DISTRICT COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS 
DIVISION OF ST. THOMAS AND ST. JOHN 
IDA SMITH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ALL PERSONS CLAIMING A PRESENT OR 
FUTURE INTEREST IN ESTATE 13, 
FRIIS, LINDA V. SMITH-FRANCIS, 
WILLIAM E. SMITH, ELOISE V. SMITH-
HENDRICKS, BAB FRIIS NO. 1, PAUL 
HOFFMAN, JANE HOFFMAN-WALKER, 
ELEANOR ADAMS HOFFMAN, MAXWELL 
ADAMS HOFFMAN, GLORIA FRANCOIS 
MCGOWAN, DAVID A. BORNN AS TRUSTEE 
TO THE GAF TRUST ESTATE 14 JOHN’S 
FOLLY EXCLUDING ALL HEIRS AT LAW, 
ESTATE 15 CONCORDIA A, CORAL BAY 
QUARTER, ST JOHN UNITED STATES 
VIRGIN ISLANDS, NATIONAL PARK 
SERVICE, LAND RESOURCES DIVISION, 
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA, STANLEY 
SELENGUT, WILLIAM B. POPPELTON, 
LORRAINE A. POPPELTON, KEVIN M. 
WALSH, MARIA K. STURATIS, SCOTT E. 
WILMOSKI, CHARLES M. PERDUE, 
MONICA PERDUE, JOZSEF NEMETH, 
NANCY NEMETH, FRED S. PATTERSON, 
MARGARET D. PATTERSON, JOHN R. 
PERGOLIZZI, TREASURE VIEW LLC, 
GEORGE PILLORGE, DEBORAH PILLORGE, 
SCOTT L. HARTSHORN, CLAUDETTE C. 
HARTSHORN, HEINZ G. FISHER, LINDA 
G. BURDET TRUSTEES OF THE HEINZ G. 
FISHER TRUST, DONALD DURANTE, 
SAFIA B. DURANTE, CRAIG E. 
MITCHELL, ALAN MARTIN KAUFMAN, 
RACHELLE KAUFMAN, JEFFREY J. 
McCRAVE, ANN McCRAVE, DOROTHY K. 
JANOSKO, WILLIAM R. KINCER, SUSAN 
B. KINCER, SUSAN GREER 
LITTLEFIELD, WAYNE CHESTERFIELD, 
MONIQUE FRANCOIS, PEDRITO 
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Smith v. All Persons Claiming a Present or Future Interest, et al. 
Civil No. 2011-41 
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FRANCOIS, SALT POND VISTA LLC, 
V.I. JOSEPH PALMINTERI, CARRIE 
GLENN, MARC KAVE, EMILY J. 
BRATTON, RICK HATHAWAY, RENE A. 
SERVANT aka RENE H. SERVANT, MARIE 
THERESE L. SERVANT, LORI JANE 
SNACK, BRIAN K. WALDEN, 
MINISTER ISHMAEL R. MUHAMMED, 
MICHAEL CARPER, REUBEN WHEATLEY, 
et al., 
Defendants. 
 
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APPEARANCES: 
 
Ida Smith 
New York, NY 
 
Pro se plaintiff, 
 
Ronald W. Sharpe, USA 
Jason Cohen, AUSA 
St. Thomas, VI 
 
For the United States National Park Service, 
 
Maria Tankenson Hodge, Esq. 
Hodge & Francois  
St. Thomas, U.S.V.I. 
For Paul Hoffman; Jane Hoffman Walker; and David A. Bornn, 
Trustee of the GAF Trust, 
 
Rafael F. Muilenburg, Esq. 
Morrisette & Muilenburg 
St. John, U.S.V.I. 
For William E. Smith; Eloise V. Smith; Deborah Pillorge; 
Claudette C. Hartshorn; Scott L. Hartshorn; Linda V. Smith-
Francis; and George Pillorge, 
 
Gloria McGowan 
 
Pro se, 
 
Wayne Chesterfield 
 
Pro se, 
 
 
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Smith v. All Persons Claiming a Present or Future Interest, et al. 
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Monique Francois 
 
Pro se, 
 
Pedrito Francois 
 
Pro se, 
 
Joseph Palminteri 
 
Pro se, 
 
W. Mark Hillsman, Esq. 
Law Offices of Norman P. Jones, P.C.  
St. Thomas, U.S.V.I. 
For Carrie Glenn; Lori Jane Snack; William B. Poppelton; 
Lorraine A. Poppelton; Maria K. Sturaitis; Charles M. 
Purdue; Monica Purdue; Salt Pond Vista, LLC; Heinz G. 
Fisher; Linda G. Burdet, Trustee of the Heinz G. Fisher; 
Safia B. Durante; Donald Durante, 
 
Marc Kave 
 
Pro se, 
 
Emily J. Bratton 
 
Pro se, 
 
Rick Hathaway 
 
Pro se, 
 
Rene A. Servant 
 
Pro se, 
 
Marie Therese Servant 
 
Pro se, 
 
Brian K. Walden 
 
Pro se, 
 
John H. Benham, III, Esq. 
Watts, Benham & Sprehn, P.C. 
St. Thomas, U.S.V.I. 
 
For Stanley Selengut, 
 
Mark D. Hodge, Esq. 
Hodge & Francois 
St. Thomas, U.S.V.I. 
 
For Kevin M. Walsh and Treasure View LLC, 
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Smith v. All Persons Claiming a Present or Future Interest, et al. 
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Scott E. Wilmoski 
 
Pro se, 
 
Jozef Nemeth 
 
Pro se, 
 
Nancy Nemeth 
 
Pro se defendant. 
 
Fred S. Patterson 
 
Pro se, 
 
Margaret D. Patterson 
 
Pro se defendant. 
 
John R. Perqulizzi 
 
Pro se, 
 
Terryhill Enterprises, II 
 
Pro se, 
 
Missouri LLC 
 
Pro se, 
 
Craig E. Mitchell 
 
Pro se, 
 
Michael E. Fitzsimmons, Esq. 
Stryker, Duensing, Casner & Dollison  
St. Thomas, U.S.V.I. 
 
For Alan Martin Kaufman, 
 
Ann McCrave 
 
Pro se, 
 
Jeffrey J. McCrave 
 
Pro se, 
 
William R. Kincer 
 
Pro se, 
 
Susan B. Kincer 
 
Pro se, 
 
 
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Smith v. All Persons Claiming a Present or Future Interest, et al. 
Civil No. 2011-41 
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Susan Greer Littlefield 
 
Pro se, 
 
Kurt Shore 
 
Pro se, 
Suzanne L. Shore 
 
Pro se, 
 
Dorothy Janosko (also known as “Dorothy K. Janoko”) 
 
Pro se. 
 
 
ORDER 
GÓMEZ, J. 
 
Before the Court is Ida Smith’s motion, which is labeled 
“Motion to Vacate.”  
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
On March 24, 2011, Ida Smith (“Smith”) initiated this 
action to determine boundaries and to quiet title to various 
parcels of land in Saint John, United States Virgin Islands. On 
April 1, 2011, Smith filed an amended complaint (the “First 
Amended Complaint”). Neither the original complaint nor the 
First Amended Complaint named an individual defendant. Rather, 
both actions were brought against “[a]ll persons claiming a 
present or future interest, in Estate 13, Friis, Bab Friis No.1, 
Estate 14, John’s Folly, Estate 15, Concordia A, Coral Bay 
Quarter, St. John, United States Virgin Islands EXCEPT The 
United States of America, National Park Service.” ECF Nos. 1, 4. 
 
