FOR PUBLICATION 
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS 
DIVISION OF ST. CROIX 
FREDERICK ESPINOSA, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
HOLLAND REDFIELD, II, 
GWENDOLYN HALL BRADY, and 
HERBERTSCHOENBOHM, 
Defendants. 
FREDERICK ESPINOSA, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
JOHN YOB, WARREN COLE, GLENN 
) 
WEBSTER, NOEL LOFTUS, TANYA 
) 
MARIE SINGH, ELISSA RUNYON, FRED) 
VIALET, JR., and AVA BOURDAN, 
) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
----------------------_.) 
YOHANA M. MANNING, Esq. 
Manning Legal Services, P.C. 
2021 Company Street, Suite 1 
Christiansted, VI 00820-4945 
Y ohana 14@gmail.com 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
ESZART A. WYNTER, SR., Esq. 
Law Offices ofEszart A. Wynter, Sr. P.C. 
27 Estate Whim 
P.O. Box 1847 
Frederiksted, VI 00841-1847 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CARTY, RENEE GUMBS, Judge 
CASE NO. SX-16-CV -286 
ACTION FOR DEFAMATION 
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 
CASE NO. SX-16-CV -544 
ACTION FOR DEFAMATION 
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 
CARL A. BECKSTEDT,III, Esq. 
SCOTT A. BURTON, Esq. 
Beckstedt & Associates 
2162 Church Street 
Christiansted, VI 00820 
Attorneysfor Defendants John Yob, Warren 
Cole, Noel Loftus, Elissa Runyon, &Fred 
Vialet, Jr. 
Frederick Espillosa v. Hol/alld L. Redfield, II, et al. 
Case No. SX-16-CV-286 
Case No. SX-16-CV-544 
Memoralldum Opillioll 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
(Filed: September 21, 2018) 
Pending before this Court is Defendant Noel Loftus, Defendant Elissa Runyon, and Defendant 
Fred Vialet, Jr. 's Motion to Dismiss on all Three Counts for Failure to State a Claim upon which Relief 
can be Granted, subject to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 
Also, pending before this Court is Defendant John Yob and Defendant Warren Cole's Motion 
to Dismiss on Counts I (Civil Conspiracy) and II (Civil Aiding and Abetting) for Failure to State a 
Claim upon which Relief can be Granted, subject to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). All 
Defendants filed their joint motion on February 24, 2017. For the following reasons, Defendants' 
motion will be granted. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff Frederick Espinosa's Original Complaint stems from an alleged illegal concerted 
action, that occurred on April 16, 2016, by all named Defendants in their attempt to defame Espinosa. I 
On January 13,2017, the Court, sua spollte, granted the Plaintiff leave to amend his Complaint to 
sufficiently plead his claims.2 Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint on February 6, 2017. In the 
Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges three counts against all Defendants: 1.) Civil Conspiracy, 2.) 
Civil Aiding and Abetting, and 3.) Defamation.3 Defendants subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
may be granted.4 This Court agrees with Defendants, and accordingly, dismissal of all claims against 
Defendants Noel Loftus, Elissa Runyon, Fred Vialet, Jr., as well as dismissal of Counts I & II against 
Defendants John Yob and Warren Cole, is warranted. 
I See generally Amended Complaint, pam. 32-37. 
2 See Order by Judge Douglas A. Brady, at pg. 3. 
1 See Amended Complaint, pam. 49- 57. 
4 See generally Defendants Loftus, Runyon, and Vialet, Jr's Motion to Dismiss. 
2 
Frederick Espinosa v. Holland L. Redfield, II, et 01. 
Case No. SX-16-CV-286 
Case No. SX-16-CV-544 
M eli/oral/dull/ Opil/iol/ 
II. 
