IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS

DIVISION OF ST. THOMAS AND ST. JOHN



PEOPLE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS _ )

)

Defendant, ) CIVIL NO. ST-10-CR-015

vs. )

)

)

CRYSTAL IRONS )

)

)

Defendant. )

)

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION



Pending before the Court is Defendant Crystal Irons’s March 27, 2013, Motion

for a Sentence Reduction. For the following reasons Defendant’s Motion will be denied.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY



On July 11, 2012, a Motion for Extraordinary Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by

Defendant Crystal Irons, seeking relief under Title 5 of the Virgin Islands Code, § 1301,

et. seq., on the grounds that her plea agreement in People v. Crystal Irons, Case No. ST-

10-CR-15, was not knowing and voluntary because she was not advised of and did not

understand the direct consequences of her plea, in violation of her rights under the Due

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.’ Considering the parties’ arguments presented

at a hearing held on December 10, 2012, and the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands’s

recent decision in Bryan v. Government of the Virgin Islands,” the Court vacated

Defendant’s original guilty plea to Murder in the Second Degree. The charges against



Defendant were reinstated under the Second Amended Information with three (3) counts:



' Defendant’s Motion for Extraordinary Write of Habeas, at 2, July 11, 2012.

?'§. Ct. Civ. No. 2008-0076 (V.I. Mar. 14, 2012) (discussing Gov't of the V.I. v. Greenaway, 379 Fed. Appx.

247, 2010 WL 1857378 (3d Cir. 2010)).

Irons v. Gov't of the Virgin Islands

Case No. ST



Memorandum Opinion, April 29, 2013

Page 2 of 5



Count One, Murder in the First Degree, in violation of 14 V.LC. §§ 921, 922(a)(1); Count

Two, Carrying or Using a Dangerous Weapon During the Commission or Attempted

Commission of a Crime of Violence, in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 2251(a)(2)(B); and Count

Three, Murder in the Second Degree, in violation of 14 V.LC. §§ 921, 922(b). Pursuant

to a plea agreement, Defendant once again plead guilty to Count Three, Murder in the

Second Degree. On January 31, 2013, the Court sentenced Defendant on this Count to

eighteen (18) years imprisonment, with three (3) years of credit for time already served.

The remaining Counts, One and Two, were dismissed with prejudice. Defendant now

seeks to have her sentence reduced.

STANDARD



Under Super. Ct. R. 136, a court has the discretion to “correct an illegal sentence

at any time . . . [or] a sentence imposed in an illegal manner.”* The court may also

“reduce a sentence within 120 days after the sentence is imposed, or within 120 days after

any order or other mandate issued upon affirmance of the judgment or dismissal of the

appeal.”* Where a sentence has not been imposed in an illegal manner, the decision



whether to reduce a Defendant’s sentence is left to the discretion of the Court.



> SuPER. CT. R. 136.



‘Td. Defendant was well within the 120 day period because she was sentenced on January 31, 2012, and

she submitted her Motion on March 27, 2013.



° See Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Charles, 47 V.1. 160, 165-66 (V.I. Super.Ct. 2005) (“.. . the nature of a

Defendant's criminal conduct and an assessment of the harm caused by the defendant are legitimate

concerns to be considered by the Court, when considering a motion for reduction of a



sentence... .Therefore, when making its determination the Court is guided by the goals of the criminal

justice system, the purposes for imprisonment, and the reasons specified in the Defendant's motion”)

(internal citations omitted).

Irons v. Gov’t of the Virgin Islands

Case No. ST



Memorandum Opinion, April 29, 2013

Page 3 of 5



ANALYSIS



Defendant seeks a reduction of her sentence primarily based on her remorse for

her conduct and her demonstrated good conduct and rehabilitation while incarcerated.

The Court finds Defendant’s argument not persuasive because Defendant has not

disclosed any occurrence since sentencing sufficient to justify a reduction of her

sentence.° During sentencing, the Court took into consideration Defendant’s statement

that she made on her behalf at the sentencing hearing on January 31, 2013, where she

expressed remorse for her conduct and indicated she had made progress while

incarcerated. Further, the Court took into consideration the letters written on Defendant’s

behalf by Janice Rey, Torya Mason, and Haldane Davies III, which demonstrated

Defendant’s rehabilitation, close friendships, and religious support system. Considering

all the testimony at the sentencing, the Court sentenced Defendant to eighteen (18) years,

with credit for three (3) years served, which is a seven (7) year reduction from her

sentence on her original guilty plea to Murder in the Second Degree.’ Further, the Court

could not ignore that Defendant’s conduct resulted in the brutal death of Stewart

Sargeant. Thus, while the Court commends the progress she has made while incarcerated

and encourages her to continue her rehabilitation, the Defendant has not presented any



new information sufficient to justify a reduction of her sentence.



° See Charles, 47 V.I. at 168 (holding that “when nothing is disclosed since sentencing to justify or merit a

reduction of sentence,” the defendant’s claims of “post conviction rehabilitation and good behavior,” and of

his family’s financial hardship due to his incarceration was insufficient to warrant a reduction of his

sentence, particularly when read in conjunction with the severe nature of his crimes).



” Defendant was originally sentenced to twenty-five (25) years imprisonment imposed following her first

guilty plea to Count III of the Second Amended Information, Second Degree Murder on June 2, 2010. See

Sentence Hearing Transcript, at p. 23, July 2, 2010; Order, at 2, May 27, 2011.

Irons v. Gov’t of the Virgin Islands

Case No. ST



Memorandum Opinion, April 29, 2013

Page 4 of 5



Finally, Defendant also argues that her sentence should be further reduced

because her crime and criminal history are less severe than those of the defendants in

People of the Virgin Islands v. Bryan’ and Government of the Virgin Islands v. Santiago.’

While the Bryan and Santiago decisions may provide guidance to this Court particularly

regarding applicable legal standards, the underlying factual determinations made by the

court which ultimately resulted in a reduction of the defendants’ sentences have no

bearing on Defendant’s sentence. Thus, the Court does not find this argument

persuasive.'” A review of the facts reveals that Defendant admitted to stabbing Stewart

Sargeant to death. An eighteen (18) year sentence for such conduct is proportionate to

the crime and well within the statutory limits, as Defendant could have been sentenced to



any number of years.'!



® ST-00-CR-375, Judgment (V.I. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 2012) (finding, where the original thirty (30) year

sentence of the defendant was vacated, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant plead guilty to one count of

murder in the second degree, and was sentenced to thirty (30) years, all of which was suspended, except for

the twelve (12) years he had already served). While Defendant draws parallels with the facts underlying

Bryan v. Government of the Virgin Islands, Defendant does not contend that that her most recent plea was

not knowing or intelligent in violation of her rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. See Bryan v. Government of the Virgin Islands, S. Ct. Civ. No. 2008-0076 (V.I. Mar. 14,

2012).



° 27 V.I. 232 (D.V.I 1992) (reducing a defendant’s sentence from eight (8) years to five (5) years for a plea

of guilty to one count of possession with the intent to distribute crack cocaine because the Court found that

(1) defendant’s life of crime was rooted in his drug dependency; (2) defendant had been drug-free and his

counselor believed defendant had the ability to remain drug-free; (3) and defendant demonstrated remorse

for his crimes).



'° The Court recognizes that a Court must explain on the record a disparity in sentencing co-defendants, and

a failure to do so could, in some cases, warrant reversal. Brown v. People, 2012 WL 1886443 (V.I. 2012).

However, this is not the case here since Defendant had no co-defendants. Further, Defendant does not

argue that her sentence in any way is cruel or unusual under the Eighth Amendment.



"| See Warner v. Virgin Islands, 46 V.1. 251 (D.C.V.1. 2004) (noting that a defendant cannot be sentenced

for murder in the second degree to life imprisonment because the legislature has determined that the

sentence must be in a term of years); 14 V.I.C. § 923(b) (“Whoever commits murder in the second degree

shall be imprisoned for not less than five (5) years . . .”)

Irons v. Gov't of the Virgin Islands

Case No. ST



Memorandum Opinion, April 29, 2013

Page 5 of 5



For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for a Sentence Reduction is



denied. An Order consistent with this Opinion shall follow.



Dated/ Aprile? 2013 SD

HON. MICHAEL C. DUNSTON

ATTEST Venetia H. Velazque7Z, Esq. JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

F THY VIRGIN ISLANDS

by) Unuy LL A



J ri B. Tyson . ‘

io Clerk Supervi 4 / GHP