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On October 17, 2013, the Magistrate Judge granted Smith 
leave to file a Second Amended Complaint. On November 1, 2013, 
Smith filed her amended complaint (the “Second Amended 
Complaint”). The Second Amended Complaint named more than thirty 
defendants, including the National Park Service (the “NPS”), an 
agency of the United States. 
 
The NPS subsequently moved to dismiss Smith’s complaint for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On August 1, 2016, the 
Court granted the NPS’s motion, holding that Smith’s pleading 
did not comply with the Quiet Title Act and that Smith failed to 
adequately allege that she had standing to bring her claims. The 
Court dismissed the Second Amended Complaint without prejudice. 
Smith was given until August 8, 2016, to file an amended 
complaint. 
 
On August 8, 2016, Smith filed an amended complaint. The 
amended complaint, however, did not “delineat[e] the changes or 
additions” made from the dismissed complaint as required by 
Local Rule of Civil Procedure 15.1 (hereinafter “LRCi 15.1”).  
 
On August 10, 2016, the NPS moved to strike the complaint. 
The Court granted that motion on August 16, 2016, and ordered 
Smith’s amended complaint stricken from the record. The Court 
gave Smith until 3 P.M. on August 18, 2016, to file an amended 
complaint that complied with LRCi 15.1. The Court further 
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explained that “[c]hanges or additions are generally delineated 
using the ‘red-line’ option in word-processing programs.” ECF 
No. 511 at 6 n.1. Smith was warned that a failure to comply with 
LRCi 15.1 “may result in the dismissal of her claims against the 
United States with prejudice.” Id. at 6. 
 
Smith did not file another amended complaint within the 
time granted by the Court’s August 16, 2016, order. Rather, on 
August 18, 2016, three hours before the Court’s deadline, Smith 
filed the instant motion, which is labeled as a “Motion to 
Vacate.” In that motion, Smith argues that the Court’s August 
16, 2017, order should be vacated. She asserts that the Court 
erred when it granted the NPS’s motion to strike Smith’s 
complaint. 
 
On January 12, 2017, the Court held a hearing in this 
matter. At the hearing, Smith was afforded an opportunity to be 
heard on her “Motion to Vacate.” With respect to that motion, 
Smith argued that, “under local court rule 15.1 . . . [,] if the 
Court orders you to amend your complaint[,] [the complaint] does 
not have to be redlined.” Hearing Tr., ECF No. 586 at 23:20-22. 
 
At the January 12, 2017, hearing, Smith also asserted that 
she did not file a redlined complaint in response to the Court’s 
August 16, 2016, order because the order “said that [she] may 
[file an amended complaint], not that [she] shall.” Id. at 586 
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at 22:10-11. Also on January 12, 2017, the Magistrate granted 
Smith leave to file an amended complaint that complied with LRCi 
15.1 by 10:00 A.M. on January 17, 2017. To date, Smith has not 
filed another amended complaint.  
II. 
DISCUSSION 
Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.3 permits motions for 
reconsideration only when there is (1) an intervening change in 
controlling law; (2) new evidence available; or (3) a need to 
correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice. LRCi 7.3; see 
also Max's Seafood Café by Lou–Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 
669, 677 (3d Cir.1999) (citing North River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA 
Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir.1995)).  A motion 
for reconsideration “shall be filed within fourteen (14) days 
after entry of the order or decision unless the time is extended 
by the Court.” LRCi 7.3. 
The purpose of a motion for reconsideration “is to correct 
manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered 
evidence.” Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d 
Cir.1985).  “Such motions are not substitutes for appeals, and 
are not to be used ‘as a vehicle for registering disagreement 
with the court's initial decision, for rearguing matters already 
addressed by the court, or for raising arguments that could have 
been raised before but were not.’” Cabrita Point Dev., Inc. v. 
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Evans, 52 V.I. 968, 975 (D.V.I. 2009) (quoting Bostic v. AT & T 
of the V.I., 312 F. Supp. 2d 731, 733 (D.V.I. 2004)). 
In the context of a motion to reconsider, “manifest 
injustice ‘generally means that the Court overlooked some 
dispositive factual or legal matter that was presented to it.’” 
Id. (quoting In re Rose, No. 06–1818(JLP), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
64622, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 30, 2007)). Manifest injustice has 
also been defined as “‘an error in the trial court that is 
direct, obvious, and observable.’” Tenn. Prot. & Advocacy, Inc. 
v. Wells, 371 F.2d 342, 348 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Black's Law 
Dictionary 974 (7th ed. 1999)). “[M]ost cases . . . use the term 
‘manifest injustice’ to describe the result of plain error.” 
Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1425 (5th 
Cir. 1996). 
III. ANALYSIS 
While Smith’s motion is labeled as a motion to vacate, at 
its core it asserts that the Court erred when it issued its 
August 16, 2016, order. She urges the Court to reconsider its 
ruling. In that context, the Court understands, and construes, 
Smith’s motion as one for reconsideration of the August 16, 
2016, order.1 Smith has not brought to the Court’s attention any 
                                                          
