IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
DIVISION OF ST THOMAS AND ST JOHN
PEOPLE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS )
)
Plaintiff )
v ) CASE NO ST 21 CR 380
)
MICAIAH COZIER )
)
Defendant ) Cite as 2022 V 1 Super 94U
)
ANNA B SCOTT Esq NICOLE LYNN KING RICHARDSON Esq
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL KING & KING LAW P C
Department of Justice 5043 Norre Gade, Suite 201
34 38 Kronprindsens Gade St Thomas V I 00802
GERS Building, 2“d Floor Attorney for Defendant Micaiah Cozier
St Thomas V I 00802
Attorney for the People of the Virgin Islands
CARTY RENEE GUMBS Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION
1]] THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss filed on March 22 2022 by
Defendant, Micaiah Cozier (“Cozier’), pursuant to Virgin Islands Rules of Criminal Procedure
l2(b)(3)(B)(ii) and 47 Defendant moves this Court to dismiss eleven counts two (2), four (4), six
(6) eight (8) ten(10) twelve(12) fourteen(l4) sixteen(l6) eighteen(l8) twenty (20) and twenty
two (22) or in the alternative, to consolidate the counts into one charge The People of the Virgin
Islands (“the People ’) filed their Opposition on March 29, 2022 For the reasons that follow,
Defendant’s motion will be granted in part and denied in part
I FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROLND
1|2 The People allege that on the morning of December 4, 2021, a black Honda Odyssey van
entered Havensight Shopping Center, St Thomas, Virgin Islands, and parked across Glitters jewelry
People ofthe Vtrgm Islands v Mzcazah ( ozzer Cite as 2022 V I Super 94U
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Memorandum Opini0n
store with the vehicle angled to face the exit At approximately 1 1 00 a m , three (3) men wearing all
black and masks exited the van and ran into the jewelry store Two (2) of the men carried guns and
one (1) carried an empty bag One of the patrons attempted to leave but was dragged back into the
store against her will by one of the gunmen The men stole approximately eighteen thousand dollars
($18,000) worth of jewelry, including a “gold byzantine necklace and “Gucci earrings ” Seconds
later, the three males vacated the store and ran into the van Before entering the van, one of the gunmen
turned and discharged several rounds in the storefront’s direction The security officer was shot in the
abdomen and taken to Roy Lester Schneider Hospital Gregorianna Julien who was pulled back into
the store moments earlier by a gunman, was shot in the shoulder, and subsequently passed away on
January 2 2022
113 Virgin Islands police officers were immediately dispatched to Glitters jewelry store where,
upon arrival, they interviewed witnesses and collected multiple spent castings as part of their
investigation On December 15, 2021 officers interviewed a witness who claimed he observed four
men and identified three of the four men by familiarity and clothing description, including the
Defendant On December 16, 2021, Cozier was brought in for questioning, however, he denied any
association with the robbery Nevertheless, the officers advised Defendant ofhis constitutional rights,
arrested him, and remanded him to the Bureau of Corrections
{4 On February 2, 2022, the People formally charged Cozier with twenty eight counts in the
Information
i Count One Murder in the First Degree (Aiding and Abetting) tit 14 V I C §§ 921
922(a)(2) § 1 1(3)
ii Count Two Use of a Firearm During the Commission of Murder in the First Degree
(Aiding and Abetting) tit 14 V I C § 2253(a) § 1 1(a)
2
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iii Count Three Assault in the First Degree (Aiding and Abetting) tit 14 V I C § 295(3)
§ ll(a)
iv Count Four Use of a Firearm During the Commission of Assault in the First Degree
(Aiding and Abetting) tit 14 V I C § 2253(a) § ll(a)
v Count Five Assault in the Third Degree (Aiding and Abetting) tit 14 VIC §
297(1)(2)(4) § 11(3)
vi Count Six Use of a Firearm During the Commission of Assault in the Third Degree
(Aiding and Abetting) tit 14 V I C § 2253(a) § ll(a)
vii Count Seven Attempted Murder in the First Degree (Aiding and Abetting), tit 14 V I C
§§ 921 922(a)(2)' § 331 § ll(a)
viii Count Eight Use of Firearm During the Commission of Attempted Murder in the First
Degree (Aiding and Abetting) tit 14 V I C § 2253(a) § 1 1(a)‘
ix Count Nine Assault in the First Degree (Aiding and Abetting) tit 14 V I C § 295(3)
§ 11(8)‘
x Count Ten Use of a Firearm During the Commission of Assault in the First Degree
(Aiding and Abetting) tit 14 V I C § 2253(a) § 1 1(a)
xi Count Eleven Assault in the Third Degree (Aiding and Abetting) tit 14 V I C §
297(l)(2)(4) § I1(a)
xii Count Twelve Use of a Firearm During the Commission of Assault in the Third Degree
