SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS

MAGISTRATE DIVISION OF ST. THOMAS AND ST. JOHN



LESLIE A. MEYERS,

Plaintiff,

vs.



ALFRED R. GEORGE, JR., and ALL PERSONS

CLAIMING AN INTEREST IN PARCEL NO. 14-A

ESTATE JOHN’S FOLLY, ST. JOHN, VIRGIN

ISLANDS, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO

ALL HEIRS OF C. BENJAMIN



CASE NO. ST-12-CV-394



Defendants.



MEMORANDUM OPINION



Pending before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Leslie A. Meyers’s January 2, 2014,

Motion! requesting the Court’s to reconsider its November 12, 2013, Memorandum

Opinion and Order. For the following reasons, Plaintiff's Motion will be denied.



FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY



On July 26, 2012, pro se Plaintiff filed a Complaint seeking to quiet title to the

property located at Parcel No. 14-A Estate John’s Folly, Coral Bay Quarter, St. John, U.S.

Virgin Islands under a claim of adverse possession. The Defendants having failed to

move, answer, or otherwise respond to the Complaint, the Clerk of the Court entered

default on February 12, 2013, against Alfred George, Jr., and all persons claiming an

interest in Parcel No. 14-A Estate John’s Folly, Coral Bay Quarter, including but not

limited to all heirs of C. Benjamin. Following a default judgment hearing held on June 6,



2013, the Court entered a default judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and quieted title to the



' Defendant Monica George-Fields has not replied to Plaintiffs Motion.

Meyers v. George et al.

Case No. ST-12-CV-394

Memorandum Opinion, March 5, 2014

Page 2 of 5

property in Plaintiff against all Defendants. However, Defendant Monica George-Fields

filed a Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment on August 6, 2013, which the Court

granted on November 12, 2013.

STANDARD



Plaintiff does not propose any standard under which the Motion should be

considered. However, considering pro se pleadings should be liberally construed,” the

“function [and purpose] of the motion” dictates which rule should apply,’ and Plaintiff is

requesting the Court to vacate its November 12, 2013, Order, the Court will consider

Plaintiff's Motion as a motion for reconsideration.



The November 12, 2013, Order vacated the Court’s June 6, 2013, entry of default



judgment in favor of Plaintiff, and is an interlocutory order. As a result, the Court applies



Loc. R. Civ. P. 7.3, made applicable by Super. Ct. R. 7, that provides:



A party may file a motion asking the Court to reconsider its order or

decision. Such motion shall be filed within fourteen (14) days after the

entry of the order or decision unless the time is extended by the Court.

Extensions will only be granted for good cause shown. A motion to

reconsider shall be based on:



1. intervening change in controlling law;



2. availability of new evidence, or;



3. the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.



“A motion for reconsideration is not to be used as a means to argue matters already



argued and disposed of, nor is it an opportunity to request that the Court simply rethink a



decision it has already made.”*



2 See Boyd-Richards v. de Jongh, 2012 WL 13682 (D.V.I. Jan. 4, 2012).

3 Lucan Corp., Inc. v. Robert L. Merwin & Co., Inc., 2008 WL 901492, *2 (V.I. 2008).

4 Valerino v. Holder, 2011 WL 3918085, *1 (D.V.I. Sept. 6, 201 1)(internal citations and quotations



omitted).

Meyers v. George et al.



Case No. ST-12-CV-394

Memorandum Opinion, March 5, 2014

Page 3 of 5



ANALYSIS



The Court shall deny Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration on several grounds.

First, Plaintiff did not file his Motion for Reconsideration until January 2, 2014, well

after the expiration of the (14) day period and has further failed to show good cause for

his failure to timely file.> Despite Plaintiff's pro se status, Plaintiff is bound by the rules

and procedures that govern the practice before this Court.



Second, even assuming arguendo that Plaintiff timely filed, Plaintiff does not

articulate any adequate basis for relief under Loc. R. Civ. P. 7.3. For instance, Plaintiff

appears to argue that Defendant Monica George-Fields lacks standing, but Plaintiff

concedes that Defendant Monica George-Fields is a lawful heir of Alfred George, Jr.,

now deceased, who claimed an interest in Parcel No. 14-A Estate John’s Folly. The

Court previously found in its November 12, 2013, Memorandum Opinion that Defendant

Monica George-Fields has standing based on these facts, and Plaintiff has provided no

new facts or other “newly discovered evidence” to refute this finding.® Insofar as

Plaintiff appears to argue that the statutory period for adverse possession ran while Alfred

George, Jr., was still alive, Plaintiff appears to be asserting a defense, rather than

challenging Defendant Monica George-Fields’ standing. At this stage of litigation, a

defense that goes to the factual merits of Plaintiffs adverse possession claim is not



properly before the Court.



5 While the Memorandum Opinion and Order were signed on November 12, 2013, the Order was entered

on November 14, 2013.



§ Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Jamison, 787 F. Supp. 231, 236 (D.D.C. 1990)(“[When determining

standing] the focus is [usually] on plaintiff, not on the claim, and rarely on the defendant—in the latter

instance, inquiry implicates questions related to whether the defendant has a sufficient interest to present a

justiciable controversy with the plaintiff.”).

Meyers v. George et al.



Case No. ST-12-CV-394

Memorandum Opinion, March 5, 2014

Page 4 of 5



Plaintiff also argues that Defendant Monica George-Fields did not timely file her

Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment. However, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 clearly provides that

“[{a] motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time . . . .” While the

Court entered default on February 12, 2013, it did not enter default judgment until after

the June 6, 2013, hearing. Plaintiff filed her Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment on

August 6, 2013, a mere two (2) months after the entry of default judgment, a “reasonable

time” under the circumstances of the case. Additionally, Plaintiff did not timely

challenge the procedural timing of Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment

because he did not raise it in his Response.



Plaintiff further argues that “the doctrine of claim preclusion bars Monica

George-Fields’ Motion to Vacate Default Judgment.” The doctrine of res judicata, the

overarching doctrine encompassing claim preclusion, applies when “an ‘adjudication

upon the merits’ acts as a bar to a subsequent action between the parties on the same



7 Here, Plaintiff has asserted no facts that demonstrate that this matter was



claim.”

adjudicated on the merits prior to the June 6, 2013, hearing.



Otherwise, Plaintiffs Motion largely attempts to challenge many of Defendant

Monica George-Fields’ factual assertions in support of her Motion to Set Aside Default



Judgment. However, none of Plaintiffs factual assertions constitute “newly discovered



evidence” pursuant to Loc. R. Civ. P. 7.3 because they were either (1) previously



” George v. Martin, 2001 WL 1568480 (Terr. V.I. Oct. 29, 2001).

Meyers v. George et al.



Case No. ST-12-CV-394



Memorandum Opinion, March 5, 2014



Page 5 of 5



considered by this Court when deciding Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Default



9908



Judgment or (2) “could have been raised before but were not.



For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's January 2, 2014, Motion is denied. An



Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion shall issue.



Dated: March Zo014



HON. MICHAEL C. DUNSTON



ATTEST: Estrella Georg



JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT



Acting CJetk of Court



OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS



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AOlY



Noakes



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Zourt Clerk Supervisor /



8 Bostic v. AT&T of the Virgin Islands, 312 F. Supp. 2d 731, 733 (D.V.1. 2004)(noting that a motion for



reconsideration is not a substitute for an appeal).