IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS



DIVISION OF ST. THOMAS AND ST. JOHN



PEOPLE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS )

)

Plaintiff, ) CASE NO. ST-17-CR-55

)

VS. )

)

SHAKIEME S. FREEMAN, )

)

Defendant. )

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION



This matter came before the Court on December 15, 2017, for a hearing! on

Defendant’s Motion to Suppress” seeking exclusion on Fourth Amendment grounds of a

firearm seized from Freeman’s person and items taken from a vehicle in which he had

been seated as a result of the warrantless encounter on February 16, 2017. The People

presented the testimony of Virgin Islands Police Officer Vernon Carr and introduced 12

photographs as exhibits; and the defense presented three witnesses, Carolyn A. Jackson,



Doran Hamilton, and Simon Rawlins, Jr



' The People were represented by Assistant Attorney General Eugene James Connor, Jr. Esq., and

Defendant was represented by Territorial Public Defender Melanie L. Turnbull, Esq.



2 The Amended Scheduling Order entered on April 20, 2017, set a motions hearing for July 24, 2017, and

provided that motions were to be filed 30 days prior to the hearing, such that Freeman’s motion is untimely.

In fact, the People’s November 29, 2017, initial Opposition relies solely upon the untimeliness of the

motion to urge its denial. And, Freeman’s accompanying Motion to Accept Defendant’s Motion to

Suppress Out of Time concedes that “Superior Court Rule 128 provides that ‘All pre-trial motions shall be

made prior to the motion deadline established by the court, unless otherwise extended by the court for good

cause shown.’” Under V.I. Rule of Criminal Procedure |2(c)(3), a motion to suppress filed after the

motions deadline is untimely, but the court may consider the request upon a showing of good cause or in

the interests of justice. Despite its tardiness, which would justify summary denial of the motion, the Court

will consider the motion on the merits in the interests of justice.



* After oral closing arguments, the Court permitted the People to file a substantive response to the motion

by January 19, 2018, and allowed Defendant to reply by February 2, 2018.

eee



People v. Freeman,



Cases Nos. ST-17-CR-55



Memorandum Opinion, February 7, 2018.



Page 2 of 16



Because the Court finds that the initial actions of the police did not violate

Freeman’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures,

the Motion to Suppress will be denied as to the discovery seizure of the firearm and

holster found on Freeman’s person. However, because the items recovered from inside

the vehicle in which Freeman had been seated were discovered as the result of an

improper warrantless search, they will be suppressed.

FACTS

On February 16, 2017, a team of roughly 15 law enforcement officers were



conducting an initiative throughout the Thomasville Housing Community near the Bertha

C. Boschulte Junior High School. Officer Carr testified that as he, his partner Officer

Reed, and Officer Josiah Angol, arrived outside the fence surrounding Thomasville in an

unmarked car, Carr observed Officer Frett, who had come in a different vehicle,

approaching a Gold Toyota Corolla where Freeman was seated with his left foot on the

ground outside the open driver’s door. While Reed stayed in the unmarked vehicle,

Officers Carr and Angol approached Freeman to “provide coverage” for Officer Frett,

and, while Frett engaged Freeman in conversation, Carr, who was standing near the

driver’s side rear tire, observed what appeared to be bullet holes throughout the passenger

compartment. Carr testified that, based upon his experience and training, which included

five years towing vehicles from crime scenes, he thought that the vehicle had “recently



been involved in a crime or near a scene where it might have received those bullet holes”,



and he became suspicious.

#éééé......#... wee



People v. Freeman,



Cases Nos. ST-17-CR-55



Memorandum Opinion, February 7, 2018.



Page 3 of 16



Carr inquired of Freeman whether there were any illegal weapons or drugs in the

vehicle, and, according to Carr, Freeman “acted nervous” and said, “Nah, men.” Carr

then asked Freeman to step out of the vehicle “for our safety”, after which Freeman said,

“Nah, men, meh boy,” and moved his right foot, whereupon Carr observed the butt of a

holstered firearm protruding from the front waist of Freeman’s pants. After Carr yelled

“gun” to alert the other officers, Freeman stood up and, according to Carr, started to flee,

but Carr used an “arm bar” to put Freeman on the ground and then handcuffed Freeman

for “officer safety.” Carr stated that Freeman was advised of his rights and was rolled

over and asked if he had a license to possess a firearm, but Freeman refused to answer.