(Aiding and Abetting) tit 14 V I C §2253(a) § ll(a)
xiii Count Thirteen Kidnapping for the Purpose of Robbery (Aiding and Abetting), tit 14
VIC §1052(a) §ll(a)
xiv Count Fourteen Use of a Firearm During the Commission of Kidnapping for the Purpose of
Robbery (Aiding and Abetting) tit 14 V I C § 2253(a) § 1 1(a)
xv Count Fifteen Robbery in the First Degree (Aiding and Abetting) tit 14 V I C §§ 1861
l862(l)(2) § ll(a)
xvi Count Sixteen Use of a Firearm During the Commission of Robbery in the First Degree
(Aiding and Abetting) tit 14 V I C § 2253(a) § 1 1(a)
xvii Count Seventeen Robbery in the Second Degree (Aiding and Abetting), tit 14 V I C
§§ 1861 1863(l)(2) § ll(a)
3
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xviii Count Eighteen Use of a Firearm During the Commission of Robbery in the Second
Degree (Aiding and Abetting) tit 14 V I C § 2253(a) § 1 Ma)
xix Count Nineteen Unlawful Entry (Aiding and Abetting) tit 14 V I C § 445' § 1 1(a)
xx Count Twenty Use ofa Firearm During the Commission of Unlawfill Entry (Aiding and
Abetting) tit 14 V I C § 2253(a) § 11(a)‘
xxi Count Twenty One Grand Larceny (Jewelry) (Aiding and Abetting) tit 14 V I C §§
1081' 1083(a)(1)'§ ll(a)
xxii Count Twenty Two Use of a Firearm During the Commission of Grand Larceny (Aiding
and Abetting) tit 14 V I C § 2253(a) § ll(a)
xxiii Count Twenty Three Reckless Endangerment in the First Degree (Aiding and Abetting),
tit 14 V I C §625(a) §ll(a)
xxiv Count Twenty Four Unauthorized Possession of Ammunition ( 40 S&W) (Aiding and
Abetting) tit 14 V I C §2256(a)(4) § ll(a)
xx» Count Twenty Five Unauthorized Possession of Ammunition (9mm) (Aiding and
Abetting) tit 14 V I C § 2256(a)(4) § 1 1(a)'
xxvi Count Twenty Six Grand Larceny (Auto) (Aiding and Abetting) tit 14 V I C §§ 1081'
1083(a)(l) § ll(a)
xxvii Count Twenty Seven Unauthorized Use of a Vehicle (Aiding and Abetting), tit of 14 V I C
§ 1382 § 1 1(a)
xxviii Count Twenty Eight Conspiracy tit 14 V I C § 551(1)
The other three co defendants were also charged with twenty eight (28) counts each of
the identical information and formally joined in the above captioned matter '
115 In his motion, Cozier moves for the Court to dismiss counts 2, 4 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20,
and 22 on the grounds that they are multiplicitous ’ In the alternative, he seeks to consolidate these
counts into a single charge of use of a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence Id
' The People filed a Motion for Joinder of Defendants on March 17, 2022, and since the filing of the Motion to Dismiss,
all four cases were consolidated on September 2 2022
I Defendant‘s Motion to Dismiss, p l 4
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Memorandum Opinion
Cozier asserts that the People overcharged him with use of a firearm by fail[ing] to identify that
although there may be more than one statutory crime of violence involved in the single underlying
criminal incident, the elements [of the firearms charges that he seeks to consolidate or dismiss] remain
the same ”3 Defendant further states that irrespective of any of the crimes enumerated, he is accused
of possessing only one firearm Cozier concluded that there are no additional facts supporting an
allegation that he possessed any other weapon
116 In their opposition the People contend that the charges are not multiplicitous as each charge
is associated with a predicate crime of violence ’ which includes different elements 4 The Pe0ple also
aver that there were at least two guns involved during the commission of the crimes charged in the
Infomation Id at 1] 9 Finally, the People argue that the Superior Court cases that the Defendant
relied upon are not only non binding, but were applied in the context of sentencing, not charging As
such, Defendant s motion to dismiss should be denied
[1 LEGAL STANDARD
1|7 Title 14, § 104 of the Virgin Islands Code prevents multiple punishments for an act or
omission that can be charged under several different counts 5 This rule provides
“An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different
provisions of this Code may be punished under any of such provisions, but in no case
may it be punished under more than one An acquittal or conviction and sentence under
any one bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other ”
1|8 Thus, [t]he plain language of § 104 indicates that despite the fact that an individual can be
charged and found guilty of violating multiple provisions in different ways arising from a single act
or omission, that individual can ultimately only be punished under one offense Galloway v People,
3 Defendant 5 Motion to Dismiss, p 6
4 People 3 Opposition to Defendant 5 Motion to Dismiss pp 3 4, at *3