LEGAL DISCUSSION 
The Court will address the counts out of tum; first, Count III, the defamation charge as it relates 
to Defendants Loftus, Runyon, and Vialet Jr. Then Count I, the conspiracy charge, and Count II, the 
aiding and abetting charge will be addressed for all moving defendants. 
a. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State A Claim Standard 
Virgin Islands Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a party to move for a motion to dismiss 
for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."s The sufficiency of a complaint is 
governed by the rule of pleadings in Rule 8 of the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure.6 Since the 
Virgin Islands is a "notice pleading jurisdiction," it requires that a complaint must "adequately allege 
facts that places an accused party on notice of claims brought against it.'" The United States Supreme 
Court has articulated, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, that the proper standard 
for evaJuating motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim requires the complaint "to contain enough 
factual matter (taken as true) to suggest the required element.,,8 Thus, under the Twombly and Iqbal 
standard, and subject to precedent from the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands in Joseph v. Bureau 
o/Corrections, a complaint must survive a three-pronged test when a trial court is reviewing a motion 
to dismiss filed under Rule l2(b)(6).9 The three-pronged test requires: 
, V.I. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (The Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure was promulgated on March 31,2017. It is largely 
analogous to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12, which was still in effect at the time of the Defendants' filing); Robles v. HOVENSA, LLC, 
49 V.1. 491, 500-50 I (V.1. 2008) (quoting Phillips v. County a/Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224 (3d. Cir. 2008) (providing that 
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has also reevaluated the Twombly standard). 
6 V.1. R. CIV. P. 8 (Fed. R. Civ. P. 8's language is similar, but V.1. R. CIV. P. 8 adds that "this is a notice pleading 
jurisdiction"); see also Mills-Williams v. Mapp, 67 V.I. 574, 584-86 (V. I. 2017) (stating that V.1. R. Civ. P8(a)(2) eliminates 
the plausibility standard and restores the notice pleading regime that had previously been in effect); Brathwaite v. H.D. V.I. 
Holding Co .• No. ST-16-CV-764, 2017 V.I. Lexis 76, at ·2-4 (V.1. Super. Ct. May 24, 2017). 
7 V.I. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (noting that FRCP 8(a)(2) also requires a 
pleading to contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief'). 
8 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007) (demonstrating that a complaint needs to provide grounds 
for relief and that requires a showing, rather than blanket assertions of entitlement to relief); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. 
'See Joseph v. Bureau a/Corrections, 54 V.1. 644, 649- 50 (V. I. 2011) (affirming that Robles. Twombly. and Iqbal all 
look to this three-pronged test). See also Brady v. Cintron, 55 V.1. 802, 823; Pollara v. Chateau St. Croix. LLC, 58 V.I. 
455,471-472 (V.1. 2013) (finding that a Court must always seek to first to determine whether the Complaint is sufficient). 
3 
Frederick Espinosa v. Holland L. Redjielll, II, et al. 
Case No. SX-16-CV-286 
CaseN~SX-l~V-544 
Memorandum Op;,,;on 
First, the court must take note of the clements a plaintiff must plcad 10 state a claim. so 
that the court is aware of each item the plaintiff must sufficiently plead. Second, the 
court should identifY allegations that. because they arc no morc than conclusions. arc 
not entitled to the assumption of truth. These conclusions can take the form of either 
legal conclusions couched as factual allegations or naked factual assertions devoid of 
further factual enhancement. Finally, where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, 
a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise 
to an entitlement of relief. Ifthere are sufficient remaining facts that the court can draw 
a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable based on the elements noted in the 
first step, then the claim is plausible. \0 
b. Count III: The Defamation Claim Does Not Survive the Three-Pronged Test with 
Respect to Defendants Loftus, Runyon, and Via let Jr. 
This Court will begin its analysis with the defamation charge. The Virgin Islands jurisdiction 
has established in Kendall v. Daily News Publ. Co., that the elements of a defamation claim are (a) "a 
false and defamatory statement concerning another; (b) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (c) 
fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and (d) either actionability of the 
statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication: ,11 
Additionally, the burden to establish the existence of defamatory statements lies with the Plaintiff. 12 
This Court need not delve any further beyond the declaration of a false and defamatory 
statement as to the defamation claim because Espinosa has not pled any singUlar fact to establish the 
four prima facie elements of defamation as required by Kendall. Plaintiff hinges the defamation claim 
upon a conspiracy charge, which the Court finds that there was no conspiracy. Thus, the defamation 
claim must also fail. In the Virgin Islands, the Supreme Court has ruled in Fleming v. Cruz that the 
Plaintiff must provide "sufficient factual matter" needed to support its claims. The Superior Court in 
Slevens v. Louise also reiterated that the Plaintiff "need not make detailed factual allegations, but is 
10 Joseph, 54 V.1. at 649- 50; Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d. Cir. 2010). 
" Restatement (Second) ofTorls § 588, (1977); Kendall v. Daily News Pllbl'g Co .. 53 V.1. 250, 261-62 (V.1. Super. Ct. 
