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IN THE TERRITORIAL COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS 
DIVISION OF ST. CROIX AT IONGSHlLL 
WILSON LETT, 
Plaintiff, 
NORBERT ROSADO, PAUL WIGHTMAN, 
HESS OIL VIRGIN ISLANDS CORP., 
~ . ,,-." 
Lee J. Robo, Esq. 
Pamela Lynn Colon, Esq. 
Law Offices orLee 1. Rohn 
1101 King Street, Suile 2 
ChriSlillll5led, St. CTQbt, 00820-493) 
{Attorneys for Plaintiffl 
Britain H. Bryant, Esq. 
Bryant, Bames & Moss, LLP 
1 \34 King 5t., Second flOTT 
P.O. Box 4589 
Chrisriansled, 51. Croix 00822 
(Attorney for Defendant HOVIC) 
CABRET, P.J. 
Defendants. 
) CIVIL NO. 7321)!l95 
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ACTION FOR DAMAGES 
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) NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
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THIS MATTER is before the Court on the plaintiff's Motion to Lift a Stay in this 
action, as to Defendant Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp.. 
The defendant opposes the motion. For 
the following reasons, the Court will grant the plaintiff's motion. 
Statemept afF.cts and Procedural History 
Plaintiff alleges he was injured in an acddent, after being struck by a vehicle driven by 
Norberto Rosado ("Rosado''). Plaintiff filed this action in negligence agail\Sl against Rosado, 
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LETT Y. ROSADO, H. al . 
CW. NO. 73111995 
ORDtR- MOTION TO UFT STAY 
PAGE 1 
Paul Wightman (",Wightman'') and Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp. ("HOVle''). In his second 
amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that Rosado was acting during the scope of employment 
with HOvie at the time of the ac<:ident and thai HOVle was utilizing a vehicle owned by 
Wightman during the course of its business. Plaintiff also alleges negligent entru.stment of the 
vehicle by both Wightman and HOVIe. 
Wightman tiled for banknJptcy after this action was filed, and this action was initially 
stayed under 11 U.S.C. 362. However, the bankruptcy coun subsequently lifted that stay order 
and allowed the plaintilTlo proceed against the co-defendants and against Wightman, only 10 the 
extent plaintiff only sought recovery of any available insunnce proceeds and not against 
Wightman's Jjei-sonal IlSSCts. Subsequently, this coun entered an order vacating the stay of this 
maner. The p!ainliffJater stipulated to. dismissal arthis action as to Wightman. Thus, only 
Rosado and HOVIe remained as defendants. 
On September 3, 1997, this Court (on petition from the lieutenant governor's office) 
entered an Droer of Rehabilitation with regard to the insuran<:e company under which Rosado is 
covered - Island National ln5urance Co. That order stayed this action with regard to Rosado, as 
lUI ill$ured of said insurance company. Rosado filed a Notic.c of Stay with the Court. HOVIC 
objected to the action beina stayed only with regard to Rosado and moved to stay the entire 
action. Plaintiff did not object and, on October 21, 1997, this Court stayed all prcx:ealings in 
this clSe. 
DiscussloD 
Plaintiff now movcs to lilt the stay with regard to HOVIC, citing the Jack of action on the 
rehabilitation of Island Nalional lnsurance, the likelihood that the insllflllCe maner will not be 
resolved anytime soon, and the prqudic.c to the plaintiff resulting from inaction in this case. 
HOVIC objects to lilting the stay on several JfOUJids: 1) Plaintiff should have sought timely 
relief through I Motion for Reconsideration of the stay order; 2) lifting the stay as to Rosado 
would amount 10 I dismissal against that defendant, whom the defendant believcs· is an 
Mindispensable party" and; 3) the stay, enlemi by the Honorable Edgar D. Ross, has no time 
limitations and eannot be lilted until fwtherorder of me coun. 
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LETT Y. ROSADO, d. aL 
elY. NO. 73111995 
ORD£R-MOTtON TO LIfT STAY 
PAGE 3 
HOVle argues that lifting the stay would be tantamount to a dismissal of this action 
against Rosado, which it contends is an indispensable party.1 Defendant further asserts mat, 
be<:ause the allegations against HOYle lie in vicarious liability, those claims are dependent on 
Rosado's liability and cannot be pursued without Rosado as a pany. Plaintiff counters that 
Rosado, though a "desirable" party. is 1101 an indispensable one. Plaintifffunher asserts that, this 
being a scope of employment case, the plaintiff may proceed only against HOVle and need not 
secure a penonal judgment against Rosado.! The central issue, then. is whether Rosado is an 
indispensable party to an action against his employer for harm done during the scope of his 
employment, requiring a continued stay of the entire action unlil Rosado's presence is assured, in 
order to~enSute··a fair disposition orthis case. 