5 14 V I C § [04 see also People v Prmgle No ST 2020 CR 00262 2021 VI Super 94U at1| l6
5
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57 V I 693 712 (2012) (quoting Wzlliams v People 56 V I 821 832 (V I 2012)) see also Tyson v
People 59 V I 391 428 (V I 2013) The Court in I ’mted States v Pollen 978 F 2d 78 83 (3d Cir
1992) held that ‘a multiplicitous indictment charges the same offense in two or more counts and may
lead to multiple sentences for a single violation, 3 result prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause
'9 In determining whether an indictment is multiplicitous, this Court looks to whether “separate
and distinct prohibited acts ’ have been committed Umted States v Planck, 493 F 3d 501, 503 (5th
Cir 2007) Where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory
provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether
each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not Blockburger v Umted States 284
U S 299 304
52 S Ct 180
76 L Ed 306 (1932) lmted States v Hodge 211 F 3d 74 78 (3d Cir
2000) (using the test set forth in Blockburger to determine whether certain offenses grew out of the
same occurrence) I S v Liotard
817 F 2d 1074 1077 1078 (3d Cir 1987) Titre v People 70 V I
797 803 2019 V I 3 (2019) Iannellz v Umted States 420 U S 770 785 n 17
95 S Ct 1284
43
L Ed 2d 616 (1975) (explaining that the Blockburger test serves the fimction of identifying
congressional intent to impose separate sanctions for multiple offenses arising in the course of a single
act or transaction ’)
$10 This test, however, is a rule of statutory construction, and because it serves as a means of
discerning [legislative] purpose the rules should not be controlling where, for example, there is a clear
indication of contrary legislative intent See thre at 803 (2019) Under Blockburger, a court is
expressly required to consider whether the offenses all arose from a single act or omission Id
However, even if a court finds that two statutes forbid the same conduct under the Blockburger test,
the government may still endeavor to impose cumulative punishment under two statutes in the same
trial if the legislature specifically authorized cumulative punishment Missouri v Hunter, 459 U S
6
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359 368 369 103 S Ct 673
74 L Ed 2d 535 (1983) see also Albernaz v United States 450 U S
333 337
101 S Ct 1137
67 L Ed 2d 275 (1981) In other words the Blockburger test examines
‘ whether the legislature intended to make separately punishable the different types of conduct referred
to in the various counts ’ United States v Stanfa,
685 F 2d 85, 87 (3d Cir 1982)
1|ll With respect to legislative intent, the United States Supreme Court has noted that “[b]ecause
the substantive power to prescribe crimes and determine punishments is vested with the legislature,
the question under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment [of] whether punishments
are multiple’ is essentially one of legislative intent ” Ohio v Johnson, 467 U S 493, 499,
104 S Ct
2536
81 L Ed 2d 425 (1984) (citing Hunter at 678 679) As a result the sentencing discretion of the
judicial branch is limited by the legislative branch in that courts must ensure that the punishment
imposed upon a defendant does not surpass that prescribed by the legislature See Hunter at 366, see
also I ’mted States v Hodge 870 F 3d 184 193 94 (3d Cir 2017)
'12 The Virgin Islands firearms statute criminalizes the unauthorized possession, bearing,
transporting, or carrying of a firearm It imposes additional penalties if the defendant also commits or
attempts to commit a “crime of violence Id Section 2253(a) of Title 14 of the Virgin Islands Code
provides
Whoever, unless otherwise authorized by law, has, possesses, bears, transports or
carries either, actually or constructively, openly or concealed any firearm, as defined
in Title 23, section 451(f) of this code, loaded or unloaded, may be arrested without a
warrant, and shall be sentenced to imprisonment of not less than ten years and shall be
fined not less than $10,000 nor more than $15,000 or both the fine and imprisonment,
except that or if such firearm or an imitation thereof was had, possessed, home,
transported or carried by or under the proximate control of such person during the
commission or attempted commission of a crime of violence, as defined in
subsection (d) hereof, then such person shall be fined $25 000 and imprisoned not less
than fifteen (15) years nor more than twenty (20) years The foregoing applicable
7
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penalties provided for violation of this section shall be in addition to the penalty
provided for the commission of, or attempt to commit, the felony or crime of violence
