FOR PUBLICATION



IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS

DIVISION OF ST. THOMAS AND ST. JOHN



KRRREER



PEOPLE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS,



)

)

Plaintiff, )

) CASE NO. ST-08-CR-F437

v. )

) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

ALEXIS JOSE LIMA, )

)

Defendant. )

)

DOUGLAS SPROTTE, ESQ. DALE I. SMITH, ESQ.

Assistant Attorney General 99 Park Avenue

U.S. Virgin Islands Department of Justice Suite 1600

34-38 Kronprindsens Gade New York, NY 10016

GERS Bldg., 2nd Floor Attorney for Defendant

St. Thomas, VI 00802

Attorney for Plaintiff

CHRISTIAN, ADAM G., Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION



(Filed: March 3, 2011)



I. Introduction.



Pending before this Court is Defendant’s “Motion to Dismiss Counts Charging

Unauthorized Possession of a Firearm on Second Amendment Grounds.” The Court will deny

this motion because Defendant lacks standing to bring said motion under the circumstances of

this case. Also submitted for adjudication is Defendant’s “Motion to Dismiss for Violation of

Mr. Lima’s Speedy Trial Rights.” This motion also will be denied in light of amendments to the

federal and territorial laws governing the judicial structure of the Virgin Islands.



Il. Background.

This matter grows out of a nine-count Information brought by the People of the Virgin



Islands (the “People”) against Defendant Alexis Jose Lima. Mr. Lima is charged with single

counts of attempted first degree murder, first degree assault, mayhem, third degree assault, and

People of the Virgin Islands v. Alexis Jose Lima

Superior Court Case No. ST-08-CR-437

Memorandum Opinion



first degree reckless endangerment. He also is charged with four counts of unauthorized use of a

firearm during a crime of violence. All of the charges are based on an incident said to have

occurred on October 11, 2008. On that date, Mr. Lima is alleged to have shot an individual in a

crowded nightclub in the Frenchtown area of St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands.



In his motion to dismiss based upon the Second Amendment to the United States

Constitution, Defendant asserts that “Virgin Islands law gives the [Police] Commissioner

unfettered discretion to ban .45 caliber handguns.” In his view, this perceived authority of the

Police Commissioner caused Defendant not to pursue a license for his .45 caliber handgun. He

argues that, insofar as this prosecution is premised upon his alleged unauthorized possession

and/or use of a firearm, his constitutional right to bear arms has been contravened, and counts

Two, Four, Six, and Eight of the Information must be dismissed.



He then asserts in his second motion to dismiss that he has a statutory right to a speedy

trial under the timelines set out in the Speedy Trial Plan of the District Court of the Virgin

Islands. Specifically, Mr. Lima posits that the 70-day time limit of the Plan expired some time

ago. Therefore, he argues, he is entitled to a dismissal of this entire prosecution under Virgin

Islands law. The Court details below the rationale for denying each of Defendant’s motions.



Ill. Analysis.



a. The Motion to Dismiss Counts Charging Unauthorized Possession of a

Firearm on Second Amendment Grounds will be denied because Defendant lacks standing

to mount his constitutional challenge.



In Defendant’s motion to dismiss on constitutional grounds, he argues that there is a

Virgin Islands Police Department (““VIPD”’) policy against licensing firearms larger than .40

caliber which violates his Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.' While all the

provisions of the United States Constitution do not automatically apply in the United States

Virgin Islands, the Second Amendment specifically has been incorporated in the Territory

through Section 3 of the Revised Organic Act of the Virgin Islands of 1954 (“ROA”). 2 Relying

on District of Columbia v. Heller (“Helle ry and McDonald v. City of Chicago (“McDonald”),

Defendant argues that the VIPD’s policy not to issue licenses for .45 caliber handguns has

essentially the same prohibitive effect as the District of Columbia’s and City of Chicago’s

firearms laws at issue in Heller and McDonald. The People oppose Defendant’s motion stating

that, because he never applied for a license to carry any firearm in the Virgin Islands, Defendant

cannot succeed on said motion. The People’s argument raises the question of whether Mr. Lima

has standing to challenge the Virgin Islands firearm regulatory scheme under the circumstances

presented in this case.



: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and



bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. II.



