For Publication
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
K’SHAWN HUGHES, ) 8S. Ct. Crim. No. 2023-0013
Appellant/Defendant ) Re: SX-2017-CR-00398
)
Vv )
)
PEOPLE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS, )
)
Appellee/Plaintiff. )
)
On Appeal from the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands
Division of St. Croix
Superior Court Judge: Hon. Alphonso G. Andrews, Jr
Argued: October 14, 2024
Filed: June 1, 2026
Cite as: 2026 VI 10
BEFORE RHYS S. HODGE, Chief Justices MARIA M. CABRET, Associate Justice; and
IVE ARLINGTON SWAN, Associate Justice
APPEARANCES
Vincent Colianni II, Esq.,
Marina Leonard, Esq
Colianni & Leonard, LLC
Christiansted, U.S.V.1. 00820
Attorneys for Appellant,
Sean P. Bailey, Esq
Assistant Attorney General
Kingshill, U.S.V.I. 00850
Attorney for Appellee
OPINION OF THE COURT
CABRET, Associate Justice
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Opinion of the Court
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q1 K’Shawn Hughes (“Hughes”) appeals from the March 1, 2023 judgment and sentence of
the Superior Court, in which he was sentenced to 30 years in prison for second-degree murder
consistent with the maximum sentence detailed in his plea agreement. For the reasons that follow,
we affirm the judgment and sentence
I FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
q2 On June 4, 2017, at approximately 2:40 p.m., Dean Schneider was fatally shot at the Ruby
M. Rouss Housing Complex in Christiansted, St. Croix. The immediate police investigation led
the officers to Hughes and a likely accomplice, Andre Auguste (“Auguste”),'! who were
apprehended and arrested on the day of the incident. In an information dated December 7, 2017,
Hughes was charged with first-degree murder, 14 V.I.C. section 922(a)(1), (2), unauthorized
possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence, 14 V.I.C. section 2253(a),
and other related charges.”
93 On September 9, 2022, Hughes entered into a plea agreement under which he agreed to
plead guilty to murder in the second degree, 14 V.I.C. section 923(b), and to the unauthorized
possession of a firearm during a crime of violence, 14 V.I.C. section 2253(a). In exchange for
Hughes’s plea, the People agreed to dismiss the remaining charges and to recommend a sentence
of no more than 30 years of incarceration for second-degree murder, with sentences for both
offenses to run concurrently
' Initially charged alongside Hughes in Dean Schneider Hughes’s murder, Auguste later died in a
car accident while released on bail
Hughes was also charged with unauthorized possession of a firearm in a vehicle, 14 V.I.C §
2253(e), first-degree assault, 14 V.ILC. § 295(1), possession of a controlled substance with intent
to distribute, 19 V.I.C. § 604(a)(1), possession of ammunition, 14 V.LC. § 2256(a), third-degree
assault, 14 V.I.C. § 297(2),(3), reckless endangerment in the first degree, 14 V.I.C. § 625(a)
possession of a drug paraphernalia, 19 V.I.C. § 630(a), and discharging or aiming a firearm, 23
V.I.C. § 479(a)
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44 During the September 19, 2022 change of plea hearing, the Superior Court declined to
accept Hughes’s guilty plea to unauthorized possession because he disputed the firearm’s
discovery in the vehicle and his fingerprints on it, leaving an insufficient factual basis to support
the plea on that count. As a result, the People amended the plea agreement to withdraw the
unauthorized possession charge. Pursuant to the amended agreement, Hughes pleaded guilty to
second-degree murder with a stipulated sentencing range of five to 30 years, which the court
accepted
q5 At the sentencing hearing, the People recommended a sentence of five to 30 years while
Hughes’s attorney asked for a sentence of 15 years.? Ultimately, the Superior Court sentenced
Hughes to 30 years in prison. The Superior Court memorialized its decision in a judgment and
sentence entered on March 1, 2023. Hughes timely filed a notice of appeal with this Court on
March 14, 2023
Il DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
46 Under 4 V.LC. § 32(a), this Court has jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments of
