t Cruz Bay C62>. 
Inside the para.pet there was a small house built of pla.nKs and "chips" <shingles ?>, where 
the lieutenant had his "lodgings". Next to it was a powder magazine with a. flat bricK roof, 
which was in good condition in 1724. There was a small barra.cKs with two chambers, one 
for the non-commissioned officer and quartermaster, the other for the rest of the 
garrison. The barra.cKs, which was constructed of pla.nKs covered with chips and pla.nKs, 
was hardly a. pleasurable residence, for according to the 1724 inventory it "cannot be 
described in harsh enough terms". However, later inventories maKe no mention of any 
dilapidation. 
Near the western end of the barra.cKs, just inside the fort's gate, there was a.n uncovered 
fireplace surrounded by an "old" wall. In 1724 it was classified as being in bad condition. 
Outside the gate stood an "old" bricK oven with its "battery" covered with sugar cane 
leaves. In 1733 these two structures were so deteriorated that they were said to have no 
value <63>. Just below the oven was an "old" negro house, also covered in cane leaves, 
which was used as a "bouteillerie" or storehouse. 
Anders Sorensen Duus' drawing shows five houses a.top Fortsb.ierg. One of them, the 
largest and most carefully drawn, is situated northeast of the others and flies the 
Dannebrog. It is probably the lieutenant's "lodging". The houses a.re placed within a 
clearly defined square, which is obviously the parapet. Duus' drawing raises two 
questions: Had he been at the fort? Ha.d he drawn it accurately? 
It is highly liKely that Duus visited the fort, since he served in the West Indies a.boa.rd one 
of the Company's ships. It is, however, questionable that he drew FrederiKsva.ern 
a.ccura.tely~ He drew five houses, when the 1724 inventory mentions only three. But, the 
missing houses may have been demolished. His drawing is somewhat naive and out of 
proportion. And, he ha.s the fort running in the wrong direction <64>. These consider&tions 
diminish the value of his drawing to such an extent that nothing definitive can be gluned 
from it alone. The drawing does however contain some written informa.tion, from which it 
can be learned that the garrison tooK its water from a. locality just to the west of Coral 
Harbor, about 1700 feet from Frederil<svurn. 
According to the inventories there was 1.lso a. "water b1.ttery
11 on 1. sm1.ll hill 1.bove the 
beach on the southeastern shoreline of Fortsb.ierg. This battery is shown by van Keulen, 
but Duus omits it. It survives today in a ruinous condition. The battery, which was 
intended to protect the vulnerable southeast corner of FrederisKvaern from naval attacK, 
wu constructed of bricK in the shape of a crescent. It ha.d six cannons of three different 
calibers. Two 6 pounders stood at the eastern end covering the less important Hurricane 
Hole. Two 12 pounders stood in the middle pointing toward the open sea. On the western 
end two 8 pounders covered the entrance to Coral Harbor, where the main anchorage was 
located. 
The fort and battery had a garrison of ten soldiers and one non-commissioned officer in 
1727 (65>. This modest force ha.d been commanded by Lieutenant Peter Frohling since 1724 
C66>. In addition, there were two negro slaves: a drummer and a water carrier. In 1726 
Governor Moth and BooKl<eeper Gardelin informed the Company that ideally the garrison 
14 
should consist of a commander, three non-commissioned officers, a doctor, a clerK, a 
quartermaster and twenty-four soldiers. (67). For comparison, Moth and Ga.rdelin 
estimated that Fort Christianvaern on St. Thomas should have fifty soldiers~ Even if their 
estimates were txaggerated, there is no doubt that Frederil<svurn wa.s underma.nntd. 
If the military force was inadequate, the state of the fort a.nd its a.rm&mtnt wu even 
worse. According to the 1724 inventory the fort H a whole W&S "in a. b&d condition". The 
armament consisted of eleven 4 pound iron cannons, of which nine were "of no use" because 
thtir bues were rotten. There were &lso five 4 pounders, which a.re not mentioned in later 
inventories, and four swivel cannons. Fifteen flintlocl<s "for the men", together with 
eleven other usable and twelve unusable flintloc1<1, constituted the light armament. 
The garrison had little &mmunition to resist an enemy a.tta.cK. They ha.d nineteen "old" 
hand grena.dtS, whose tubes were "of no use", seventy-six 4 pound balls, thirty-three 3 
pound balls a.nd five cudgels <68>. There were two thounnd flint bullets for the guns and 
some powder. As previously mentioned, tht bl.'ttery had six iron cannons. One of the 12 
pounders was "rusty" and i.11 of the carriages were characterized as being useless, txcept 
for "the carriage fabrica.ted here", that belonged to tht other 12 poundtr. The ammuntion 
store consisted of thirty-seven 12 pound bi.lls, twenty-seven 8 pound balls, forty-sevtn 6 
pound balls and twelvt cudgels. An "old" 4 pound cannon without ca.rriagt was registered 
as lying on the road to the fort. It is mentioned in the 1727 inventory that balls wer1 cast 
at both the fort and the battery. 
Whilt the 1724 inventory paints a very dismal pictU'e rtspecting military prepa.redneu on 
St. Jahn, later inventories were not so gloomy, possibly bec&use conditions had bHn 
improv1d, possibly because military min, who tendtd to be mort critical than Comp1.ny 
offici&ls, were not so prominent in their prtparation. Four of th• fivt people who 
prepa.red the 1724 inventory wtrt solditrs, whilt th1.t of 1727 was ma.de out by two 
civilians. 
Still, it &ppurs that during our period Frtderil<sv&1rn was never at\ imposing d1t1rrent. 
Not even its strategic location could compens1.t1 far its small g&rrison, its almost total 
lacl< of usable hea.vy armament and its limittd supply of ammunition. It might have bun 
Able to repel a pirate who v1ntU'td into Coral Bay, but it definitely WH not 1quipp9d to 
offer meaningful resistanct to an attacl< by th• British or Spanish. On the other hand, tht 
fort wu reason&bly well supplied with arms to resist internal disturbances, a fa.ct which 
U"\derscorn the usumption that it was prim&rily intended for inttrnal rathtr th&n 
•xtern1.l purposes. 
Givtn thHe considtrations it is necessary to r•.itct ThorKild Hanstn's a.sstrtion th1.t in 
1733 "FrederiKsfort was & strong fortress, really the only one on the D1.nish isla.nds which 
could be called almost impregnable" <69), More important, it must be concluded th1.t 
Denmarl<'s interest in St. John was not founded on stra.tegic or milita.ry considerations. 
Rather, the motives for the colonization must be aought elsewhere. 
Economic Motive: Coral Bay Harbor 
Coral Bay is a spacious body of water on the ea.st end of St. John. It is reasonably well 
protected from sea. swells and the prevailing tr1.de winds by a long, narrow, mountainous 
peninsula tha.t curves outward into the Caribbean Sea. from the northeast corner of tht 
island. The lee side of this peninsula divides into a series of small bays, each of them 
providing excellent 1.nchora.ges. Hansen's Bay on the northwest, Hurricane Hole to the 
North a.nd Coral Harbor at the west a.re the most important of these secure anchorages. In 
15 
its totality Coral Bay provides one of the .finest natural harbors in the Ea.stern Caribbe&nt 
a. fa.ct clea.rly appreciated by the Danes. 
Governor Breda.lt who elected to disemba.rK his colonizing expedition a.t Coral Ba.yin 1718t 
called it "completely secure" and "as sa.fe and bea.utiful as can be imagined" (70>. Christia.n 
Marfeldtt a Danish economist who visited the islands in the 1760'St described its many 
attributes: it could hold four to six hundred ships; it provided ea.sy landing places for 
ma.ny surrounding plantations; its "beautiful" Hurricane Hole could provide perfect 
security from storms for forty to fifty ships; it contained several excellent careening 
places <71>. Peter Oxholmt a milita.ry engineer, wrote on his map of 1780 that "Cora.l Ba.y is 
one of the best in the West Indies ... and it ca.n hold a. considerable number of warships" 
(72). 
The Danes were not the only ones to apprecide the value of Corl.l Bay. In his efforts to 
secure ptrmission to expel the Danes from St. John, Governor Ha.rt of the British Leeward 
Islands claimed that the harbor's str&tegic advantages were compar&ble to those of 
Gibraltar. He ma.intaintd that it wa.s not only the best harbor in the West lndiest but the 
only one &pa.rt from that of St. Thoma.st that could be used en route from Antigua. to Puerto 
Rico. Ha.rt contended that homeward bound British vessels from the Leeward Islands 
needed a H.ft anchorage in cue of bad wuther or military dangers. Ht further argued 
that the D1.nes might use it to blocK Britain's tr1.de with Jamaica <73>. While Hart's 
assertions were certainly 1ugger1.tedt it is noteworthy that ht chose to argue a.gt.inst a 
Danish possession of St. John on the basis of Coral Ba.y ha.rbor, ra.ther tha.n beca.use of the 
timber or agricultural potential of the island. 
Nature had thus endowed St. John with a ha.rbor of considerable a.dva.ntagts. It could have 
bttn ma.de into 1. ma.jar naval facility as Oxholm mentiontdt and as Governor Hart feared. 
But no nava.l base ever materialized because the Dants had not come to the West Indies for 
strategic purposes or to maintain a position u a world power. They had no need of a. naval 
port in our period. Nor did the Compa.nyt whose sole purpose was profit, h1.ve funds to 
invest in a facility tha.t would bring no 1conomic gain. Moreover, it cannot be overlool<td 
that the English would certainly have intervened if the Danes had tried to establish a. 
na.va.l ba11. 
Coral 81.y might 1.lso have supported 1.n import1.nt trading cel"\ter. Bred&l sttms to have 
this in mind when he thought of fotslding a. town on the plain below the fort <74>. Governor 
Suhm also propoud that a town be Ht&blished at Coral Bay (75). But 1. town, much less 1. 
major s11.portt never beet.me 1. reality at Cor&l Bay. 
During our periodt and probably throughout the 18th 1.nd 19th centuries, Coral Bay was uud 
by ships primarily for c1.reening <76> and as a storm anchorage. For example, in 1730 the 
Directors ordered Governor Suhm to anchor two Company ships c1.refully in Hurricane Hole 
during the hurricane season <77>. Ships ttngaged in the coastal trade between St. Thomas 
1.nd St. John ptriodically put into Coral Bay to exchange pl1.nt1.tion supplies for plantation 
products, but this traffic wa.s too small to require an urban distribution center. 
Three reasons can be 1.dduced why the Da.nes f1.iled to capitalize on the economic poui-
bilities of such a natural harbor. Firstt plantation agriculture on St. John never became 1.s 
important AS had been hoped. At the outset of colonintion Bred&l seems to ha.ve imagined 
all of St. John planted with suga.rt and in 1718 the planters lauded its soil <79>. In 1724 
16 
Governor Moth suggested that the Company sell its Krum Bay plantation in St. Thomast 
which had never been profitable, and send its sla.ves to the Compa.ny's plantation in St., 
John "where in due time two capable sugar worl<s can be established CandJ then the 
Company will see what beautiful profits that plantation will yield •••• " <SO>. As late as 1726 
Moth was praising the productive capacity of St. John (81>. 
But this optimism proved short lived. It was soon discovered that much of the soil was 
unsuited to sugar cane cultivation <see below>. In 1728 Governor Suhm informed the 
Company that the soil on its St. John plantation was bad because of the high content of 
saltpetre <82>. Additional complaints of poor soil conditions followed <S3>t and in 1733 
Governor Gardelin even suggested that the Company part with the plantation (84>. A 
similar situation obtained on many other sugar plantations <SS>. Thust St. John never 
proved the sugar adventure dreamed Oft so one reason to invest in the development of its 
harbor disappeared. 
Secondlyt the harbor at St. Thomas was becoming & major maritime center during this 
period, but its potential was far from being realized. The merchants and planters of St. 
Thomas had little inttrest in promoting the devtlopment of a competing seaport at St. 
John, &nd they certainly would h&ve resisted &ny such effort sponsored by other parties. 
Finally, St. Croix wu acquired only fifteen years after the occupation of St. John. This 
island presented far greater opportunities for the Company and for enterprising planters 
&nd merchants. The liquidity of the Company was tight, and the acquisition of St. Croix 
demanded not only the expense of new facilities, but 101.ns to the new pl&nters. The future 
lay with St. Croix, so interest in a suport at St. John quicl<ly faded. Thus, it was not tht 
slave rebellion which forestalled the economic development of St. John, but competition 
from the rich cane fields of St. Croix. 
In sum, the maritime prosperity of St. Thomas and the agricultl.M"al success of St. Croix 
deprived St. John from realizing her full economic potential. 
CHAPTER 3: ISTABUSHING TH8 COLONY 
The liramewark of Settlement 
On March 24 1718, the day before th~ occupation of .St. John, the coloni&l administration 
negociated &n agreement with the St. Thomas planters that defined the privileges and 
duties of the settlers who wanted to est&blish plantations in the new colony. This 
document 11t&blished the general frameworl< that governed the colonization of St. John 
during the period of our study m. 
The first privilege was seven years frHdom from taxation. However, the planters had to 
pay a tax on exported plantation produce during the ta.x-free period. The planters did not 
gain this privilege without & struggle. Initially the coloni&l administr&tion decided on 
four ti.x-free yea.rst but the pl1.nters demanded eight yea.rst as had been the case on St. 
Thomas <2>. They compromised on seven yea.rs. The administration made this concession 
out of fea.r that the land hungry planters might h&ve bypassed St. John and moved to other 
islands. They also wanted to encourage rapid colonization of St. John. 
17 
Ey insisting on the export tax Company officials sought not only direct revenue, but tried 
to ensure that produce from the new colony would go to the Company storehouse in St. 
Thomas as return cargo for its next ship. But, the tax only encouraged smuggling, a 
common problem, which various governors tried unsuccessfully to overcome. The second 
privilege allowed the planters to ta.Ke a.s much wood a.nd lime as they needed for plantation 
development. However, they could not export this material from the island. 
