IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS

FILED

July 06, 2023 06:37 PM
SxX-2015-CV-00620

TAMARA CHARLES IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
CLERK OF THE COURT DIVISION OF ST. CROIX
IN RE: Red Dust Claims. Master Case No. SX-2015-CV-620

(Complex Litigation Division)
(Re: 15-1038)

Cite as: 

MEMORANDUM OPINION (SEALED)
(Filed July 6, 2023)

Andrews, Jr., Judge
INTRODUCTION

"1 Plaintiffs bring this action against defendant owners and/or operators
of an alumina refinery plant that existed on St. Croix for many years. They claim,
in 1998, Hurricane Georges blew large quantities of red dust, mud, asbestos and
other particulates onto their nearby family residence which caused them to suffer
property damages and personal injuries, including emotional distress. Plaintiffs
claim Defendants are responsible for the harm they suffered because they: 1)
created bauxite, red mud, and red dust residue as byproducts of their refinery
operations; and 2) failed to properly store, secure and / or remove the byproducts
before and after the storm.

Defendants deny the allegations. They seek to compel Plaintiffs to answer
questions about a sexual molestation incident that occurred around the time of the

storm, involving one of them (i.e., Jane Doe), to challenge their claims for
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emotional damages. Plaintiffs request that this Court issue a protective order
precluding such inquiry. For the reasons mentioned below, this Court finds good
cause to issue an order to protect Plaintiffs from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, and undue burden.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND

"2 On July 8, 2017, plaintiffs Beatrice Rivera, Estrellita John, Yahmillia
John, Ebony Rivera and Alfred John, Jr. commenced this seven-count action for
property damages and personal injuries. They sued refinery owners/operators St.
Croix Alumina LLC, Glencore International AG, Alcoa, Glencore, Ltd. (f/k/a
Clarendon, Ltd.), Century Aluminum Company and St. Croix Renaissance Group,
LLP (SCRG). Plaintiffs filed, among others, a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress (Count 5) and negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count
6) resulting from their exposure to bauxite, red dust, red mud, and other
particulates during and after Hurricane Georges. Compl. pp 21 - 23. They
allege their exposure resulted from Defendants’ failure to properly store secure
and remove these particulates. 

 at8-10. Plaintiffs seek compensatory and
punitive damages. ld. at 33.

"3 Pursuant to the discovery process, the parties scheduled depositions

of plaintiff Jane Doe and one of her siblings for February 10, 2023. When Plaintiff
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and her counsel arrived, defense counsels informed them that medical records for
Ms. Doe revealed she was sexually molested at the age of nine.' Mot. for
Protective Order, Ex. 3 (Affirmation of Att'y Natalie Tang How, p 1 5); Opp. to
Mot. for Protective Order; Decl. of Andrew C. Simpson, p 6 J 15. Defense
counsels stated they would be willing to avoid asking questions regarding the
molestation if Ms. Doe waived her emotional distress claims. Affirmation of Att’y
Natalie Tang How, p 1 46. Attorney Tang How discussed the matter with Ms.
Doe who became agitated but eventually agreed to waive her emotional distress
claim. Affirmation of Att'y Natalie Tang How, p 2 ff 9-10; Decl. of Andrew C.
Simpson, p 7 J 16; Mot. for Protective Order, Ex. 4 (Dep. of Jane Doe, p 5 fq 6 -
10. The deposition thus proceeded without any inquiry regarding the molestation.
Dep. of Jane Doe, pp 5-24; Decl. of Andrew C. Simpson, p 7 916. Towards the
end of the deposition defense counsel indicated they would pursue the molestation
matter with Ms. Doe’s siblings unless they too waived their claims for emotional
distress. Affirmation of Att'y Natalie Tang How, p 2 ¥ 12; Decl. of Andrew C.
Simpson, p 7917. After consultation between Plaintiffs’ counsels, they decided