aunt:
((1) As used in this chapter
( 1) “Crime of violence” shall have the same definition as that contained in Title 23,
section 451(g) of this Code ”6
[4 V I C § 2253
Title 23, section 451(g) states that a ‘ crime of violence means the crime of, or the attempt to
commit, murder in any degree, voluntary manslaughter rape, arson, discharging or aiming firearms,
mayhem, kidnapping, assault in the first degree, assault in the second degree, assault in the third
degree, robbery, burglary, unlawful entry or larceny 23 V I C § 451
1113 The latter portion of section 2253(a) regarding a crime of violence is structured as a sentencing
enhancement and attaches to the underlying offense in a separate charge Hodge at 198 (2017) In
effect, the latter portion of section 2253(a) cannot stand alone and must be associated with an
underlying violent offense Because § 2253(a) serves as an enhancement to each underlying charge
and each crime ofviolence varies in punishment, it stands to reason that the enhancement is applicable
to each respective underlying charge Use of a firearm only enhances the underlying sentence and
cannot serve as the basis for another prosecution for a firearm possession offense under section
2253(a) Untied States v Xavzer 2 F 3d 1281 1291 (3d Cir 1993) ( [Section 2253] provides
punishment for use or possession except that’ a greater punishment applies for a defendant convicted
of possessing a weapon during a crime of violence ”), see also I ’mted States v Fontame, 697 F 3d
221 at 229 (‘ It is thus the lack of authorization to have a firearm that stands as a prerequisite to
criminal liability [under section 2253(a)] ) Also, section 2253(a) unequivocally provides in the last
6 14 V I C § 2253(a) (d)
8
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sentence that the punishment imposed is in addition to the sentence imposed for the underlying
charge Hence, the Virgin Islands Legislature intended this charge to be separate and apart, and in
addition to each and any of the specified crimes of violence under § 451(g)
III LEGAL DISCUSSION
'|l4 In his motion, Cozier relies heavily upon Connor v People, 59 VI 286, 310 (VI 2013)
(citing Blockburger which states that multiplicity occurs where criminal charges have identical
statutory elements, or one is a lesser included offense of the otheg Cozier applies this standard to
his case and asserts that the People improperly charged him with eleven excessive counts in the
Information under § 2253(a) because each count shares identical elements, to wit (1) defendant
possessed a firearm; and (2) during the commission or attempted commission of a crime of violence
Next, Cozier argues that the People exceeded the limits set by the legislature s constitutionally valid
definition of chargeable offenses ’7 because they linked § 2253(a) to every underlying crime of
violence charged in the Information Cozier rationalizes his argument using the standard set forth in
People v Colon, 60 V I 149, 163 (2014) by arguing that the use of the indefinite article “a” under §
2253(a) in “a crime of violence” should be interpreted as a single charge because the legislature of
the Virgin Islands did not intend for there to be separate units of prosecution” for each ofthe pertinent
crimes of violence alleged in a single case Quoting Colon, he further argues that ‘ if the legislature
wants to refer to something particular, not general, it uses the word ‘ the rather than “a” or “an” Id
Additionally, Cozier argues that the ‘ Legislature 5 use of disjunctive conjunction or at the end of
the definition of “a crime ofviolence” supports the legislative intent to include various types of crimes
of violence ” Id
7 Defendant 5 Motion to Dismiss p 5 9
People ofthe Virgin Islands v MlLaIah ( 0218!” Cite as 2022 V I Super 94U
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Memorandum Opinion
‘|15 Cozier concludes that irrespective of whether it was murder, attempted murder, assault, or any
other type of crime of violence, if there was one possession of a firearm that arose from a single act,
it violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment Cozier also draws this inference from
People v Prmgle No ST 2020 CR 00262 2021 V 1 Super 94U which provided that it is
multiplicitous to charge someone for possession of the same weapon multiple times for multiple
underlying crimes when the same weapon is used and the crimes are a part of the same ongoing
criminal activity ’
‘ 16 In response, the People contend that the charges are each linked to a specific predicate crime
of violence with distinct elements that need to be established They argue that the Virgin Islands
Legislature intended for a defendant who uses a weapon, whether it is a gun or other dangerous