The Federal Rules require thai parties bejoined in a single action if: 
(I) in lIle person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded 
among those already parties. or (2) lIle person claims an interest 
relating 10 the subject of the action and is so situated that the 
disposition of the action in the person's absence may 0) as a 
practical matter impair or impede lIle person's ability to protect 
lIlat interest or (ii) leave any of lIle persons already parties subject 
to a substantial risk of incuning double, multiple. or otherwise 
inconsi$lent obligations by reason of the claimed interest. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 19 (a). 
In other cases, where !he concerns noted in Rule 19 are not 
present, a litigant seeking a right to relief 'jointly, severally, or in the alternative in 
respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or 
occurrences" may, but is not required to,join parties in one action. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 20 
(a) ("Pennissive Joinder"). 
The policies underlying lIle compulsory joinder rule are to 
prevent actions from proceeding against parties which would resull in "partial or hollow 
ralller lIlan complete relief to the parties before the court" or which would result in 
repeated lawsuits on the same subject matter. 
See FED. R. Clv. P. 19, advisory 
committee notes to 1966 amendment (internal quotation marks omitted). 
DeC.lllUm·. CKhot arguments have no meri~ becall5e the plaintiff is no4 seeking rttOnsidmUoII, bUI ",!ber 
se.ks la lilt tho stay. 
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Tbo [)errndam dl.s 10 no IU1hori1y far the propoJitian lllal the~ an be noacUoD apinJl 1M QlI$I ... , in lb. 
oboe"". af!he servaot, ror 1wm resultina from the servam's canduct duriJlg the srope afhis employmeal or 
resultia& from. !he ma..<ter's nc&ligenlenlrUSttnenl. 
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LETT Y, ROSADO, lit. al. 
crv. NO.1J1Il995 
ORDER- MonON TO UfT STAY 
PAGE 4 
The Restatement of Torts reflects the pennissive joinder requirements for actions 
involving tortfeasors subject 10 joint and several liability. Where more than one lortfeasor 
contributes 10 another's hann in a single event, the Restatement penni!s an injured perwn to seek 
recovery, in a single action, from one or more of those tortfeasors. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 882, at 328 (1979). The comment to the Restatement notes: 
The rule stated in this Section permits joining in one action any number of 
lonfeasors, each of whom is resoonsjble for the entire amount of damages for 
which the action is brought. II applies when master and servant or principal and 
agent are both subject to liability for the tort orthe $efVanl or agent .... 
REsTATEMENT § 882, comment b (emphasis added). 
The illustrations to Section 882 further 
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support the oennissive. rather than mandatory, joinder of a master and servant, and refute the 
defendant's argument that Rosado is an indispensable party subject to compulsory joinder. As 
the Restatement illustrates: "A employs S, a servant, who negligently nulS over C. C is entitled 
to maintain an action against A Of B or against either of them." !d. at iIlus. 1; see also, 7 
CHARlES WRIGHT AND ALLAN MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTtCE AND PROCEDURE § 1623 (2001); see 
also FED. R. Ctv. P. 19, advisory committee notes to 1966 amendment (acknowledging the 
"well-settled authorities holding that a tortfeasor with the usual joint and several liability is 
merely a permissive party to an action against another with like liability" and that joinder of such 
tortfeasors is regulated by Rule 20) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The case 
law also supports this result in actions involving a principal/master and an agent/servant. 
In Hall v. NUI/ollal Service Il/dlU/ries, Iflc., 172 F.R.D. 157, 159-60 (E.D.Pa. 1997), on 
facts strikingly similar to those oow before this court, the court had occasion to decide whether 
an employee must be joined in an action against an employer based on vicarious liability 
principles. That Court held that the employee need 001 be joined in such a case, consistent with 
authorities which hold that joinder is not required of a principal and agent.ld. (citations omitted). 