2010). 
" See Kendall, 53 V.1. at 262.; ... e also VECC. Inc. v. Bank of Nova Scolia, 296 F. Supp. 2d 617, 622 (D. V.I. 2003). 
4 
Frederick Espinosa II. Holland L. Redfield, II, et al. 
Case No. SX-16-CV-286 
Case No. SX-16-CV-544 
Memorandum Opinion 
required to assert more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation".13 This 
Court recognizes the elements necessary for a defamation claim and finds that in light of the facts 
pleaded in the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff fails to provide a scintilla of evidence supporting the 
allegation that either Loftus, Runyon, or Vialet Jr. "allegedly made and/or published" a defamatory 
statement toward Plaintiff.14 
Further, despite the previous Court's leave to amend the Complaint because the initial 
complaint contained labels and baldly asserted conclusions, Plaintiff still unsuccessfully demonstrates 
that Defendants Loftus, Runyon, and Vialet, Jr. purportedly made or published any defamatory 
statement about Espinosa, which is a basic and necessary element of a defamation claim. IS This Court 
notes that Plaintiff readily identified the satisfactory defamatory actions of the other Defendants (Yob, 
Redfield, Webster, Schoenbohm, and Bourdan).16 As such, Plaintiff exercised due care to highlight the 
specific defamatory element of publishing by offering that the statements were widely circulated in 
"local, national, and international media.,,17 He also goes to great length to precisely detail some of the 
contents of said statements. 18 However, regarding Defendants Loftus, Runyon, and Vialet, Jr., Plaintiff 
neither provides any illustration of an instance of an alleged defamatory statement nor indicates that 
any such statements were published. Instead, Espinosa merely employs broad language such as 
"others" or "other Defendants" when referring to Loftus, Runyon, and Vialet, Jr.'s conduct relative to 
13 Fleming v. Cruz, 62 V.1. 702, 714 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557); Slevens v. LOllise, No. SX-14-CV-456, 2016 
V.I. Lexis 80, at · 4 (asserting that the plaintiff failed to provide the Court with any basis to detennine whether a 
disparaging statement was made). 
J4 See Amended Complaint, paras. 32 & 35 (finding that these are the only two paragraphs where Loftus, Runyon, and 
Via let Jr. are mentioned by name and they are only mentioned because they were present at the meeting and also voted). 
"See Fleming, 62 V.1. at 714 (noting that Complaints that contain labels and conclusions without factual enhancements 
to support those claims are the types of complaints that Iqbal warns against). 
16 See Amended Complaint, paras. 40-45. 
17 Id 
"Id (demonstrating that Plaintiff was very specific when it came to the comments that Defendants Redfield, Webster, 
Yob, Schoenbohm, and Bourdon made). 
5 
Frederick Espinosa v. Hollalld L Redfield, II, et al. 
Case No. SX-16-CV-286 
Case No. SX-16-CV-544 
Memorandum Opinion 
the generalized actions of the group of defendants.19 As the previous Court Opinion noted with respect 
to Defendant Tanya Singh's Motion to Dismiss, and as this Court reaffirms in this instance, the 
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint "presents vague allegations lumping all Defendants together but is 
devoid of a recitation of facts ... that identifies tortious conduct" by Loftus, Runyon, and Vialet, Jr.20 
Absent any facts in the Amended Complaint, this Court cannot rely on vague, broad, and 
unsubstantiated statements about the existence of alleged defamatory statements made by Defendants 
Loftus, Runyon, and Vialet, Jr., where Plaintiff also provides particular factual examples regarding 
other Defendants. Hence, this Court need not address the other three elements of the defamation claim. 
Therefore, this Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 
and dismisses the defamation claim against Defendants Loftus, Runyon, and Vialet, Jr. 
c. Count I: The Civil Conspiracy Claim Does Not Survive the Three-Pronged Test with 
Respect to All Moving Defendants 
Regarding the civil conspiracy claim, the elements of civil conspiracy are "when that person 
(I.) does a tortious act in concert with the co-defendant pursuant to a common design with him; (2.) 
knows that the co-defendant's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or 
encouragement to the co-defendant to so conduct him or herself; or (3.) gives substantial assistance to 
the co-defendant in accomplishing a tortious result and his or her own conduct, separately considered, 
constitutes a breach of duty to the plaintiff.,,21 
" See Amended Complaint. para. 24, 38, 46 (highlighting where Plaintiff used others); Amended Complaint, para.37, 39, 
48 (highlighling where Plaintiff used other Defendants). 