weapon, during the commission of a crime of violence, face two charges one for the underlying
crime of violence and another for the use of the weapon The People further assert that there were two
firearms used during the commission of the underlying felonies 8 “How the weapons were used or
carried pursuant to 14 V I C § 2253(a) is different and specifically linked to the crime of violence it
was used in the commission of 1d The People also argue the supporting facts to prove use of the
firearm is distinct from each charge In addition to that, the People assert that each of the underlying
crimes of violence require separate distinct elements to prove Id
#17 Finally, the People admitted that although there is a constitutional prohibition against
cumulative punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause, there is no prohibition from being charged
in multiple ways Id at 1] 8 Hence, there is no legal justification for narrowing prosecutonal discretion
in charging in a manner inconsistent with the legislative intent or pursuits ofjustice The Court
a People 5 Opposition to Defendant 5 Motion to Dismiss, p131 9
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Case No ST 21 CR 380
Memorandum Opinion
agrees with the People in some respects Thus, some charges are multiplicitous and others are not
A Counts Two, Four, and Six are multiplicitous and consolidation of them is
appr0priate
1|18 Analyzing counts two (2), four (4), and six (6) (use of a firearm during the commission of the
underlying crimes of violence murder and assault), this Court finds them multiplicitous because
they stem from one act of discharging projectiles in a single shooting incident Each count of use of
a firearm is paired with felony murder, assault in the first degree and assault in the third degree The
underlying crimes of violence charged in counts one, three, and five arise from the killing of
Gregorianna Julien, as a result, the assault charges addressed in counts three and five are subsumed
into the murder charge contained in count one For the reasons elucidated below, it is in interest of
justice to consolidate them into one count
i Underlying crimes of violence and their relation to the respective gun charges
$9 Since a homicide generally results from the commission of an assault, every felonious assault
ending in death automatically would be elevated to murder in the event a felonious assault could serve
as the predicate felony for purposes of the felony murder doctrine Government ofthe Virgin Islands
v Vergzle 50 V I 127 139 (2008) Felony murder is defined in 14 V I C § 922(a)(2) which provides
All murder which is committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate arson,
burglary, kidnapping, rape, robbery or mayhem, assault in the first degree, assault in
the second degree, assault in the third degree and larceny is murder in the first
degree
With respect to assault in the first degree 14 V I C § 295(3) provides in the pertinent part
“Whoever
(3) with intent to commit rape, sodomy mayhem robbery or larceny, assaults
another;”
Il
People ofthe Vzrgm Islands v Micazah ( ozzer Cite as 2022 V I Super 94U
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Memorandum Opinion
Assault in the third degree is defined in 14 V I C (3‘ 297(a)(l)(2)(4), which provides in its pertinent
parts
“(21) Whoever, under circumstances not amounting to an assault in the first or second
degree
(1) assaults another person with intent to commit a felony,
(2) assaults another with a deadly weapon,
(4) assaults another and inflicts serious bodily injury upon the person assaulted; or
whoever under any circumstances, ’
1120 Some elements of 14 V I C § 297(a)(2) differ from the elements of § 295 as they are mutually
exclusive of each other, hence, it is important to clarify the relationship between the two sections
The language in 14 V I C § 297(a) provides for circumstances not amounting to an assault in the
first or second degree” However, as addressed in Daws v People, 69 V I 619, 632 33 (V I 2018),
the language under circumstances not amounting to an assault in the first or second degree” does not
establish an additional element of the offense, but rather constitutes a condition precedent to the
sentencing range prescribed in section 297 Mbbs v People 73 VI 617, 622, 2020 V I 18, at 12
Moreover, § 297(a)(1) is effectively the same as § 295(3) except that § 295(3) is inclusive of all
felonies whereas section 297 specifies five categories of felonies Consequently, § 297 is not subject
to the Blockburger analysis with respect to comparable section 295(3) Therefore, 14 V I C § 297(a)
shall be considered in tandem with assault in the first degree