As for the duties of the planters, the first was that a white man of St. Thomas should live 
full time on every plantation. If this obligation was not adhered to within three months 
after the plantation had been claimed, title would be forfeited. The planter did not have 
to be personally present. He could, and many did, hire an overseer to satisfy the 
requirement, but only on condition that the person selected had lived on St. Thomas for at 
lea.st one year and tooK an oath of allegiance to the Danish King. The Company insisted on 
having one white person on each plantation so that the slaves could be properly 
supervised. Nonetheless, many planters seem to have disregarded the regulation. 
The second duty wa.s that a sugar worK had to be constructed on the plantation within five 
yea.rs, on penalty of confiscation. This requirement indicates thi.t Ereda.l envisioned all of 
St. John planted with sugAr cAne, as there was no provision for 1.ny other l<ind of 
cultivation. Cotton cultivation, which was very common on St. Thomas, was not mentioned 
(3). 
The First Yurs of Settlement 
Little information could be found concerning the situ1.tion on St. John during the first 
yurs of settlement. Available sources consist only of the Company's Account BooK for 
1718-1725, which actually ends in 1722, and short passages in the Governors' outgoing 
correspondence to the Company. The dearth of information a.bout St. John in the 
Governor's letters wa.s criticized by the Company <4>. 
Table 1, which presents annual Compa..ny expenditures on supplies for St. John between 
1718 a.nd 1722, provides some indica.tion of the level of activity on the island. 
TABLE 1: ANNUAL COMPANY EXPENDITURES FOR 
SUPPLIES TO ST. JOHN 1718-1722 
YEAR 
EXPENDITURE <Rigsda.lers> 
1718 
$ 1470 
1719 
$ 593 
1720 
s 853 
1721 
$ 2283 
1722 
s 1260 
SOURCE: RA, V-g-K, No. 792: OmKostsKonto 1718-1725 
~ 
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1718 
1719 
1720 
1721 1722 1723 1724 1725 
1726 1727 
1728 
1729 Pm<No~ SUM 
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8 
Caneel Bay 
8 
1 
l 
1 
11 
Duurloo Ba;r 
1 
5 
1 
1 
8 
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Cruz Ba;r 
2 
5 
2 
3 
5 
l 
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19 
0 z 
Ul 
Ree! Bay 
9 
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2 
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14 
0 z 
Lame sure KY. 
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1 
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. 
00 
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SOURCE: 
RA, V-g-K, St. John Land List 1729 
...... 
N 
IO 
19 
Comparing these figures with those relating to plantation foundations <Table 2 >tit ca.n be 
seen tha.t a.ctivity on St. John fell off for two yea.rs after the initia.l colonizationt only ·to 
be revived by a new wave of settlement starting in 1721. 
The supplies consisted prima.rily of construction ma.teria.l a.nd foodstuffs tra.nsported from 
St. Thoma.s to the ga.rrison a.nd the Compa.ny pla.ntation a.t Cora.l Ba.y. To help ease the 
need for foodt corn a.nd pota.toes for the sla.ves were pla.nted immedia.tely after the slopes 
of Fortsb,ierg had been clea.red <5>. Some turtle nets were a.lso sent to St. John <6>. 
DrinKing water wa.s a.lso tra.nsported until sources of fresh wa.ter were loca.ted on the 
island m. 
Conditions of life were difficult a.t first. Until the first wood houses were builtt the 
settlers lived in ca.nva.s tentst which exposed them to ra.iny wea.ther. There were 
compla.ints about bad drinKing wa.ter a.nd mosquitoes, who "devoured" the settlers to such 
a.n extent that they lool<ed "monstrous" (8). WorK was ha.rd due to the hot, da.mp dima.tet 
and the shortage of sla.ve labor resulting from frequent desertions (9). Finallyt the 
settlers lived in constant fear of an S:nglish punitive expedition. 
Conditions on St. John were so terrible that the St. Thomas authorities even used the 
island a.s a Kind of penal colony for social undesirables and incompetents. Breda.l wrote 
that "in our humble opinion no one deserves better to bt on St. John than Axel Dahl" a 
lower official who had irritated him C10>. Two clerKs who ha.d fallen into disgrace were 
sent to St. John: 
We ha.d to send Edward Poulsent our best scribet 
to St. John beca.use he ha.d been drinl<ing himself 
quite mad here .... Harboet who arrived on the ship 
ALETTEt is incapable of writing down a. single line, 
tven if dictated .... He wrote everything so wrong 
that we also had to send him to St. John where 
they use him to rea.d the church text to the 
residents on holida.ys <11>. 
· 
One other txample of deportation wu found. Jens Hi.nsen Grundtt a sergeant who h1.d 
committed a crime on St. Thoma.s, wa.s sentenced to banishment on St. John <12>. The 
frequency of such sentences c1.nnot be determined from available documentation. 
By 1721 the first results of the coloniza.tion had become noticea.ble. In the spring Breda.l 
reported th1.t the Company's 
11pl1.nta.tion on St. John is improving" <13>. A ftw months la.ter 
Thoma.s Borduux supplied it with a. sugar worKt three copper boiling Kettles a.nd six 
donKeys <14>. Breda.l 1.lso reported tha.t "things ha.d progressed so fa.r tha.t ... Ja.cob van 
Stell has been offered 800 rigsda.lers for this yea.r's cotton crop, which he refused; 1.nd 
Pieter Duurloo has improved his pl&ntation to such 1.n extent that it has been vdued at 
1000 rigsda.lers" C15>. 
Thus, it can be said that by 1721 the "establishment period" had 1.lmost been concludedt a.s 
the first plantations ha.d begun to produce harvests and realize some income. 
20 
The Plantation System: Bxtemal Jrr1.meworl< · 1118-1733 
In order to mu.sure tht pact of colonization on St. John it is n1cessary to consider both 
the external and internal frames of plantation development. By "external fri.me" is meant 
tht parctlling out of the island into plantations; while "inttrni.l frame" refers to the 
Hta.blishment of economic activity on individual plantations. This distinction is necessary 
b1cause in itself parcelling out is no gu1rant11 that a.n a.ctual settlement occurred. For 
colonization to take place another dimension must be be a.dded, namely th• ninternal 
frame", which consists of occupation, land clearance, cultivation and the processing of 
harvnted crops. 
The exttrnal development of the planta.tion system can be followed reasonably well from 
start to finish from information found in the Land Lists. They state when i. land 
certificate wu issued for 11.ch plantation, wh1n the parcel was claimed and when the tax 
free period expired. But this exercise is not without problems. The question a.rises which 
of tht thr111ntrits in th1 Land Lists should be used to determine the date of plantation 
foundation. Normally the date of the land certificate would be preferred, as this was the 
key legal docum1nt. However, not all plantations received land certificates; or, at least, 
not all land certificates were recorded in the L1.nd Usts. Moreover, m1.ny la.nd certificates 
were issued after the plantation had been claimed <16>. 
This leaves us with the date of claim, which is the date Company officii.ls used for 
••tablishing when the tax frH period began. This choice is not without its problems 
becauu the 1728 and 1729 Land Lists give different dates of d1.im. I haw elected to use 
the datu given in the 1729 Land List because it is complet1r and its datts a.re replicated 
by all subsequent Land Lists. 
As shown by Table 2, the filling out of the exttrni.l framework of colonization began in 
1718 with the foundation of ten plantations <17>. The Comp1.ny tool<~ the large plain west 
of Fortsb.itrg. A singl1 plantation was established at Duur'loo Bay <now Ca.neel B1.y>. 
Otherwise, int•rHt wu directed toward Ca.nee! Bay Quarter <around Cima.men and Mi.ho 
Bays> on the north side of St. John, wher1 tight pl1.nt&tions wer1 founded. Only three 
other plantations were established in this qu&rter before it wn complt!t1ly ta.1<9n up by 
1722. Thus, Professor Dool<ha.n is not entirely correct when ht states that the Danish 
colonintion beg&n 1.t Coral Bay t.nder the protection of the fort U8>. 
Since th1 first planters did not 11ttl1 a.round the fort, it can be concluded that defense 
considerations did not determine the situation of the pli.ntations. The planters Knew what 
little protection they could expect from the f.ort, 1.nd they w1.nted to loca.tt their 
plantations on 11.nd best suited for the cultivation of sugar cane, which was dong the 
north side of the isl1.nd. 
That sugar cane cultivation wa.s preferred to cotton growing is shown by the fa.ct that the 
sugar quarters (those where over half the plantations cultiv1.ted sugar c1.ne> were t1.!<9n up 
first. Caneel Ba.y Quarter was ta.ken up i.lmost immediately. When 11.nd was no longer 
&v1.ilable there interest shifted to Duurloo Ba.y (19) and Maho Ba.y <20>. These three 
quarters had been &lmost entirely tal<tn up by 1721. 
The la.st quarters to be ta.ken up were Coral Bay 1.nd the French Quarter <Ea.st End>, which 
were the principal cotton districts. The ta.king up of the cotton quarters beg1.n in 1724, 
thrtt years after most northside land had been claimed. Between 1721and1724 land 
marginally suit1d to sugar growing wa.s t&ken up on the southside and west end of St. John. 
Apparently the planters preferred to take up plantation grounds in a.rea.s where there was 
some chance of sugar cultivation, rather than claiming land suited to other crops. Thu5, 
21 
sugar cultivation was tried briefly on several plantations befora their owners turned to 
other crops. Lamesure Quarter in the southeast section section of the island provides an 
example of this tendency. Here half of the pl1.ntations cultivated sugar in 1728; but by 
1730 most of these had 1.ba.ndoned sugar in favor of cotton or other crops <vide Table 7>. 
Table 2 shows that most plantation foundations occurred in three waves: one in 1718, one 
in 1721 and the la.st in 1724-25. Between these waves plant&tion foundations were 
modest, less than six per year. The reasons behind such a noticeable pattern must be 
lool<ed for on St. Thomas. No data has bun found that c1.n expldn the wave of 1718. But 
it seems likely that some of the planters who proposed the colonization in 1715 were 
involved. Nothing is mentioned about soil exhaustion on St. Thomas u a f1.ctor, even 
though this consideration had stimulated the initial interest in St. John. Perhaps this is 
because two good years followed after the severe drought of 1715 <21>. 
By the early 1720's however, soil exhaustion had once again become noticeable, which 
partly explains the wa.ve of 1721. Bredal obstrved in the summer of 1721 th1.t St. Thomas 
"becomes obsolete and worsens every da.y" <22>. In connection with a. possible English 
attack, he commented: "it would hurt the Danish colony Cof St. Thoma.sJ severely if St. 
John were lost to it, u some plots here are already so bad that nothing will grow thereon 
and in some time will become so bad that they will h1.ve to be a.bandonttd" <23>. In July 
1722 Bredal explicitly stated that four planters had recently ti.Ken up land in St.John 
bec&use their lots on St. Thomu had deteriorated <24>. 
Soil exhaustion, however, represents only part of the explanation for the wave of 1721. 
Another factor was the severe drought that commenced in 1719 1.nd luted, with only 
occasional rttin, until 1723 <25>. This drought a.ggrava.ted the soil exha.ustion, prompting 
marginal planters on St. Thomas to look elHwhere for relief. 
Nothing explicit has been found in the sources to explain the la.st wave of plantation 
foundations that began in 1724. DettrioratinQ agricultural conditions certainly pl1.y1d a. 
part, but there is also evidence that the sugar crop was good in 1724 <26>. This was 
followed by the onset of a new dl"ought in starting in the summer of 1724 &nd la.sting 
through 1725 <27>. 
In Spring 1726 Governor -Moth wrote: "St. John is now so popul&ted that no lots are left, 
except in the vicinity of the fortress and the Comp1.ny plantation." Ht suggested 
parcelling out some of the la.nd belonging to the Comp&ny's plantation, leaving "for the 
honorable Company enough of the best and ea.siest land that tcould be mANgedJ by two or 
three capable sugar works" <28>. The Company agreed to this propos&l <29>, thereby 
allowing more planters, most of whom were Company employ11s, to take up new 
plantations on St. John. The external fra.meworK of colonization thus ends in 1729, when 
the la.st plantation to be granted by the Company wa.s taken up. 
The Pl&ntation System: Internal Framework 1718-1733 
While it is possiblt to follow the externa.l frameworK of colonization fa.irly closely, it is 
quite differ1nt with respect to the internal framework. Due to the nature of the source 
material little can be known a.bout the beginnings of economic &ctivity on individua.l 
plantations. The Governors' reports say very little a.bout the genera.I situation of the 
plantation system on St. John a.nd next to nothing a.bout individua.l planta.tions. The Land 
Lists, which start in 1728, provide the first meaningful site specific information. 
22 
Through the Governors' correspondence a.nd va.rious inventories we ca.n get a. fa.irly good 
picture of the situa.tion on the Compa.ny's pla.nta.tion at Cora.l Ba.y. However, the Company 
plantation is not so helpful from a. general perspective, as it was atypical in several ways. 
First, its size (approximately one thousand acres), was considerably larger tha.n average. 
Secondly, its soil seems to have been relatively poor. Thirdly, there was a large, well 
ca.pita.lized, organization behind it. 
As mentioned a.bove, the production of sugar and cotton had begun on some other 
plantations by 1721. A year later it was noted that Cornelius Delicat was the only 
planter, apart from the Compa.ny, who had a. sugar worK (30). By 1726 the number of sugar 
worKs had reached "almost 20", some of which were still under construction <31>. In 1730 
there were 22 sugar worKs (Table 7>, which meant that most had been constructed before 
1727. In 1730 there were still eight sugar planta. tions where no worK had been built. 
There were also three cotton worKs and two Killdevil <rum> worKs. Pla.ntation development 
during the 1720's significantly diminished St. John's forest. It was reported in 1720 that 
no large timber rema.ined, a.lthough plenty of small trees still survived <32>. 
Had the internal frames been filled in prior to the sla.ve rebellion of 1733? Probably not, 
although a. conclusive a.nswer is not possible from existing documenta.tion. By 1733 a.11 of 
the suga.r pla.nta.tions a.ppear to ha.ve been brought under cultiva.tion. Most northside, 
southside and west end pla.nta.tions ha.d sla.ve la.borers, a.lthough their numbers were sma.11 
in many ca.ses. However, in Cora.l Ba.y and French Quarters, the la.st to be ta.Ken up, there 
were still pla.nta.tions tha.t ha.d not been measured, a.nd the number of slaves on most 
plantations was quite sma.11. Indeed, a. few planta.tions ha.d no slaves. 