Revised Organic Act of the Virgin Islands 1954, as amended, § 3, 48 U.S.C. § 1561, reprinted in V.1. CODE

ANN., Historical Documents, Organic Acts, and U.S. Constitution at 86 (1995) (preceding VI CODE ANN. tit. 1).

See also, People v. Penn, No. ST-10-CR-179, 2010 WL 2927465 * 1 (V.I. Super. Ct. July 14, 2010).



554 U.S. 570 (2008).

‘ 130 S.Ct. 3020 (2010).

People of the Virgin Islands v. Alexis Jose Lima

Superior Court Case No. ST-08-CR-437

Memorandum Opinion



Although the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands is not a court established by or

pursuant to Article III of the United States Constitution, the “...requirement that a litigant have

standing to invoke a court’s authority has been incorporated into Virgin Islands jurisprudence.”

The standing inquiry focuses on “whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the

merits of the dispute or of particular issues.° Standing does not focus on the merits of the issue,

rather, it is “a preliminary jurisdictional requirement” necessary to establish that a litigant is

entitled to judicial action.’



A movant must allege a personal injury fairly traceable to the opponent's allegedly

unlawful conduct and that the injury is likely to be redressed by the requested relief.* In other

words, to have standing to raise his challenge to the Virgin Islands firearms licensing laws and

regulations, Defendant must show that he has suffered “‘...(i) an actual or threatened injury that

was (ii) caused by [the People’s] actions and is (iti) capable of judicial redress.”.” In this case,

Mr. Lima cannot establish his standing to challenge the alleged VIPD policy because he cannot

show that he suffered any injury-in-fact or that any governmental action was the cause of his

alleged injury.



1. Defendant lacks standing because he does not have any Second Amendment

right to bear arms under the circutmstances of this case.



Mr. Lima cannot establish any injury-in-fact because, based on the circumstances

presented in the record before the Court, he does not have any Second Amendment right to bear

arms. As noted above, an injury-in-fact is essential for Defendant to establish his standing to

raise his challenges. In assessing whether he incurred an injury-in-fact, the Court must look at

whether Mr. Lima has demonstrated his alleged injury falls within the “zone of interests” which

the Second Amendment is intended to protect.'°



In Heller, the United States Supreme Court held that a person has a Second Amendment

right to possess a firearm for home defense. McDonald extended the Heller holding, a case that

originated in the District of Columbia, to the States pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment,

which also applies in the Virgin Islands through Section 3 of the ROA. What Defendant ignores,

however, is that Heller also proclaimed, “...we do not read the Second Amendment to protect

the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation....”'’ Rather, “...the Second

Amendment protects a personal right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes, most notably

for self defense within the home.””’” In this case, Mr. Lima does not assert that he was deprived



Arlington Funding Servs., Inc. v. Geigel, 51 V.1. 118, 124 (V.I. 2009) (citations omitted).



Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).



Id.



Id...



Arlington Funding Servs., Inc. v. Geigel, 51 V.I. at 125 (citing Valley Forge Christian College v.

Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)).



: See, Anjelino v. New York Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 88 (3rd Cir. 2000); Jones v. McElroy, 429 F. Supp. 848,

851 (E.D. Pa. 1977).



u 554 U.S. at 594 (emphasis in the original).



2 McDonald, 130 §.Ct. at 3044 (emphasis added).



i a!

People of the Virgin Islands v. Alexis Jose Lima

Superior Court Case No. ST-08-CR-437

Memorandum Opinion



of his right to bear arms for self-defense, protection of his home, or for any other lawful purpose.

Indeed, he does not present any purpose for having a firearm at all. He simply argues that a

VIPD policy exists which deprives him of a general right to bear a .45 caliber handgun under the

Second Amendment. While Heller and McDonald do not definitively set the parameters of the

Second Amendment right to bear arms, they do make clear that the right is not unlimited.



Herein, Defendant was not in possession of a weapon in or within the curtilage of his

residence. He is accused of shooting an individual in the back in a nightclub while several other

patrons were present. This Court is comfortable in determining that the Second Amendment

right to bear arms does not protect this type of alleged activity. Indeed, even if Mr. Lima had a

license to carry a firearm and he engaged in the asserted conduct, he still would face serigus

criminal charges under a different statute which carries maximum penalties that are similar!?

those he may face if he is convicted on the challenged charges in the existing Information.