There, the court allowed the plaintiff to proceed in the negligence action only against the 
principal/employer, holding that the employee was not an indispensable party within the 
meaning of Rule 19 (a). [d. (action fOf respondeat superior and negligent entrustment ofvehicle 
10 servant). 
Similarly, in Murphy v. Newport Waterfront Landing, Inc., 806 F.Supp. 322, 325 
(D.R.T.1992), the Court permitted a negligence and vicarious liability claim to proceed against 
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Lr.tT Y. ROSADO, ........ 
ClV. NO. 13l1ltfS 
ORDER-MOTJONTO UfTSTAY 
PACE 5 
the employer, despite the fact that the claim agairut its doorman was dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction, holding that the doonnan was not an indispensable party. In so holding, the Court 
noted that an "employee is not a necessary party to a suit against his employer under !'e$pOTldcat 
superior", in line with "the well established principle that a person has a joint action 19ainst the 
masleT and his servant for the injuries resulling from !he negligence or wrongful act of the 
servant under the doctrine of respondeat sLiperior, or he may bring his suit against either the 
servant or the masler." Id. (citations omined; internal quotation marlts omitted). The court noted 
thai the plaintiff could have brought suit solely against the employer from the outset. fd. 
A similar result was reached in Toogood~. Owen J. Rogal, D.D.S., P.e., 764 A.2d 552, 
SSg (pa.Supa:·2000), where the court pcnnined a vicarious liability negligence claim to proceed 
against the principal doctor (employer), despite his employee doctor's death. Jd. at 559 (holding 
that "[w]hen olle defelldant's tort liability is vicariously based 011 respondeal superior, the other 
parties life not initially required to pursue their rights of recovery, contribution or 
indemnification from the urvant wh05e operative negligence led to the plainrifi's injury by 
joining that servant.") (quoring Rivera v. Philadelphia Theological Seminary of SI. Charles 
Borromea, Inc., S07 A.2d I, 11-12 (1986); distinguishing Mamalis v. Alias Van Lines, Inc., 522 
Pl. 214, 560 A.2d 1380 (1989), in which plaintiff was barred from asserting claim against 
principal, after full satisfaction of claim by agent for the harm, which extinguished the entire 
claim). 
Here, as the Restatement and the other authorities noted above illustrate, Plaintiff may 
proceed against the employer 12!: the employee, either of which may be held liable for the entire 
hann. The concerns noted in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 (a) are not present, because 
there is no risk of double recovery, ina)flsistent results or multiplicity of lawsuits on the same 
subject matter. Thil is because the plaintiff can enjoy only one satisfaction, from either party, 
for the hann .Ileged and would be barred &om later bringing a separate action against the other 
party 10 recoyer for the $MIle harm. See, e.,. REsTATEMENT § 885. MouoYer, if the employer i$ 
found liable (or. judgment based on its employee's conduct, it may then sceIc contribution or 
indemnity from the employee (or any amounts paid on such judgment. See REsTATEMENT §§ 
886A(I), 8868 (2Xa). Finally, HOVIC 
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not Rosado -
may be held directly liable (oc 
negligent CIlttustmcnl of the yehicle to Rosado. Thus, because complete relief is available 
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LETT Y, ROSADO, tt. ... 
crv. NO. 732/1995 
ORDER - MonON TO LIFT STAY 
PAGE Ii 
regardless of whether either or both master and servant are parties 10 this litigation, and where 
HOVIe is not subject 10 double liability, this case does not implicate the concerns of Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 19 which would compel a finding that Rosado is indispensable 10 this 
action. Given the foregoing, and in the absence ofauthonty from the defendant to the contrary, 
the Court concludes thai the plaintiff CQuld properly proceed against HOVle, despite the 
continued Slay as 10 Rosado. 
CODdusioD 
An action against an employer for the conduct of an employee during the scope of 
employrfteni/irilder respondeat superior principles, may be brought solely against the employer 
and need nOI include the employee. Indeed, an employer may be held solely liable for the entire 
hann caused by its employee under such circumstances. Additionally,joint and several liability 
principles pennit only one satisfaction for a single harm and, therefore, pose no risk of 
duplicitous litigation or multiple and inconsistent obligations. Moreover, an action for negligent 
entrustment is one against the employer, based on its conduct. For the foregoing reasons, the 
employee, Norbeno Rosado, cannot be said to be an indispensable party. Accordingly, this 
action may proceed against HOVIe. An appropriate order follows. 
ATTEST: