Not For Publication 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS 
 
IN RE: JAMAL MORTON, 
          Petitioner. 
)
) 
) 
S. Ct. Civ. No. 2014-0070 
Re: Super. Ct. Crim. No. 164/2010 (STT) 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus 
Superior Court Judge: Hon. Kathleen Y. Mackay 
 
Considered and Filed: December 4, 2014 
 
BEFORE:  
RHYS S. HODGE, Chief Justice; MARIA M. CABRET, Associate Justice; and 
IVE ARLINGTON SWAN, Associate Justice. 
 
APPEARANCES: 
 
Joseph A. DiRuzzo III, Esq. 
Fuerst Ittleman David & Joseph, PL 
Miami, FL 
 
Attorney for Petitioner. 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
PER CURIAM. 
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to a petition for writ of mandamus filed by 
Jamal Morton.  In his petition, Morton requests that this Court direct the Superior Court judge 
presiding over the underlying matter to issue a merits ruling on a “Motion For A Determination 
Regarding Preserving Error During Jury Selection” in People of the V.I. v. Morton, Super. Ct. 
Crim. No. 164/2010 (STT).  For the reasons that follow, we deny the petition. 
I. BACKGROUND 
On March 26, 2010, the People of the Virgin Islands charged Morton with numerous 
offenses, including first-degree murder.  Morton, through his counsel, filed a June 4, 2014 
motion requesting that the Superior Court determine the applicable rule governing preservation 
In re: Morton 
S. Ct. Civ. No. 2014-0070 
Opinion of the Court 
Page 2 of 4 
 
of error during the jury selection process.  According to Morton, such a ruling was necessary 
because federal and state courts are split as to the appropriate standard and he wished to ensure 
that any error in the jury selection process is properly preserved. 
The Superior Court, in a September 26, 2014 order, denied the motion.  While the 
Superior Court found that the standard for preserving an error with the jury selection process was 
unclear, it concluded that Morton’s motion was premature because a trial was not yet imminent, 
and that even if the matter did proceed to trial there was no guarantee that Morton would move to 
strike a juror or that such a motion would be denied.  Thus the Superior Court concluded that the 
motion was premature, and that issuing a merits ruling at that time would not further the interests 
of judicial economy. 
Shortly thereafter, Morton filed his petition for writ of mandamus with this Court.  In his 
petition, Morton asserts that the Superior Court abdicated a ministerial duty to rule on a motion 
properly before it, and that he possesses no other means, short of mandamus, to compel the 
Superior Court to issue a merits ruling.   
II. DISCUSSION 
This Court possesses jurisdiction over original proceedings for extraordinary writs, 
including a writ of mandamus.  See 4 V.I.C. § 32(b).  “To obtain a writ of mandamus, ‘a 
petitioner must establish that it has no other adequate means to attain the desired relief and that 
its right to the writ is clear and indisputable.’”  In re Rogers, S. Ct. Civ. No. 2014-0024, 2014 
V.I. Supreme LEXIS 31, at *6 (V.I. May 27, 2014) (unpublished) (quoting In re People of the 
V.I., 51 V.I. 374, 382 (V.I. 2009)).  But “even if the first two prerequisites have been met, the 
issuing court, in the exercise of its discretion, must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under 
the circumstances.” In re Joseph, S. Ct. Civ. No. 2013-0015, 2013 V.I. Supreme LEXIS 14, at *8 
In re: Morton 
S. Ct. Civ. No. 2014-0070 
Opinion of the Court 
Page 3 of 4 
 
(V.I. Apr. 5, 2013) (unpublished) (quoting Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380-81 
(2004)). 
We conclude that Morton has failed to meet this high burden.  While Morton frames his 
claim as the Superior Court failing to rule on his motion, the Superior Court did, in fact, issue an 
order denying the motion as premature.  This Court has repeatedly held that the mere fact that a 
motion is filed does not compel a ruling on the merits of the issue or issues presented therein; in 
fact, this Court has, on occasion, reversed the Superior Court for issuing a premature merits 
ruling on a motion.  See, e.g., V.I. Gov’t Hosps. & Health Facilities Corp. v. Gov’t of the V.I., 50 
V.I. 276, 280-81 (V.I. 2008) (error to rule on merits of attorney’s fees motion when underlying 
judgment is on appeal).  Moreover, this Court has already held that the Superior Court may 
exercise its discretion to defer a merits ruling on a motion if the interests of judicial economy 
would be furthered by considering the issue at a later date.  In re Royer, S. Ct. Civ. No. 2014-
0023, 2014 V.I. Supreme LEXIS 34, at *5 (V.I. June 30, 2014) (unpublished).  As such, 
Morton’s right to a merits ruling is not clear and indisputable. 
For similar reasons, it is clear that Morton possesses an adequate alternate means to 
obtaining a merits ruling.  In its September 26, 2014 order, the Superior Court did not state that it 
would never rule on the issue raised in Morton’s motion; rather, it indicated that the motion was 
premature, and implied that it would consider the issue if the case proceeded to trial and an 
actual dispute between the parties occurred during jury selection.  While we question the value of 
such a ruling given that the Superior Court lacks the authority to establish standards for error 
preservation on appeal to this Court, see Tindell v. People, 56 V.I. 138, 150 n.12 (V.I. 2012), it is 
clear that the Superior Court is amenable to issuing a merits ruling in the event a jury selection 
issue arises during trial.  See In re Le Blanc, 49 V.I. 508, 517 (V.I. 2008) (“[W]here there are 
In re: Morton 
S. Ct. Civ. No. 2014-0070 
Opinion of the Court 
Page 4 of 4 
 
practical avenues for seeking relief that are untried, this Court will ordinarily deny a petition for 
mandamus.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus. 
Dated this 4th day of December, 2014. 
ATTEST:  
VERONICA J. HANDY, ESQ. 
Clerk of the Court