Freeman was then placed in a police vehicle, and the Forensic Unit was called to the

scene to take photographs and collect evidence. The Forensic officer processed the

vehicle, doing what Carr called “an inventory search”, and took possession of the firearm,

as well as three additional magazines, a radio scanner, and marijuana that Carr claimed

were found in the vehicle, for which Freeman was given a receipt but refused to sign.

Carr indicated the inventory search was conducted at the scene because the area where

they were ordinarily conducted was full with two vehicles from a recent homicide. A

registration check of the vehicle was conducted, revealing it was owned by an

unidentified young woman who was later identified as Freeman’s girlfriend.

Freeman was taken to the Richard Callwood Command to be booked, and a



review of firearms registration records determined that Freeman was not authorized to



possess a firearm in the Virgin Islands. Photographs of Freeman in handcuffs with a



holstered firearm visible in the front of his pants, a magazine found in the vehicle’s

People v. Freeman,



Cases Nos. ST-17-CR-55



Memorandum Opinion, February 7, 2018.

Page 4 of 16



driver’s door, Freeman’s vehicle, and one of the bullet holes were introduced without

objection.



For the defense, Ms. Jackson, a resident of Thomasville, testified that she was in

her kitchen “peeping through the window” while cooking when police officers

approached Freeman. Jackson claimed she had a good view of the officers from her

vantage point. Jackson confirmed that the vehicle door was open when officers

approached Freeman, and that Freeman “came out of the car”. According to Jackson,

Freeman “step[ped] away from the car with the policeman”, who “like hold him a little

bit” by the right shoulder, and the officer ““guided”’ Freeman across the street and

searched him. Jackson said that she did not see Freeman run, testified that she was

“videotaping” the incident from the window and indicated that, when she saw Freeman

react in a way that made her believe “something hurt”, she got upset, coming out her door

and down her steps to “videotape it some more” at the gate at the entrance to

Thomasville. Although Jackson initially testified she could not hear any conversations

while standing at the window, she later claimed she thought it important to videotape,

“[bJecause when I was looking through the window and he [Freeman] bend and it sound

to me he saying “ah”, and then he bend, so I was saying maybe they touching him too

hard or something, so that’s why I went outside.” No recording of any kind was

presented as evidence, but Jackson testified she gave the “videotape” to “an investigator

for the attorney.”



Jackson indicated that the officers were searching Freeman, “and then he went to



the ground — they put him on the ground with one of the knee in the back.” She claimed

People v. Freeman,



Cases Nos. ST-17-CR-55



Memorandum Opinion, February 7, 2018.

Page 5 of 16



she never saw a gun on Freeman. She later saw one officer that she thought was

searching the car Freeman had been in, and then observed two “lady officers” that she

thought were “Forensic” go in the car and came out with bags, but said she couldn’t tell

what was in the bags.



Doran Hamilton, who described Freeman as a friend of 10 to 15 years and her

“best friend”, said she was at her home in Bovoni with Freeman during the whole day up

until about 4:00 or 4:30 p.m. Hamilton testified that, “about a minute or two” after

Freeman left to pick his girlfriend up from work, she walked down the hill to visit a

friend in Thomasville. Outside the entrance to Thomasville Hamilton saw a gold Toyota

where Freeman was sitting with the door “nearly shut all the way” with police cars

blocking the vehicle in. From about 10 to 15 feet away, Hamilton said she saw a police

officer walk up to Freeman’s car, exchange a couple of words with Freeman, and walk

away, after which another officer had a 10 to 20 second conversation with Freeman,

following which Freeman came out of the car, was placed on the ground, arrested, and

taken to a police vehicle, which “left the scene right after they placed him in it.”

Hamilton said she did not see Freeman run, resist, or back away from the officers at any

point. After Freeman was gone, “they begin to take pictures and do forensic on his car.

That’s when they begin to enter the car.” Hamilton said she took the car, which Freeman

did not own, from the scene after signing a document provided to her by a Forensic



officer, who gave Hamilton the keys.



* The credibility of this portion of Hamilton’s testimony was called into question by the photographs taken

at the scene by a Forensic Unit officer showing Freeman with the firearm in his waist.

People v. Freeman,



Cases Nos. ST-17-CR-55



Memorandum Opinion, February 7, 2018.