the Superior Court. In a criminal case, the written judgment embodying the adjudication of guilt
* Appellant’s and Appellee’s briefs show disagreement as to whether the People requested 25 years
or 30 years at the sentencing hearing. Although it is true that the record shows that the prosecution
orally requested 25 years at the hearing, the record also shows the Superior Court questioning the
inconsistency between the 25 years requested orally and the 30 years written in the plea agreement
To clarify the discrepancy, the People restated: “Paragraph Three of the amended complaint
specifically states that the parties agree to recommend a sentencing range of five to 30 years
incarceration as to Count One. And that is the People’s recommendation to the Court this morning
I said 25 [previously]. I was thinking of the original [sentencing range] but that [five to 30 years]
is the request of the People.” We note that the term “amended complaint” appears to be a
misstatement by counsel during the sentencing hearing, as no amended complaint exists in the
record. It is apparent that counsel intended to reference the amended plea agreement, specifically
paragraph 3, which sets forth the sentencing range discussed
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and the sentence imposed based on that adjudication constitutes a final judgment for purposes of
review. Hightree v. People,
60 V.I. 514 (2014) (citing Williams v. People, 58 V.1. 341, 345 (VI
2013) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Fontaine v. People, 62 V.1. 643, 647 (V1
2015). Because the Superior Court entered a final judgment and sentence on March 1, 2023, this
Court properly exercises jurisdiction over this appeal
q7 The standard of review for our examination of the Superior Court’s application of law is
plenary, while the trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. Antilles Sch., Inc. v.
Lembach, 64 V.1. 400, 408-09 (2016) (citing St. Thomas-St. John Bd. of Elections v. Daniel, 49
V.1. 322, 329 (V.I. 2007)). “Generally, this Court will not review a sentence which falls within
the bounds prescribed by the applicable statute. In that regard, the trial court’s sentencing
determination will be interfered with only upon a showing of illegality or abuse of discretion.”
Cheiuk-Davis v. People, 57 V.1. 317, 321 (V.I. 2012) (citing Brown v. People,
56 V.I. 695, 699
(V.I. 2012)) (internal citations omitted); see also Irons v. People,
57 V.I. 473, 478 (2012). Here
we review the Superior Court’s sentencing decision for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Irons, 57 V.1
at 477-78. “An abuse of discretion arises only when the decision rests upon a clearly erroneous
finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.” Streibich v
Kaplanek, 8. Ct. Civ. No. 2024-0043,
2025 WL 1582282, at ¢ 16 (V.I. June 4, 2025) (citing
Streibich v. Underwood, 74 V.1. 488, 499,
2021 VI 3, | 17 (2021) (internal quotation marks
omitted))
B. The Mitigating Factors
48 On appeal, Hughes challenges his 30-year sentence as excessive, asserting that the Superior
Court abused its discretion and violated his due process rights by disregarding critical mitigating
factors, including his youth, lack of prior felonies, difficult childhood, and potential for
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rehabilitation. Hughes emphasizes that he lacked a stable parental figure, experienced frequent
changes in guardianship, and left school after 10th grade to care for an ill grandmother. He
compares his situation to that in /rons, where a defendant with a lengthy criminal history
nonetheless received 25 years for second-degree murder in part because the court credited her
traumatic childhood. See /rons,
57 V.I. at 475-78, 480. Unlike the court in Jrons, he argues, the
Superior Court here overlooked his background, resulting in a harsher sentence. He further avers
that at the time of the offense he was an emerging adult, with a brain still undergoing critical
development — particularly in the prefrontal cortex governing judgment and impulse control
thereby substantially reducing his moral culpability and elevating his prospects for rehabilitation.’