the siblings would not waive and Ms. Doe would withdraw her waiver as she was

1 Defendants had produced to Plaintiffs on February 9, 2023, the day before the deposition, a related
medical record from Juan Luis Hospital indicating that Jane Doe was molested at age 9, her mother was
unaware of it and Ms. Doe feets like she had worked through it. Mot. for Protective Order, Ex. 1.
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not prepped for the molestation questions. Affirmation of Att'y Natalie Tang How,
p 2 {| 13; Decl. of Andrew C. Simpson, p 8 J 18; Dep. of Jane Doe, p 25 FQ 12-14.
Ms. Doe's counsel further stated, “we would like an opportunity to be able to prep
our witness and review the documents, if that’s the case.” Dep. of Jane Doe, p
25 Jf] 17-19. She further said

Well, on the record, again, we’re rescinding any and all waivers for

not only [Ms. Doe}, for any of the other siblings in this matter. We

would move for protective order if we have to.

Under the circumstances, if you feel that you need to continue to

question this witness along those lines, with your claim that it was

contemporaneously around Hurricane Georges, she will do the best

she can, but | don’t believe she recalls any information.
Dep. of Jane Doe, p 27 [ff 3-11. The deposition of Ms. Doe thus proceeded.
Defense counsel asked Ms. Doe “What events in your life have caused you
emotional distress?” 

 at 29 J] 12-13. Ms. Doe responded, “Please. | don’t
want to do this. Excuse me.” 

 9 14. She then left the conference room
sobbing. Affirmation of Att'y Natalie Tang How, p 3918. The deposition thereby
ended.

On March 15, 2023, Defendants filed the instant motion to compel the

continuation of Ms. Doe’s deposition. On March 31, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a motion

for protective order and opposed Defendants’ motion to compel on April 24, 2023.
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Defendant SCRG responded on April 5, 2023.2 Defendants St. Croix Alumina
LLC, Alcoa Inc., and Glencore Lid. filed their opposition, to Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Protective Order, on April 24, 2023. Piaintiffs replied on May 15, 2023.3 This
Court, on May 15, 2023, held a hearing on both motions and took the matter under
advisement.
APPLICABLE LAW

Parties in a civil proceeding are entitled to “obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense” even if the
information is not admissible. V.I.R Evid. 26(b)(1). The scope of discovery is
thus broad. In the event a party refuses to provide disclosure or discovery, the

opposing party may move to compel such disclosure. V.I.R. Evid. 37(a). The

* In its response, SCRG noted it has no intention to continue nor compel Jane Doe's deposition. As a
consequence, it maintains that Plaintiffs’ motion “can be denied as moot as to SCRG.” Resp. by SCRG,
pi. This Court agrees and thus deems both motions moot as to defendant SCRG.

3 This Court will not consider arguments made in Plaintiffs’ Reply since it exceeds the 20-page limit
permitted by V.1.R. Civ. P. 6-1(e){2) and no permission has been granted to exceed the limit. The Court
further notes that the Reply consists of some 25 pages much of which address matters impertinent to the
issues in the motion for protective order, lacks merit, or repeats arguments made in the motion for protective
order, Plaintiffs spend numerous pages attempting to demonstrate inconsistent positions taken by
Defendants in an attempt to bolster an argument for judicial estoppel which is inapplicable here. See
Sarauw v. Fawkes, 

, 2264 - 65 (V.1. 2017) (concluding that judicial estoppel precludes a party
from asserting a position “that is inconsistent with a position taken by that party in a previous judicial
proceeding.) (emphasis supplied). Plaintiffs’ attempt, in this Court's view, constitutes petty nit-picking, is
based on speculative accusations of counsel’s motives and is not helpful to the court.

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party refusing to provide disclosure or discovery may also seek a protective order
to preclude it.