20 See Order by Judge Douglas A. Brady. at pg. 2 (noting that Judge Brady was referring to the facts as it relates to 
Defendant Singh, but the facts are essentially identical as it relates to Defendants Loftus, Runyon, and Via let Jr., therefore 
the same reasoning is also applicable here). 
" See Donas/org v. Daily News Publ'g Co., Inc., 63 V.1. 196,330 (V.I. Super Ct. 2015); Isaac v. Crichlow,63 V.1. 38, 65 
(V.1. Super. Ct. 2015). 
6 
Frederick Espi//osa v. Holla//d L. Redfield, II, et al. 
Case No. SX-16-CV-286 
Case No. SX-16-CV-544 
Memora//d,,111 Opi//iOiI 
i. 
The Civil Conspiracy Claim Against Defendants Loftus, Runyon, Vialet, Jr. is 
Dismissed 
Plaintiff fails to adequately plead any relevant facts to ascertain that the moving Defendants 
were involved in a civil conspiracy because Plaintiff was unable to highlight the presence ofa tortious 
act to hinge this claim on. Here, Plaintiff offered Berrios v. Hovic from the Virgin Islands District 
Court, in an effort to establish that the conspiracy claim implicates the Defendants regarding the 
defamation claim.22 Berrios also adds that "civil conspiracy consists of an agreement or combination 
to perform a wrongful act that results in damage to the plaintiff.. . [and] may also consist of an 
agreement to do a lawful act by unlawful means.,,23 Plaintiff somehow concludes that because 
Defendants Loftus, Runyon, and Vialet, Jr., participated in the subsequent meeting at Defendant 
Warren Cole's office, and voted in favor of the subsequent resolution, they are also implicated in the 
subsequent defamation of Espinosa by the other Defendants and are "liable as if [they] published the 
statements.,,14 This Court disagrees. 
Plaintiff's argument is deficient. Espinosa references the meeting that was held on April 16, 
2016, at Attorney Warren Cole's office, after the conclusion of the Republican Party meeting.2s 
Espinosa incorrectly identifies the alleged illegal meeting as a wrongful act, but Espinosa neither cites 
to any authority nor provides any factual evidence to prove that such meetings are indeed illegal. 
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and his Opposition brief improperly characterizes the subsequent 
meeting as the "wrongful act," and thus incorrectly analyzes the Berrios case to the facts pleaded. It is 
" See Berrios v. Hovic, No. 05-CV-192-F, 2010 U.S. Disl. Lexis 77525, at ·20 (D.V.l.July 29, 2010). 
/J Jd. at ' 18. 
" Jd. ; see Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant Singh's Motion, at pg. 2-3 (This Court relied, in part, on the arguments and 
analysis offered by the Plaintiff in its opposition to Defendant's Singh' s motion because the same situation applies to 
Loftus, Runyon, and Vialet Jr. as it did for Singh); see also Amended Complaint, para. 31 & 32. 
IS See Amended Complaint, para. 26 & 32. 
7 
Frederick Espinosa v. Holland L Redfield, II, et al. 
Case No. SX-16-CV-286 
Case No. SX-16-CV-544 
Memorandum Opinion 
clear that the convening of the Defendants, after the conclusion of a properly conducted meeting, failed 
to comply with the Rules, Principles, and Policies of the Republican Party of the United States Virgin 
Islands.26 However, absent a provision in the aforementioned rules, or other evidence provided by 
Plaintiff that such meetings are indeed illegal or unlawful, this Court cannot rely on Plaintiffs 
interpretation where case law clearly demonstmtes that the unlawful act charged is presumed to be a 
tortious conduct, such as the violation oflaw.27 Similarly, this Court echoes the previous Court's Order 
that Plaintiff failed to identifY the qualifying tortious conduct that is "necessary to pursue Plaintiffs 
conspiracy claims."2R Therefore, due to Espinosa's failure to sufficiently identifY "the underlying 
tortious conduct" as relating to the above-named Defendants, this Court holds that the civil conspimcy 
claim fails.29 
Moreover, Plaintiff supported his reasoning for the conspiracy claim with persuasive but non-
binding authority. This Court is neither required to consider nor apply non-binding precedent out of 
the Fifth Circuit in the face of binding case law within the Virgin Islands jurisdiction.30 Alternatively, 
where Plaintiff provided binding Virgin Islands precedent, Plaintiff fails to take note that the civil 
conspiracy claims in those situations were predicated on some violation of applicable law -in Sorber, 
the plaintiffs claim was based on a violation of the Virgin Islands Wrongful Discharge Act, in de 