The number of slaves provides the best indica.tor of pla.ntation development during our 
period. The Land List of 1720, which provides the first census of slaves on St. John, 
enumerates a. tota.l of 806 sla.ves. By 1733 the slave population had grown by 50'¥., to 1255 
<Table 3>. These figures suggest a strong growth rate for·the planta.tions during the last 
yea.rs covered by this study. Nevertheless, the shorta.ge of sla.ve la.borers for. pla.nta.tion 
development wu & continuous complaint throughout our period <33>, and there is rea.son to 
believe that in 1733 no i:>la.ntation wa.s yet fully cultivated. 
In 1727 Governor Moth sent the Company a letter which provides some information 
regarding the number of sl&vH need to bring a. sugar plantation into full production. ln 
recommending th&t the Company parcel out land belonging to its St. John plantation, Moth 
provided estimates showing that 100 slaves &nd l complete sugar worK were required to 
cultivate 146 acres of c&ne <34>. There &rt many reasons to believe that this estimate w&S 
reli&ble. Moth was an experienced pla.nter, who owned several la.rge planta.tios on St. 
Thom&S and St. John. Moreover, he claimed tha.t several other prominent planters stood 
behind his figures <35). Finally, in a. subsequent.letter, Governor Suhm used comparable 
figures <36>. 
If valid, Moth's estimate indicates that in 1733 St. John plantations were still 
underdeveloped, for according to the figures presented in the 1733 Land List nearly all fell 
well short of a ra.tio of 1 slave for every 1.5 acres. An inventory showed that the 
Company plantation had 110 slaves in 1733, but it contained approxima.tely one thousa.nd 
acres <37>. While there is reason to suspect that the number of slaves shown in the Land 
Lists was low, the figures were probably not too far off the ma.rK. 
In sum, the gener&l impression from available evidence is that while considerable 
agricultural development had ta.Ken place throughout the island by 1733, there was still 
substantial room for internal expansion on most St. John plantations. 
23 
TABLE 3: 
SLAVES ON ST. JOHN. 1728 AND 1733 
Men 
!Women 
Bosa ls Plaquerons 
Adolescents Children 
SUl'I 
Inael Bay Q. 
74 
32 
11 
18 
2 
137 
Duurloo Bay Q. 
59 
23 
0 
18 
0 
loo 
Cruz Bay a. 
47 
25 
9 
13 
B 
102 
Reef Bay Q. 
62 
21 
11 
11 
3 
108 
Lame sure Q. 
53 
'·2o 
14 
lo 
9 
106 
Core_l Bay Q. 
37 
7 
44 
5 
13 
132 
French Q. 
14 
6 
9 
7 
1 
37 
Maha Bay Q. 
33 
19 
5 
lo 
17 
84 
SUM + 26F 
379 
153 
103 
92 
53 
806 
Westergaard++ 
563 
-
84 
3o 
677 
Caneel Bey Q. 
136 
4 
33 
7 
29 
2o9 
Ouurloo Bay Q. 
124 
8 
28 
15 
27 
2o2 
Cruz Bay a. 
121-t+i-
7 
lo 
lo 
54 
2o2 
Raef Bay a. 
Bo 
8 
12++-t-+ 
4 
23 
127 
Lama sure a. 
82 
4 
16 
8 
12 
122 
Coral Bay Q. 
137 
4 
6 
3 
34 
184 
Franch Q. 
58 
3 
9 
l 
14 
85 
fl'laho Bay Q. 
7o 
l 
18 
12 
23 
124 
SUl'I 
808 
39 
132 
60 
216 
1255 
Weetargaard++ 
731 
-
119 
-
237 
1087 
Balance 
77 
39 
13 
60 
78 
168 
SOURCE: 
RA, V-g-K, St. John Land Lists 1728, 1733. 
BOSALS: 
Newly arrived Africans, who were not taxed during their first year. 
MAQUERONS: 
Slaves incapable of working, who were not taxed. 
ADOLESCENTS: 
Slaves age 12 to 16 years, who were not taxed. 
1728 
1733 
+ 
Some of the Company's slaves, of whom 16 were unspecified and 10 were on 
St. Thomas. 
The source for this figure is an inventory in V-g-K, No. 523. 
++ 
Westergaard (1917), Appendix I, p. 319. 
+++ 
Includes "three without sufficient information". 
++++ 
Includes one mulatto girl. 
24 
CHAPTER 4: ST. JOHN PLANTATIONS 
Pla.nta.tion Position 
West India.n pla.nta.tions were usua.lly organized in a.ccordance with a fairly general pa.ttern 
(1). Access to the sea. was one of the ma.in criteria, since this cut down transportation 
time and expense. Consequently, the coa.stal regions were the first to be ta.Ken up. This 
preference was decisive in shaping plantation contours: most were rectangular, with a 
narrow side fronting the sea.. 
For several reasons it was further advantageous to have a coastal plantation on the 
leeward side of the island. First, the plantations became less vulnerable to raids by naval 
vessel, privateers or pirates, which had to ta.cl< against the wind to get inshore. Secondly, 
it was easy for heavy ladened vessels to leave the coast. Thirdly, droghers were not 
exposed to heavy wind and waves. 
How does St. John match this genera.l pattern'! The prevailing wind off St. John blows 
from the northeast, becoming easterly during the summer. This means that St. John ha.s 
its narrow side facing the wind during most of the year, allowing sa.iling ships rela.tively 
easy access to most of the shoreline. The prevailing winds a.lso made it easy for ships 
leaving St. John to get to St. Thomu. 
' 
The coast of St. John is indented by many sma.11 bays, nearly all of which provide excellent 
la.nding pla.ces. This is especially the ca.se on the north coast, where, for instance, TrunK 
Bay ha.s deep water 1.nd sa.ndy ground right up to the buch. There are some places that do 
not possess these qualities, such a.s Reef Bay on the south coast, where a large reef 
blocKs access to nearly all the shoreline. The coastline between Leinster Bay a.nd New 
Found Bay is also rich in rocKs and reefs. Generally spea.King, however, much of St. John 
can be easily accessed by boat. 
The direction of the tra.de winds and the a.bunda.nt landing pla.ces favored 1. coa.sta.l traffic 
along St. John, 1.nd there is 1.mple evidence that such occurred·, primarily in small vessels 
<droghers>. Natura.Uy, this maritime commerce wu concerned prima.rily with the 
tr1.nsportation of plantation goods (2), but there was also consider1.ble smuggling <3>. 
Despite these advantages, the coastal area.s were not alw1.ys t1.l<en up first on St. John. In 
Cruz B1.y Quarter, for eumple, two inl1.nd plantations were ta.Ken up in 1720, although 
seaside plots were still available. This p1.ttern c1.n also be seen at Reef Bay, La.mesure 
and Cor1.l Bay Qua.rters. In contra.st, the sea.side locations were the first to be ta.Kin up 1.t 
Maho :Say Quarter. In cases where inland plan.tilions were ta.Ken up first, the planters 
must have given priority to the quality of soil, terrain and rainfall. 
Nor was the principle of turning the narrow side of the plantation to the sea. always 
followed on St. John. Of thirty-nine plantations described in the Land Lists as bordering 
on the Ha, only seventeen turned their narrow side seaward. Of the remainder, ten had 
their long side fronting the sea., while there a.re differences of interpretation for twelve 
others <4>. One must conclude, then, that St. John does not easily conform with the 
regional pattern, &S only one element, the coastal traffic, has been ascertained. 
We do not Know much about the actual location of the St. John plantations, as no map shows 
the plantation boundaries. The Land Lists do provide written descriptions of plantation 
boundaries, but these a.re often vague, and have little value without a map. It is 
impossible even to define the quarterlines. 
25 
It is possible to discern the general geometric shape of inost plantations from the Land 
Lists, which usually give their measurements in length and width. The St. John 
plantations were far from dead straight with uniform borders. One meets rectangles, 
squares and parallelogr1.ms, some 1.d,iacent to one another, some perpendicular <5>. There 
were even a few trapezoid and triangular parcels (6). The coastal plantations were 
particularly irregular because of points and bays which seemingly caused measuring 
difficulties. The widths of some of these plantations were said to be "uncertain as it runs 
in and out" m. Many headlands were not included in the plantation measurements. 
Finally, the plantations differed in their overall size. In short, unlil<e the uniform pattern 
found on St. Croix, St. John wa.s a puzzle of different geometric shapes. 
Plantation Measurement 
When a planter decidtd to ta.Ke up 1. plantation on St. John his claim wu registered (8). As 
on St. Thom&S the planters did not have to pay the Company for their land. Once a. 
plantation had bten registered, the Governor usually ordered some planters of St. Thomas, 
genera.Uy four, to go to St. John to measure its boundaries. Neighbors were requested to 
be present at the measuring to ensure that none of their land was t1.1<en, and to certify the 
measurement by oath <9>. After the plantation had been measured "barricades" were 
planted to define the boundaries and a. "certificate of land measure .. was issued. These 
certificates of measurement differed from the "land certificates", which were gentri.lly 
issued relatively long &fter the measur1m1nt; 1.lthough sometimes the musuring wu done 
in accordance with a land certificate UO>. The cost of measuring a plantation was borne by 
the new owner <11>. 
These procedures ca.used many disputes a.bout plantation boundaries U2>, which sometimts 
ended with a new mea.surement <13>. Land certificates were sometimes issued without 
regard to previously established boundaries. For example, planttr Isuc Const1ntin h&d to 
t1.Ke a plantation on St. John &fter the measurement of neighboring plantations so reductd 
his lot on St. Thomas that he could no longer livt on it <14>. Responsibility for this 
recurring problem lay with the colonial administration, which does not &ppear to have b11n 
v1ry dilig1nt in accurately determining the boundarin of its land grants. Also, th1re is 
some question whether all neighbOl"S participated in the musuring, or th1.t those who did 
were i.lwa.ys honest a.bout their own uba.rrica.dH". Obviously the 1.uthorities placed very 
little credenc1 in the •certificates of m11.surem1nt
11 , which they considered less importl.nt 
than th1 land certificatn. 
Pl1.nta.tion Size 
The size of the plantation was important. West Indian planters recognized that thtre was 
an optimum size which could not be profitably exceeded. Several criteria determined this 
limit <15>. 
The first f&ctor was tr&nsportation of the sugar cane to the mill. This time consuming 
process was accomplished either by donl<eys, animal drawn carts, or slave labor. To 
prevtnt the canes from spoiling they had to be ground and the juice boiled within 
twenty-four hours after cutting. This time constraint meant that the fields could not be 
too far from the sugar worl<. Ideally the production complex should be situated near the 
c1nter of the plantation. Often, however, the nature of the terrain dictated a less than 
ideal placement. 
26 
TABLE 4: 
NUMBER AND ACREAGE OF ST. JOHN PLANTATIONS IN 1730 
Num er 
30 
25 
2o 
15 
lo 
~ i 
5 
r.:l 
~ 
a:: 
~ 
O'\ .. 
+ 
..:t" 
(\J 
ti) 
Cl) 
""' 
(.) 
0 
< 
'"-
"> ··~ 
-. 
-"""":..:.~ 
'\.: 
.:-.... _. 
O'\ .. 
O" 
4' 
U"'\ 
(\J 
... _, 
O" 
O'\ 
.. 
.. 
..:t" 
Q'\ 
['. 
O" 
' 
0 
II\ 
U"'\ 
['. 
' 
O'\ .. 
..:t" 
(\J 
.-1 
I 
0 
0 
...... 
,.,-~----. __ ... 
.,, -. ~ 
-~~-.:,...· 
:-_ . ..,-, 
.. 
- . ~ 
. 
-.; 
·-
-~, 
"\~" 
·-... ,:---~-" 
._·, __ 
O'\ .. 
O'\ 
..:t" 
.-1 
I 
U"'\ 
(\J 
...... 
·-·' 
O'\ . 
..:t" 
('.. 
...... 
' 
0 
II\ 
...... 
SOURCE: 
RA, V-g-K, St. John Land List of 1730 
......~. 
·~~· 
...,,,.._. 
~ 
O'\ 
O'\ 
• 
• 
O'\ 
..:t" 
II\ 
O" 
(\J 
(\J 
...... 
(\J 
(\J 
I 
I 
s.. 
II\ 
0 
Qj 
('.. 
0 
I> 
...... 
(\J 
0 
+ The total acreage of all 85 plantations amounted to 9889,S ac:res 1 
or roughly 80% of the entire island. 
27 
A second limiting factor wa.s the ca.pa.city of the sugar worK~ Water and wind mills could 
grind more suga.r than animf.l mills, but they were more expensive to bpera.te, and less 
reliable. A water mill, for example, could grind fifty cartloads of sugar ca.ne per 
twenty-four hours, compared to ~st twentr·five to thirty-five cartloads per day for a.n 
a.nimal mill. 
The size of the llbor force constituted a third factor. It was generally estimated that two 
slaves were needed for every 2-3 acres under cultivation. West Indian planters believed 
th&t no matter where the suga.r worK was situ&ted, it could not serve a plantation of more 
th&n 300 to 350 slaves, or an area of more than 300 &eres. Even on big islands such as 
Jamaica. &nd St. Dominque a 300 a.ere plantation was considered l&rge. 
The L&nd List of 1730 has been used to determine the actual size of the St. John 
planta:tions. It wu chosen becluse lll the la.nd had been p&rcelled out to the plantations 
by tha:t date, &nd it provides the most detailed information a.bout plantation size. 
According to the Land List, in 1730 St. John h&d 1. tota.l of 100 pl&nta.tions. Of this number 
the a.pproxima.te size of 85 c&n be determined. l't can be seen from T&ble 4 that three sizes 
pr1dominat1d to such a.n extent that th1y c&n be considered standard. The rnost frequent 
plantation size was 146 acres, followed by 109., 1.cres &nd then 73 1.cres (16). Most of the 
rem&ining plantations w.r1 sm&ller than 73 &cru. The sm&llest pa.reel, belonging to 
Ja.nnitie Reins in Cruz Bay Quarter, a.mounted to ,Ust 6.5 1.cres. At the opposite tnd of the 
sc&le were a. h&ndful of largtr plant&tions. Ont of these, totttlling 1.pproxim&t1ly 1000 
acres, belonged to the Comp&ny. In Mttho B1.y Quarter there was one of 293 a.crn 
belonging to Christopher Gottsch&lK and another a.f 462 a.crts own.d by Willi&m Vessup. 