The issuance of protective orders is governed by the Virgin Islands Rules of
Evidence. Such orders may issue upon a showing that good cause exist “to
protect a parly or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden or expense.” V.I.R. Evid. 26(c)(1). A protective order may take many
forms including: forbidding the disclosure or discovery sought; specifying the terms
of disclosure or discovery; prescribing an alternate method of discovery; or limiting
the scope of the discovery or disclosure. 

 To establish “good cause” a party
must specifically demonstrate that “disclosure will cause a clearly defined and

serious injury.” Gienmede Trust Co. v. Thompson, 

, 483 (3d Cir.

1995) (construing F.R.E. 26(c) from which V.1.R. Evid. 26(c) was adopted). In
determining the existence of good cause, the court should engage in a balancing
process and consider: the need for information by the requesting party; the injury
that might result by compelled uncontrolled disclosure; any privacy interest of the
party seeking protection; whether the information is being sought for a legitimate
purpose versus improper purpose; and whether the party benefitting from an order

of confidentiality is a public entity or official. See Pansy v. Borough of

Stroudsburg, 

, 787 - 88 (3d Cir. 1994) (construing F.R.E. 26(c) from

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which V.LR. Evid. 26(c) was adopted). In determining the propriety of issuing a

protective order, this Court exercises broad discretion. See Molloy _v.

Independence Blue Cross, 

 (V.I. 2012) (acknowledging “the trial

court's broad discretion to control discovery.”).
LEGAL ANALYSIS

Defendants seek to compel Plaintiff Jane Doe to complete her deposition
testimony which she terminated on February 10, 2023. Specifically, they wish to
depose her regarding a molestation incident she endured as a child. Mot. to
Compel, pp 1, 11. Defendants argue their inquiry is relevant to Plaintiffs’
emotional distress claims because the molestation incident occurred around the
time of hurricane Georges and constitutes an alternate stressor they are entitled
to probe. Plaintiffs oppose the motion and seek an order protecting them from
such discovery pursuant to V.IL.R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1) and V.LR. Evid. 412.4

Specifically they ask this Court to issue a protective order:

4 in their Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Compel, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants were required
to disclose Ms. Doe’s medical records in advance of her deposition. Opp. to Mot. to Compel,p 11. Since
the Court is denying the motion to compel on other grounds, it does not reach Plaintiffs’ disclosure
argument.

Plaintiffs mention in their Motion for Protective Order that Defendants acted in bad faith by
deliberately withholding Ms. Doe’s medical records until the day before her deposition, attempting to seek
a waiver of emotional distress claims and refusing to stop her deposition to allow for a protective order.
Mot. for Protective Order, pp 23 —- 24. They do not explain, nor cite any authority as to, how such action,
if it occurred, relates to their motion for protective order. Further, their conclusion constitutes pure
speculation, The Court thus does not consider Plaintiffs’ bad faith allegation in determining the motion for
protective order.
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a. prohibiting Defendants from obtaining any additional deposition
testimony of Ms. Doe;

b. prohibiting Defendants from asking any questions of Ms. Does’ siblings
or other family members regarding Ms. Doe or the sexual molestation of
Ms. Doe; and

c. barring Defendants from disclosing or inquiring into the sexual history of
any plaintiff coordinated under this Master Case.

Mot. for Protective Order, pp 1, 14, 16. Additionally Plaintiffs ask this Court to
“order the information contained in the medical records relating to reports of a
history of sexual assault shall be immediately redacted”; and to issue a Standing
Order applicable to all complex litigation cases pertaining to discovery of prior
sexual history. 

. As explained below, this Court finds Defendants’
intended inquiry permissible, but will restrict the mode of inquisition.

1) Defendants Are Entitled To Seek Discovery Regarding Ms. Doe’s

Molestation Incident As \t Is a Nonprivileged Matter Relevant to Her
Emotional Distress Claim.

Defendants maintain they are entitled to pursue deposition inquiry of Ms.
Doe’s molestation incident based on V.I.R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). This Court agrees.

