IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS 
DIVISION OF ST. THOMAS AND ST. JOHN 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DELLANNA MAGNER, 
Defendant. 
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Case No. 3:16-cr-0039-005 
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 
MOLLOY, Chief Judge 
BEFORE THE COURT is Defendant Dellanna Magner’s (“Magner”) pro se Motion for 
Early Termination of Supervised Release. (ECF No. 424.) The Government did not file a 
response. For the reasons stated below, the Court will deny the motion. 
I. 
On January 26, 2017, Magner plead guilty to Count Four of the Superseding 
Indictment which charged possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(ii). (ECF No. 245.) The underlying facts of this case involved 
Magner conspiring with several other individuals to trafϐic cocaine between St. Thomas and 
the United States mainland through the Cyril E. King Airport. Count Four carried a mandatory 
minimum term of incarceration of 60 months and a mandatory term of supervised release of 
four years. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B).  
On March 16, 2017, the sentencing judge sentenced Magner to sixty months 
imprisonment along with a term of sixty months of supervised release to be served 
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immediately upon her release from prison. Id. Magner’s term of supervised release 
commenced on April 9, 2021, and is scheduled to terminate on April 8, 2026. As of the date 
of this Order, Magner has served approximately 46 months of her 60-month term of 
supervised release.  
Magner requests that her supervised release be terminated arguing that she has 
abided by all terms and conditions of her supervised release and has had no violations. ECF 
No. 424 at 1.  
II. 
Motions to amend or modify the conditions of supervised release are governed by 18 
U.S.C. § 3583(e), which allows the District Court to terminate a term of supervised release 
and discharge the defendant released “at any time after the expiration of one year of 
supervised release. . . if [the court] is satisfied that such action is warranted by the conduct 
of the defendant released and the interest of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e )(1). The Court must 
consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) when evaluating early termination:  
 
(i) 
“the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 
characteristics of the defendant,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1); 
 
(ii) 
the need for the sentence imposed “to reflect the seriousness of the 
offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment 
for the offense,” id. § 3553(a)(2)(A); 
 
(iii) 
the need for the sentence imposed “to afford adequate deterrence to 
criminal conduct," id. § 3553(a)(2)(B), "to protect the public from 
further crimes of the defendant,” id. § 3553(a)(2)(C), and “to provide 
the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical 
care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner,” id. 
§3553(a)(2)(D); 
 
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(iv) 
the “kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for the 
applicable category of offense [or violation of probation or supervised 
release] committed by the applicable category of defendant” under the 
Sentencing Guidelines, id. § 3553(a)(4); 
 
(v) 
“any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission,” 
id. § 3553(a)(5); and 
 
(vi) 
“the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants 
with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct....” 
id. § 3553(a)(6). 
18 U.S.C. § 3553. 
 “District courts are not required to make specific findings of fact with respect to each 
of these factors; rather, a statement that the district court has considered the statutory 
factors is sufficient.” United States v. Melvin, 978 F.3d 49, 52–53 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation 
omitted). The District Court’s discretion whether to modify the terms of supervision is 
“broad.” United States v. Wilson, 707 F.3d 412, 416 (3d Cir. 2013). The Court has authority to 
“consider a wide range of circumstances” and considerations in determining whether early 
termination is appropriate. Melvin, 978 F.3d at 52. (citing United States v. Emmett, 749 F.3d 
817, 819 (9th Cir. 2014)). However, it is the defendant’s burden to convince the Court that 
she deserves the “rarely granted” early termination of her supervised release conditions. 
Emmett, 749 F.3d at 824. 
The defendant need not demonstrate that “something exceptional or extraordinary 
warrants” early termination or that there are “new or unforeseen circumstances” that have 
arisen since the Court originally imposed the defendant’s sentence. Melvin, 978 F.3d at 53 
(citations omitted). All a defendant must show is that the 3553(a) factors, the defendant’s 
conduct, and the interest of justice all warrant early termination. No additional specific 
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showing is required. However, the Third Circuit has held “if a sentence was ‘sufficient, but 
not greater than necessary’ when first pronounced, we would expect that something will 
have changed in the interim that would justify an early end to a term of supervised release.” 
Melvin, 978 F.3d at 53. 
III. 
After reviewing the record and upon full consideration to the section 3553(a) factors, 
the Court concludes that early termination of Magner’s supervised release is not warranted. 
Magner engaged in a very serious crime. She conspired with several other individuals to 
traffic drugs through the airport. Notwithstanding that this incident occurred in 2016 – more 
than eight years ago – the Court continues to preside over cases involving this exact conduct. 
The trafficking of cocaine (and other controlled substances) at our airports continues to be 
a major societal problem requiring law enforcement agencies to garner resources to combat 
this illegal flow of drugs. The early termination of Magner’s mandatory term of sixty months 
of supervised release would send the wrong message and frustrate the purpose of the need 
to afford adequate deterrence to Magner specifically, and to individuals, generally, who are 
prone to engage in this type of illegal behavior. Thus, as a critical component of the sentence, 
the term serves the crucial goals of deterrence and just punishment contemplated within 
section 3553(a). Moreover, Magner plead guilty and was convicted of an offense that carries 
a mandatory minimum 4-year term of supervised release. As of the date of this Order, 
Magner has completed only 46 months of her 60-month term of supervised release.   
The Court recognizes Magner’s commendable compliance during her period of 
integration while under supervised release. The Court also recognizes that supervised 
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release is not intended as punishment in lieu of incarceration. United States v. Granderson, 
511 U.S. 39, 50 (1994). The primary purpose of supervised release is “to facilitate” the 
reintegration of offenders back into the community. United States v. Santiago, No. 12-566-1, 
2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84714, at *9 (E.D. Pa. May 9, 2024) (citing United States v. Albertson, 
645 F.3d 191, 197 (3d Cir. 2011) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Moon, No. 19-
143, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159416, at *11 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2021)("Compliance with the 
conditions of supervision, including refraining from engaging in criminal conduct, is required 
behavior while serving a term of supervised release.")(citation omitted)).  
  Because Congress intended supervised release to assist individuals in their 
transition to community life, it “fulfills rehabilitative ends, distinct from those served by 
incarceration.” Santiago at *9 (citations omitted). “The fact of compliance may very well 
mean that supervision is serving its deterrent and rehabilitative purposes and continuation 
of it to full term will achieve its desired effects on the supervised individual and community.” 
Santiago at *10-11 (citation omitted). Given that compliance is expected, compliance alone 
is insufficient to justify early termination under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). United States v. Taylor, 
729 F. App'x 474, 475 (7th Cir. 2018); see also Emmett, 749 F.3d at 823 (reasoning that 
compliance and non-criminal behavior are “not tethered to a § 3553(a) factor” for purposes 
of deciding whether to grant an early release). Simply stated, complying with the terms of 
supervised release, alone, is not a basis for early termination of supervised release.   
IV. 
After careful consideration of the record in this matter, including consideration of the 
section 3553(a) factors, the Court ϐinds that the interest of justice do not warrant early 
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termination of Magner’s supervised release. Accordingly, Dellanna Magner’s Motion for Early 
Termination of Supervised Release, ECF No. 424, will be denied. An appropriate Order 
follows.  
 
Dated: January 31, 2025 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Robert A. Molloy  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
ROBERT A. MOLLOY 
 
 
 
 
         Chief Judge 
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