As shown by Table 5, most of the 146 a.ere plttnt&tions cultiv1.ted sugar, this being exactly 
the right sizt for a sug&r wort< on St. John a.ccording to Governor Moth <17>. Overall, St. 
John sugar plantations had an average r;iz1 of 147 acres. But this figure is utifically 
infl&ted by the inclusion of two or thrtt 1xc1ptiona.lly large plant&tions. T&blt 5 shows 
that most of the sugar pl1.ntations w.re betw.1n 100 and 150 acres in size. By contra.st, 
St. John cotton pl&ntations av1rag1d 85 acrn, but most &lso fell into th• 100-150 1.cr1 
range <Ta.ble 6>. 
Cultivation 
Plantation cultintian by qu1.rter in 1728 &nd 1730 is shown in Ta.bl• 7. SuQ&r 1.nd cotton 
were clearly the m&in crops. SticKing to these two categories it cttn be seen th&t there 
w.re 32 sugar and 50 cotton pl&ntations in 1728, while in 1730 these figures stood at 30 
&nd 58 respectively. This data. indicates a trend aw&y from sugar cultivation toward 
cotton production. But tht f&ct that cotton plant&tions were nurly twice u numtrous H 
sugar pla.ntations in 1730 does not necessa.rily mean that they occupied twice a.s much land, 
or even more land. 
To get a more accurate picture of the general trend it is necnsa.ry to dttermine the tot&l 
acreage held by tht cotton &nd sugar pl&ntations, and to compa.re thtse figures over a 
longer period. This .1x1rcist is not without its difficultiH bec&use the L&nd Lists do not 
give acreage figures, but only the measurement of individual pl1.ntations. Moreover, 
mea.surement figures for some plant&tioris ar~ _ incompl1t1. Fin1.lly, the cultiv&tion of some 
28 
TABLE 5: 
NUMBER AND ACREAGE OF ST. JOHN SUGAR PLANTATIONS IN 1730 
Number 
2o 
15 
lo 
5 
-';:.;._ : ~~;~:-
.~ ..... .. '" 
°' "' °' "' "' "' 
°' 
°' 
°' 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
... 
.. 
.. 
..:t 
°' 
..:t 
°' 
..:t °' 
..:t 
°' 
..:t 
II'\ 
C\J 
..:t 
['-
°' 
(\J 
..:t 
['-
"' 
C\J 
C\J 
r-4 
r-4 
r-4 
r-1 . 
C\J 
C\J 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
... 
II'\ 
0 
II'\ 
0 
IJ\ 
0 
" 
['-
0 
C\J 
IJ\ 
['.. 
0 
> 
r-1 
r-4 
..... 
r-1 
C\J 
0 
Cl) 
Q) 
~ 
0 
IJ\ 
0 
CJ 
(\j 
IJ\ 
< 
SOURCE: 
RA, V-g-K, St, John Land List of 1730, 
29 
TABLE 6.: 
NUMBER AND ACREAGE OF ST. JOHN COTTON PLANTATIONS 1730 
Number 
.15 
lo 
5 
. ·a-- ···- """"' - "' . ·--1" 
.:t 
t\I 
I 
· o 
II\ 
0 
l'\I 
I(\ 
.°' . 
.. 
.::t 
(\J 
.... 
I 
0 
0 
.-I 
'• .. 
... \ .. 
.. ' - . ~ 
· . . 
.. . 
:3· ... 
°' .. 
°' 
.::t 
·r-f 
I 
II\ 
(\J 
.-I 
.·. 
°' .. 
.::t 
~ 
r-t 
I 
0 
I(\ 
.-I 
SOURCE: 
RA, V-g-K, St. John LandList of 1730 
1 .·. ·. ~ 
°' .. °' 
0 
°' 
0 
r-t 
"' 
I 
... 
II\ 
., 
~ 
~ 
.-I 
0 
30 
TABLE 7: 
PLANTATION CULTIVATION ON ST. JOHN 1728 AND 1730 
Sugar Cotton 
Mixed Nothing Unknown 
SUM 
Canael Bay a. 
7 
2 
1 
0 
1 
11· 
Duurloo Bay a. 
4 
2 
D 
0 
2 
B 
Cruz Bay a. 
4 
11 
1 
0 
0 
16 
Reef Bay a. 
5 
lo 
2 
0 
0 
17 
Lame sure a. 
6 
6 
0 
O· 
0 
12 
Coral Bay Q. 
1 
7 
0 
1 
0 
9 
rrench a. 
0 
9 
0 
1 
0 
lo 
fllaho Bay Q. 
s 
3 
0 
0 
0 
8 
SUM 
32 
.So 
4 
2 
3 
91 
Weaterqaard + 
29 
4B 
9 
-
-
87 
Ceneel Bay Q. 
9++ 
l 
1 
0 
0 
11 
Ouurloo Bay Q.· 
5 
2 
0 
0 
1 
B 
Cruz Bay Q. 
2 
15 
1 
0 
l 
19 
Reef Bay Q. 
4 
8 
1 
0 
1 
l4l 
Lameaura Q. 
4 
B 
0 
0 
0 
12 
Coral Bay Q. 
1 
12T' 
0 
0 
0 
13 
f"rench Q. 
D 
9 
0 -
1 
4 
14 
l'laho Bay Q. 
5 
3 
0 
0 
l 
' 
SU"' 
3o 
58 
3 
1 
8 
loo 
Sugar "'orka 
Cotton worka 
Killdevil works 
Canaal Bay O. 
s 
0 
0 
Ouurl,~o Bay Q. 
s 
2 
0 
Cruz Bay a. 
l 
l 
l 
. 
Raaf" Ray Q. 
3 
0 
0 
Lemesure Q. 
3 
0 
0 
Coral Bay Q. 
2~ 
0 
1 
rrench Q. 
0 
0 
0 
Me ho Bay a. 
4 
-
0 
0 
SUM 
23 
3 
2 
SOURCE: 
RA, V-g-K, St. John Land Lists of 1728 and 1730 
+ 
Westergaard (1917), Appendix I, p. 319. 
Westergaard 
has no figures for 1730. 
11 i 
++ 
Of these, No. 8 is taken from the Land List of 1731, as 
were Nos. 69 and 74 Coral Bay. 
+++ 
No. 38 has been taken from the Land List of 1728. 
++++ Includes a sugar works on the Company plantation which 
is not shown in the Land List. 
. 1728 
1730 
1730 
31 
Returning to the data. in Table 8t and comparing it with that in Table 2. we can get a. pretty 
good idea. of the cultivation pattern between 1718 and 1739. The areas suitable.for sugar 
cultivation were the first to be ta.Ken up. As the sugar quarters became fully occupied 
around 1722 planters had to be grateful for a. cotton plantation. which accounts for their 
increasing numbers during the la.st half of the 1720's. The decline in sugar plantations and 
overall sugar acreage after 1728 can be explained by the fact that plantations marginally 
suited to sugar cultivation shifted to cotton production. This squares with the fact that 
the districts where the decline tooK place, liKe Cruz Bay and Reef Bay quarters, were 
typical cotton quarters. Despite the numerical advantage of the cotton plantations in 
1730, sugar cultivation appears to have predominated up to that date. However, during the 
1730's the total acreage of the cotton plantations came to supercede that of the sugar 
plantations, indicating that cotton cultivation had indeed become predominent. 
Can these conclusions be overturned by gaps in the data? The 1728 findings seem to be 
rusona.bly secure. In that year the sugar plantations aggregated 1200 more acres than the 
cotton plantations. This figure does not ta.Ke into account seven cotton plantations of 
unKnown size and three plantations. aggregating 255 acres of unKnown cultivation. Still. 
even assuming that all ten plantations were cotton plantations, it is unliKely that their 
total acreage could ma.Ke up the deficit. since cotton plantations averaged only 85 acres 
each. Moreover, one sugar plantation of unKnown acreage has been excluded from the sugar 
totals. 
Less reliance can be placed on the 1730 figures, since they 1xclude nine cotton plantations 
of unKnown acrea.ge and eight plantations of unKnown cultivation. It is probable that few, 
if any, of the latter category cultivated sugar, since the Land Lists tended to note the 
sugar plantations. Hence it is possible that aggregate la.nd on the cotton plantations 
exceeded that on the sugar plantations as early as 1730. 
The conclusions evident from the 1739 figures seem secure. In that year cotton planta-
tions aggregated 746 more acres than sugar plantations. Excluded from this calculation 
a.re ten plantations of unKnown cultivation. The acreage of eight of these amounts to 1051. 
Assuming that all eight ha.pp1med to be sugar plantations, sugar plantations would hold 
305 more acres tha.n cotton pla.ntations. However, such 1.n usumption is unreasonable, H 
h1.lf of the ten pb.ntlltions <aggregating at lust 444 acrtsl were situated in typicd cotton 
quarters, indicating that l.t least some cultivated cotton. Moreover, there is a "reserve" 
of sixteen cotton plantations of unKnown acruge th.it has 1.lso been excluded from the 
totals. It seems, therefore, that the predominance of cotton cultivation may actually have 
been greater in 1739 th1.n the figures indicate. 
CHAPTER 5: THE PLANTERS OF ST. JOHN 
The Company's Popula.tion Policy 
The Company had a deliberate population policy for the settlement of St. John. It tried to 
restrict admission to the island, and it clearly had certain preferences as to whom it 
wanted to grant plantations. 
32 
plantations is not denoted in the Land Lists. Nonetheless, it has been possible to 
determine the acreage and cultivation of most plantations in the 1728 and 1730 Land Lists. 
Similia.r data. has been compiled from the 1739 Land List so that cultivation trends can be 
traced through the 1730's. Table 8 presents the results of this exercise. 
TABLE 8: CUL TI VA TION TRENDS, ST. JOHN 1728-1739 
1728 
1730 
1739 
Total Acreage on 0 
Sugar Plantations 
5683 (31) 
5428 (30) 
4272 (25) 
Total Acreage on O 
Cotton Plantations 
4410 (43) 
4943 (49) 
5018 <57) 
Total Acreage on O 
Other Plant..tions 
714 (06> 
371 <04) 
299 (02) 
Unl<nown Culivation 
255 (03) 
73 (08) 
1051 (10) 
Sugar Plantations of 
Unl<nown Acreage 
(Qi) 
(00) 
(00) 
Cotton Plantations of 
Unl<nown Acrea.ge 
(07) 
(09) 
<16) 
SOURCE: RA, V-g-K, St. John La.nd Lists of 1728, 1.730, 1739. 
Some data. from the 1738 Land List has betn 
incorporated into the 1739 figures. 
O denotes number of plant1.tions counted. 
Befort discussing this data. two points must be noted. First, it should be stressed th&t 
the figures express total acreage a.nd not cultivated acreage. The latter would, of course, 
have been more informative, but such information does not exist for this period. The 
cultivated 1.creage was always smaller than the total acreage since land was also used for 
residences, processing facilities, pasturage, provision grounds a.nd roads. Moreover, much 
land was unsuited to cultivation. 
The second point is that the acreage sugar plantation acreage includes that belonging to 
the Company plantation in Coral Bay. Its exact size is unl<nown, but it can reasonably be 
estimated &t one thousand acres. According to a.n inventory only 195 acres of this 
plantation was cleared in 1728 (18), which emphasizes the vast disparity in this period 
between total acreage and cultivated acreage. 
33 
Pla.nters from other West India.n isla.nds were not encoura.ged to settle on St. Johnt a.s ha.d 
been the ca.se a.t St. Thoma.st a.nd la.ter St. Croix. Ra.ther. the Compa.ny a.imed a.t recruiting 
only Da.nish "citizens" of St. Thoma.s (1). In this context the term "citizen" covers not only 
people of Denma.rK. but a.lso other na.tiona.lities who ha.d sworn a.n ca.th of a.llegia.nce to the 
Da.nish King (2). Tha.t Da.nish citizens of St. Thoma.s were preferred is shown quite clea.rly 
in the Compa.ny's pre-coloniza.tion a.greement. which sta.ted tha.t no pla.nta.tion on St. John 
should be ta.Ken up unless a white person from St. Thoma.s was pla.ced on it (3). One reason 
for this insistence on people from St. Thomas ma.y ha.ve been tha.t St. John wa.s being 
colonized in pa.rt to help a.lleviate problems confronted by St. Thoma.s planters. 
Additiona.llyt the Da.nish a.dministra.tors were undoubtedly concerned tha.t opening up the 
coloniza.tion to other nationalities would bring in too ma.ny Englishmen, thus crea.ting 
problems of control. 
The Compa.ny a.lso encoura.ged certa.in types of people from St. Thoma.s to emigra.te to St. 
John. To begin with it ordered Breda.l to send a.s ma.ny poor a.nd idle people to St. John a.s 
possible C4>. 
However. Breda.l recognized that the colonization required people with 
investment ca.pital, ra.ther than those with little or nothing. In 1721 he wrote to the 
Compa.ny: 
When newly a.rrived colonists a.re ta.Ken for 
the planting of such a. colony they 1.re poor 
people a.nd the honora.ble Company is obliged 
to give them credit, as it is impossible for 
them to get along without three negroes. 1.nd 
this immediately demands 300-600 rigsdalers. 
Those people who enjoy such credit. 1.nd have 
nothing themselves, a.re not capa.ble of estab-
lishing a sugar worK in 20 or even 30 yea.rs. 
Brediil was further concerned tha.t the slaves purcha.sed by such creditors might be worKed 
to death. He therefore wanted to recruit rich people, and the Compa.ny 1.greed with his 
approach <5 >. 
A nationt.l preference 1.lso influenced Company population policy. The Directors wanted to 
have St. John •mostly cultivated by people of the Danish nation" beet.use "they show us on 
St. Thomas tha.1: one may be more sure of one's own". The Company sought to achieve this 
result by granting plantations to families sent from Denm1.r1<. The Directors felt that 
these people could be assisted without great costs <6>. 