This Court concludes that Mr. Lima’s alleged injury does not fall within the zone of interests

protected by Second Amendment right to bear arms under the circumstances presented.

Therefore, he fails to meet his initial burden of demonstrating an injury-in-fact.



2. Defendant also lacks standing under Poulos v. New Hampshire.



In addition to his lack of a cognizable Second Amendment right, Mr. Lima never

attempted to obtain a license to carry a firearm under Virgin Islands law. Therefore, he cannot

demonstrate that any conduct of the government caused him any Second Amendment injury. In

order to have standing to challenge a licensing system, generally, the litigant first must have

attempted to obtain a license and been refused by the regulatory agency. As previously declared

by the United States Supreme Court



3 See, 14 V.1.C. § 2251, which provides:

“a) Whoever

(2) with intent to use the same unlawfully against another, has, possesses, bears, transports,

carries or has under his proximate control, a dagger, dirk, dangerous knife, razor, stiletto, or any

other dangerous or deadly weapon shall

(A) be fined $5,000 and imprisoned not more than five (5) years; or

(B) if he has previously been convicted of a felony, or has, possesses, bears, transports,

carries or has under his proximate control, any such weapon during the commission or attempted

commission of a crime of violence (as defined in section 2253(d)(1) hereof) shall be fined $10,000

and imprisoned not more than fifteen (15) years, which penalty shall be in addition to the penalty

provided for the commission of, or attempt to commit, the crime of violence.”

‘4 See, 14 V.I.C. § 2253, which provides:



“a) Whoever, unless otherwise authorized by law, has, possesses, bears, transports or carries

either, actually or constructively, openly or concealed any firearm, as defined in Title 23, section

451(d) of this code, loaded or unloaded, may be arrested without a warrant, and shall be sentenced

to imprisonment of not less than one year nor more than five years and shall be fined not less than

$5,000 nor more than $15,000 or both the fine and imprisonment, except that if such person shall

have been convicted of a felony in any state, territory, or federal court of the United States, or if

such firearm or an imitation thereof was had, possessed, borne, transported or carried by or under

the proximate control of such person during the commission or attempted commission of a crime

of violence, as defined in subsection (d) hereof, then such person shall be fined $25,000 and

imprisoned not less than fifteen (15) years nor more than twenty (20) years. The foregoing

applicable penalties provided for violation of this section shall be in addition to the penalty

provided for the commission of, or attempt to commit, the felony or crime of violence.”

People of the Virgin Islands v. Alexis Jose Lima

Superior Court Case No. ST-08-CR-437

Memorandum Opinion



“A close parallel exists between unlawful refusals and failure to apply for license

on the ground that such application would be unavailing. Such a defense is not

allowed. ‘It is well settled that where a licensing ordinance, valid on its face,

prohibits certain conduct unless the person has a license, one who without a

license engages in that conduct can be criminally prosecuted without being

allowed to show that the application for a license would have been unavailing. * *

* In short, the individual is given the choice of securing a license, or staying out

of the occupation, or, before he acts, seeking a review in the civil courts of the

licensing authority's refusal to issue him a license.’” Is



The Virgin Islands firearms scheme is facially valid as it expressly permits persons to

possess arms for home protection, which is at the heart of both Heller and McDonald, and also

allows for the licensing of guns and persons for other reasons.'° Herein, Mr. Lima plainly asserts

that he did not apply to the VIPD for a license to carry a .45 caliber handgun. In fact, Defendant

did not apply to carry any type of firearm. Moreover, he did not file a civil action to challenge

the validity of the alleged VIPD policy. He only claims that his application would have been

futile. However, the language of Poulos forecloses his ability to raise this defense.



In Poulos, the Supreme Court presented a non-exhaustive list of regulated activities for

which a person may be criminally prosecuted if he or she does not comply with the applicable

licensing or permitting procedures. Notably, the regulation of firearms was named among these

activities.'? Further, both Heller and McDonald expressly state that they are not intended to

invalidate all firearms laws and regulations.'® Thus, Heller and McDonald do not overrule or

undermine the decision in Poulos. Rather, all of these cases can, and should, be read together as

authorizing jurisdictions to impose reasonable restrictions on the licensing, possession, and use

of firearms. Mr. Lima’s implicit argument that any restriction on his ability to license his .45

caliber firearm is inconsistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedents.



