IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
DIVISION OF ST. CROIX
THE PEOPLE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS Plaintiff)
)
)
)
)
Defendant )
CASE NO. SX-10-CR-0000247
ACTION FOR: 14 V.I.C. 2253
Vs.
JAMASON CHARLES
TO:
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF
MEMORANDUM
OPINION AND ORDER
LAW LIBRARY
KIPPY G. ROBERSON, ESQ.
JUDGES, MAGISTRATES, LAW CLERKS
. J<CLERK OF THE COURT, BOOK
VERNEST E. MORRIS, JR., ESQ.
Please take noticethat on June 16, 2010 a(n) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER dated June 15, 2010
was entered by the Clerk inthe above-entitled
matter.
Dated: June 16, 2010
ietia H. Velazquez, Esa.
CLEBtk/OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
SHARLENETURNBULL
s COURT CLERK SUPERVISOR
FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
DIVISION OF ST. CROIX
PEOPLE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMESON CHARLES,
Defendant.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. SX-10-CR-247
MURDER FIRST DEGREE;
RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT FIRST;
POSSESSION OF AN UNLICENSED
FIREARM DURING COMMISSION OF
A CRIME OF VIOLENCE
Counsel:
Kippy Roberson, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
V.I. Department ofJustice
6040 Estate Castle Coakley
St. Croix, VI00820
Attorneyfor Plaintiff
Ernest E. Morris, Jr., Esq.
Territorial Public Defender
1-B Clifton Hill, 2nd Floor
St. Croix, VI00850
Attorneyfor Defendant
BRADY, Julio A., Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Thismattercamebefore the Court on May 17,2010 for a Hearing on thePeople's Motion
For Detention.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
OnMay6,2010,thisCourt issued anarrest warrant fortheDefendant, Jameson Charles, for
the crimes of Murder in the First Degree, in violation of 14 V.LC. § 922(a)(1), Reckless
Endangerment in the First Degree, in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 625(a), and Possession of an
Unlicensed Firearm During the Commission of a Crime of Violence, in violation of 14V.I.C.
Memorandum Opinion And Order
People v. Charles, SX-10-CR-247
Page2of 11
§ 2253(a). A search warrant was also issued, andbail was set at $125,000.00. On the People's
Motion, the affidavitsupportingthe arrestwarrantwassealed. Defendantwasarrestedonthewarrant
onMay 8,2010, and wasadvised ofhisrights by theHonorable Harold W. L.Willocks onMay 10,
2010. DefenseCounsel moved for hisrelease. The People objected to the Motion for Release, and
further requested aDetention Hearing. A Detention Hearing was scheduled for May 11, 2010by
JudgeWillocks, who, becauseofotherpendingmatters, askedtheundersignedtohearthe Detention
Motion.
OnMay 10,2010,thePeople filed aformal Motion AndMemorandum InSupportOfMotion
To DetainWithout Bail. Also,thePeople filed a"Motion ToContinue Pretrial Detention Hearing"
onthesame date. TheAssistant AttorneyGeneral assigned tothecase represented that hereceived
this assignment on May 10, 2010 and, accordingly, needed "more time to properly prepare the
evidence of the case for presentation to the Court." This Court granted the People's Motion to
Continue byan Order signed on May 10,2010 noting that the "Court believes itisinboth parties'
bestinterest to continue ... to May 17, 2010." At that time and date, the Court wasunaware that
Defense Counsel had filed an Opposition tothe People's Motion ToContinue onMay 11,2010. In
point offact, this Opposition was not presented to the Court until Friday afternoon, May 14,2010.
These circumstances wererevealed to the Parties beforethe start ofthe Detention Hearing.
Defense Counsel requested that the affidavit accompanying thearrest and search warrants
be unsealed, over the objection ofthe People. The Court granted the request and the Prosecutor
provided Defense Counsel withtheaffidavit ofDetective Dino Herbert.