Page 6 of 16



Simon Rawlins, Jr., is a 30-year resident of Thomasville, where he claimed there

was “no violence...no burglary, nothing whatever.” He said whenever police come to the

area investigating reports of gunshots he directs them to Jenny’s Hope or Bovoni.

Rawlins indicated he heard no gunshots on the day of the incident or for the month

previous. While taking out garbage, Rawlins, who was about 20 feet from Freeman,

whom Rawlins had known for about 15 years, saw “5 or 6” jeeps, “maybe 10 to 12”

officers, block the Thomasville entrance. Rawlins said one officer conversed with

Rawlins, then Rawlins watched a second officer come to Freeman’s car, and, although

Rawlins said he didn’t hear anything that was being said, saw Freeman come out of the

car “with anger” shouting “what I do, why you harassing me, like why you want to search

me for?” Rawlins said the officer reached for Freeman and they started struggling, and

that the officer called out to other officers, who came and took Freemen away. Rawlins

said he did not see Freeman run and that Freeman couldn’t run or drive away. Rawlins

claimed the officers took pictures, Freeman was taken away, and the vehicle was then

searched. Rawlins admitted that he was upset and that he cursed the officers and was

disrespectful to them.



On rebuttal, Officer Carr said that Thomasville is a high crime area, with one of

the highest rates of reported discharges of firearms. He claimed the vehicle in which

Freeman sat was not blocked in by the police, and that only three police officers were in

the area of Freeman’s vehicle at the time of the incident. Carr reiterated that Freeman



was still on the scene when the “inventory search” of the vehicle was being conducted.

People v. Freeman,



Cases Nos. ST-17-CR-55



Memorandum Opinion, February 7, 2018.

Page 7 of 16



STANDARDS



The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States protects the “right

of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures...” Similarly, Section 3 of the Revised Organic Act

of 1954, as amended, provides, “The right to be secure against unreasonable searches and

seizures shall not be violated.” The United States Supreme Court approved the exclusion

of evidence as a sanction for violations of the Fourth Amendment in Weeks v. United

States,> and the exclusionary rule was later extended to the States in Mapp v. Ohio.® It

has long been recognized as part of Virgin Islands jurisprudence.’



Under these constitutional standards, the Court must determine whether a search

or seizure is reasonable. Generally, searches conducted without a warrant approved in

advance by a neutral and detached judge are presumed to be unreasonable.* When police

act without a warrant, the probable cause requirement must be strictly enforced. ° In order

to pass constitutional muster, a warrantless search must be shown to fall within one of the

few narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement.'? However, the Fourth



Amendment does not require a police officer to ignore a possible crime.!!



5232 ULS. 383 (1914),



® 367 U.S. 643 (1961).



7 See, for example, Government v. Thomas,5 V1. 276, 286 (Mun.Ct. 1966) (“It is well settled that evidence

obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment may be suppressed on a motion made by a party who is

aggrieved.”).



* United States v. Chabot, 19 V.1. 28 (D.V.I. 1982); Government v. Berry, 11 V.L. 40 (D.V.I. 1974); Katz v.

United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).



° Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959).



’° Katz, supra; Berry, supra; Government y. Fabiani-Ogno, 20 V.1. 404 (T.Ct. 1984).

"' Chabot, supra.

People v. Freeman,



Cases Nos. ST-17-CR-55



Memorandum Opinion, February 7, 2018.

Page 8 of 16



Under the Fourth Amendment, probable cause is generally a necessary predicate

to a police search or seizure.'* However, in Terry v. Ohio,'? the Supreme Court

recognized an exception to this general rule, and to the warrant requirement, when police

make a brief, limited stop and detention of an individual in order to question him

concerning a suspected criminal offense. Terry held that a quick pat-down search for

weapons can be conducted without a warrant and on less than probable cause as part of

the investigative stop if based on a “reasonable suspicion” of criminal activity.



In order to be valid under Terry, a pat-down search must be based on a reasonable

belief that the person is armed and presently dangerous.'* In Terry, the court was careful

to note that the stop and frisk exception is “narrowly drawn.” The officer must be

aware of specific articulable facts that give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the person

stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.'° To be reasonable, the

suspicion must be based on objective facts!’ rather than on “inchoate and unparticularized

suspicion or ‘hunch’”.!®



A court must apply a “totality of circumstances” analysis when deciding whether



reasonable suspicion existed to conduct a Terry stop and frisk.!? Under the test, “the



totality of the circumstances- the whole picture- must be taken into account.””° The



'? Government y. Rodriguez, 23 V.1. 386 (T.Ct. 1988).