2. See Amended Complaint, para. 37. 
27 See Berrios, 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 77525, at "20 (noting that in Berrios. the unlawrul act was a violation or Plaintiff's 
civil rights pursuant to 10 V.I.C.§ 3); see generally Rules, Principles, and Policies orthe Republican Party of the United 
States Virgin Islands (noting that there is no provision in the Rules that characterizes improperly conducted meetings as 
illegal). 
"See Order by Judge Douglas A. Brady, at pg. 2 (illustrating that Judge Brady found this same issue in Plaintiff's first 
complaint as it relates to Defend. nt Singh, and the same situation arises yet again in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint with 
regard to Defendants Loftus, Runyon. and Vialet Jr.). 
2. See generally Crichlow, 63 V.1. at 65; Donas/org., 63 V.1. at 330; Sarpolis v. Tereshko, 625 Fed. App's 594, 598 (3d. 
Cir.2016). 
30 Plaintiff provided the Court with a series of 5th Circuit cases to discuss the motion to dismiss standard such as Lowrey 
v. Texas A&M Univ., 117 F.3d 242, 274 (5th Cir. 1997) and In re Ka/rina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191,205 (5th 
Cir. 2007). 
8 
Frederick Espillosa v. Hollalld L. Redfield, II, et al. 
Case No. SX-16-CV-286 
Case No. SX-16-CV-544 
Mellloralldlllll Opillioll 
Jongh, the underlying violation came in the form of an unfair labor practice claim, and Capogrosso is 
inapplicable because it specifically addresses the issue of judicial conspiracy.31 However, in this 
present case, Espinosa incorrectly asserts that Defendants' participation and voting in the subsequent 
meeting suffices as their role in the alleged conspiracy and subsequently attempts to link them to the 
defamatory conduct ofthe other Defendants.32 Accordingly, this Court remains unmoved by Plaintiff's 
arguments and dismisses the civil conspiracy claims against Defendants Loftus, Runyon, and Vialet. 
Ir. 
ii. 
The Civil Conspiracy Claim Against Defendant Yob is Unwarranted and is 
Dismissed 
With respect to Defendant Yob, this court need not begin an analysis. Plaintiff Espinosa failed 
to provide evidence in his Amended Complaint that Yob was present at the meeting where the alleged 
conspiracy plans were discussed; and also fails to provide any facts to support the allegations that he 
was involved in any way with the supposed conspiracy whether before or after the fact. JJ Espinosa 
painstakingly mentions, by name, the Defendants that were present at the meeting, but lacks additional 
facts that allude to Defendant Yob's presence or knowledge of any alleged conspiratory plans.J4 Thus, 
in the absence of any factual evidence, Plaintiff has not succeeded on V.1. R. Civ. P.(8)(a)(2) grounds 
as he did not provide adequate facts to put Defendant Yob on notice ofthe claims against him, and thus 
are insufficient to survive a Rule 12(bX6) motion to dismiss analysis. Hence, Plaintiffs civil conspiracy 
charge against Defendant Y ob is dismissed. 
" See Hill v. de Jongh, No. ST-IO-CV-585, 2012 V.1. Lexis II, al ' 11 (V.1. Super Cr. Apr. 19,2012); Sorber v. Glacial 
Energy VI. LLC, No. ST-IO-CV-S88, 2011 V.1. Lexis 34, al'5 (V.1. Super. Cr. June 7, 2011); Capof!,rosso v. Supreme 
Caul" a/N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 184-185 (3d. Cir. 2009). 
" See generally PlainliiT's Opposition to Defendanls Loftus, Runyon, and Vialet, Jr. 's Motion. 
II See Amended Complaint, para. 32 (specilYing Ihal Loftus, Singh, Cole, Via let, Jr., Redfield, Webster, Runyon, and 
Schoenbohm assembled al Cole's office). 
" Id. 
9 
Frederick Espinosa v. Hollalld L. Redfie/d, II, et 0/. 