Hughes also claims that these factors, coupled with his clean criminal record — limited to an
expunged misdemeanor ~ are well-established bases for a shorter sentence. Hughes concludes that
the trial judge imposed the maximum sentence primarily as a deterrent, without considering and
giving meaningful weight to these mitigating circumstances, resulting in a punishment
insufficiently tailored to his individual situation
* To support this argument, Hughes pointed out that “courts in other jurisdictions have held that
age is a mitigating factor in capital murder cases when a defendant is an emerging adult, meaning
an adult aged 18, 19, or 20.” Hughes relies on Commonwealth v. Mattis,
224 N. E. 3d 410 (Mass
2024), arguing that “emerging adults,” young people ages 18-20, share neurological characteristics
with juveniles, affecting reasoning, planning, and impulse control, thus indicating less moral
culpability and greater rehabilitative potential. /d. Nevertheless, Hughes failed to fairly present
this argument to the Superior Court and thus, as he conceded in his brief, has waived it. See V.1
R. App. P. 4(h) (“Only issues and arguments fairly presented to the Superior Court may be
presented for review on appeal ’); V.I. R. App. P. 22(m) (“Issues that were (1) not raised or
objected to before the Superior Court ... are deemed waived for purposes of appeal ”); see
e.g., World Fresh Markets, LLC v. Henry, 71 V.1. 1161, 1172 (V.I. 2019); see also Ubiles v
People,
66 V.I. 572, 584 (V.1. 2017)
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q9 In response, the People contend that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in
sentencing him to 30 years in prison because that sentence fell squarely within the boundaries of
the plea agreement and was well-supported by the record as reflected in the pre-sentencing report
and hearing transcript. The People further maintain that while the Superior Court considered
mitigating factors, it ultimately determined that Hughes’s evident lack of genuine remorse was
paramount, concluding that this outweighed any mitigating circumstances and justified imposing
the maximum sentence allowed under the agreement. We agree with the People
qi0 “A trial court generally enjoys ‘broad discretion in fashioning a sentence within legislative
parameters’ so long as it satisfies constitutional requirements.” Miller v. People, 67 V.1. 827, 837
(V.I. 2017); Brown,
56 V.I. at 713. This Court has long recognized that “when a sentencing judge
is exercising discretion in his sentence, due process permits and requires him to take into account
all aggravating and mitigating factors.” Beaupierre v. People,
55 V.I. 623 (V.I. 2011) (internal
citations omitted). But sentencing is not beyond appellate review, and the punishment imposed
must be fashioned to fit both the defendant and the crime. See Chciuk-Davis v. People, 57 V.1
317, 322 (V.I. 2012); see also Karpouzis v. Gov’t of the V.1.,
58 F. Supp. 2d 635 (D.V.I. 1999)
United States v. Thompson,
483 F.2d 527, 529 (3d Cir. 1973). In other words, the sentencing must
be individualized, that is, the punishment must be tailored “to the circumstances surrounding each
individual defendant.” Thompson,
483 F.2d at 529. Such individualized treatment is necessary “to
consider every convicted person as an individual and every case as a unique study in the human
failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the punishment to ensue.”
United States v. Carter,
564 F. 3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009). (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S
38, 52 (2007). Additionally, while a sentencing court may weigh numerous considerations, the due
process clause imposes a substantial constraint to ensure fundamental fairness in the exercise of
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that discretion. See, e.g, U.S. ex rel. Collins v. Claudy,
204 F.2d 624, 628 (3d Cir. 1953)
Nevertheless, a trial court need not provide an exhaustive recitation of its rationale; a clear
acknowledgment that it has. See Chciuk-Davis,
57 V.I. at 322 (internal citations omitted)
{11 In this case, the record leaves no doubt that the Superior Court considered the full array of
the mitigating circumstances advanced on Hughes’s behalf. The sentencing transcript shows that
the court acknowledged his background as reflected in the presentence report, defense counsel’s
emphasis on Hughes’s youth at the time of the offense and his assessment that Hughes exhibited
genuine remorse, his aspiration to pursue a college degree, as well as his and his mother’s
statements of condolences to Dean Schneider’s family. The Superior Court also directly inquired
whether any additional evidence of remorse or explanation for the crime had been presented on
the record. After Hughes characterized the offense as a “mistake” resulting from youthful