The rule provides that

“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that

is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the

needs of the case . . . Information within this scope of discovery need
not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.”
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V.LR. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). This rule of discovery is rather broad as explained by the

United States Supreme Court in Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 

(1984). There, the court stated

“The Rules do not differentiate between information that is private or
intimate and that to which no privacy interests attach. Under the
Rules, the only express jimitations are that the information sought is
not privileged and is relevant to the subject matter of the pending
action. Thus, the Rules often allow extensive intrusion into the affairs
of both litigants and third parties.”

. Accordingly, absent the existence of some privilege, any matter is
subject to discovery so long as it is relevant to any party's claim or defense.

IceMOS Tech. Corp. v. Omron Corp., No. CV-17-2575, 

, at *8 (D. Ariz. Apr 17, 2020) (stating “[bJut now, Rule 26(b){1)’s plain
language limits discovery to matters relevant to the parties’ claims and defenses.”)

Here, Ms. Doe and her siblings all jaunched claims for intentional and
negligent infliction of emotional distress allegedly caused by Defendants’ conduct.
Evidence regarding an alternate contemporaneous source of emotional distress is
certainly relevant to their claims. Defendants are thus entitled to investigate and
discover such alternate source of distress as no evidence or argument of privilege

has been presented. See Keller v. Arrieta, Civ. No. 20-259, 

, at* 7 (D.N.M. Jul 27 2021) (ruling that if the counter-plaintiff were to argue
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he suffered a specific emotional distress, counter-defendant “should have the
opportunity to discover other sources of stress that could provide alternative

explanations for the manifestation of his emotional distress.”); Mahoney v. L.S.

Holdings, Civ. No. 2012-67, 

, at *4 (D.V.I. Aug 6,
2013) (stating “[W]here a party seeks damages based upon a mental or emotional
condition allegedly brought on by defendants’ actions, it cannot seriously be
argued that a defendant is not permitted to investigate the scope of such condition,
including . . . whether the condition arose from some other cause.”); Leidel_v.

Ameripride Servs., 291 Fed. Supp. 2d 1241, 1245 (D. Kan. 2003) (rejecting

Plaintiff's argument that evidence was admitted in violation of Fed. R. Evid. 412,
and holding “[bjecause Plaintiff sought compensatory damages for emotional
suffering, evidence concerning other sources of emotional distress during that time
of his life was quite probative.”). Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to inquire
into the impact of the molestation incident, if any, upon Plaintiffs’ emotional distress
claims.

Plaintiffs assert that Defendants “claim that the sole purpose of inquiring into
the sexual molestation issue is to impeach Jane Doe’s credibility.” Mot. for
Protective Order, p 16, 21 (arguing “Defendants have conceded that the sole

purpose of inquiring into sexual molestation is to impeach Jane Doe's credibility.”).
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in support to this assertion, Plaintiffs cite to an email, from defense counsel
regarding the duty to disclose Plaintiffs’ medical records, wherein counsel stated
that the duty to self-disclose records “applies to documents a party may use to
support its claims or defenses,” and “does not apply to documents solely used for
impeachment purposes.” 

. Plaintiffs misread Defendants’ position.
The email reveals Defendants’ position regarding their duty to self-disclose the

medical records of Ms. Doe already in Defendants’ possession. Pursuant to

VIR. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A), no such disclosure is required if the medical records are

to be used solely for impeachment. Defendants’ position regarding the deposition

of Ms. Doe, to acquire new information, is that Rule 26(b)(1) permits such
discovery since it is related to her emotional distress claim. Nothing presented to
this Court suggests that Defendants are pursuing further deposition of Ms. Doe
solely for impeachment purposes and Defendants have made no such claim. As

such Plaintiffs’ reliance on the holding in Doe v. City of San Diego, Civil No. 12-

CV-0689, 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 109061, at *13 (S.D. Calif. Aug. 1, 2013)
(concluding the intended deposition inquiry regarding the plaintiff's sexual history
was irrelevant to her credibility) is misplaced.