1|21 Here, Cozier is charged with felony murder in count one of the Information When utilizing
the Blockburger test, elements of both assault charges overlap with the elements of the murder charge
The core distinction between the assault under § 297(a)(l)(2) and (4) § 295(3) and § 922 is that
ultimately, the person died Thus, the People do not have to prove additional elements in assault
charges beyond those required to prove under murder They just need to prove the assault charges
resulted in the death of the person Since the assault charges fall under the umbrella of the murder
12
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Memorandum Opinion
charge, the respective firearm charges are lesser included offenses 0f the firearm charge associated
with murder Therefore, counts four and six are both lesser included offenses of count two, in that the
People are not required to prove any additional element to obtain convictions for counts four and six
that are not required to obtain a conviction under count two Consequently, the Blockburger test is
satisfied
1122 Cozier allegedly possessed a handgun as a co defendant carried a long gun when they entered
the store The People allege that when Cozier and the other co defendants exited the jewelry store
and ran to the Honda Odyssey van, the accomplice with the long gun allegedly discharged multiple
rounds of firearm ammunition into the store One of the bullets struck Gregorianna Julien in her
shoulder causing her death Therefore, the resulting death is a direct consequence of the serious bodily
injury that was caused by the felonious assault
ii Prosecutorial discretion with respect to application of 14 V I C § 2253(a)
1|23 As this Court noted above, Defendant is arguing that the People exceeded their prosecutorial
charging discretion when they charged him with eleven counts of 14 V I C § 2253(a) This Court
disagrees The Third Circuit concluded that prosecutors enj 0y a great amount of discretion in charging
a defendant United States v Pungztore 910 F 2d 1084 1112 (3d Cir 1990) As other courts have
pointed out, “prosecutors have traditionally enjoyed discretion in deciding which of multiple charges
against a defendant are to be prosecuted or whether they are all to be prosecuted at the same time ’
[d (citing l mted States v Cardall
885 F 2d 656 666 (10th Cir 1989) see also United States v
Becker,
892 F 2d 265 269 (3d Cir 1989) (successive prosecutions of two separate drug conspiracies
did not constitute harassment) United States v Partyka
561 F 2d 118 124 (8th Cir 1977) cert
denied 434 U S 1037
98 S Ct 773
54 L Ed 2d 785 (1978)
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People ofthe Virgin Islands v Mzcatah Cozter Cite as 2022 V I Super 94U
Case No ST 21 CR 380
Memorandum Opinion
1124 Defendant’s reasoning for supplanting the word “the ’ for the word “a” within “a crime of
violence’ is implausible because it misinterprets the legislative intent behind 14 V I C § 2253(a) The
indefinite articles of “a” or “an” are a reference to any of the fourteen specific crimes of violence
named in Title 23, section 451(g) of the VI Code that the government may choose from when it
exercises its prosecutorial discretion Title 23, section 451(g) of the V I Code provides
Crime of violence means the crime of, or the attempt to commit, murder in any
degree, voluntary manslaughter, rape arson, discharging or aiming firearms, mayhem,
kidnapping, assault in the first degree, assault in the second degree, assault in the third
degree, robbery, burglary, unlawfiil entry or larceny
A reading of § 2253(a) with Cozier’s interpretation reads as follows
“[Ilf such firearm or an imitation thereof was had, possessed, home, transported or
carried by or under the proximate control of such person during the commission or
attempted commission of the crime of violence, as defined in subsection (d) hereof,
then such person shall be
This interpretation implies that the legislature intended the government to charge only one
count of a firearm as an enhancement charge despite any number of violent crimes charged Choosing
to follow Defendant’s position in narrow application of the definite article “the” before “crime of
violence” would result in substantial contradiction with the legislative intent and obstruct the very
purpose of the section Defendant’s reading leads to an absurd result because it suggests the
prosecutor lacks discretion and must select which underlying offense the firearm charge must be made
applicable to This perspective renders the interpretation of section 451(g) unsound Each
enhancement charge is specifically tied to a distinct crime of violence As a result, following this
restricted view would significantly limit prosecutorial charging discretion and undermine its role to