There is another reason that Mr. Lima cannot show that any government conduct caused

his alleged injury. Though asserting that VIPD has a policy of not licensing firearms larger than

.40 caliber, Defendant has not presented the Court with any statute or regulation to sustain this

contention. The applicable gun control statutes are found in Title 23, Chapter 5, Virgin Islands

Code. There a firearm is defined as “any devise by whatever name known, capable of

discharging ammunition by means of gas generated from an explosive composition, including

any air gas or spring gun or any ‘BB’ pistols or ‘BB’ guns that have been adapted or modified to



a Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 409 n. 13 (1953) (citations omitted) (“Poulos”).



‘6 V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 23, § 454(3).



~ “But to allow applicants to proceed without the required permits to run businesses, erect structures,

purchase firearms, transport or store explosives or inflammatory products, hold public meetings without prior

safety arrangements or take other unauthorized action is apt to cause breaches of the peace or create public dangers.

The valid requirements of license are for the good of the applicants and the public. 345 U.S. at 409 (emphasis

added).



8 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-627 and n. 26; McDonald, 130 S.Ct. at 3047.

People of the Virgin Islands v. Alexis Jose Lima

Superior Court Case No. ST-08-CR-437

Memorandum Opinion



discharge projectiles as a firearm.”!” The rules promulgated by the VIPD, which have been in

effect since 1988, utilize the same definition.”” No statute or regulation places a limit on the

caliber of the firearms which may be licensed in the fashion asserted by Mr. Lima. The Court

has been advised that there are some efforts underway to revise the VIPD firearm regulations.

However, if there is an unofficial policy of the type asserted by Mr. Lima, or an on-going process

to revise the existing regulations, any such policy or regulation is of no legal effect until issued

by the Commissioner and approved by the Governor.”! Had Mr. Lima applied for a license and

been rejected based on this alleged policy, he could have challenged the policy via an appeal to

this Court.” Mr. Lima cannot demonstrate that he was injured by any action of the Government

merely by asserting that the VIPD’s regulation or policy, the existence of which is questionable

or which would be unenforceable in the form he asserts, could potentially have been applied to

deny him a license to bear a .45 caliber handgun. Thus, he cannot establish the requisite standing

to challenge the Virgin Islands firearms licensing statutes and regulations in this case.



Notwithstanding Poulos’s general prohibition on the type of challenge raised by Mr.

Lima, the Court has found some recent cases determining that a defendant in a criminal action

has standing to challenge firearms laws and regulations when they are the basis for his criminal

prosecution and his Second Amendment rights are implicated, even when the defendant has not

applied for a firearm permit.”° These cases are premised on the recent pronouncements of the

United States Supreme Court in Heller and McDonald. Just as in this case, the defendants in

Foster and Plummer asserted that applying for a gun license would have been futile under the

applicable statutes and regulations, and the prosecutions should be dismissed as inconsistent with

their Second Amendment rights. However, this Court declines to follow these cases because

they are distinguishable from the instant matter.



The defendants in Foster and Plummer were arrested for having unlicensed guns in or

immediately outside of their residences, and the laws under which they were being prosecuted

clearly would have prohibited those defendants from obtaining a firearm for home defense even

if they had applied for a permit. In stark contrast, Mr. Lima is charged with shooting another

person in the back with his firearm in a nightclub. Also, the Foster and Plummer defendants

were able to cite to particular firearm statutes or regulations of their respective cities which, in

their view, compromised their rights under the Second Amendment to the United States

Constitution. Conversely, Defendant herein does not identify, nor can the Court locate, any

statutes or rules which set forth the policy of which he complains. Also, he has not presented

any facts which reflect when he obtained his .45 caliber firearm and that the alleged VIPD policy

of which he complains was in effect at the time. Thus, in Foster and Plummer the defendants

were able to present both an injury-in-fact and causation based on the holdings of Heller and

McDonald. Mtr. Lima, as discussed above, fails on both prongs, and therefore lacks the standing

present in Foster and Plummer.



sid 23 V.LC. § 451(d).



= Tit. 23, Ch. 5 V.I. CODER. § 485-2(d).



al 23 V.LC. § 485.