Case No. SX-16-CV-286 
Case No. SX-16-CV-544 
Memoralldum Opinion 
iii. 
The Civil Conspiracy Charge Against Defendant Cole is Not Successfully 
Pleaded and is Dismissed 
This Court then turns to the civil conspiracy claim against Defendant Cole. As it pertains to 
Defendant Cole, Plaintiff improperly assumes that the concerted action of the Defendants in attending, 
participating, and voting on a unanimous resolution, and the resulting alleged defamatory conduct by 
Cole gives rise to a viable claim of civil conspiracy. Plaintiff utilizes Sorber v. Glacial Energy to show 
that his facts satisfy the plausibility requirement of 12(b)(6).35 In that case, a suit based on a violation 
of the V.1. Wrongful Discharge Act, the Superior Court found that the supervisors acted on a retaliatory 
motive and in a personal capacity to terminate Sorber, and thus they acted in concerted action that was 
outside the scope of their employment, and the Complaint adequately "support[ed) the inference that 
the Defendants acted outside the scope of their employment".36 This is not the case before this Court. 
Moreover, the Third Circuit has also promulgated, first in Heffernan v. Hunter, and then again in Gen. 
Refractories Co. v. Fireman 's Fund Ins. Co., that regardless of whether "the challenged activity 
violates the canons of ethics, so long as it is within the scope of representation, it is exempt from a 
conspiracy charge. ,,37 The Third Circuit also added that the mere fact that the Defendants acted with 
mixed motives, bad faith, or with the illegitimate purpose of abusing process, does not bring their 
actions outside the scope of their representation or agency relationship.38 
Jl See Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants Loftus, Runyon, and Vialet, Jr.'s Motion, at pg. 3. 
36 1d. See generally Sorber, 2011 V.1. Lexis 34, at '8-9. 
"Heffernan v. Humer, 189 F.3d 405, 412-13 (3d. Cir. 1999) (adding that "it is, ofcourse, axiomatic that if the challenged 
conduct occurs outside the scope of representation, no reason for immunity exists" and a conspiracy could be fonned); Gen. 
Re/rac/ories Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 297, 313-14 (3d. Cir. 2003) (if all defendants are acting within the 
scope of their agency, then they cannot be considered conspirators). 
" Heffernan, 189 F.3d at 413; Gen. Refractories Co., 337 F.3d at 314 (finding that the Court dismissed the argument that 
just by the mere nature of the conduct and despite the appellees referring to it as outrageous or illegitimate, did not take 
their conduct outside the scope of the representation) 
JO 
Frederick Espinosa v. Holland L. Redfield, II, et al. 
Case No. SX-16-CV-286 
Case No. SX-16-CV-544 
Memoralldum Opinioll 
This Court finds that Plaintiff Espinosa fails to point to any fact in the Amended Complaint that 
demonstrates that the purpose of the alleged illicit meeting was to conspire to defame him. Plaintiff 
alleges in his Opposition brief that he "identifies the people involved, the roles those persons played 
and the place and time the agreement took place, the reason as to why the Defendants chose to defame 
him, and the underlying tort c1aim."39 However, other than the blanket assertions and conclusory 
statements alleged that this was a "scheme" targeted at defaming Espinosa, this argument remains 
unpersuasive.4o 
Applying the standards set out in Sorber, Heffernan. and Gen. Refractories Co., this Court 
concludes that Plaintiff Espinosa does not illustrate any fact in the Amended Complaint that 
demonstrates that the purpose of the alleged illicit meeting was to conspire to defame him; he actually 
provides evidence to the contrary to show that the Defendants were still acting within the scope of their 
representation. In his Amended Complaint, he details the process through which Defendants conducted 
themselves: the subsequent meeting followed immediately after the initial meeting because the 
Defendants believed that all agenda items were not addressed, the chairman was identified, there was 
a roll call, one of the Defendants brought an agenda with three items to discuss, another defendant 
seconded the motion, and all parties voted for a resolution.41 All of which are adequately asserted and 
only lead to the inference that the Defendants acted within the scope of their representation as 
Republican Party members, notwithstanding that Defendants were disgruntled after the first meeting 
). See Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants Loftus, Runyon, and Via Ie!, Jr. 's Motion, at pg. I. 
,. See /d. at pg. 2. 