2) Rule 412 Is inapplicable To The Instant Proceeding.

Plaintiffs rely heavily on V.I.R. Evid. 412 to support their request to preclude
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any further inquiry regarding the molestation incident. They argue “[t]his Court
need only look to the history of the rape shield law (V.1.R. Evid. 412) and the sordid
history that led to its enactment and amendment for guidance.” Mot. for Protective
Order, p 16. They emphasize that F.R.E. 412 (from which V.1.R. Evid. 412 was
adopted) was extended to civil cases to protect alleged victims against invasion of
privacy, embarrassment, and stereotyping. 

. Rule 412 is a rule of
exclusion and provides as follows:

(a) Prohibited Uses. The following evidence is not admissible in a civil or
criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct:

(1) evidence offered to prove that a victim engaged in other sexual
behavior; or

(2) evidence offered to prove a victim’s sexual predisposition.
V.LR. Evid. Rule 412. A cursory reading of the rule quickly reveals it is intended

to apply to civil cases involving alleged sexual misconduct. This conclusion is

reinforced by the committee notes to F.R.E. 412 (from which V.LR. Evid. 412 was
adopted verbatim). Those notes provide

While often used in criminal cases involving sexual assault and rape,
the prohibition in Rule 412 also applies “in any civil case in which a
person claims to be the victim of sexual misconduct, such as actions
for sexual battery or sexual harassment.”

F.R.E. 412, Advisory Committee Notes (emphasis supplied). Plaintiffs’ claims
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here involve no allegation that any of them was a victim of sexual misconduct.
Even if they did, Defendants do not seek to offer evidence of Ms. Doe’s sexual
molestation “to prove that she engaged in other sexual behavior” or “to prove her
sexual predisposition.” V.ILR. Evid. 412(a)(1)(2). Instead, they seek to probe and
present evidence of an alternate cause of Ms. Doe’s emotional distress claim.
Rule 412 is thus wholly inapplicable here and Plaintiffs’ reliance thereon is
misplaced.

Plaintiffs’ argument, pursuant to Rule 412(b)(2), that Defendants’ need to
impeach credibility does not substantially outweigh the demonstrated harm to Jane
Doe, is likewise misplaced. Mot. for Protective Order, p 18. Rule 412(b)(2)
creates an exception in civil cases, to the presumptive exclusion of evidence of a
victim’s sexual behavior or predisposition, where the probative value substantially
outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party. It
does not come into play unless a party seeks to admit evidence of a victim’s sexual
behavior or predisposition. Since such is not the nature of the evidence here,
412(b)(2) is irrelevant. For these reasons, Rule 412 does not preclude disclosure
of, nor inquiry into, Ms. Doe’s sexual history.

3) Good Cause Exists To Issue a Protective Order Regarding Further
Deposition of Ms. Doe,

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Although Rule 412 does not preclude inquiry into Ms. Doe’s molestation
incident, this Court may preciude or restrict such inquiry, upon a showing of good
cause, to protect Plaintiffs from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden. V.L.R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). Here it is clear that Ms. Doe suffered severe
emotional trauma as a result of being presented with a simple inquiry, i.e., “what
events in your life have caused you emotional distress.” Mot. for Protective Order,
Ex. 4 (Dep. of Jane Doe, p 29: 12-13). She obviously knew the question related
to the molestation incident as her counsel had advised her, before the deposition
commenced, that defense counsel was aware of it. At that point, according to her
deposition counsel, “she became agitated and panicked and was clearly under
duress.” Mot. for Protective Order, Ex. 3 (Affirmation of Att'y Natalie Nelson Tang
How, p 2 {| 9). Another plaintiffs counsel, shortly after termination of the
deposition, observed Ms. Doe crying uncontrollably and repeating “nobody
protects me” and “I feel so dirty” and “now everyone knows.” Mot. for Protective
Order, Ex. 9 (Affirmation of Rhea R. Lawrence, p 1 45). An hour later, at Ms.
Doe's home, counsel further observed her hyperventilating in a fetal position,
crying and repeating the phrases: “| need to protect her;” “I want to go home;”
“people cannot be trusted;” and “they wasn’t supposed to know.” 

 at 2 § 13.