Thirdly. the Company wa.nted to promote settlement by white fa.milies. The Directors 
wrote to Breda.! in 1722 tha. t "some citizens of St. Thomas should have preference over 
others; for instance, if - apart from being native Danes and consequently belonging to the 
Lutheran religion - they have children or relatives whom they want to put on the 
plantations, so that the island is thus populated with whites" (7). This sta.tement also 
indicates a religious preference. 
A decade after the colonization commenced the Compa.ny still adhered to its population 
policy. When. in 1727t the Directors a.greed to pa.reel out some of the land belonging to the 
Company pla.nta.tion, they wrote that priority should be given "to the very deserving of the 
Company's servants or citizens who can best put them in order ••• with preference for our 
own na.tion a.nd religion. and it would please us that Moth and Ga.rdelint more tha.n others, 
be given pla.ntations to their pleasure" <B>. 
34 
Were the Company's preferences fulfilled? With respect to the economic consideration, 
several rich planters from St. Thomas did acquire plantations on St. John (9). But there 
were also many less affluent plantation owners. 
The Company was less successful in populating St. John with Danes, for only a.bout 25% of 
the plantation owners were of Danish descent <Table 9>. Some planters did send relatives 
to St. John <10>, but, in fa.ct, the Land Lists show that only a few families, such as the van 
Stells, the Von Beverhoudts and the Runnels, settled on the plantations. Relatively few 
whites settled on St. John during our period, there being only 157 in 1733 <Table 10). The 
Land List of 1730 shows that the Company's desire to parcel out land from its plantation 
to its own servants bore results. 
Thus, it appears that while the Company had a. settlement policy that favored people with 
capital, Danes, families, Lutherans, whites and Company employees, these preferences 
only partially influenced the actual composition of the St. John population. 
The First Planters 
The sources shed little light on the first planters on St. John. Bredal wrote in July 1718 
that three planters had gone to St. John, and ten others had registered claims to 
plantations <11>. A month later he reported that "nearly 30 men" had claimed plantations 
on St. John <12>. However, according to the Land List of 1729 only 10 plantations were 
ta.Ken up in 1718, although there is evidence that this figure may be low. In 1722 Breda.I 
prepared a list showing 39 plantation owners on St. John <13), a. figure which corresponds 
closely with information in the Land Lists. 
While we have some idea of the number of plantations occupied in 1718, the sources a.re 
rather silent with respect to the owners. Pieter Duurloo was said to be the first planter 
on St. John <14>. In 1719, Jens Hansen Grundt, a Sergeant, was granted a plantation in 
accordance with the Company's preference for Danes and Compa.ny employees C15>. It is 
l<nown that Jacob von Stell bega.n harvesting cotton in 1721 <16> and that Cornelius Delicat 
had erected 1. sugar worK by 1722 U 7>, so it is lil<ely that they were among the first 
settlers. 
On the other hand, it is interesting to note that Johan Heinrich Sieben, 
supposedly one of the prime movers of the colonization initiative, is not shown by Bridal 
as a plantation owner in 1722, Although he did acquire one 11.ter <18>. 
Tht Pl1.nt1rs' N1.tionl.lity 
As mention above, Da.nish citizens of the West Indies consisted of Danes and foreign 
nationals who ha.d sworn an oath of allegiance to the Danish King. The first planters ca.me 
from St. Thomas, but what was their national composition? And how large was the Danish 
contingent? 
Two sources can be used to help answer these questions: Breda.l's 1722 list of planters 
and the Land Lists of 1728 and 1733. There a.re also some desultory remarKs a.bout some 
planters' nationality in the Governors' correspondence. Table 9 presents the findings. 
35 
TABLE 9: NATIONALITY OF THE PLANTERS ON ST. JOHN 
Yea.r 
Dutch 
Da.nes 
French 
Britons UnKnown Tota.l 
1722 
23 <39%) 
8 (20%) 
7 <18%) 
0 <00%) 
1 <03Yo) 
39 
1728 
49 (56%) 23 (26%) 5 (06%) 2 (02%) 
9 <10,.o) 
88 
SOURCES: RA, V-g-K, No. 95: "Character pa. indva.nerne pa. 
Eyla.ndet St. Jan", enclosed in Breda.I to the Company 
7-15-1722; St. John La.nd Lists 1728, 1733. 
Except for those planters whose na.tiona.lity is 
Known from other sources, the above classifi-
ca.tion is based on name. Persons whose na.mes 
1.re difficult to classify have been shown as 
"unKnown". Some Germans may ha.ve been cla.ssi-
fied a.s Dutch, beca.use it is sometimes diffi-
cult to distinquish between the two nation11.li-
ties by na.me. Widows have been cla.ssified 
according to the surname of their husba.nds. 
It can be seen from Table 9 that the Dutch predominated, as they constituted more than 
half of the pl11.nta.tion owners. Danes comprised only 20 to 25 1>1rc1nt. Tht Frtnch wert 
rtlatively numerous initially, but their representation declined during the period. The 
British wert hardly present. 
The pictur1 is almost similia.r to that of St. Thomas, where the Dutch also prtdominated, 
but where more nationalities were present <19>. 
It is clear tha.t despite Danish 
sovereignty, foreign na.tiona.lities comprised the grea.t ma.,iority of the population and 
domina.ted the agricultural economy. Nevertheless, the Da.nish representa.tion was twice 
as high as on St. Thomas, where in 1716 Da.nish pla.nters were estima.ted at between 10 and 
12 percent of the popula.tion <20l. 
It appears tha.t in a.ccorda.nce with Company policy all of the early planters came from St. 
Thomas. La.rge numbers of Dutchmen, most of them from other West India.n islands, had 
migri.ted to St. Thomas from the outset of the Da.nish occupation <21>. Eredal mentions 
tha.t severa.l Dutch colonists on St. John were second genera.tion citizens <22>. The French 
were m.iinly Huguenots who ha.d fled the French isla.nds beca.use of religious persecution 
<23). 
l'IEN 
lllflltEN 
CHILDREN 
SUl'I 
~ 
Plenters 
Other 1119"1 
Overseers 
Plenters 
Other women 
t"" 
trj 
Cenael Bay Q. 
3 
1 
6 
3 
3 
5+ 
21 
~ 
0 
Duurloo Bay Q. 
2 
0 
5 
0 
2 
2 
11 
_t_ruz _e_ax Jk 
7 
1 
lo 
4 
6 
16 
44 
~ 
Reef Bey Q. 
4 
0 
6 
0 
1 
0 
11 
Lnaaure Q. 
1 
0 
3 
'l 
0 
1 
6 
trj 
.... 
~ 
...,, 
H 
Coral Bey a. 
0 
12 
5 
0 
0 
0 
17 
N 
t-3 
CD 
trj 
F"rench Q. 
3 
1 
0 
0 
4 
6 
14 
"d 
0 
l'laho Bay a. 
3 
l 
2 
1 
4 
4 
15 
Current sum 
23 
16++ 
37 
9 
2o 
"d 
c:: s 
SUl'I 
76 
29 
34 
139 
Weate~g_aard+++ 
76 
6 
41 
123 
H 
0 z 
0 
w 
'"rj 
°' 
Ul 
Caneel Bay Q. 
0 
2 
6 
2 
0 
0 
lo 
t-3 . 
Duurloo Bay Q. 
1 
0 
3 
0 
2 
9 
15 
Cruz Bay Q. 
7 
6 
6 
3 
6 
21 
49 
c.... 
~ 
Reef Bay Q. 
4 
1 
3 
0 
6 
lo 
24 
~ 
-....J 
Lamesure Q. 
3 
0 
4 
1 
3 
2 
13 
N 
.... 
00 
...,, 
Coral Bey Q. 
2 
l 
2 
1 
1 
5 
12 
F"rench a. 
7 
2 
1 
0 
6 
3 
19 
i.i 
~ 
i.i 
~ 
l'laho Bay Q. 
2 
3 
2 
0 
s 
3 
15 
Current a1111 
26 
15 
'Z1 
7 
29 
-....J 
w 
w 
SUl'I 
68 
36 
53 
157 
lllestergeerd +++ 
97 
!53 
58 
208 
SOURCE: 
RA, V-g-K, 
St. John Land Lists of 1728 and 1733 
37 
More is Known a.bout the Da.nish colonists on St. John, a.s most were a.tta.ched to the 
Compa.ny. Ta.ble 11 classifies the Da.nish planters by occupationa.l ba.cKground: 
TABLE 11: OCCUPATIONAL BACKGROUND OF THE DANISH 
PLANTERS ON ST. JOHN, 1722, 1728, 1733 
1722 
1728 
1733 
Administrators 
s 
12 
11 
Soldiers 
2 
4 
s 
Planters 
1 
7 
s 
Tota.I 
8 
23 
21 
SOURCES: RA, V-g-K, No. 95: "Character pa. indva.nerne pa. 
Eylandet St. Jan", enclosed in Breada.l to the 
Company, 7-15-1722; St. John Land Lists 1728, 
1733; Gagerboger for St. Thomas og St. John 1718-
1733. 
The 1728 "administrator" category includes the 
Lutheran priest, Phillip Adam Dietrich. The 
category "planters" refers to Danes with no 
apparent a. ttach ment to the Company. 
It can be seen that only a. few Danes other than Company employees felt tempted to ta.Ke up 
a. plantation on St. John. Comparison of the names in the Land Lists with those in the 
Gageboger indicdes thAt several soldiers sent over to the West Indies beef.me 
a.dministri.tors. 
Poul Hansen Sti.ge, the Ca.shier, is one example. 
Another is Johi.n 
Reimert Soedtma.nn, who WAS a. soldier before the Company recruited him and ma.de him the 
Town BAiliff of St. John bttAUSt of his "cleverness and Ci.p&bilities" <24>. Moreover, there 
a.re several exa.mples of soldiers who became overseers, for example the Company overseer 
Svend Bergesen <25). 
Planter C&pita.l 
The sources provide little information a.bout where the capital for the colonization ca.me 
from. There are three possibilities: 
l> it ca.me from the planters; 2> it ca.me from the 
Company; 3> it ca.me from externa.l sources. It ca.n be ascertained that both the planters 
and the Company invested in St. John, while nothing definitive ca.n be said respecting the 
third possibility. 
Breda.I reported from St. Thomas in 1721 that "those who have ha.d fully grown children in 
this island have sent them there [St. JohnJ. Now the parents here ca.n gua.rantee the 
credit which they ha.ve with the Company, and a.s they ha.ve more funds tha.n a. newly Arrived 
38 
colonist they can continue the cultivation with greater energy" C26>. In the same letter he 
noted that agricultural progress on the clantations of Jacob van Stell and Pieter Duurloo 
"could never have happened in such a short time if they had not had resources from here". 
Elsewhere, Bredal mentioned that planter Johannes Charles "has previously been a citizen 
of St. Thomas, but as his plantation on this island has been ta.ken from him by the Company 
because of debt, they have found it necessary to help him and his wife in their poverty 
with a lot on St. John" (27>. 
The above quotations show that capital ca.me directly from the planters and as credit from 
the Company. The last quotation, however, is somewhat problematic as it is not clear if 
the "they" refers to the Company, or to other planters or merchants. Besides helping 
planters with land grants and credit, the Company also invested directly in a plantation on 
St. John. 
It is possible that some capital ca.me from external sources. In 1719 Breda.I mentioned 
that in 1716 the planters of St. Thomas owed Dutch merchants in Amsterdam more than 
40,000 rigsdalers, which equaled the Company's own claims against the planters (28>. In 
1721 Breda.l lea.rned that several planters were indebted to the Dutch firm of Jeremias van 
der Meer & Zoonen <29>. But, it is not possible from 1.vailable sources to est&blish 1.ny 
direct connection between external capital a.nd the colonization of St. John. 
Pla.nt1r Rtsid1ncy 
Inform&tion rtspecting the place of residence of the St. John pl&nters is presented in 
T&bles 12 and 131 which show that less than half the plantation owners lived on the island. 
It can be seen from Table 12 that less than ha.If of the St. John plantation owners lived on 
the island. Between 1728 and 1733, however, the percent&ge of planters living on St. John 
rose slightly, while the percentage living on St. Thomas declined. 
TABLE 12: RS:SIDB:NCY OF ST. JOHN PLANTATION 
OWNERS 1728 AND 1733 
St. John 
St. Thomas Absentee 
Unl<nown 
1728 
36,.. 
50% 
1% 
13% 
1733 
41''. 
42,.. 
12% 
SOURCE: RA, V-g-K, St. John Land Lists 1728 and 1733 
The "absentee" category refers to plantation 
owners known to live outside the Danish islands. 
39 
TABLE 13: 
RESIDENCY OF ST. JOHN PLANTERS BY QUARTER IN 1728 AND 1733 
On the plantation 
st. Thomes 
Absent. 
Unknown 
SUM 
Caneel Bey a. 
6 
4 
0 
2 
12 
Ouurloo Bay a. 
2 
4 
0 
0 
6 
Cruz Bay a. 
11 
3 
1 
1 
16 
Reef Bey a. 
4 
lo 
0 
3 
17 
Lemesure a. 
2 
7 
0 
2 
11 
1728 
Coral Bay Q. 
0 
7 
l~ 
1 
9 
french Q. 
3 
5 
0 
2 
lo 
Ma ho Bay Q. 
4 
3 
0 
0 
7 
SUM 
32 
43 
2 
11 
ea++ 
Westergaard~ 
28 
36 
1 
-
65 
Ceneel Bay Q. 
3++++ 
5 
1 
2 
11 
Ouurloo Bay Q. 
1 
5 
0 
0 
6 
Cruz 8ay o. 
11 
4 
1 
1 
17 
Raef Bay a. 
4 
3 
0 
0 
~. 
7 
Lamesure Q. 
4 
6 
0 
1 
11 
l?J3 
Coral Bey Q. 
3 
5 
l~ 
3 
12 
french a. 
7 
4 
0 
2 
13 
Ma ho Bay Q. 
2 
4 
0 
2 
8 
SUI'! 