1
Memorandum Opinion And Order
People v. Charles, SX-10-CR-247
Page 3 of 11
The Peoplecalledonly one witness and presented no exhibits. Thus, this Court's decision
on the Defendant'sdetention is predicated on the testimonyonboth direct andcross-examinations
by thePeople's Counsel and Defense Counsel and the fewinquiries by the Court. The following is
asummaryoftheevidencepresentedbythePeoplethroughDetectiveHerbert's Affidavit andsworn
testimony, which the Court found to be probative. As will be discerned, most ofthe evidencewas
either perceived by Detective Herbert (e.g., his description ofthe crimescene), orreceived directly
by him (e.g., his interviews of Witness 1 and the confidential informant) in the course of his
investigation.1 Detective Dino Herbert, athree (3) year veteran ofthe Homicide Division ofthe
Virgin Islands Police Department on St. Croix, testified as follows:
Detective Herbertwas dispatched to a reportedhomicide on March 16,2010 at about 1:30
a.m., on Fisher Street in Frederiksted. Upon his arrival, he observed a male lying on the ground.
He recognized the body to be Dupert"Apache" Knowles, IQ. He statedthatthe Emergency Medical
Technicianwho examined thebody reportedto him thattherewere no vital signs. He further stated
that the victim had two (2) gunshot wounds to the back ofhis head and three (3) to his lower back.
He saidon both directand cross examinations that the area where the corpse lay was well lighted.
Detective Herberttestified that the Police securedthe scenebyhaving Police Officers direct
traffic aroundthe areawhere thebodywas located. One ofthose officers told DetectiveHerbertthat,
while atthe scene,the Defendantapproached him andinquiredifsomeone was deadatthatlocation
and further indicated that this inquirywas made within fifteen (15) minutes ofthe shooting. The
Detective identified the Police Officer by name.
Any other testimony produced at the Detention Hearing not recounted herein the Court deemed to be
insufficiently probative or reliable for the Court to consider.
Memorandum Opinion And Order
People v. Charles, SX-10-CR-247
Page 4 of 11
Detective Herbert also said that during hisinvestigation aconfidential informant (who had
provided him previously with reliable information) told him that the Defendant was making
statements that he was responsible for Knowles' death. When asked by Defense Counsel if the
statement was made by the Defendant to the informant, Detective Herbert's answerwas "yes."
Detective Herbert also saidthathe spoke with an eye witness to the deathofMr. Knowles,
who recounted that he observed the two (2) men (Defendant and Knowles) having a conversation
when he was less than 30 feet from them and after hearing gunshots he saw the Defendant standing
over the bodyofMr. Knowles clicking agun. That witness (whom he referred to asWitness 1) also
said thattheDefendant resides nextto abakeryonKingStreet.2 DetectiveHerbert further testified
thatWitness 1alsopicked out the photograph ofthe Defendantasthe shooter from aphoto array of
six (6) individuals.
Continuing his testimony, Detective Herbert then identified the Defendant sitting in the
courtroom astheperson whose photograph Witness 1hadselected from the photo array. He stated
thatWitness 1 alsotold him thatthe Defendantwas standingbehind the victim when he shot him.
DetectiveHerbert further statedthathis examinationofthe corpseindicatedthatthe victim was shot
at close rangebecause the wounds bore gunshot residue.
Oncross-examination, DefenseCounselconductedavigorousandconscientious questioning
ofthe Detective on all ofhis direct testimony. The Court specificallydid not permitthe Detective
to identifyWitness 1andthe confidential informant. When questionedon the results ofthe Search
2Detective Herbert, inhisArrest/Search Warrant Affidavit, asserted thattheDefendant resided intherearof
his mother's Sica Health Food Store and Restaurant located at 19A & 20 King Street, Frederiksted. In his testimony,
he confirmed that Defendant's mother's business was next to a bakery.
Memorandum Opinion And Order
People v. Charles, SX-10-CR-247
Page 5 of 11
Warrant issued along with the Arrest Warrant, Detective Herbert admitted that no gun was
confiscated.
After the People rested its case, the Defense offered no witnesses or evidence, but made a
closingargumentrecommendingdenial oftheDefendant'sdetention. ThePeoplemadenorebuttal.
