IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
JASON B COULTER
)
S Ct Crim No 2019 0024
Appellant/Defendant
)
Re Super Ct Crim No 415 2015 (STT)
)
V
)
)
PEOPLE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
)
Appellee/Plaintiff
)
)
On Appeal from the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands
Division of St Thomas
Superior Court Judge Hon Kathleen McKay
Argued June 8 2021
Filed October 1 2021
Cite as 2021 V I 17
BEFORE
RHYS S HODGE Chief Justice IVE ARLINGTON SWAN Associate Justice
and MARIA CABRE'I‘, Associate Justice
APPEARANCES
Samuel A Walker, Esq
CPLS P A
Orlando FL
Attorneyfor Appellant
Kenneth R Case, Esq
Assistant Attorney General
St Thomas U S VI
Attorneyfor Appellee
OPINION OF THE COURT
SWAN, Associate Justice
1| 1
Appellant Jason B Coulter challenges the Superior Court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the
information and criminal charges filed against him, in which he asserted violations of his Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial For the reasons elucidated below, we determine Coulter has waived
appeal of the Superior Court 3 denial of his motion to dismiss
I
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
112
In February 2015, the Superior Court authorized an arrest warrant for Jason Coulter
(‘ Coulter ’) because he allegedly murdered his roommate, William Ray Bennett, between
November 28, 2014 and November 29, 2014 at their shared apartment in St Thomas, U S Virgin
Islands The information charged Coulter with eleven counts, including first degree murder, in
violation of 14 V I C §§ 921 and 922(a)(1); second degree murder, in violation of 14 V I C § 921,
using a dangerous weapon during the commission of murder, in violation of 14 V I C
§
2251(a)(2)(B) and first degree assault in violation of 14 V I C § 295(1)
1]}
On July 5, 2015, Orange County sheriffs arrested Coulter in Florida
Subsequently,
although Coulter waived extradition to the Virgin Islands and Florida officials notified the People
that Coulter was in their custody, the People failed to arrange Coulter 5 return to the tem'tory until
November 2015
1|4
In November 2015, following his transfer to the territory, the court held Coulter’s advice
of rights hearing and, in December 2015, the court arraigned him At the time of his arraignment,
Coulter invoked his Sixth Amendment constitutional right and requested a speedy jury trial
1|5
In December 2015, Coulter’s case was assigned to Judge Adam Christian, who established
a scheduling order that stipulated a discovery completion date of December 31, 2015, a discovery
hearing for May 3, 2016, and jury selection for October 3, 2016 However, the People failed to
tender to Coulter complete discovery by February 26, 2016 Therefore, Coulter filed a motion to
compel discovery or, alternatively, to dismiss the case pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 16
Ultimately, the court denied Coulter s motion to dismiss but granted Coulter s
motion to compel discovery and instructed the People to serve initial discovery upon Coulter by
May 26 2016
116
On May 27, 2016, the People served Coulter with initial discovery which violated the
court’s May 26, 2016 deadline Because the People failed to serve initial discovery by the May 26,
2016 deadline, Coulter filed a motion for sanctions However, the trial court record fails to disclose
how that court adjudicated Coulter s motion for sanctions
1|7
In June 2016, the People completed discovery, and the court scheduled a bail hearing for
August 2016 Before the bail hearing, Judge James Carroll was assigned to preside over the case
because Judge Christian left the judiciary At the bail hearing, Judge Carroll noted a possible
conflict of interest because of an association with Coulter 3 potential third party custodians
Immediately, the People requested Judge Carroll’s recusal from the case, which occurred on
August 22, 2016 Following Judge Carroll 5 recusal, the case was reassigned to Judge Renee
Gumbs Carty However, citing a potential conflict of interest, Judge Gumbs Carty eventually
recused herself from the case on September 8, 2016 On September 15, 2016, the case was
reassigned to Judge Kathleen McKay
$8
Following the reassignment, the court established a new scheduling order that mandated a
January 24, 2017 pretrial conference, with jury selection on February 13, 2017 At the January 24,
2017 pretrial conference, Coulter requested a continuance because he could not locate a critical
witness The People did not oppose Coulter 5 request and the court rescheduled jury selection to
May 8, 2017 However, on February 24, 2017, Coulter s attorney, the Virgin Islands Office of the
Public Defender, moved to withdraw from the case because of disagreements resulting in a
deterioration in communications between itself and Coulter