35 
36 
3 
11 
es++ J 
+++ 
Wastargaard"'""" 
67 
4 
l 
-
72 
SOURCE: 
RA, V-g-K, St. John Land Lists of 1728 and 1733 
+ 
The Company, which is difficult to place, is included here. 
++ 
The figures presented in this Table differ somewhat from those 
in tables showing the ntnnber of plantations. 
This is because 
some planters owned more than one plantation, while others were 
joint owners. 
Thus, 78 planters owned own plantation each, 4 
owned two, 1 owned 2~ and 5 owned half a plantation each, with 
the result that 88 planters owned 91 plantations. 
+++ 
Westergaard (1917), Appendix I, 319. 
++++ 
Owned by the minor heirs of Cornelius Delicat's widow, who lived 
with their guardian Jacob Delicat in Reef Bay. 
Here it is 
decisive that they are on St. John. 
Generally, minors are in-
cluded in their guardian's residence, as ±t is most likely that 
they lived there. 
+++++ 
Here 70 own a single plantation, 8 own two, 1 owns 2~, 2 own 
three, 1 owns four and 3 own half a plantation each, which 
results in 85 planters owning 100 plantations. 
40 
Several reasons help explain why most St. John plantation owners lived on St. Thomas. 
First, nearly all the original pla.nta.tion owners ca.me from St. Thomas, a.nd many felt 
comfortable there. Secondly, many already had plantations on St. Thomas, which they Kept 
as their "ma.nor house". Thirdly, some may have preferred to live in the sea.port of 
Charlotte Amalie for social and/or economic reasons <30>. Fourth, some planters 
undoubtedly feared an e:nglish attack against St. John during the early yea.rs of the 
colonization. Finally, fear of the slaves was undoubtedly a. deterrent, particularly since 
many of the plantations on St. John were isolated from one another by wood and mountain, 
a.nd there were few places of security. During the period under study most St. Thomas 
residents must have considered St. John as a godforsaken wilderness beyond civilization. 
CHAPTER 6: THE ADMINISTRATION OF ST. JOHN 
The &:arly Administration 
No civil authority Hems to have txisted on St. John during the first years of colonintion. 
Rather it appears that the island was under army rule, since one of the Company demands 
was that the planters obey orders from the commandant concerning everything relating to 
the defense of the island m. It would not be unusual if no civil authority existed, for in 
1.n urly phase of dev1lopm1nt, coupltd with the threat of foreign attacK, the military must 
h&ve & dominant position. Moreov1r, from the Company's point of view there was a limited 
nted for & sep&rate civil authority during this 11.rly period, &S the soil was not yet fully 
cultivated, the number of inhabitants was small, taxes could not bt expected before 1725 
because of tht tax 1x1mption period, and, finally, & civil offici&l would be 1.n &dditional 
burden on the Company's limited capital resources. 
A start wu m&dt toward the est&blishment of & civil &uthority on November 21, 1724 when 
Phillip Gardelin wa.s commissioned "vice supreme he&d" of St. John <2>. But Gardelin did 
not 1.rriv1 in the West Indies until late June of the following yur <3>. And, u ht wu 1.lso 
commissioned H11.d Bool<l<eeper for the Comp1.ny, which wu his prim&ry function, his 
presence on St. John wu probably cursory. 
As soon &S Gardelin reached St. Thomas he began putting in order the Company accounts 
bacK to 1714 <4>. The &ccounts were in such confusion th&t Governor Th&mbsen would ha.ve 
nothing to do with them <5>. This time consuming job probably l<ept G&rdelin on St. Thomas 
for much of the time, a supposition supported by his letters home from St. Thomas. 
Nevertheless, 
despite Gardelin's limited presence, a start was ma.de in the civil 
administration of St. John during this period. 
The Town Bailiff on St. John 1727-1733 
A civil authority of & more meaningful nature became a reality on May 20, 1727, when Johan 
Reimart Soedtmann, a Company clerk, was appointed temporary Town Bailiff <6>. 
This 
appointment can be considered as more meaningful than Gardelin's because Soedtmann 
settled on his sugar plantation in Ma.ho Bay and, consequently resided permanently in his 
ilrisdiction m. 
41 
It must be noted that secondary studies and archival shelflists use the term '.'~and~oged" 
when speaKina of this official, but he is called "Byfoged" or Town Bailiff m ~he 
documentary ~ources. This title suggests that the Town Bailiff was to be head authority 
in a town on st. John. It has already been noted that the Company harbored ideas of 
establishing a town below the fort at Coral Bay. 
The office of Town Bailiff was established because there was no firm administrative grip 
on st. John. 
Conditions were such that "no registration and law enforcement has 
happened", so Soedtmann was ordered to "go there to underta.Ke legal ma.t~e_rs" (8). Among 
other things, the Company Directors were thinKing of the confusing condition of the land 
certificates. But their primary concern wa.s the growing need to ma.Ke a Land List, as the 
tu: exemption period had expired for many plantations by 1727 (9). 
The citizen's captain, the militia. chief and the comma.nda.nt of the fort were to assist the 
Town Bailiff in certain of his tasKs (10). In 1733 Soedtmann also had a couple of officials, 
Peder Kroyer and Peder Sorensen, under his direction to assist with probate matters U 1>. 
The Town Bailiff's responsibilities included probate matters, the collection of debts and 
fines owed to the Company, and he was to ta.Ke ca.re tha.t "no foreign ships either unload or 
load there by which the reputation of the Company could be damaged". Apa.rt from his 
standing instructions the Town Bailiff occasionally received orders to underta.Ke special 
assignments, such as inventorying and supervising the Company's plantation, or receiving 
statements for the Land List <12>. 
His instructions restricted the 1.uthority and person1.l initiative of the Town Bailiff. With 
respect to probate matters, the Town Bailiff could only interfere if the deceased h&d 
property on St. John exclusively. If the deceased also h&d property an St. Thomas, the 
administration/distribution of the estate had to taKe place there. In the case of fines the 
Town Bailiff was not 1.llowed to proceed without orders from the Governor, and he must 
have nothing to do with payments. The Town Bailiff could neither ta.Ke 1.ction on beha.lf of 
the Company, or st1.rt property executions without written permission from the Governor. 
The limitations imposed on the Town Bailiff's freedom of 1.ction show that in 
1.dministr1.tive matters St. John did not have independent st1.tus, but wu essenti&lly 
subordinate to St. Thom&s. The f&ct th1.t his authority 11.y prim1.rily within the financial 
sphere indic&tes that the Comp1.ny's interest in St. John wu l&rgely 1tconomic. 
The Gu&lifications of th1t Administr1.tors 
Generally speaKing the men who governed St. Thomas - St. John during our period seem to 
ha.ve been rather competent. At lea.st the Company Directors were satisfied with the 
performance of most of them. 
Certainly the Directors were pleased with EriK Breda.11 who did much to improve the 
administrative chaos tha.t he inherited from his predecessor, MiKKel Crone. Bredal tried to 
resign as Governor on several occasions from 1720 onward, but not until 1724 did the 
Company reluctantly accept his resignation <13>. A few yea.rs later the Company offered 
him a position as supervisor of all its property on the islands, which he rejected <14>. 
When the accounts from the period of his governorship were being settled, it appeared that 
he owed some "table money". 
Governor Suhm, however, a.sKed the Company to release 
Bredal from this debt as a. means of encoura.ging him to return to its service <15>. When St. 
Croix was colonized the Directors wa.nted Breda.l to ta.Ke charge, but "he was absent at that 
42 
t_ime" <16>. From the Company's point of view, therefore, Breda.I c&n be considered a. valued 
Governor. 
Otto Jacob Tha.mbsen succeeded Breda.I, but he died a.fter only six months in office which 
mea.n_s tha.t he had little opportunity to accomplish much. 
The Council of Secr;ta.ries 
Appointed FrederiK Moth as his temporary replacement. 
Moth had worl<ed his way up in the Company from ship's captain, to steward of the 
warehouse, to Chief M_ercha.nt before being named temporary Governor. It is liKeiy that 
Moth wa.s a.n a.ble administrator, even though the Company did not ma.Ke his appointment 
permanent. The Directors thought tha.t he lacl<ed loyalty and zeal (17), charges which Moth 
vigorously refuted <18). Nonetheless, the Directors believed tha.t he ha.d been a good man, 
a. view which Suhm confirmed <19). Moth regained respecti.bility when he was appointed the 
first Governor of St. Croix in 1734 <20>. 
HenriK Suhm, Moth's successor, served H Governor for six years C1727-1733). Prior to his 
1.ppointment he hi.d served a.s Governor of the Gold Cea.st. Although the sources provide no 
information &bout the Directors' opinion of him, it ca.n be usumed from his long 
appointment th1.t they were utisfied. On the other ha.nd, both Joha.n Horn, the Company 
Bool<l<eeper, &nd Gardelin, complained thi.t Suhm wu obstinate <2U, which, of course, does 
not mean that he was a bi.d Governor. At most it implies tha.t he h1.d difficulties worl<ing 
with some of his subordinat1S. 
Phillip G1.rdelin relieved Suhm in 1733. It is outside the scope of this pi.per to evi.lu&te 
his Governorship. But his performance H He1.d Bool«eeper c&n be discussed. It is certain 
th1.t before G1.rdelin became Governor the Directors were more than pleased with having 
him in its service. The Comp11ny, through Bredi.l, tried unsuccessfully to dissu1.de him 
from resigning his position in St. Thomas in 1717 <22>. When he re-entered the Comp1.ny's 
service in 1725, his 1.bilities as 1.n 1.ccount1.nt bec1.me evident when he found "some 
hundreds of thousands of rigsdalers" in outstanding debts <23>. The Directors were so 
pl11.sed th&t they appointed him Vice Commandant of St. John, with a substanti&l increase 
in Hl&ry <24>. Suhm &lso praised Gardelin as •a most industrious &nd careful m&n" &nd 
recommended that the Company give him & pl&nt&tion in St. John to l<tep him in its service 
(25). 
The lut of the 111.ding civil serv1.nts requiring 1.ttention is Johan Reimert Sotdtm&nn, 
whose office wu directly connected to St. John. Like Moth, Soedtm&nn h&d wort<ed his w1.y 
up within the Company, so he cannot have been without &bilitits. 
He entered the 
Company's service as 1. soldier in 1721. A ye&r l&ter he was promoted to sub-assistant 
•due to his c&p&city and cleverness". In 1724 he is mentioned as &n usistant. Fin&lly he 
became Town Bailiff of St. John upon recommend&tion of his fa.ther-in-la.w, Phillip 
Gardelin <26). 
While the Company seems to have been ti.Ken care in selecting well qualified Governors 1.nd 
high r&nl<ing officials to administer its West India.n colonies, it was not so scrupulous 
when it came to the lesser civil strvants. It has been mentioned that Edward Poulsen and 
Harboe were sent to St. John because of heavy drinking and incapa.city respectively. 
Unfortunately, they were not isolated examples. 
In the spring of 1720 two apprentices a.rrived in the West Indies, but both were such 
drunkards that one had to be made a soldier <27>. In 1721 Andreas Hissing, the Bool<J.<eeper 
died, but Governor Bredal refused to replace him with someone local because "none of the 
assistants here can post anything properly", thereby permitting the accounts to suffer 
<28). 
43 
Nor was Hissing free of faults, for after he married "he was more careful a.bout his own 
business than that of the Honorable Company, and the rest of the time he spent at inns" 
<29>. 
The same letter reported that two assistants, Friis and Harbel<, had been .iailed in 
Christianfort as an example, because they had neglected Company interests. The newly 
appointed Head Bool<l<eeper, Johan Horn, complained of the quality of the lesser officials 
(30>, as did Governor Thambsen, who, also accused Horn of neglect C31>. When the Cashier, 
Poul Hansen Stage, wanted to resign in 1724, Thambsen wrote that none of his assistants 
could be trusted with the money <32>. 
Court officials were also lacl<luster. In his first letter to the Directors Thambsen wrote 
that Sandberg "who presides over the Court of the Ordinary Council ... is totally useless, as 
he is incap&ble of grasping even the smallest a.mount of information unless someone copies 
it down for him" <33>. 
Bredal complained that there were too few judges, some of whom 
were "ignorant of the law" <34>. Suhm reported that Andreas H&mmer, the former Town 
B&iliff of St. Thomas, "is so addicted to lechery that due to his many excesses, and 
complaints from the citizenry that no one could wl.11< in the streets because of his attacl<s 
or feel their lives secure, he has been placed in jail where to this day no improvement can 
be expected; consequently we a.re so embara.ssed with him that we most humbly a.sl< what 
we are to do with this desperate person" <35>. Some stories the sources teW 
The examples of official incapacity are numerous. It could be suspected that the letttr 
writers made the lesser officials much worse tha.n they a.ctua.lly were in order to cover 
their own fa.ults, or to press the Compa.ny into stnding more people, since most of the 
letters conta.ined requests for new a.ssistants. 
But, beca.use the examples are so 
numerous, divtrse 1.nd sent by different people - for exa.mple, 1.ll Governors but Moth - the 
picture presented ca.nnot be too distorted. 
As the na.tur. of the sources is to report the un~u1.l it is difficult to say whether 1.11 
lower officia.ls were poorly qualified 1.nd undisciplined. 
But the number of examples 
cert&inly indicates that this kind of Company strvant wa.s rather common. Since most 
Danes felt that service in the West Indies spelt certain duth <36>, it can be assumed that 
the best qualified office clerl<s stayed home, while most people who w.nt to the islands did 
10 because they could not hold 1. .iCb in the Mother Country. 
The poor conditions of administr&tion in the Danish W11t Indies were not caused only by an 
U"lqualified, undisciplined civil service, but also by tht stingy policy of the Compa.ny. The 
Campany paid extr1m1ly low wages, which, coupled with the high cost of living in the 
islands, resulted in incesunt demands for pay increases <37>. Thambsen gave 1. good 
illustration of the gravity of the situation when he suggtsted that the Company raiH a 
sub- assistant's wage from seven to ten rigsdalers a month "because he cannot get food. 
much less clothes." "The poor assistants", Thambsen continued <38>: 
have to add to their subsistence by scribing 
for some of the planters on this island, and 
he who is incapable of the Dutch language 
must soon die, which means thd the Company's 
service is extremely neglected, and we can 
assure the Honorable Gentlemen that the worse 
of the assistants have very little or no 
desire to remain in the Company's service. 