13 392 ULS. 1 (1968),



'4 Ybarra vy. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979).



'5 392 U.S., at 27.



'© Government v. Rodriguez, 23 V.1. 386 (T.Ct. 1988).

'7 Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. (1979).



'8 Terry, 392 US., at 27.



9 US. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981).

20 fd, at 417.

People v. Freeman,

Cases Nos. ST-17-CR-55

Memorandum Opinion, February 7, 2018.

Page 9 of 16

inferences of a trained officer may be considered, and probabilities, not certainty,

govern.?!

Generally, a warrant is not required for a valid investigatory stop of a vehicle.”

But, in order to justify a warrantless investigatory stop, the officer must possess

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based on the totality of the circumstances. 7°

Another widely recognized warrant requirement exception, the so called

“automobile exception” or “Carroll Doctrine” established in Carroll v. United States,"

and subsequently refined in Chambers v. Maroney” and Coolidge v. New Hampshire”®,



provides that no warrant is necessary to search a car when there is probable cause to



believe that there is contraband or evidence of a crime in the automobile and exigent



circumstances exist.7’



Ordinarily, on a motion to suppress evidence, the burden rests upon the accused to

establish that the evidence sought to be suppressed was illegally obtained.”? However,

once it is shown that a search or seizure was conducted without a warrant, the burden

shifts to the People to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the

governmental activity fell within some recognized exception to the warrant



requirement.”°



21 id



22 See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002).



3 Id.



24.967 U.S. 132 (1925).



25 399 US. 42 (1970).



26 403 U.S. 443, 458-464 (1971).



27 See also Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999).



28 Government v. Morton, 15 V.I. 418 (T.Ct. 1978); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980).



2° Morton, supra.; McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48

(1951).

People v. Freeman,



Cases Nos. ST-17-CR-55



Memorandum Opinion, February 7, 2018.

Page 10 of 16



ANALYSIS



1. The initial contact with Freeman was not a confrontation requiring reasonable

suspicion or probable cause.



Relying on the holding of Terry v. Ohio, Freeman argues that this incident is an

investigatory stop, requiring the police to “point to specific and articulable facts which,

taken together with rational inferences from these facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.”

No evidence was produced at the suppression hearing suggesting that Frett, Carr, or Angol

possessed probable cause, or even a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, when they

first approached the vehicle in which Freeman was seated. Nor is there testimony that

those officers were acting upon a tip or had observed anything unusual in Freeman’s

behavior before they went to the vehicle.



Regardless, this encounter did not begin as a Terry stop and frisk or as an

investigatory stop of a vehicle. Freeman’s vehicle was not moving when the officers

approached it, and, despite the testimony of Ms. Hamilton and Mr. Rawlins, credible

evidence reveals that movement of the vehicle in which Freeman sat would not have been

impeded by other vehicles.°° Freeman was merely seated in an automobile with a door

ajar, and there was no testimony that the motor of the vehicle was running. As the U.S.

Supreme Court indicated in United States v. Mendenhall,*! “[N]ot every encounter between



a police officer and a citizen is an intrusion requiring an objective justification.”>?



*° Officer Carr indicated Freeman was not blocked in, and neither People’s Exhibit No. 4 nor People’s

Exhibit No. 12, the only photographs depicting the area in front of Freeman’s vehicle, show any other

vehicle blocking it.



41 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980).



*? See also, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring) (“There is nothing in the

Constitution which prevents a poOlicemean from addressing questions to anyone on the streets.”’)

People v. Freeman,



Cases Nos. ST-17-CR-55



Memorandum Opinion, February 7, 2018.

Page 11 of 16



This incident occurred in a public area outside a residential housing community

where the police were conducting an operation. The police protecting the perimeter of the

operation in the Thomasville Housing Community were free to walk in any public space

in that area. The People were not required to demonstrate reasonable suspicion or probable

cause for the officers Officers Frett, Carr, and Angol to merely approach someone seated

in a parked vehicle in a public place and ask questions. Freeman was free to answer the

questions or decline to do so, as he chose. At its inception, this was not an encounter

between an individual and the police that rose to the level of a seizure under the Fourth

Amendment.*?