impulsiveness and remarked that “things happen,” the Superior Court determined that these
explanations lacked sincerity and fell short of demonstrating the contrition necessary to mitigate
the severity of his sentence. Finding neither evidence of remorse nor a discernible motive for Dean
Schneider’s murder, the Superior Court characterized the offense as “senseless” and emblematic
of the community’s ongoing struggle with gun violence in the territory. After considering the
presentence report, the mitigating evidence on the record, and the parties’ submissions, the
Superior Court concluded that a 30-year sentence was warranted under the circumstances and
imposed it. Based on these facts, we are persuaded that the Superior Court thoughtfully considered
the aggravating and mitigating factors presented by both sides and exercised its lawful discretion
in tailoring an appropriate sentence to fit Hughes as well as the crime he committed against Dean
Schneider. Therefore, we reject Hughes’s argument that the Superior Court violated his due
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process rights by overlooking the mitigating factors and conclude that the court did not abuse its
discretion
C. Excessiveness of Hughes’s Sentence
{12 We now turn to Hughes’s contention that the 30-year sentence was excessive. The Virgin
Islands Code mandates a minimum sentence of five years for second-degree murder but does not
prescribe a maximum, thereby granting the Superior Court broad discretion in determining an
appropriate sentence. See 14 V.I.C. § 923(b); see, e.g., Irons, 57 V.1. at 480; see Jackson-Flavius
v. People, 57 V.1. 716, 730 (V.1. 2012). Here, Hughes agreed to a sentence ranging anywhere from
five to 30 years in his plea agreement, and the Superior Court sentenced him within the range set
by statute and within the plea agreement sentencing range. Accordingly, we conclude that the
sentence was legally sound, consistent with the plea agreement, and well within the Superior
Court’s lawful discretion. See, e.g., Lake v. Gov’t of the V.1, 69 V.I. 84 (V.I. 2018) (affirming that
the Superior Court possessed the discretion to impose a sentence different from [and in this
instance, greater than] the plea agreement’s recommendation, especially when the defendant
acknowledged this possibility and the recommendation was not binding on the court);° see also
e.g., Brathwaite v. People, 67 V.1. 609 (V.I. 2017) (citing Tindell v. People, 56 V.1. 138, 153 (V.I
2012) (the trial court did not err in imposing a sentence which was within the sentencing range set
by the statute, and which “mirrored the People’s recommended sentence pursuant to the plea
agreement”)); see also Miller v. People, 67 V.1. 827, 837 (V.I. 2017) (citing Brown,
56 V.I. at 713)
‘In Lake, the defendant received a 30-year sentence for second-degree murder notwithstanding a
20-year recommendation in his agreement. This Court rejected Lake’s excessiveness challenge,
citing Jrons for the principle that plea recommendations do not bind the sentencing court so long
as the sentence falls within statutory limits — a constraint Lake acknowledged, just as Hughes
agreed to a five- to thirty-year range
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(“[a] trial court generally enjoys ‘broad discretion in fashioning a sentence within legislative
parameters’ so long as it satisfies constitutional requirements”); see, e.g., Beaupierre, 55 V.1. at
631 (finding that the trial judges must exercise any sentencing discretion within the constraints by
statute, but cannot disregard mandatory minimums even if they believe a lower sentence is
appropriate); see also Brathwaite v. People,
60 V.I. 419 (V.I. 2014) (holding that so long as
statutory and mandatory minimums are respected, the judge’s sentencing discretion is protected,
and the specific sentence selected above the minimum is entrusted to the judge’s careful judgment)
Il CONCLUSION
413 In sentencing Hughes the Superior Court acted well within its lawful discretion, after
conducting a thorough and deliberate evaluation of all pertinent facts and legal arguments. The
record, including the plea and sentencing hearings, demonstrates that the sentencing was a
reasoned and measured exercise of judicial authority, free from arbitrariness or caprice. The
sentence conforms precisely to the plea agreement, and the Superior Court properly considered all
mitigating factors. This appeal borders, in a genteel sense, on the fringe of frivolousness ~ it fails
to present any substantial legal error or meritorious basis for reversal. Accordingly, we affirm the
Superior Court’s judgment and sentence as a reasoned exercise of discretion that faithfully applies
the law to the facts of this case
Dated this 1°‘ day of June 2026
BY THE COVRT
aw
ARIA M BRE’
Associate Justize
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ATTEST
DALILA E. PATTON, ESQ
Clerk of the oe)
Deputy Clerk X..
Date & \ NUNN d