Given this situation it is no wonder that some of the lower officials became negligent and 
drunl<. Matters were further complicated by frequent illness and deaths, resulting in more 
44 
worK <at lust in theory>, for those who were still able, especially &S the Company was 
reluctant to send out new people (39). 
Thi N1.tur1 of Colonial Administration 
As a consequence of the poor quality 1.nd uneven performance of Compa.ny officia.ldom, the 
colonia.l a.dministra.tion was chaotic and inefficient. The sta.te of the 1.ccounts provides the 
best example of this a.dministra.tive sloppiness. 
In the Summer of 17113 it was reported tha.t the account booKs for 1715-1716 were almost 
finished <40). The accounts, then, were already a. couple of yea.rs behind. Moreover, the 
worK which had been done does not seem to have been sa.tisfa.ctory, for when Gardelin 
began a thorough revision of the accounts in 1725 he ha.d to sti.rt a.s far bacK as 1714. ln 
the bool<s for 1715-1716 he found "some fa.ults a.nd mis-entries", which resulted in a 
dema.nd for i.n usista.nt to help set the record straight <41>. The mess in the accounts 
continued throughout Bredi.l's period. 
By 1724 it ha.d become so bad tha.t Thambsen 
disclaimed any responsibility <42>. 
There a.re oth1r 1xa.mples of ma.la.dministration. Proba.te ma.tters wer1 neglected, a.s wa.s 
the registra.tion of pla.nta.tions on St. John. In 1733 Governor Ga.rdelin wa.rned the Town 
Ba.iliff in Cha.rlotte Arna.lie th&t he should do som1thing &bout the twenty-thr11 proba.te 
cases tha.t hi.d not been tended to for several yea.rs, causing "muttering" among the 
citizenry <43). In 1727 Horn found that ther1 wer1 still twenty-four pla.nta.tions on St. 
John that had not been mea.sured, which meant tha.t "the Compa.ny loses its right to land 
tax" <44>. 
The Company had dema.nded in 1719 and aga.in in 1722 tha.t a. La.nc:I List be 
pr1pa.red for St. John <45>. Nevertheless, the first La.nc:I List wa.s not ma.de until 1728, 
three yea.rs after the first ta.x exemptions bega.n to 1xpire. As ther1 had bttn ma.ny 
disputes a.nc:I cues a.bout pla.ntation bounc:la.ries, 1.nd 1. few dema.nc:ls for new m11.surings, 
the pl1.nters were ordered to 1.ppea.r before Secr1t1.ry Schionem1.m to show proper land 
certific&tes 1.nd certificates of area. measurement <46>. 
There had been many similia.r 
boundary disputn on St. Thomu <47>. 
The incompetency of the administration resulted in 11.d< of respect from the planters, which 
ca.n be s11n by th1 fact th&t the administrators had grut difficulty in r11.lizing their 
dem1.nds. For instance, it was announced twice in 1724 that everyone should report with 
their weigh slips to the Hud BoolO<eep1r's offitt in Christi&nfort; but this never 
happened, 1.nd therefore a third request h&d to be made <48>. Befortt Suhm's arrival in 1727 
orders h1.d b11n given th&t everyone should pay h11.d 1.nd 11.nd taxes for two yurs, but, 
according to Suhm, this never occurred <49>. 
It is in the light of these conditions th&t the fa.ulty Land Lists for St. John must be 
understood. It is obvious that there was great trouble in ha.ving the planters deliver their 
reports for the Lists. J1.cob Schionemann, who signed the L1.nd List for 1728, compla.ined 
in a postscript th&t despite many warnings planters did not present their reports. He 
thought it would be better if colonial offici1.ls went out to the individual pl1.ntations 1.nd 
ma.de a register of the objects for taxation. 
In 1730 Ga.rdelin reported that "many of the inh&bitants do not report to the office tither 
when a slave dies or is sold, consequently no small argument is caused every year in their 
bills a.nd a continuous writing off on the booKs. It seems 1.bsolutely btst to me tha.t the 
inhabitants of St. John, a.swell as here CSt. ThomasJ, should be entered according to their 
own r1ports of head &nd 11.nd t1.x" <50>. Three months 11.ter Suhm also recommended th&t 
the planters be required to hand in reports for the La.nd List <51>. The Company approved 
45 
of this procedure, with the proviso tha.t the planters' figures must be found rea.sona.ble 
(52). 
Comparison of the 1733 La.nd List with tha.t of 1728 shows tha.t the problem of poor 
reporting wa.s increasing. It seems tha.t the situation ha.d gotten totally beyond the 
control of the a.dministra.tion. La.cl< of a.dministra.tive personnel seems to ha.ve been one 
reason (53>. If there ha.d been sufficient qualified office clerl<s it would not ha.ve been 
difficult to visit ea.ch pla.nta.tion to estimate its ta.x. 
And, if the Company ha.d ha.d 
competent officials, there would have been greater respect from the planters for its 
directives. But, a.s noted, the Directors were very reluctant to send out new people, a. 
policy which benefited the planters. To collect a.11 debts, taxes and money owed it the 
Company had to employ more a.nd better manpower. But the a.ssocia.ted expenses might well 
exceed the losses of poor administration. Thus the dilema.: could the Company afford to 
lose the revenue, or would it be more economical to employ more servants? 
CONCLUSION 
The colonization of St. John became a reality because in the West Indies and Denma.rl< there 
were people economically interested in spreading plantation agriculture to new territory. 
The St. Thomas planters were interested because of emerging problems with opera.ting 
their own plantations profitably, while the Company in Copenhagen saw a possibility to 
txpa.nd its colonial income. 
The initiative ca.me from the St. Thomas planters in the form of two addresses in 1715. At 
first the Company did not respond. But seeing the English interest in St. John, it tool< the 
opportunity of a new a.ddress in 1716 to direct that the colonization should proceed as soon 
a.s possible. By 1717, however, the planters and the Governor had become reluctant due to 
fear of a.n English a.tta.cl<. 
The Company, unwilling to accept this negative attitude, 
ordered the Governor to get the project underway before the English tool< possession of 
the island. While the Governor worried a.bout the vulnerability of the colony on St. Thoma.s 
to foreign repriul, he nevertheless obeyed his instructions, and St. John was occupied in 
March 1718. 
The Danish occup&tion of St. John sparl<ed protests from both the Spa.nish and British. 
That the colonization succeeded despite this opposition must be attributed to disputts 
between the home governments and local authorities as to the n&ture of &ction to be ta.l<en. 
Local a.uthorities in the English Leeward Islands several times a.sl<ed for permission to 
forcibly expel the Da.nes, but the British Government would not a.uthorize such a.ction. 
Conversely, colonial officials in the Spanish islands twice disregarded orders from the 
Spanish King to drive out the Danes. If either of these European powers had 1.tta.cl<ed, the 
Danes would ha.ve been extremely ha.rd pressed to ma.inta.in a. presence on St. John. 
The Company claimed both St. John and Crab Island. While the latter wa.s better suited to 
plantation agriculture, St. John was preferred because of its proximity to St. Thomas and 
because it wa.s hoped tha.t its occupa.tion would be of only marginal interest to the Spanish. 
Colonization commenced despite uncertainties a.bout the reaction of neighboring foreign 
powers. Plantations were quicl<ly established in accordance with the following pattern: 
The north coast of St. John was ta.Ken up during the first few yea.rs, then the southern and 
west regions, while the ta.stern section of the island a.round Cora.I Bay was ta.l<en up la.st. 
46 
By 1729 the whole of the isla.nd ha.d been parcelled out. Despite the external threatt the 
fir5t plantations were not established under the protection of Fort FrederiKsva.ernt but 
where soil a.nd terra.in best suited sugar cane cultivation. 
Plantation establishment occurred in three main waves, of which the last two were 
connected with periods of drought that had exacerbated the problem of soil exhaustion on 
St. Thomas. The first economic results of the colonization could be seen in 1721t when 
crops of sugar cane and cotton a.re reported. In 1722 there were only two sugar worKs on 
St. John, but within a. few yea.rs many others ha.d been constructed. Although the sources 
contain little information a.bout the dtvelopment of economic activity on individual 
plantations, there are strong indications that the plantation economy was still rela.tively 
underdeveloped a.t tht outbreaK of the slave rebellion in 1733. 
Although the plantation system on St. John conformed in some ways with the general West 
Indian pattern dtscribed by Pa.res and Sherida.nt there were severa.l notable differences. 
Not a.11 the coastal a.rea.s were ta.Ken up first, and coastal plantations did not a.lwa.ys have 
their na.rrow sides fronting the sea.. The pla.nta.tions, while genera.Uy larger than thoH on 
St. Thoma.s, were somewhat smaller than elsewhere in the Caribbean. Their size seems to 
ha.ve been determined primuily by tht c1.pa.city of their sugar worKs. Three plantation 
sizes predominated: 146 a.cres; 109.5 acres and 73 acres. Plantation shapes seem to have 
been ra.thtr div1rse, although the sources do not permit 1. clear picture to emerge. Suga.r 
wu the primary crop during the 1720's, but it wu superced'ed by cotton during the 1730's. 
It ha.s bttn ascertained that the Company tried to follow a. popultltion policy that preferred 
Danes, people with ca.pita.I, families, Lutherans and Company servants. Danes, how•ver, 
constituted no more than 25% of the colonists, while the Dutch predominated, H on St. 
Thomu. Pa.st a.nd present Company Officials comprised most of the Danish pll.nta.tion 
owners on St. John. Only a.bout ha.lf of all pla.nt&tion owners lived on St. John in 1733. 
Very little ca.n be Hid with certainty a.bout the upita.l behind the colonization. It ca.n be 
determined, however, that it ca.me pa.rtly from th• planters, a.nd partly from the Company. 
The Company's contribution ca.mt primarily in the form Of credit, but it &lso invested 
directly in a. lug1 sugar plantation at Coral B&y. 
There does not a.ppeu to h&ve bttn any civil authority on St. John before 1727, when the 
office of Town Bailiff was cruted to mttt the demand for a registr&tion &nd suling of 
l&w and th• prep1.r&tion of the first land list. By 1733, if not earlier, the Town Bailiff 
ha.d two usistants to help him with probate cases. 
Some factors c&n be identified t1S having a forwarding effect on the colonization. First, 
soil exhaustion began to hav• some effect on harvests in St. Thomas, particularly during 
periods of drought, while St. John offered a. virgin area. Stcondly, available ca.pita.! could 
find new fields of activity on St. John. 
Thirdly, there were minimal logistical and 
transportation problems due to the close proximity of St. John to St. Thomas. Fina.lly, the 
uven years of t&x exemption certainly encour1.g1td people to invtst in plantations. 
There were &lso some factors that retarded the colonization. First, there wa.s fear of a.n 
English a.ttacK, which discouraged plantation development during the early yurs. 
Secondly, throughout the 1720's there was 1. shortage of slaves, one of the most essential 
factors of production. Thus, forHt clearance, planting 1.nd harvesting proceeded slowly. 
Thirdly, periods of drought &nd hurricanes put the planters in considera.blt debt to the 
Company, which, in turn, m1.de it difficult for them to increase their investments in 
ma.npower a.nd ca.pital improvements, since the Company was unwilling to extend the 
47 
necessa.ry credit. Needless to say, however, the forwa.rding fa.ctors predominated, as the 
isla.nd wa.s completely ta.Ken up, and rela.tively well developed within eleven yea.rs. 
From a. broader perspective it can be seen tha.t the settlement of St. John resembled more 
closely the colonization of St. Thoma.s than that of St. Croix. In the first place, the 
planters did not pay for their land on St. Thomu and St. John, while the Company sold 
plantation lots on St. Croix. Secondly, there was no clear plan followed in parcelling out 
planta.tion grounds on St. John and St. Thomas, while the Company followed a. well 
developed land distribution policy on St. Croix. This can be seen by the fa.ct that on St. 
John the pla.nta.tions were not measured in advance, which resulted in irregula.r plantation 
boundaries. On St. Croix pla.nta.tion lots were not sold until the entire island ha.d been 
measured and divided into quarters with a. strictly regula.r division of plantations, whose 
narrow sides fronted on the sea.. 
On a third point, however, St. John represented a. transitional phase between the other two 
islands. On St. Thomas the plantations were genera.Uy small, while on St. John the most 
common plantation size became that of the ca.pa.city of a sugar worK. This size became 
totally dominant on St. Croix. 
This pa.per has demonstrated that economic motives were behind both the Da.nish presence 
in the West Indies a.nd the colonization of St. John. 
The Company Charter of 1671 
explicitly sta.ted that its motives were economic. Governor Crone forsa.w la.rge profits 
from the colonization of St. John. The Company aimed at a quicK cultivation by granting 
freedom from taxation for seven years, 1.nd it sought the most profitable type of 
cultivation by demanding that sugar worKs be built within 1. cert1.in time period. The 
Company also sought rich planters for the colonization. 
Finally, the Town B1.iliff's 
instructions show that he was primarily to loot< after the Company's economic interests. 
St. John never became the sugar 1.dventure thi.t was dream of, in part bec1.use 11.nd 
suitable for profitable sugar cultivation proved to be limited. Seen from the point of view 
of production 1.nd economic returns, it might be 1.rgued that the colonization of this island 
had been 1. mistaKe. But there were no other realistic options in 1718. Before the island 
h1.d time to completely develop its 1.gricultur1.l potenti1.l, 1.nd before the contempl1.t1d 
found&tion of 1. seaport 1.t Coral Bay could become 1. rei.lity, Denmarl< purch1.sed the 11.rger 
1.nd more fertile island of St. Croix from fi'r1.nc1. After 1733 investment c1.pit1.l, pl1.nter 
.xpertise, slave labor 1.nd Company interest was directed toward developing the pl1.ntation 
economy of St. Croix. Thus, it wu not the slave rebellion that put St. John into 1. 
secondary postion, but rather competition from the rich sugar plain of St. Croix. 
48 
APPENDIX: A NOTE ON SOURCES 
My original intention was to write a paper based exclusively on primary source mattrial. 