2 23 V.LC. § 472.



8 See, People v. Foster, No. 2010KN076422, 2010 WL 5187702 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Dec. 15, 2010) (“Foster”);



Plummer v. United States, 983 A.2d 323 (D.C. Ct. App. 2009) (“Plummer’’) (expressly declining to follow Poulos v.

New Hampshire).

People of the Virgin Islands v. Alexis Jose Lima

Superior Court Case No. ST-08-CR-437

Memorandum Opinion



Based on the foregoing, because Mr. Lima did not apply for a firearms license, cannot

articulate any offensive statute, regulation or action of the Government, and does not have a right

to bear arms based on the circumstances of this case, he lacks standing to challenge the Virgin

Islands firearm licensing regime. Accordingly, Mr. Lima’s Motion to Dismiss Counts Charging

Unauthorized Possession of a Firearm on Second Amendment Grounds will be denied.



b. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Violation of Mr. Lima’s Speedy Trial

Rights is premised on an outdated view of the Virgin Islands judicial structure and will be

denied.



In Mr. Lima’s second motion to dismiss, he asserts that the District Court of the Virgin

Islands adopted a Speedy Trial Plan which mandates the application of the time limits and

sanctions of the federal Speedy Trial Act to the prosecution of all criminal offenses enacted by

the Legislature of the Virgin Islands. Defendant continues that the Legislature chose to adopt

the rules of the District Court to govern the practice and procedure in the Superior Court

pursuant to 4 V.LC. § 83.74 Defendant also argues that the holding of Government v. Quetel,”°

wherein the then-Territorial Court concluded that the District Court’s Speedy Trial Plan does not

apply in this Court, is not well-taken. Rather, he suggests that Quetel was incorrectly decided.



The People oppose Mr. Lima’s motion on two bases. First, the People invoke Quetel, for

the proposition that the Speedy Trial Plan of the District Court was not made applicable to the

Superior Court under SUPER. CT. R. 7. Second, the People declare that Defendant’s Sixth

Amendment speedy trial rights have not been violated when the factors of Barker v. Wingo” are

applied to posture and events in this case. Because Mr. Lima has not asserted in his motion that

his Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights have been violated, the Court will not address the

Barker factors in this opinion. Also, the Court agrees with the People that Mr. Lima’s motion

should be denied, but not based on Quetel.



The District Court adopted its Speedy Trial Plan to provide timelines for the prosecution

of Virgin Islands crimes being tried before it because the federal Speedy Trial Act did not apply

to such prosecutions.”” The Court observes that in Bryan, the Third Circuit specifically declined

to determine whether Quete/, which announced that the federal Speedy Trial Act and the District

Court Plan did not apply in the Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands, was correctly decided.”

This Court concludes that the District Court’s Speedy Trial Plan does not apply in the Superior

Court.



24 “The practice and procedure in the territorial court shall be as prescribed by rules adopted by the district



court. Subject to the approval of the district court, the territorial court may from time to time prescribe rules for the

conduct of its business consistent with law and with the rules prescribed by the district court may issue all writs and

make all orders necessary or appropriate in aid of its jurisdiction and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”

2s 18 V.I. 145 (Terr. Ct. 1982).



* 407 U.S. 514 (1972).



= See, Government v. Bryan, 818 F.2d 1069 (3rd Cir. 1987) (“Bryan”).



*8 Id. at 1072 n. 1.

People of the Virgin Islands v. Alexis Jose Lima

Superior Court Case No. ST-08-CR-437

Memorandum Opinion



In 1984, two years after the Quetel opinion, the United States Congress enacted

amendments to Sections 21, 22, and 23 of the ROA. Specifically, Section 22 was amended to

provide the District Court with the same limited subject matter jurisdiction enjoyed by nd

federal district courts, with some specific additional jurisdiction over income tax cases.””

caveat to this amendment was that the Virgin Islands Legislature was required to enact

affirmative legislation vesting jurisdiction over local matters in territorially-established courts.°”

On August 29, 1990, the Virgin Islands Legislature took the required action by enacting 4 V.I.C.

§ 76(a) which divested the District Court of jurisdiction over local civil matters as of October 1,

1991 and placed that authority in this Court.*! Jurisdiction over all local criminal matters was

vested in this Court by Act No. 5890, which became effective on January 1, 1994.”