1]9
On March 20, 2017, the court granted the Public Defender 5 withdrawal motion and
appointed new counsel Subsequently, at an April 18, 2017 pretrial conference, Coulter s new
attorney requested a continuance because he needed more time to comprehend the issues in the
case The People did not oppose defense counsel’s motion for continuance The court granted
defense counsel’s motion to continue and rescheduled jury selection to August 7, 2017 However,
Coulter requested another continuance on July 19, 2017
Again, the People did not oppose
Coulter’s motion to continue
Thereafter, the court granted the motion for continuance, and
rescheduled jury selection to October 23, 2017
$10
Unfortunately, two category five hurricanes, Irma and Maria, visited the
territory
respectively on September 6, 2017 and September 20, 2017 Accordingly, at an October 3, 2017
pretrial conference, the court recognized that it was unlikely that a jury array could be assembled
under the circumstances because of the conditions existing in the territory and rescheduled the
October 3, 2017 pretrial conference to October 26, 2017 and likewise postponed jury selection to
October 30, 2017 However, at the October 26, 2017 pretrial conference, the People informed the
territory because of the existing devastation chaos, and disarray following the two hurricanes
Therefore, the court again rescheduled jury selection to January 22, 2018
f l 1
On January 8, 2018, the People again moved to continue the case, which Coulter opposed
In its written memorandum supporting the continuance, the People cited its inability to contact key
witnesses
In his opposition, Coulter stated that he had been incarcerated since July 2015 and
reiterated his demand for a speedy trial Ultimately, the court ordered a pretrial conference for
March 20, 2018 and rescheduled jury selection to April 9, 2018
Simultaneously, the court
cautioned the People that it would not grant additional continuances but would dismiss the case
without prejudice, if the People moved for another continuance of the case
‘12
Despite the court’s prior warning, the People again moved for another continuance at the
final pretrial conference on April 5, 2018 Coulter opposed the People 8 motion and reiterated his
desire for a speedy trial Rather than grant the People’s motion, the court removed the case from
the court 5 calendar and rescheduled the trial 3 commencement date to November 2018
'113
On April 20, 2018, Coulter filed a motion to dismiss the case with prejudice or
alternatively, without prejudice In his motion, Coulter asserted that a violation of a defendant’s
Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights is evaluated using the four factors adduced in Barker v
Wingo 407 U S 514 (1974) The four Barker factors are (i) the length of delay' (ii) the reason for
the delay; (iii) the defendant’s assertion of his rights; and (iv) the prejudice to the defendant In his
motion, Coulter painstakingly addressed each delay in the case, arguing that the majority of the
delays were caused by the People and ultimately contending that the four Barker factors weighed
in his favor
1|l4
In its April 24, 2018 opposition to Coulter's motion to dismiss, the People unequivocally
contended that the delays were not in bad faith and were without malice Significantly, the People
asserted that the delays that were caused by the hurricanes could not have been anticipated or
foreseen Moreover, the People argued that, during the protracted case history, Coulter only
asserted his right to a speedy trial in the motion to dismiss and he did not demonstrate any prejudice
from his prolonged incarceration
(15
In a June 20, 2018 opinion, the court denied Coulter’s motion to dismiss In the opinion,
the court agreed with Coulter that the Barker factors were the correct standard for assessing a
claimed Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation However, the court concluded that the most
important factor, prejudice to the defendant, did not weigh in Coulter s favor
Specifically,
although the court determined Coulter s prolonged imprisonment warranted evaluation ofthe other
three Barker factors, it ruled that Coulter could not establish the kind of prejudice that warranted
dismissal of this case Therefore, the court decided the People did not exhibit deliberate conduct
or conscious effort to hamper or impede Coulter’s defense
1H6
Eventually, the parties consummated a plea agreement At an August 9, 2018 hearing,
Coulter changed his plea to guilty and accepted the parties’ plea agreement The agreement
required Coulter to plead guilty to second degree murder In exchange, the People agreed to
dismiss the other charges in the information and to recommend a 22 year sentence During the
August 9, 2018 hearing, the court directly voir dired Coulter and concluded that he understood the