prosecute crimes Consequently, it is the not in interest ofjustice to limit the prosecutorial arm of the
l4
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government in fulfilling its role Therefore, the People did not exceed their limits of prosecutorial
discretion bestowed upon them by the statutes
1|25 Defendant’s next argument is that the Virgin Islands Legislature intended to include various
types of crimes of violence when it used the disjunctive conjunction “or” at the end of the definition
of “a crime of violence” in section 451(g) This argument is meritless The disjunctive conjunction
or ’ serves the purpose to conclude the number of limited violent crimes named in section 451(g)
that the government may choose from when executing its prosecutorial discretion in charging a
defendant with § 2253(a) Defendant s reasoning also contradicts the legislative intent anchored in §
104 that allows the People to prosecute a single act or omission that violates several different laws
‘|26 In addition to the reasons stated above, this Court finds that Cozier misapplies § 104 during
his argument with respect to multiplicity of charges under § 2253(a) As already stated above, section
104 provides in pertinent part
“An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different
provisions of this Code may be punished under any of such provisions, but in no case
may it be punished under more than one An acquittal or conviction and sentence under
any one bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other ”
Hence, the plain language of section 104 explains that despite the fact that an individual can be
charged and found guilty of violating multiple provisions of the Virgin Islands Code arising from a
single act or omission, that individual can ultimately only be punished for one offense See Galloway
at 712, see also Tyson at 428
‘27 Defendant failed to recognize that 14 V I C § 104 carries rather a permissive character with
respect to multiple charging Section 104 allows the government to impose multiple charges against
a defendant as a part of their prosecutorial discretion however, it forbids multiple punishments for
the same act In Titre, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court addressed the issue of sentencing in
15
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Memorandum Opinion
compliance with § 104 The Court held the trial court 3 sentencing decision to the standard developed
in Rutledge v United States 517 U S 292 116 S Ct 1241
134 L Ed 2d 419 (1996) Pursuant to
the Rutledge decision, the Superior Court was required to announce a sentence for only a single
conviction of each group of offenses, and then to vacate rather than merge or stay the remaining
offenses within that group ’ Titre at 807 Consequently, the Court concluded that the Superior Court
should have imposed sentences for the underlying crime of violence (murder in the second degree)
and its corresponding firearm charge under § 2253(a) and vacated the convictions for lesser included
offenses (assault in the first degree and assault in the third degree) and their respective firearm charges
under § 2253(a) Id In its Opinion, the Court explained that its reasoning stems from an observation
that other courts have exercised their supervisory powers to replace merger with vacatur as the remedy
for violations of state double jeopardy protections Id at 809 (citing State v Polanco, 61 A 3d 1084,
1087 (Conn 2013) (“[T]he vacatur approach shall replace the use of the merger of convictions
approach when a defendant is convicted of greater and lesser included offenses ”)) The Court
concluded that vacatur shall be the remedy in cases in which section 104 is implicated, just as is the
case with violations of the Fifih Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause 1d at 809
'28 Following the Virgin Islands Supreme Court 3 considerations with respect to sentencing in
accord with 14 V I C § 104, this Court recognizes the importance to abide by this rule at the
sentencing stage Given the early stage of the proceedings in this case, the People are not prohibited
by the law to execute their charging discretion at this time
729 Lastly, Cozier argues that single use of a firearm cannot support multiple prosecutions under
section 2253(a) This Court disagrees In United States v Hodge 870 F 3d 184 188 (3d Cir 2017)
the Court of Appeals considered a defendant who shot a man holding a bag of cash, in an attempt to
steal the bag When the victim resisted, defendant shot him twice more Id He then shot the man s
16
People ofthe Virgin Islands v Micaiah Cozier Cite as 2022 V I Super 94U
Case No ST 21 CR 380
Memorandum Opinion
companion and fled with the bag Id Defendant was charged, Inter aha, with three counts under 18