1 In her motion, Smith takes issue with the brief time period within which she 
was to file an amended complaint. See ECF No. 512 at 5 (“Plaintiff is caring 
for her mother . . . and cannot amend her complaint, yet again, with the two 
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intervening change of law or new evidence. The Court is also 
unaware of any. Thus, the Court understands Smith to proceed on 
the theory of clear error or manifest injustice. 
Smith argues that the Court erred in striking her complaint 
for several reasons. First, Smith argues that LCRi 15.1 only 
applies when a plaintiff moves to amend a complaint. Because the 
Court had already granted Smith leave to amend her complaint, 
the argument goes, it cannot require her to comply with LCRi 
15.1. Second, Smith argues that failure to comply with LCRi 15.1 
is not a proper ground for a motion to strike under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(f). Third, Smith argues that the Court 
erred in granting the NPS’s motion to strike before her response 
was due, denying her an opportunity to respond. The Court 
addresses each of these arguments in turn. 
 
 
                                                          
days, by August 18 at 3pm, due to scheduled medical appointments for her 
mother.” (citations omitted)). Smith did not, however, explicitly ask for 
more time to file an amended complaint. Moreover, since filing her motion for 
reconsideration, Smith has made it abundantly clear she intends to stand on 
the vacated complaint. See, e.g., Hearing Tr., ECF No. 586 at 22:10-11 (“THE 
COURT: Have you [filed an amended complaint] to date? MS. SMITH: I did not 
because you said that I may [file an amended complaint], not that I shall.”); 
24:6-9 (“THE COURT: . . . My question isn’t whether you’ve been ordered to, 
my question is just whether you intend to. Do you intend to [file an amended 
complaint that complies with LRCi 15.1] currently? MS. SMITH: Not if I don’t 
have to, no.”). Nevertheless, on January 12, 2017, the Magistrate granted 
Smith leave to file an amended complaint by 10:00 A.M. on January 17, 2017. 
See Hearing Tr., ECF No. 487 at 20:1-5. Smith failed to take advantage of 
that additional time, and to date, she has not filed another amended 
complaint.  
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1. Application of LRCi to Amended Pleadings 
The Court will first consider whether Smith is bound by 
LCRi 15.1. That rule provides that 
A party who moves to amend a pleading shall file the 
amendment with the motion. Except as otherwise 
ordered by the Court, any amendment to a pleading, 
whether filed as a matter of course or upon a motion 
to amend, must reproduce the entire pleading as 
amended specifically delineating the changes or 
additions and may not incorporate any prior pleading 
by reference. A proffered amended pleading must note 
prominently on the first page the numbered amendment 
it represents; i.e., 1st, 2nd, 3rd amendment, etc. 
 
LRCi 15.1. 
 