ramifications of changing his plea and he did so voluntarily and knowingly
'll7
On February 22, 2019, the court held Coulter’s sentencing hearing At the hearing, the
court heard the People’s allocution, a victim impact statement from Bennett 3 daughter, and
Coulter’s statement The court proceeded to sentence Conlter to 40 years’ imprisonment and
entered a judgment on March 27, 2019 which was later reduced on June 7, 2019 to 30 years
(18
On March 7, 2019, Coulter perfected a timely appeal
[I
JURISDICTION
119
“The Supreme Court [has] jurisdiction over all appeals arising from final judgments, final
decrees, and final orders of the Superior Court ” 4 V I C
13‘ 32(3)
‘An order that disposes of all
claims submitted to the Superior Court is considered final for the purposes of appeal
Jung v
Ruzz 59 V I 1050 1057 (2013) (citing Matthew v Herman 56 VI 674 677 (2012)) Because the
Superior Court’s February 22, 2019 order sentencing Coulter disposed of all claims submitted for
adjudication, the order is final and we exercise jurisdiction over Coulter s appeal
III
STANDARD OF REVIEW
1120
We review the trial court 8 factual findings for clear error and exercise plenary review over
its legal determinations Thomas v People, 63 V I 595, 602 03 (2015) (citing Stmmonds v People,
53 V I 549, 555 (2010))
However, in ruling on the correctness of discretionary rulings, such as
those granting or denying motions to suppress evidence or for severance, we review only for abuse
of discretion
’ Ponce v People, 72 V I 828 (V I 2020) (citations omitted)
IV
DISCUSSION
f21
Interestingly, Coulter’s notice of appeal cites his sentence as the basis for the appeal
However, Coulter s appellate briefcompletely fails to discuss his sentence Rather, the briefargues
the Superior Court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss based on asserted violations of his
Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial Notably at the August 9 2018 hearing Coulter told the
court that he understood that changing his plea to guilty and accepting the People 5 plea offer
meant he could only appeal his sentence Coulter’s notice of appeal unambiguously states that the
sentence the court imposed was the only issue on appeal (S A 8) Thus, it is flabbergasting and
disconcerting that Coulter’s appellate brief is devoid of any argument or a modicum of facts
pertaining to his sentence
1122
Regardless
it
is
axiomatic
that
a
defendant
is
prohibited from
challenging any
constitutional issue on appeal once he has pled guilty if the issue arose before the court accepted
the pleal See United Stares v Chavez Dtaz 949 F3d 1202
1206 (9th Cir 2020) ( When a
criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with
which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of
constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea He may only attack the
voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea ”) (quoting Tollett v Henderson, 41] U S
258
267 (1973) and further stating that
it is well settled that an unconditional guilty plea
constitutes a waiver of the right to appeal all non jurisdictional antecedent rulings and cures all
' The United States Supreme Court has announced a narrow exception to a defendant 5 ability to challenge his guilty
plea afier it has been accepted by the court The exception relates to double jeopardy claims and challenges to the
ggtgngifnality of statute under which the defendant is convicted See Class v United States, 138 S Ct 798, 803
antecedent constitutionaldefects )' UmtedStatesv Reed 770 Fed Appx 305 306 (8th Cir 2019)
(speedy trial claims
are foreclosed by [a] guilty plea )
1|23
However, if the guilty plea is conditional, a defendant may challenge issues preserved in
the written plea agreement once the court and government have acquiesced to the agreement See
Unwed States v Schafler 586 F 3d 414 420 (6th Cir 2009) ( Generally a valid guilty plea bars
any subsequent non jurisdictional attack on the conviction
Pursuant to FED R CRIM P
ll(a)(2), a defendant may, with the approval of the court and consent from the government, enter
a conditional plea of guilty ‘reserving in writing the right, on appeal from the judgment, to review
of the adverse determination of any specified pretrial motion ’ This rule places an ‘affirmative
duty’ on the defendant to preserve any issues collateral to the determination of guilt or innocence
by specifying them in the plea itself
[I]n the absence of a court approved reservation of issues
for appeal, [a defendant pleading guilty] waives all challenges to the prosecution except those
going to the court’s jurisdiction ”’) (citations omitted), Unzted States v Doherty, 17 F 3d 1056,
1058 (7th Cir l994)( Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 1 1(a)(2) allows a defendant to enter a