The Court suggested written submissions ifthe Parties were so inclined, and took the matter under
advisement. No submissions were made by either Party.
At the conclusion of the Hearing, the Court, at Defense Counsel's request and without
objection by the People, arraigned the Defendant and entered his 'not-guilty' plea and demand for
a speedyjury trial.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In the Tobalcase (filed February 11,2009), the Supreme Court invalidated the long-standing
practice ofthe Territorial Court andnow Superior Court ofdetaining defendants charged with other
major feloniesand limitedpre-trialdetentiononlyto defendantschargedwithFirstDegreeMurder.
Tobal v. Peopleofthe Virgin Islands, 51 V.1.147 (VI2009). Inapriordecision, Browne v. People
ofthe Virgin Islands, 50V.I.241 (VI2008),whereintheDefendant/Appellantwascharged withand
ultimatelyconvictedby ajury of, amongother crimes, Murder First Degree,the Court set forth the
applicable law on detention:
[W]e hold that section 3 of the ROA governs the issue of pretrial
detention for first degree murder defendants in local Virgin Islands
courts, and that title 5, section 3504a is inapplicable to the extent that
it purports to grant pretrial bail for defendants charged with first
degree murder in the Superior Court under Virgin Islands law where
the proofis evident or the presumption great.
Browne, 50 V.I. at 257-258.
Memorandum Opinion And Order
People v. Charles, SX-10-CR-247
Page 6 of 11
Id. at 261.
Although articulating the standard in various ways, the
overwhelming majorityofstatesrequireevidencethatis greaterthan
probable cause, but less than beyond a reasonable doubt.
In a later case wherein our Supreme Court remanded a detention determination by a trial
court, it cited approvingly from a First Circuit Court ofAppeals case:
Facedwith the government's reliance upon hearsayevidence at apre
trial detention hearing, the First Circuit Court of Appeals aptly
explained the reasoning behind the admissibilityofhearsay evidence
at such proceedings:
[the] authority rests primarily upon the need to make
the bail decision quickly, at a time when neither party
may have fully marshalled all the evidence in its
favor. It may also reflect the realization that at least
some hearsay on some occasions may be fairly
reliable, perhaps more reliable than certain direct
evidence.
For example, well-kept records, though
hearsay, may be more reliable than eyewitness
accounts of, say, a road accident on a foggy night. In
any event, the need for speed necessarily makes
arraignments, "probable cause" determinations,
and bail hearings typically informal affairs, not
substitutes for trial or even for discovery.
Williams v. People, 2010 WL 1565533 (V.I.), *6 (VI April 19, 2010) quoting United States v.
Acevedo-Ramos, 755 F. 2d 203,206 (1st Cir. 1985) (emphasis added).
Relying upon the Uniform Rules of Evidence (5 V.I.C. §§ 931-935) which permit the
admission ofhearsayatpre-trialdetentionhearings, theBrowne caseupheldthetrialcourtaccepting
hearsay testimony in its detention hearings.3 In its unanimous Opinion issuedon April 19,2010,
3The passage bythe Legislature ofAct No. 7161 (sections 15(a) and (b)) onMarch 23,2010, and itsapproval
by the Governor on April 7, 2010, replacedthe UniformRulesof Evidenceand made the Federal Rules of Evidence
applicableto the Superior Court in criminal cases. The substitutionofthe Federal Rules ofEvidence by legislative fiat
wouldnotnegatetheCourt's decisionsinBrowneand Williamstopermithearsayevidenceinpre-trialdetentionhearings.
Memorandum Opinion And Order
People v. Charles, SX-10-CR-247
Page 7 of 11
the Supreme Court succinctly set the standard that must befollowed bytrial Judges in making a
determinationon detentionhearingsas this one:
Wehold that, when the People elect to present exclusively hearsay
evidence at a pre-trial detention hearing, the trial court, when
determining whether the evidenceis clearand convincing,must
undertake by whatever means are appropriate under the
circumstances to ascertain the reliability of the underlying
hearsay statements when their accuracy is in question.