In part, LCRi 15.1 requires the filing of an amendment by 
“[a] party who moves to amend a pleading.” LRCi 15.1. 
Significantly, LRCi 15.1 also directs that “any amendment to a 
pleading . . . must reproduce the entire pleading as amended 
specifically delineating the changes or additions.” Id. 
(emphasis added). That directive applies “[e]xcept as otherwise 
ordered by the Court.” Id. 
 
In its August 1, 2016, order, the Court instructed Smith 
that she “may file amended claims against the United States.” 
ECF No. 511 at 6. The Court did not relieve Smith of her 
obligation to follow the Local Rules of Procedure, nor was the 
Court required to specifically instruct Smith to follow these 
rule. See Carter v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 784 F.2d 1006, 
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1008 (9th Cir.1986) (“Although pro se, [plaintiff] is expected 
to abide by the rules of the court in which he litigates.”). 
 
Indeed, the letter and spirit of the Court’s August 16, 
2016, order was to point out that (1) Smith was required to 
comply with LRCi 15.1; (2) Smith failed to comply with LRCi 
15.1; and (3) Smith could remedy her deficiency if she filed a 
compliant complaint within a time certain. The Court went to 
some length to explain how compliance could be achieved. Smith 
chose not to cure her deficiency. Moreover, at the January 12, 
2017, hearing, Smith was specifically instructed by the 
Magistrate to refile her stricken complaint, “call it the third 
amended complaint, and delineate where the changes are from the 
previous complaint.” Hearing Tr., ECF NO. 587 at 10:13-15; see 
also id. at 20:1-4 (“You may file an amended complaint by no 
later than Tuesday morning at 10 a.m. It will be titled the 
Third Amended Complaint. You will accompany it by a redlined 
version.”). Notwithstanding that specific instruction, Smith has 
elected not to file an amended complaint that complies with LRCi 
15.1. 
 
The Court finds no error in that approach.  
 
 
 
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2. 
The Court’s Authority to Strike a Pleading  
The Court will now address Smith’s argument that the Court 
committed clear error when it granted the NPS’s motion to strike 
Smith’s complaint. 
District courts have the “inherent authority to control 
[their] docket[s]” and are “empower[ed] . . . to dismiss a case 
as a sanction for failure to follow procedural rules.” Knoll, 
707 F.3d at 409. More to the point, “[d]istrict courts have the 
inherent power to strike items from their docket for litigation 
conduct.” Ibrahim v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 1048, 
1065 (9th Cir. 2016). As discussed above, all parties--pro se as 
well as represented--can properly be required to follow a 
district court’s local rules of procedure. See, e.g., Parkell v. 
Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 324 n.6 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Although courts 
liberally construe pro se pleadings, unrepresented litigants are 
not relieved from the rules of procedure . . . .”); Mearin v. 
Folino, 654 Fed. App’x 58, 61 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Even with the 
leniency due pro se litigants, [the pro se plaintiff] could 
expect to be held to the local rules surrounding summary 
judgment motion practice.”).  
As the Court has explained in the past, the purpose of LRCi 
15.1 “is to have the plaintiff identify the differences between 
the [amended] complaint and the original pleading.” David v. AMR 
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Servs. Corp., 191 F.R.D. 89, 93 (D.V.I.), aff'd without opinion, 
251 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2000). Such rules are quite common in the 
district courts. See, e.g., Sherrod v. Ryan, No. 
CV150296PHXDJHESW, 2016 WL 4035326, at *1 (D. Ariz. July 22, 
2016) (discussing local rule which requires plaintiffs to 
provide an amended complaint that “indicat[es] in what respect 
it differs from the original [c]omplaint (i.e., by bracketing or 
striking through the text to be deleted and underlining the text 
to be added)”); Bohnhoff v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 853 F. Supp. 
2d 849, 858 (D. Minn. 2012) (describing local rule which 
requires “a redline comparing the proposed amended pleading to 
the party’s operative pleading” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Turner v. Wetzel, No. 3:13-CV-2680, 2015 WL 5695305, 
at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2015) (discussing local rule which 
requires “a copy of the original pleading in which stricken 
material has been lined through and any new material has been 
inserted and underlined or set forth in bold-faced type”).  
Rules like LRCi 15.1 impose a relatively minimal burden on 
a plaintiff, who must simply mark out what she changed in the 
new amendment. At the same time, such rules pay courts and other 
litigants dividends in saving them from “submit[ing] to the 
exercise of comparing two complaints line by line to determine 
the additions and deletions.” Hansen v. Governor Juan F. Luis 
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Hosp. & Med. Ctr., No. SX-15-CV-509, 2016 WL 3881016, at *3 
(V.I. Super. July 11, 2016); see also David, 191 F.R.D. at 93 
(explaining increased difficulty “in determining the new 
substantive allegations of the proposed amended complaint” when 
plaintiff fails to comply with LRCi 15.1). As such, LRCi 15.1 
and similar rules are invaluable to courts in exercising their 
inherent authority to manage dockets. 
Though Smith was obligated to comply with LRCi 15.1, she 
failed to do so. The Court was well within its authority to 
strike the Complaint for that reason. See Ibrahim, 835 F.3d at 
1065; see also Bohnhoff, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 858 (“Where, as 
here, the plaintiff has not filed a motion to amend or a 
redlined complaint, the motion is not properly before the 
court.”); cf. Brooks–McCollum v. Emerald Ridge Serv. Corp., 563 
Fed. App’x 144, 147 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that “fail[ure] to 
comply with D. Del. Local Rule 15.1, which requires that a draft 
of the proposed amended complaint be submitted with the motion . 
. . is an adequate basis for denying leave to amend”). 
Accordingly, the Court finds no clear error or manifest 
injustice. 
 