conditional guilty plea
that is, to reserve in his guilty plea the right to appeal
the adverse
determination of any specified pretrial motions
The rule requires a conditional plea to be in
writing to ‘precisely identify which pretrial issues the defendant wishes to preserve for review ”)2
(citations omitted)
2 Although this case arose before the Virgin Islands Rules of Criminal Procedure became effective in December
2017, Coulter s plea occurred in August 2018 after the rules were enacted and, under Rule l(c)(2)(B) of the Virgin
Islands Rules of Criminal Procedure which states that the rules apply to all pending matters, the Virgin Islands
Rules of Criminal Procedure apply to this case Accordingly, we cite the relevant portion of the V I R CRlM P 11
to demonstrate that it compons with its federal counterpart
With the consent of the court and the government a
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere, reserving in writing the right to have an
1124
In this case, Coulter’s unconditional plea agreement specifically states that he may only
dispute his sentence on appeal Thus, Coulter s decision to only discuss the Superior Court’s denial
ofhis motion to dismiss in his appellate brief leaves us with little recourse except to deem the issue
of any alleged speedy trial violation to be waived Accordingly, we conclude that Coulter waived
appellate review of the lower court s denial of his motion to dismiss because of alleged Sixth
Amendment speedy trial right violations See e g Unzted States v Bell 966 F 2d 914 915 16 (5th
Cir
1992) (explaining that a defendant pleading guilty preserves case dispositive issues for
appellate review by accepting a written conditional guilty plea that specifies the issues the
defendant intends to appeal) Despite that finding, even if he had preserved the issue for appellate
review, we would affirm the Superior Count 3 denial of Coulter’s motion to dismiss based on
purported Sixth Amendment speedy trial right violations because the delays in the trial 3
commencement were attributable to both Coulter and the People and he failed to demonstrate any
prejudice from his prolonged incarceration See United States v Brown, 808 Fed Appx 347, 349
50 (6th Cir 2020) (affirming a plea agreement that waived all grounds for appeal except one was
enforceable, and concluding that a delay partially attributable to the defendant, coupled with a lack
of evidence showing that the defendant was prejudiced by prolonged incarceration, prevented a
ruling that the defendant’s speedy trial right had been violated) 3
3 Although we stated above that the Virgin Islands Rules of Criminal Procedure and, by extension V I R CRlM P
l l(a)(2) apply to this matter we have not had previously had the opportunity to interpret the rule ll(a)(2)
Therefore, we review interpretations of federal rule 1 l(a)(2) because local rule I l(a)(2) mirrors the federal version
See People v Ventura No SX 2012 CR 076 2014 WL 3767484 at ”‘15 (VI Super Ct July 25 2014)( [Clourts
do not state that borrowed rules incorporate the construction given them by the highest court ofjurisdiction from
which they were borrowed Instead, courts typically view such earlier constructions ofborrowed rules as persuasive,
not mandatory )See also Harbel 011Co v Steele, 298 P 2d 789, 792 (Ariz 1956) (“In construing our own rules we
recognize and typically give much weight to interpretations made of similar federal rules
”), Wheat State Tel
Co v State Corp Comm’n 403 P 2d 1019 1022 (Kan 1965) (interpreting state agency rules, borrowed from state
civil procedure code which was in turn bonowed from federal rules of civil procedure, according to well settled
V
CONCLUSION
{25
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude Coulter waived appellate review of the Superior
Court’s denial of his motion to dismiss on Sixth Amendment speedy trial grounds because he
entered an unconditional guilty plea that precluded appellate review ofconstitutional pretrial issues
that materialized before he entered the plea However, had we reached the merits of Coulter s
appeal, we would affinn the Superior Court’s denial of Coulter’s motion to dismiss based on
purported Sixth Amendment speedy trial violations
Dated this
/
day of4 Z 2 f;
:
2021
f:
IVE ARLINGTO
WAN
Associate Justice
ATTEST
VERONICA J HANDY ESQ
Clerk of the Co
t
By
ty Clerk II
Date
JQ‘
I
‘ Q21
Judgment rules and especially the requirements of supponing or opposing affidavits, were taken from the Federal
Rules of Practice and Procedure Rule 56, 28 U S C A , so that interpretations ofthe Federal Rules are especially
persuasive as to the meaning of the Maryland rules
) Dobbms v State, 483 P 2d 255, 258 (Wyo 1971) ( ‘In
considering the points raised here perhaps it should first be noted that the foregoing rules were taken from Rules