Ms. Doe failed to respond to counsel’s attempt to get through to her. Id. J 14.
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Under these circumstances the Court concludes that any further attempt to
depose Ms. Doe on the subject of the molestation would result in further
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, and undue burden to her. This Court
will not permit such victim re-traumatization to occur and will thus preclude further
deposition of Ms. Doe. Although not directly applicable, restricting discovery
under the circumstances here is consistent with the policies underlying related rule
F.R.E. 412 from which V.I.R. Evid. 412 was adopted. See F.R.E. 412, Advisory
Committee Notes (explaining that Rule 412 was extended to civil cases in part due
to “the need to protect alleged victims against invasions of privacy, potential
embarrassment, and unwarranted sexual _ stereotyping.”). Under the
circumstances, Defendants can obtain the desired discovery through less intrusive
means.

The Court is mindful though that Defendants have a right to conduct
discovery and properly assess Ms. Doe’s emotional distress claim to prepare their
defense. Having balanced this right and the need for information against the
injury that will almost certainly result through deposition inquiry, the Court
concludes that inquiry via interrogatories is more appropriate. See V.I.R. Civ. P.
26(c)(1)(C). This will allow Defendants to seek discovery regarding the

molestation incident and at the same time protect Ms. Doe from further injury.
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Defendants’ right is not unfairly compromised by limiting the mode of pursuit to
interrogatories and reasonable parameters set by the court. Further, no purpose
of deposition overrides the significant risk of harm to Ms. Doe. The Court thus
finds good cause to issue a protective order, pursuant to Rule 26(c)(1)(C), to avoid
the harm noted above.®

4) Good Cause Exists To Issue a Protective Order Regarding Further
Depositions Of Ms. Doe’s Family Members.

Plaintiffs also seek a protective order precluding further depositions of Ms.
Doe's siblings and family members regarding Ms. Doe or the molestation incident.
Mot. for Protective Order., p 1. They inform that depositions of the siblings and
family members have been completed but any inquiry related to Ms. Doe was
immediately terminated by counsel pursuant to V.I.R. Civ. P. 30(d)(3)(A). 

.
The issue is thus whether further deposition of those individuals should be
protected. This Court so concludes.

Based upon the facts presented, it is unclear whether Ms. Doe’s siblings and

other family members knew about her molestation during the time of Hurricane

Georges when they claim to have suffered emotional distress. Directly

5 Defendants claim that Plaintiffs’ request for a protective order under V.I.R. Civ. P. 30 is untimely. Opp. to
Mot. for Protective Order, p 23. The Court does not address this claim since: Plaintiffs moved for a
protective order pursuant to V.ILR. Evid. 412, V.LR. Civ. P. 26(c} and V.LR. Civ. P. 30(d)(3)(A); and this
Court is granting the motion pursuant to Rule 26(c), not Rule 30.
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mentioning Ms. Doe or her molestation, under those circumstances, would likely
lead to further embarrassment, annoyance and burden to them and Ms. Doe.
There is thus good cause to limit the scope of their inquiry in this regard. V.1.R. Civ.
P. 26(c)(1)(D). Accordingly, Defendants may conduct further depositions of Ms.
Doe's siblings and family members however: 1) they may not mention Ms. Doe’s
name, 2) they may not mention Ms. Doe’s sexual molestation or any sexual
conduct unless the matter is mentioned in response to an inquiry; and 3) any
inquiry probing alternative causes of the siblings’ and family members’ claimed
emotional distress must be limited to the time period of Hurricane Georges in 1998.
These limitations would provide adequate protection from the potential injury
mentioned above.
5) Plaintiffs’ Request To Issue a Blanket Order Barring Disclosure or

Discovery Regarding the Sexual History of All Plaintiffs Under The
Instant Master Case is Overbroad.