This was almost obligatory since so little historical literature on St. John exists. 
Howevert some secondary sources have been consulted for both specific and contextual 
bacKground information. 
Most primary source material predating 1755 lies in the archives of the West 
India-Guinean Company deposited at the Danish National Archives <Rigsa.rl<ivet> in 
Copenhagen (1), I have also used materia.l from the collections of maps and private 
manuscripts at the Danish Na. tiona.l Archives and the Roy al Library, 
The primary sources a.bout St. John a.re not voluminoust a.nd only a few of them deal with 
the island exclusively. Among these a.re the Land Lists and the expense accounts. Some 
information can be found in lett1rs and related documentation sent from the Governor to 
the Company, but it is scanty and frAgmentary compared to that for St. Thomas. 
Several groups of sourcest which have not been cited in the Bibliography, were 
unsuccessfully investigated. Among these were the Boo!< of Instructions 1698-1717, the 
Ma.na.gement Ledger 1697-1734, and some r1ports and votes of 1708-1754. Furthermore, 
there are some gaps in the sources, the most important being the releva.nt papers in the 
West Indian Local Archives, which were inAccessible because of their poor condition. 
Fivt important groups of sources require specific comment. The first is Peder Ma.riager's 
"Manuscript". Ma.ria.g1r was a. longtime Compa.ny Bool<l<eeper in Copenh1.gen, who in 1753 
wrote a. history of Compa.ny opera.tions in Africa. and the West Indies. It is an inv1.lua.ble 
sourctt which hu been utilized by other scholars. However, I did not find it pArticularly 
germa.ne to my pa.per, since I focus on conditions in the West Indies, while Ma.ria.ger 
considers matters from the persp1ctiv1 of Compa.ny headqua.rttrs in Copenha.gen. His 
informa.tion about conditions in tht West Indies must necessarily have come from letters, 
documents and other records s1nt home. This means tha.t in principlt I had the possibility 
of l<nowing as much as ht by 1x1.mining the same r1cords, Thust his ma.nuscript btcomes a. 
secondary sourc1 at many points, It is, how1v1r, a primary sourc1 wh1nev1r oth1r sources 
are lacking or are silentt such as the Company's motivts for colonizing St. John. 
The next not1worthy sourc1 group is the Amtrican 1.nd Afric1.n Copy Bool<s, which contain 
tht outgoing mail of the Company to the Wnt Indies and Afric1.. This group includes 
orders and dir1ctions to the gov1rnors, numerous inquiri11, 1.nd occasion1.l complaints and 
reprimands, It is 1. useful source 1.bout the perceptionst ev~lua.tions, policies and 
viewpoint of the Company Directors. 
A third inva.luable source group consists of letters and documents sent home from the West 
Indies. Naturallyt this correspondence reflects the viewpoint of the Governor and Council 
of Secretaries <Secreta.rrad1t>. The Council of Secretariest which consisted of the 
Governort the Chief Merchant, the Cashier a.nd the Bool<l<eepert was the supreme authority 
of the islands. Its members signed all important letters to the Companyt which meant in 
principle that their content was Approved by a.11 members. Thus. the Governor's personal 
viewpoint did not color their cont1nts too greatly. Butt the Governor also stnt letters 
directly to the Company Directors without consulting the Council. 
Obviouslyt neither the Governor nor the Council reported everything. Their own failingst 
for examplet were seldom mentioned, On the other ha.nd, one should not ma.l<e too much out 
49 
of letters where the Governor underlines himself or his own efforts. These considerations 
raise the question a.bout the reliability of this source group. 
Let it be said at once that it was possible to verify only a little information due to the 
sparseness of alternative sources. Some of the information a.bout foreign relations can be 
compared with documents in British archives printed in the Calendar of State Papers, 
Colonial Series, America. and the West Indies, 1699-1733. These generally agree with the 
letters of the Danish Governors, and sometimes even confirm conditions which a.re 
otherwise reported as rumors by the Danish Governors. It remains a. fa.ct, however, that it 
is impossible to confront most of the Governors' information with other sources. 
Therefore, we a.re in the sad, but usual, situation of possessing a. central group of sources 
which cannot be controlled very carefully, but which nevertheless must be used in order to 
write history. Consequently, the material has been used with a. critical eye in order to 
detect underlying motives. 
The fourth group of sources is the Calendar pf State Papers Colonial Series, America and 
the West Indies, a. ma.mmouth edition of English documents a.bout the colonies. This 
publishtd material contains litters tha.t are crucial to an understanding of Anglo-Da.nish 
relations in the West Indies. The l•tters consist of both accounts and documents, often as 
extracts or •nclosures. This sourct group is similia.r to the Danish Govtrnors' lett•rs and 
copybooks. Unfortunately, it too has deficiencies. Frequently it contains only summaries 
of the original documents, and somttimes the informa.tion is presented in an incomplett or 
somewhat distorted m1.nner. Moreover, the perspective is genera.Uy from th• British point 
of view. Thus, these sourcts ha.vi also been ustd cautiously. 
The final noteworthy source group is the Land Lists or land ta.x records pertaining to St. 
John. This source group, covering the yurs 1728-1733, is extremely important &Sit 
contains considerable information about the pla.ntations, their owners tl.nd their slave 
laborers. But, from a methodological point of view it is problematical as its purpose was 
taxation. Like 1.ny income tax return the Land Lists undoubtedly conti.in ina.ccur1.cies due 
to incorrect reporting. 
· 
Moreovtr, the Land Lists 1.r1 incomplete. This is established by the f&ct that far from 1.ll 
pl1.nters bothered to send their t1.x returns to tither the Bool<l<eeper on St. Thom&S, or the 
Town Bi.iliff on St. John. I h&ve asctrti.ined that in 1728 some 24% of tht pla.nt1rs did not 
hand in their r1turns. In 1733 this number h&d grown to 36%. One can see from comments 
on the L1.nd Lists thi.t those plant1rs who h&d not ha.nded in their r1turns were ti.xtd an 
the basis of their returns the previous yea.r. But, u it was frequently the same pl1.nters 
who sinned, many of these income tax returns were sever1.l y11.rs old 1.nd thus prtstnt 1.n 
erroneous impression. For inst1.nce, one may find usessments in the Land List of 1733 
based on data. originally presented in 1730. Nearly 20'· of the &Ssessments in 1733 appear 
to have been copied from previous yea.rs. 
Nevertheless, since the Land Lists a.re invalu1.ble sources, it is import1.nt to establish 
which information can be reg1.rded a.s sound and which is doubtful. The information that 
can be ta.Ken at face value includes plantation ownership, plantation cultivation, plantation 
location and the number of white persons on the plantations. There was no reason to alter 
this Kind of data. On the other hand, there could be a. reason to change the size of the 
plantations, a.s that figure provided the basis of the land tax. Such changes were unlikely, 
however, as the size was pretty constant and difficult to alter secretly from year to year. 
If necessary the Company BooKl<eeper could summon the planters to present their 
certificates of land measurement, which would correctly determine the size. 
50 
This lea.ves the number of sla.ves, certa.in ca.tegories of which were a.lso ta.xed, tha.t must 
be used ca.refully, a.s this figure wa.s susceptible to a.lter1.tion. As noted above, in those 
yea.rs when a. return wa.s not obta.ined, informa.tion from the previous yea.r wa.s entered in 
the Land Lists. It is impossible to show direct copying of previous yea.rs for those 
pla.nta.tions whose owners dutifully ha.nded in a.ssessments. For exa.mple, if one compares 
the number of sla.ves on each pla.nta.tion listed in the first three L1.nd Lists <1728-1730> 
one finds tha.t most planters ha.ve a. different number of sla.ves ea.ch year. Severa.I 
pla.nta.tions ha.ve identica.l numbers for two consecutive yea.rs, but not for the third. Some 
pla.nters a.re shown a.s ha.ving the same number of sla.ves a.11 three yea.rs, which is certa.inly 
suspicious, since it would be unusual if none died, or no new slaves were purchued during 
this period. A similiar pattern occurs in the Land Lists of 1731-1733. Thus, it can be 
demonstrated tha.t copying of previous returns occurred on some planta.tions, a.nd one 
suspects that it occurred on many others. 
As we a.re spea.l<ing a.bout income ta.x returns, we also have to consider the possibility that 
they may h1.ve been "doctored" in various wa.ys. In filling out his return the clever 
taxpayer may omit some pertinent da.ta., which means tha.t some slaves ma.y ha.ve been 
"overlooKed", or listed in a. non-ta.xa.ble category, Capable sla.ves, for instance, might have 
been listed a.s disabled, since these were ta.x free. It is equally easy to imagine that i. 
capable slave did not ha.ve to be very ill before he was listed a.s disabled. It is also 
possible that ta.xa.ble slaves may dso have been placed into the group of "bouls" <new 
arrivals from Africa.), who were tax free their first yea.r. 
Given these considerations, the number of slaves shown in the Land Lists must be 
considered a minimum. This is supported by the fa.ct that the planters did not protest 
against t&x assessments which in several cases were bued on yea.r old declarations. If 
the planters ha.d pa.id more than they should ha.ve they would have undoubtedly protested in 
order to correct the figures. But this did not happen, an indication that the st&te of 
a.Hairs cannot have been unfavorable to them. Therefore, it is liKely that in many 
instances the actual number of slaves on a plant&tion wa.s higher th&n shown in the Land 
Lists. 
There is also some question whether the Land Lists always give the correct date when the 
plantation was claimed. For example, while all Land Lists show four plant&tions in Durloe 
Bay Quarter H being claimed in 1721, in a. footnote to the first Land List, prep&red in 
1728, someone wrote th&t they "undoubtedly" hi.d been t1.Ken up H Hrly as 1718. The 1728 
Land List cont1.ins sever1.l other similiar notations. The explani.tion fer such incorrect 
entries is probably that some pl1.nters capitalized on the sloppy administration by 
Compa.ny officials to insist th1.t their plantations had not been claimed until 1721. 
Another example of this type of inaccuracy is when Company Bool<l<eeper Andreas Hissing 
obtained a land certificate for 1. plant1.tion in 1721 that is not shown on the Land List, but 
which must be regarded as fa.ct since the la.nd certificate was entered in a separate 
register <2>. 
It must be concluded, therefore, that in addition to the number of slaves, the Land Lists 
cannot be fully relied on with respect to the tota.l number of pla.nta.tions. and the yea.r 
when the pla.nta.tion was claimed. 
With respect to secondary sources, only the study by Ha.tch (1972) focuses specifically on 
the history of St. John. However, it relies almost exclusively on information ta.Ken from 
earlier historical studies, so it is derivative rather than original. As mentioned above, 
the ea.rly colonization of St. John is discussed briefly in severa.l general histories of the 
Danish West Indies: Westergaard <1917), Larsen <192S>, Bro-Jargensen <1953>, ThorKild 
Hansen <1970), DooKha.n U 974> a.nd Pa.lle Lauring <1978). Of these I ha.ve relied most 
51 
heavily on Bro-Jorgensen's account, which I found generally reliable. The studies by 
Larsen, Hansen and La.uring must be considered scientifically dubious because of 
insufficient documentation. 
I have also been forced to discount much of the information in Westerga.a.rd's standard 
worl< because to my surprise I found much of it unreliable. Westergaard was the first to 
write a general history a.bout the colonization of the Danish West Indies. However, my own 
research calls into question some of his statistical material relating to St. John. As his 
bool< has been of major importance to subsequent research, both in Denma.rl< and the United 
States, and his statistics have been used uncritically by many scholars, it is necessary to 
discuss our differences. 
My unease with the accuracy of Westergaard's statistics for St. John began when I noted 
that the total number of plantations he cited did not balance with mine. He states <3> that 
in 1728 and 1733 there were 87 plantations and 109 plantations respectively according to 
the Land Lists. By a thorough examination of those Land Lists I found that 91 plantations 
had been admitted by April 1728, and that in 1733 the number stood at just 103. 
I cannot a.ccount for why Westergaard found fewer plantations than me in 1728; but I can 
offer a.n explanation for his figure of 109 for 1733. Although he never explains his 
methodology, he appears to have included as plantation owners those persons whose names 
were entered, but who were not assigned a plot number or a plot in the Land Lists. This 
method allowed him to reach a figure of 109 plantations. However, on several occasions it 
is explicitly mentioned in the Land Lists that the person in question lives on the 
plantation mentioned above, or that he/she owns it in partnership with the planter cited 
above. Clearly, in such cases we &re not t&l<ing &bout two sepa.rate plantations. My 
figures have been adjusted to ta.Ke these comments into &ccount, whereas Westergaa.rd 
seems to ha.ve ignored them. 
Another point of disagreement is over the number of sla.vts <Table 3>. Westergurd gives a 
figure of 677 slaves for 1728, whereas I found 806. He cites 1,087 slaves for 1733, while 
my figure is 1,255. These differences art so great thd they cannot be a.ttributed to 
miscount. I have checKed my figures several times a.nd am satisfied of their a.ccur&cy. So I 
c&n only conclude th&t Westergurd did not make such scrupulous use of the sources. 
Westerga.ard and I also disagree on figures a.bout planter residency <Table 13>. He claims 
th&t 28 pll.ntation owners lived on St. John, 36 resided on St. Thomas and 1 outside the 
Danish Islands in 1728. This gives him a total of 65. He does not explain the discrepency 
betw11n this figure and the 87 plantations he found. On the other hand, for 1728 I found 
32 planters on St. John, 43 on St. Thomas, 2 outside the Danish islands and 11 with an 
undisclosed residency. Moreover, I have been able to fit the total of 88 planters with the 
actual number of plantations. A similiar case obtains with respect to the figures for 1733. 
In that year Westergaard found only 4 St. John pla.nters living on St. Thomas, while I 
loca.ted 36. 
I cannot a.ccount for our great differencts respecting residency. They cannot be attributed 
to some planters owning more than one pla.nta.tion, a.s both of us tool< this into account in 
our calculations. My worl<ing method was to first examine the St. John Land Lists. If the 
owner's place of residence wa.s not noted there, I then checKed the St. Thomas Land Lists. 
In a few instances neither source gave place of residence, hence I made use of an 
"unl<nown" category in my tabulations.