Once Carr was positioned near the rear driver’s side wheel, a place he had every

right to be, Carr observed, through a door that was already open upon his arrival, what he

believed were bullet holes in the interior of the vehicle. Carr testified he drew this

conclusion based upon his training and experience, which including towing vehicles from

crime scenes for a five-year period. Based upon that observation, Carr became suspicious

that a firearm had been discharged in the interior of the vehicle. That suspicion was

heightened when Freeman acted nervously and gave what Carr considered an evasive

answer when asked whether there were any illegal weapons or drugs in the vehicle, such



that Carr was reasonably justified in requesting Freeman to step outside the vehicle to



ensure the safety of the officers. When Freeman turned to place his right foot outside the



3 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 185 (2004) (no seizure when officers only ask for

identification); United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200 (2002) (no seizure when officers questions

wiling indiciduals in the stree or other public places); Fla. V. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 5-6 (no seizure when

officers speak with willing individuals in airports).

People v. Freeman,

Cases Nos. ST-17-CR-55

Memorandum Opinion, February 7, 2018.

Page 12 of 16

vehicle in response to that request, Carr observed the butt of a holstered firearm in

Freeman’s trousers.

Another well recognized exception to the warrant requirement is the plain view

doctrine. Under the plain view exception, law enforcement officers are permitted to seize

objects whose incriminating character is immediately apparent without a warrant if the

officers are lawfully in a position to observe them.*4 The plain view doctrine has been

extended to also encompass observations made by lawful use of other senses, such as the

“plain smell” of marijuana that police recognize based upon their training and experience,*°

or the “plain hearing” of incriminating remarks.*°



Of course, it is not unlawful, per se, to possess a firearm in the Virgin Islands. If

the possessor has a license, possession of the weapon is presumably lawful. Therefore,

merely learning that someone possesses a firearm does not provide an officer with

reasonable suspicion to believe the person is then committing a crime. The information

would need to be supplemented with additional facts to draw such a conclusion.2’

Nonetheless, plain view observation of a firearm in the waist of Freeman’s trousers,

coupled with the presence of what appeared to be bullet holes in the vehicle and Freeman’s

nervous and evasive responses to questions, provided reasonable suspicion allowing



Officer Carr to detain Freeman to determine whether Freeman possessed a license to



possess the firearm. Carr testified that Freeman refused to respond when asked whether



4 Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. (1960); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990); Coolidge, supra.



35 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961); Jones v.

United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958)



36 See, for example, United States v. Fisch, 474 F.2d 1071 (9" Cir. 1973).



37 See United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213, 217 (3° Cir. 2000) (citing 23 V.I.C. 470).

People v. Freeman,



Cases Nos. ST-17-CR-55



Memorandum Opinion, February 7, 2018.

Page 13 of 16



Freeman possessed a firearm owner’s license. While Freeman had the right to remain

silent, the refusal to respond created a justification for detaining Freeman until his licensure

or lack thereof could be discovered. Once it was determined that Freeman did not possess

a license, there was probable cause to arrest Freeman without a warrant. In fact, 14 V.I.C.

2253(a) specifically authorizes a warrantless arrest in those circumstances. Consequently,

the motion to suppress will be denied regarding the firearm and holster seized from

Freeman’s person.



2. There were no exigent circumstances to justify the subsequent warrantless

search of the vehicle.



Exigent circumstances sufficient to justify a warrantless search include: (1) the

danger that evidence will be destroyed;** (2) a threat to the safety of the public or law

enforcement officers;*’ (3) hot pursuit of a suspect;*° and (4) the danger a suspect will

flee before a warrant can be obtained.*! On the facts before the Court, none of those

exigencies presented themselves to justify the warrantless search of the vehicle in which

Freeman had been seated after Freeman was placed in a patrol car.



It is clear that, before the interior of the vehicle was searched, Freeman had been

detained and, at a minimum, placed in the back of a police vehicle.47 Once Freeman was

removed from the area of the vehicle, any exigency that may have previously existed was



removed. Nothing in the record suggests that there were any other occupants of



38 Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 294-96 (1973)



° Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 204, 298-99 (1967).



4) Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990).



*? There is testimony in the record that Freeman was not even at the scene when the search of the vehicle

interior was conducted, although Carr testified to the contrary.

People v. Freeman,



Cases Nos. ST-17-CR-55



Memorandum Opinion, February 7, 2018.



Page 14 of 16

Freeman’s vehicle. Thus, there was no danger that evidence would be destroyed. Once

Freeman was detained, the police were clearly not in hot pursuit of anyone. They merely

had to station someone at the vehicle, whose keys were present’? and obtain a warrant

for the vehicle search. Similarly, once Freeman was detained, no threat to the safety of

the public or law enforcement officers existed, and there was no danger that a suspect

would flee before a warrant could be obtained.



After the sole occupant had been taken into custody, the vehicle was no longer

mobile, and the search, if valid at all, must be justified on grounds other than the

automobile exception or exigent circumstances.“ The vehicle could have been secured

in situ by the other officers for the relatively brief period of time it would have taken to

apply for and obtain a search warrant for the vehicle. Rather than choosing this course of

conduct, the police instead searched the vehicle shortly after the Defendant was detained.

Under the circumstances, the search was not justified under the exigent circumstances or

automobile exceptions.



Apparently recognizing this problem, the People attempt to justify the search as

an inventory search. After lawfully taking custody of property, police may conduct a

warrantless search of that property if the owner’s diminished expectation of privacy is



outweighed by the government’s interest in satisfying one of three purposes: (1)



protecting the owner’s property while it is in police custody; (2) protecting the police



43 There was no evidence presented at the hearing regarding how the Forensic Unit came to be in

possession of the keys to the vehicle, but the unrebutted testimony of Ms. Hamilton was that a Forensic

officer gave her the keys after the vehicle was processed.



“1 Compare Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964), with Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967).

People v. Freeman,



Cases Nos. ST-17-CR-55



Memorandum Opinion, February 7, 2018.

| Page 15 of 16

against claims of lost or stolen property: or (3) protecting the police from potential

danger.** Because the justification for the search is the production of an inventory of the

vehicle’s contents, police may not conduct an inventory search in bad faith or solely for

investigative purposes.*© Inventory searches are valid only if conducted according to

standardized criteria and procedures.*”



Here, the People presented evidence that the lot at which inventory searches were

ordinarily conducted was full with vehicles from a homicide investigation. That would

present a valid basis for conducting an inventory search on the scene rather than at the

usual lot. But, none of the three valid purposes of an inventory search is present here

because, after conducting a thorough search and seizing evidence, the police did not take

the vehicle into custody. Had the police taken the vehicle into custody, the Court’s ruling

would have been different. That eventuality notwithstanding, the evidence is unrebutted

that, after the search was performed, the police turned the vehicle and its keys over to Ms.

Hamilton, who thereafter removed the vehicle from the scene. Because the vehicle was

relinquished to Hamilton, the search could not be justified as protecting the owner’s

property while it is in police custody. Similarly, searching the vehicle, seizing items

from it, and turning the vehicle over to someone else afforded the police no protection



against claims of lost or stolen property. And, as has been discussed, the search did



nothing to protect the police from potential danger, since no one else had access to the



45 Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987); llinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 646 (1983); South

Dakota vy. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976).

4 Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990) (“[A]n inventory search must not be a ruse for a general



rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence.”)

47 Id.

People v. Freeman,



Cases Nos. ST-17-CR-55



Memorandum Opinion, February 7, 2018.



Page 16 of 16

vehicle’s contents. Consequently, the warrantless search of the interior of the vehicle

was invalid, and the magazines, radio scanner, and marijuana seized from within the

vehicle must be suppressed.



CONCLUSION

Because Officer Carr observed the firearm in Freeman’s waist from a place where



Carr had every right to be, the plain view doctrine permits the seizure of the firearm and

the detention of Freeman until his authority to possess a firearm could be determined.

But, because no exigency or other exception existed to justify the subsequent search of

the vehicle, the items seized from its interior must be suppressed and may not be used in



evidence. Thus, the Court concludes that the Defendants’ Motion to Suppress must be



granted in part and denied in part. An appropriate Order will issue herewith.



Dated: February 7, 2018. —



HON. MICHAEL C. DUNSTON

JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

ATTEST: Estrella H. George OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS



2 T18



Supervisor