Williams at 10 (emphasis added).
Significantly, the Court added this caveat:
[T]he trial judge should focus on the strength of the People's
evidence,ratherthanthe defendant's ultimateguiltor innocence,and
may not resolve direct conflicts as to inculpatory and exculpatory
facts.
Williams at 3 (citation omitted).
DuringtheHearing,Defense Counsel objected several times to the use ofhearsaytestimony.
However, there is a wealth ofauthority both in the Federal Rules ofCriminal Procedure as well as
relevant case law that allow for such testimony to be considered. Title 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f), under
the heading of Detention Hearing, clearly states that in such hearings, "[t]he rules concerning
admissibility of evidence in criminal trials do not apply to the presentation and consideration of
information atthehearing."SeeUnitedStates v. Perry, 788F.2d100, lOo^Cir. 1986) (18U.S.C.
§ 3142(f) "explicitly permits use of evidence [in pre-trial detention hearings] that would not be
permissible in a criminal trial"); see also United States v. Delker, 757 F.2d 1390, 1397 (3rd Cir.
1985); and see People v. Matthew, 49 V.I. 285 (Super. Ct. 2008). Moreover, as previously stated,
the Browneand Williams cases, supra, expresslypermit hearsay evidence in detention hearings. The
Memorandum Opinion And Order
People v. Charles, SX-10-CR-247
Page 8 of 11
People objected to the Defense Counsel's questions seeking disclosureofnames ofwitnesses and
informants. These objections were sustained for several reasons. Witness disclosure is heavily
protected under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under 18 U.S.C. § 119(a), revealing
personal information about a"covered person" is a crime punishableby imprisonment ofno more
than five (5) years. The definition ofa covered person in 18 U.S.C. § 119(b) includes informants
or witnesses. It is clear that these statutes are aimed at maintaining the safety of informants and
witnesses so that justice can ultimately be served.
Furthermore, the statements made by the
government witnesses or prospective government witnesses are similarly protected for safety
reasons.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3500, no statement by any government witness, other than the
defendant, can be the subject of subpoena, discovery, or inspection until after the witness has
testified on direct examination in the trial of the case.
Only after such testimony on direct
examination has occurredcanthe defense petition the government to producethe statements ofthe
witness. The realityin this caseis that the Defense Counsel was given the Affidavit ofDetective
Herbertwho was the sole testifier at the Detention Hearing. Given the natureofthe crime alleged
against the Defendant - allegedly a revenge killing - the Government had ample justification to
protect theidentity ofits prospective trial witnesses.4
The onlychargewhich makestheDefendanteligibleforpre-trial detentionistheFirstDegree
Murdercharge. CountOneoftheInformation charges"That Jameson(Jama) Charles didunlawfully
andwith willful, deliberate and premeditated design, kill Dupert "Apache" Knowles, m, a human
^e front page article inthe June 13-14, 2010 edition ofThe St. Croix Avis informs the reader: "Within the
past year, fromJune 2009 to June 13, 2010 there have been 63 homicides throughoutthe Territory." This horrific
statistic provides thelegitimate obligation oftheProsecution andtheCourts toprotecttheidentity ofwitnesses (atleast
at this stage) to preserve the integrity ofthe criminal justice system.
Memorandum Opinion And Order
People v. Charles, SX-10-CR-247
Page9ofll
being, by shooting him with a firearm in the back ofthe head and lowerback."See Information, filed
May 6, 2010. The following recitation consists ofthe evidence that the Court deemed to be both
probative and reliable in evaluating the People's Motion For Detention.
DISCUSSION
Detective Herbert, as an experienced homicide investigator, observed that the gunshot
wounds ofthe victim were caused by a gun fired at very close range due to the presence ofgunshot
residue. This testimony is corroborated by the statement given to the investigatorby Witness 1who
said that the Defendant (whom he knew personally) was standing behind the victim when he shot
him and was clicking his gun over the prostate body of the victim after he had collapsed on the
ground. Also, Detective Herbert repeated the statement in his Affidavit that he provided Witness
1 with a six (6) picture photo array, and that Witness 1 identified Defendant's photo as the shooter.