Plaintiffs seek an order “barring Defendants from disclosing or inquiring into
the sexual history of any plaintiff coordinated under this Master Case.” Mot. for
Protective Order, p 1. They have presented no specific argument or support for
such an overly broad blanket request. Absent some rational basis, it is more
appropriate to address such discovery matters on a case-by-case basis.

Plaintiffs’ request will thus be denied.
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6) Plaintiffs’ Request To Redact Medical Records Is Vaque and Overbroad.

Plaintiffs ask this Court to “order that information contained in medical
records relating to reports of a history of sexual assault shall be immediately
redacted.” Mot. for Protective Order, p 26. They provide no further information,
support, nor rationale, regarding their request. Consequently, it is unclear
whether the request targets medical records of the instant plaintiffs, medical
records of all plaintiffs and/or witnesses in all cases coordinated under the instant
master Case, or medical records in all cases. Further, Plaintiffs do not specify
whether their request pertains to records filed with this Court, in the hands of
opposing counsel or in the possession of medical providers/institutions. More
significantly, Plaintiffs set forth no basis for their blanket request. V.I.R. Civ. P. 6-
1(a)(2) (requiring that all motions “state with particularity the grounds for seeking
the order, including a concise statement of reasons and citation of authorities.”).
Their request is thus vague, overbroad, and legally unsupported. As such, this
Court will deny it.

7) Plaintiffs’ Request To Issue a Standing Order Is Inappropriate.

In addition to a protective order, Plaintiffs ask this Court to issue a Standing
Order “applicable to all complex litigation matters.” Mot. for Protective Order, p

26. The order would include a statement that “there is a presumption that a
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plaintiff's prior sexual history, including the history of being a sexual abuse/assault
victim, is irrelevant and not subject to discovery under Virgin Islands Rule of Civil
Procedure 26"; and would set forth a standard procedure regarding discovery of a
party or witness’ sexual history. 

 This order, Plaintiffs’ claim, is justified since
sexual assault is one of the most serious and fast-growing violence in the territory
and statistics show that one of every three girls and one of every five boys will be
a victim of sexual assault before age eighteen. 

 For several reasons,
Plaintiffs’ motion is inappropriate.

First, inserting a request for issuance of an order, applicable to all complex
cases, in an individual case which involves several sealed documents (including
the instant opinion) is inappropriate. Second, a far-reaching order, as Plaintiffs
seek, should not be issued based solely on input from a single litigant. Third,
Plaintiffs cite no legal authority in support of their requested order. Particularly,
absent from Plaintiffs’ request is a single authority for the assertion that there is a
presumption that a plaintiffs prior sexual history is irrelevant and not subject to
discovery under V.LR. Civ. P. 26. The Court will thus deny Plaintiffs’ request for
a standing order.

CONCLUSION

74 For the reasons mentioned above, this Court will: deny Defendants’
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Motion to Compel; grant Plaintiffs’ Motion for Protective Order regarding inquiry
into Ms. Doe’s sexual molestation as modified herein; and deny Plaintiffs’ Motion
for Protective Order regarding disclosure of the sexual history of any plaintiff under
the instant master case, the redaction of all medicai records relating to sexual
assaults, and regarding a standing order applicable to all complex litigation cases
pertaining to discovery of prior sexual history. An order consistent herewith will

be issued contemporaneously.

DATE: July 6, 2023

ALPHONSO G. ANDREWS, JR.
Superior Court Judge

Attest:
TAMARA CHARLES
CLERK OF THE COURT

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ZOURT,.CLERK Ill

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