Additionally, Section 23 of the ROA was amended in 1984 to provide that “The relations

between the courts established by the Constitution or laws of the United States and the courts

established by local law...shall be governed by the laws of the United States pertaining to the

courts of the United States, including the Supreme Court of the United States, and the courts of

the several states....’°? Further, Section 21(c) of the ROA was amended to provide that “The

rules governing the practice and procedure of the courts established by local law...shall be

governed by local law or the rules promulgated by those courts.”**



Taking these congressional amendments together, the Third Circuit has expressly held

that pre-existing territorial laws which bestowed on the District Court authority over local

matters and procedures are no longer viable, “‘...inasmuch as the laws of the Virgin Islands must

be consistent with the laws of the United States. 35 Because the relations between the courts of

this Territory and those established by Congress now are akin to the relations between state

courts and federal courts throughout the Nation, the District Court cannot have any authority to

mandate the rules of procedure for the Superior Court. Mr. Lima does not, and cannot, cite to

any authority which provides that the courts established by the Constitution or Congress

prescribe the procedural rules of state courts. This now is the condition of federal-territorial

relations in the judicial framework of the United States Virgin Islands.



And, if the amendments to Sections 21, 22, and 23 of the ROA and Rawlins and its

progeny do not make it clear enough that this Court has the authority to promulgate its own rules

and procedures, 4 V.I.C. § 32(f)(1), enacted in 2004 and amended in 2007, plainly states that

“The Superior Court shall adopt the rules of court for the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands

consistent with Section 21(c) of the ROA of the Virgin Islands.” Thus, in addition to the

supremacy of the amendments to Sections 21, 22, and 23 of the ROA over 4 V.LC. § 83, the

same Virgin Islands legislative enactment also was impliedly repealed by 4 V.I.C. § 32(f)(1).*°

Taking all of the local and federal statutory amendments together, it is plain that Defendant’s



9 48 U.S.C. § 1612.

x0 See, Estate of Thomas Mall v. Territorial Court of the V.I., 923 F.2d 258 (3rd Cir.1991).

3 Moravian Sch. Advisory Bd. of St. Thomas, Inc. v. Rawlins, 33 V.1. 280, 285, 70 F.3d 270, 273 (3rd Cir.



1995). See also, Edwards v. Hovensa, LLC, 497 F.3d 355, 358 (3rd Cir. 2007).

1993 V.I. Sess. Laws 214.



8 48 U.S.C. § 1613.



i. 48 U.S.C. 1611(c).



= Moravian Sch. Advisory Bd. of St. Thomas, Inc. v. Rawlins, 33 V.1. at 288, 70 F.3d at 275.

36 See, VI. Pub. Servs. Comm'n v. VI. Water & Power Auth., 49 V.I. 478, 486 (V.I. 2009).

People of the Virgin Islands v. Alexis Jose Lima

Superior Court Case No. ST-08-CR-437

Memorandum Opinion



reliance on the old version of the District Court’s jurisdiction is entirely without merit. The

practice and procedure in the Superior Court are no longer governed by rules and plans adopted

by the District Court unless the Superior Court expressly adopts them. Thus, Lima’s Motion to

Dismiss for Violation of Speedy Trial Rights will be denied.



IV. Conclusion



Defendant did not apply to the VIPD for a license to carry a .45 caliber handgun, and his

Second Amendment right to bear arms is not implicated in this case. Therefore, Mr. Lima does

not have standing to challenge his prosecution under the Second Amendment. Additionally,

Defendant’s reliance on 4 V.I.C. § 83 to support his claim that the District Court’s Speedy Trial

Plan is applicable in the Superior Court is misguided. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss Counts Charging Unauthorized Possession of a Firearm on Second Amendment

Grounds and the Motion to Dismiss for Violation of Mr. Lima’s Speedy Trial Rights will be

denied in an order of even date.



Dated: March 3 , 2011 Laz =a



0 Hom Adam G-Chi Hom Adam G-Christian

Judge of the Superior Court

of the Virgin Islands

ATTEST:

Venetia H. Velazquez, Esq.

Clerk of the Court



Strella George



Acting Chief Deputy Clerk {BYy/



—l>