Moreover, Detective Herbert said that the Emergency Medical Technician who responded
to the call examined the victim in his presence and stated he found no vital signs. In his Affidavit,
Detective Herbert reported that Dr. Fernando Landron, the Territory's Forensic Pathologist,
performed an autopsy on the victim and concluded that he died as a result of five (5) gunshot
wounds, removed five (5) projectiles from the corpse, and concluded that the manner ofdeath was
homicide.
Finally, when Defense Counsel questioned Detective Herbert about the autopsy report, both
Detective Herbert and the Prosecutor acknowledged that an autopsy was performed on the victim
but that it had not as yet been delivered to the Attorney General's Office. Detective Herbert, in both
his Affidavit and his testimony, said that he interviewed an informant who told him that the
Memorandum Opinion And Order
People v. Charles, SX-10-CR-247
Page 10 of 11
Defendanthadsaidtohim(the unnamed informant) thathe(the Defendant) hadkilled Knowles due
to his beliefthat Knowles had killed someone named Vincent "Sensi" Johnson.
TheCourt'stasknowis to determine theprobative value of the evidence produced at the
hearing asto the essential elements of FirstDegree Murder withwhichtheDefendant is charged.
Unlawful Killing
The evidence adduced at the Detention Hearing clearly and convincinglyshows that the
victim was shot at close range with a gun inflictingwounds to the back of his head and his lower
back, resulting in his death. Nothing in this scenario suggests - much less interposes - any other
cause ofdeath such as accident or any lesser degree ofmurder or manslaughter.
Wilful. Deliberate and Premeditated Design
In addition to the above analysis, the hearsay statement given by Witness 1that he witnessed
the shootingofthe victim by the Defendant leaves no rational explanation for the killing other than
malicious intent, which ultimatelywill be determined bythe triers offact. The eyewitness account,
at this stage, is buttressed by the hearsay statement by an informant who told the investigator that
the Defendant had told him that he had killed the victim due to his beliefthat the victim had killed
another human being (Vincent "Sensei"Johnson). While the People bear no burden ofestablishing
a motive for the murder, it is more likely than not to be an issue that will be raised at a jury trial.
Also, the autopsy referenced in Detective Herbert's probable cause Affidavit reveals that five (5)
firearm projectiles were taken from the body of the victim. This degree of violence supports the
People's charge that the Defendant's intent was to kill the victim.
Memorandum Opinion And Order
People v. Charles, SX-10-CR-247
Page 11 of 11
CONCLUSION
Based on the evidencepresented at the DetentionHearing and applying the criteriaset forth
most recently in Williams, this Court concludes that there is a substantial probability that the
Defendant, Jameson Charles, committed, among other crimes, Murder First Degree against Dupert
Knowles on March 16, 2010 as charged by the People in the Information.
In recognition ofthe Supreme Court's caution about resolving conflicts between "inculpatory
and exculpatory facts," this Court concludes that there were no such conflicts in this case. Indeed,
the only significant non-inculpatory testimony was Detective Herbert's admission that no gun was
recovered by the searches that he executed pursuant to a warrant in an attempt to locate the murder
weapon. This testimony does not establish a "fact" in this Court's estimation and, moreover, is
merely non-probative, not exculpatory in nature.
Accordingly, the premises considered, it is hereby
ORDERED that the People's Motion for Detention is GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED that the Defendant is detained pending his trial on the charge of First Degree
Murder.
ORDERED that a copy of this Order be served on all the parties.
Dated: June /fT, 2010
ATTEST:
VENfilfo H. VELAZQUEZ, ESQ.
Clerik/fthe Court
wAjJ ^UalUu
Court Clerk Supervisor
bfa/io
CERTI
,H. )WM=Ll^ 20/CL
VEI&&A HrVELAZQUEZ, ESQ.
Court Clerk