41 See Amended Complaint, paras. 32-36 (listing that the three points discussed at the subsequent meeting were: I) a 
resolution confirming the "winning delegates", 2) condemnation of Plaintiff for assaulting Gwen Brady at the initial 
meeting. and 3) condemnation of the state chairman and a vote of no confirmation). See e.g. Rules, Principles, and Policies 
of the Republican Party of the United States Virgin tslands Rule 9 (detailing that the chairman presides at the meeting), 
Rules, Principles, and Policies of the Republican Party of the United States Virgin Islands Rule 5 (describing the need for 
an agenda that lists the points to be addressed at the meeting). 
11 
Frederick Espillosa v. Hollmld L. Redfield, II, et al. 
Case No. SX-16-CV-286 
Case No. SX-16-CV-544 
Memorandum Opinion 
to signifY a retaliatory motive, personal animus, or bias towards him. Nowhere in Plaintiffs account 
of the procedure or discussion of the agenda items is the alleged conspiracy, either overtly or covertly, 
to publicly defame Plaintiff mentioned. Instead, because Plaintiff Espinosa merely disagrees with the 
nature of the meeting -by calling it "illegal", "illegitimate", and "a scheme"- he summarizes that 
the subsequent meeting was a conspiracy to defame him. Plaintiffs Amended Complaint barely 
displays the elements of a cause of action for conspiracy, and only relies on conclusions which are 
insufficient to withstand a 12(b)(6) analysis. As such, because this Court is limited to the allegations 
contained in the Amended Complaint, and even when all allegations are still taken as true, this Court 
finds no viable conspiracy charge against Defendant Cole. Thus, the motion to dismiss is granted and 
the civil conspiracy charge is dismissed. 
d. Count II: The Aiding and Abetting Claim Does Not Survive the Three-Pronged Test 
for all Moving Defendants 
Notwithstanding the three-pronged test, and as stated in the Opinion regarding Defendant Tanya 
Singh, this Court determines that, based on the lack of statutory authority and absence of common law 
precedent, the Virgin Islands does not recognize the civil liability theory of aiding and abelling as an 
independent cause of action. Moreover, Plaintiff Espinosa failed to sufficiently plead facts that 
demonstrate and support the allegation that any of the moving Defendants "aided or abelled the other 
Defendants" due to their participation in the alleged illegal meeting. Consequently, this Court grants 
Defendants Loftus, Runyon, Vialet Jr., Yob, and Cole's motion to dismiss on this claim likewise. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, this Court concludes that Plaintiff Espinosa failed to meet the 
standard of review for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, in accordance with 
Rule 12(b)(6). The facts alleged in the Amended Complaint are replete with vague and ambiguous 
12 
Frederick Espillosa v. Hollalld L. Redfield, II, et al. 
Case No. SX-16-CV-286 
Case No. SX-16-CV-544 
Memoralldum Opillion 
factual allegations pertaining to Defendants Loftus, Runyon, Vialet Jr. on all counts, and to Defendants 
Yob and Cole with respect to the Civil Conspiracy and Civil Aiding and Abetting claims. However, 
this Court recognizes that the Plaintiff does not have to provide "detailed factual allegations," Rule 
8(a)(2) still requires the Plaintiff to plead sufficient facts that "place the defendant on notice of the 
claims brought against him".42 Additionally, the Court duly notes that albeit the meeting violated the 
Republican Party's rules, this Court finds nothing wrong with a meeting between members ofa group, 
suffice it to say, this Court recognizes that it is well within the Defendants' constitutional rights to 
freely assemble. Therefore, this Court will grant Defendants Loftus, Runyon, Vialet Jr.'s motion to 
dismiss on all three claims because Plaintiff's Amended Complaint failed to illustrate that the 
Defendants engaged in 1.) a civil conspiracy, 2.) the tortious alleged act of defamation, and 3.) civil 
aiding and abetting. For the same reason, this Court will grant Defendants Yob and Cole's motion to 
dismiss on the civil conspiracy and civil aiding and abetting claims. 
An Order consistent with this memoranl~d!UlILOtt!ilnion will be issued on even date. 
Dated: SePtembe~, 2018 
....... 
( ... 
CE~
I .
-;- ' U 
()are: 
~ -
-
-
41 V.1. R. eiV. P. 8. See also Mills-Williams v. Mapp, 67 V.1. 574, 585 (V.I. 2017). 
13