 
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3. The Need for a Response From Smith to the NPS’s Motion 
to Strike 
 
The Local Rules recognize that ordinarily a party has 14 
days after service of a motion by another party to file a 
response. LRCi 7.1(e)(1). At the same time, the Local Rules also 
provide that the Court is not prohibited “from ruling without a 
response or reply when deemed appropriate.”2 LRCi 7.1(e)(3). 
 
Here, LRCi 15.1 required Smith to file an amended complaint 
that “specifically delineat[ed] the changes or additions” made 
from the original. LRCi 15.1. She clearly did not. As Smith’s 
objectively demonstrable failure to comply with the rule was an 
immutable procedural fact, the Court deemed it appropriate to 
rule on the NPS’s motion to vacate. The Court hastens to note 
that that disposition was without prejudice. Indeed, in an 
abundance of caution, the Court provided Smith with leave to 
cure her deficient amendment. 
The Court finds no error in that approach.  
                                                          
2 That approach is not uncommon among trial courts. See, e.g., Osman v. Bimbo 
Bakeries USA, Inc., No. 14-CV-03281-MEH-CBS, 2016 WL 322390, at *1 (D. Colo. 
Jan. 27, 2016) (“The Court has determined no further briefing is required and 
rules on the Motion without response from Defendant, pursuant to D.C. Colo. 
LCivR 7.1(d).”); Garden City Boxing Club, Inc. v. Collins, No. CIVA B-05-260, 
2006 WL 2037567, at *3 n.4 (S.D. Tex. July 18, 2006) (“[T]he Court concludes 
that the underlying motion should be denied even without a response from the 
Plaintiff . . . .”). 
 
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Having found no grounds under which to reconsider the order 
striking Smith’s amended complaint, the Court will deny Smith’s 
motion to reconsider. 
The premises considered, it is hereby 
ORDERED that Ida Smith’s “Motion to Vacate” docketed at ECF 
Number 512 is DENIED. 
 
S\ 
 
 
 
 
CURTIS V. GÓMEZ 
District Judge 
 
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