et em 3m: mm Nt soe

Ae ee cnt ent tema ates Sw



fo

i

qe



ee 0m ae Echcmh tae pe

MR: sae eine a ae



“



Vt tes



FEUERZEIG, J.



‘Islands law that “abolished the doctrine of interspousal tnminity, 1



cage2 Supp. ).



“ant has counterclaimed, alleging that the defendant. fraudulently induced her to



IN THE TERRITORIAL COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS

DIVISION OF ST. THOMAS AND ST. JOHN



=o0=



ANDRE STRIDIRON,



Plaintiff;

vs. | 7 : CIVIL NO. 504/1983

EDITH STRIDIRON, :

Defendant :



MARIA T. HODGE, ESQ.



P. O. Box 4511



St. Thomas, Virgin Islands , : i

(Attorney for Plaintiff) : :



BRENDA J. HOLLAR, ESQ.



P. 0. Box 8897



St. Thomas, Virgin Islands

(Attorney for Defendant)



MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER



Plaintife's m motion to dismiss defendant! ‘8 counterclain m requires this court



4, Bs ee



her former husband, and ‘to. determine the effect and applicability of. he



2 gages ae



Plaintiff requests the imposition of a constructive trust and a ) declaration,



of his interest in real property located in St. Thomas, Virgin Islands. Defend~



"marry" him "knowing that the marriage was a nullity since he was already



married, not divorced, and that his prior wife was not dead. " It is not



defendant, five children were born, all of ‘whom the defendant says were . bora

Ce an. A Cor teers



‘under the assumption that the children were the product of a lawful Marriage.



san Pope a



As a result the defendant seeks $250,000 compensatory and punitive damages.



The. parties concede that the amount prayed for in the counterclaim is beyond



| the jurisdiction of this court. Consequently, if the counterclaim states a



eran



claim, the action must be transferred to the District Court of the Virgin

*



Islands pursuant to 4 V.I.C. 832(c) (1967).



In support of his motion to dismiss the counterclaim, the defendant

relies on two theories. First, he argues that the counterclaim is res judicata

because the same claim was raised by the defendant as an affirmative defense

and counterclaim in ‘the divorce action between the parties in Fam. No. D93/80.

5 That action.was recently Yemanded to this court by the United States Court of



Appeals for the Third Circuit, which reversed this court's denial of the wife! s

:! motion to set aside the divorce decree on the basis of newly discovered evi-



amd



? dence of fraud. Stridiron v. Stridiron, 698 F.2a4 204 (3d Cir. 1983) rev'g.



tan age ste peo



Civ. No. 81-294 (D.V.I., Div. St.T, & St. J., March 24, 1982). Res judicata, —



Ri Non esp tomes “latiey 9

ay ae:



however, could not act as a bar because it is clear that the jur (



Virgin Islands divorce laws do not permit | a cause of action . for tort.



Sine Ges



giedge 4,



the court ‘in the 2 divorce action did not have jurisdiction t to o grant the relie



‘requested. ae



The second ground for dismissal of the counterclaim - is that the only



t



judicial remedy for a marriage that is void ab initio due to a previous marriage

: : i=

a4 $



' by one spouse, which marriage has not - been terminated, is a decree of annulment.



. Defendant in support of this theory relies on Paiewonsky v. Paiewonsky,



Seg Ra ON wa ee roe

em pene



8 V.I. 421 (3d Cir. 1971). Defendant, however, correctly points out that the _



$m mee note



er en

tet a a pelle Biala,



. Accordingly, it is



. this order with respect to the following issues:



persuasiveness o of Paiewonsky was eliminated in 1973 when the Legislature passed |

Act No. 3397, which amended Virgin Islands law, 16 V.I.C. 863, and abolished

the common law doctrine of interspousal immunity.



Consequently, the court is confronted with two basis questions: (1)

whether a cause of action may be asserted under 16 V.I. C. 863 for fraud and

deceit, and (2) if so, whether a cause of action is stated where the alleged

fraud occurred before enactment of the statute abolishing the common law bar_



i/



against interspousal suits.



There is authority in Many jurisdictions that the elimination of inter-



spousal immunity subjects a Spouse to suit not only for personal injury, but



for intentional torts. See, e.g., 43 A.L.R.2d 632 (1955), and 92 A.L “Re 3a 901



(1979). Counsel, however, unfortunately have not briefed any of the issues



}



postulated above... While the court has found | one case for the proposition that’



& cause of action has been stated, s Spindle Vv. Spindle, 283 F.Supp. - 797 (B.D. N Wey.



1968) (holding that. under New York law inducing @ person to enter into a.



marriage is actionable), the court is not satisfied that counsel have been.



_ ORDERED that counsel for plaintife and defendant submit supplemental. meno



_randa with appropriate citations to authority within 30 days of the date o



1. ‘Whether under Virgin Islands law, 16 V.I.C. 863, a cause of action



for fraud. and deceit will lie where the allegation is fraud in the inducement



ofa marriage, and



1/ A third issue also is possible. If a marriage is void ab initio because



it was fraudulently induced, can the doctrine of interspousal immunity ©

apply, i. i-e:, if void ab initio can the parties be considered to have been

spouses so as to bring | the interspousal immunity doctrine into play.

woe



4 are Sin retry re



eared I En



ro



Se Pann eM ete AE be Oss



OE eater



Se ke ee be ome re ee

Le ees oe



SA ree a esate em he ot



2. Assuming a cause. of action, when such cause of action may be said

to accrue, and _ oO . . ' ; t



3. Assuming a cause of action. and that the alleged fraud occurred



_ prior to the repeal of the interspousal immunity doctrine, whether the cause



of action is barred, and .



4, Whether the interspousal immunity doctrine applies to parties toa



"narriage" which is void ab initio. A dye,

ATTEST: | ss FENRSPL SPs rar

: Judge of the Orial Court , : ’ t

. 2 ot ‘ : : oF

VIOLA E. SMITH en) re

Administrator/Clerk of the Court Lo . . - 4