U S C § 924(c) Two were premised on the attempted murder of each of the two men, and one
premised on the robbery 1d The Defendant argued that 18 U S C § 924(c) can be read to mean that
single use carrying, or possession of a firearm cannot support multiple prosecutions Id at [96
Therefore, the predicate offenses one for robbery and one for attempted murder are both based on
a single use of his firearm in shooting a man [d at 196 In rejecting Hodge’s contention, the Court
stated as follows “[c]rimes occurring as a part of the same underlying occurrence may constitute
separate predicate offenses if properly charged as separate crimes It follows that each may be a
separate predicate for a section 924(c)(1) conviction ’ Id at 196 (quoting Untied States v Caszano,
113 F 3D 420 426 (3d Cir 1997)) (citations omitted) The Court fimher opined that the statutory
text of § 924(c) is “susceptible of differing interpretations” with the relevant unit of prosecution being
either (1) the underlying predicate offense, or (2) each individual instance in which a defendant uses
or carries a firearm throughout the duration of an underlying predicate offense Id at 196 97
'I30 In Hodge the Court observed that Defendant engaged in multiple uses of a firearm to commit
multiple crimes, albeit all during the same criminal episode 1d at 197 The Court s observation was
not based on the way the firearm was employed but rather the fact that it was used to further several
different crimes Thus, the case at bar resonates with Hodge because Cozier is alleged to have
employed a firearm multiple times to commit multiple predicate offenses during the incident
iii Judicial economy, risk of prejudice, totality and severity of the charges
1131 Cozier relies on the reasoning of Prmgle inter aha, which provides that courts should
consider factors such as “judicial economy, risk of prejudice, the totality of the charges against the
defendant, and the severity of those charges when addressing multiplicitous charges This Court
finds this argument unavailing In United States v Bowers, 495, F 3d 362 (3d Cir 2020), Defendant
17
People ofthe Virgin Islands v Micalah Cozier Cite as 2022 V I Super 94U
Case No ST 21 CR 380
Memorandum Opinion
contended that multiple counts charging violations of section 924(c) and (j) are multiplicitous in
violation of the Eighth Amendment and the Federal Death Penalty Act He asserted that the nature of
charges against him may render a jury determination of punishment unreliable due to juror confusion
and the risk of double counting both charges and aggravated circumstances Id In that vein, Defendant
expressed concerns that jurors may be under the impression that just because there are multiple
counts, the crime is worse and the Defendant more culpable Id The Court disagreed and opined that
Defendant 3 concerns can be addressed through appropriate instructions to the jury and conscientious
management of the trial and evidence presented Id
1|32 Returning to the present case, there is no reason for this Court to believe that a jury will be
unwilling to properly carry out their jury duty Therefore, Cozier is not at risk of unfair prejudice or
jury confusion created by the multiple charges in the People 5 Information It is in the interest of
justice to allow the government to exercise its discretion in fulfilling its role as a prosecutorial body
As already stated above, limiting the People in their charging discretion will undermine the legislative
intent behind § 104 that allows for acts or omissions to be “made punishable” Therefore, Cozier’s
concerns (10 not outweigh interests ofjustice and public concerns
iv Aiding and Abetting with respect to multiple charges for use of a firearm
1133 Defendant argues that although there were two victims, it was only one possession of a firearm
during the commission of the alleged crimes of violence, thus, it is multiplicitous to charge him with
multiple counts for the same possession He draws parallels from the Virgin Islands Supreme Court
decision in Tyson In Tyson, the Court held that the trial court failed to comply with § 104 when it
imposed separate sentences for two counts of use of a firearm under § 2253 for two different murders
The Court reasoned that the crime of possession under the facts was a single act because Tyson
l8
People ofthe Virgin Islands v Mzcazah ( ozzer Cite as 2022 V I Super 94U
Case No ST 21 CR 380
Memorandum Opinion
possessed the same firearm throughout the duration of the shooting incident 9 In conclusion, the Court
held that it is multiplicitous to charge someone for possession of the same weapon multiple times for
multiple underlying crimes when the same weapon is used and the crimes are a part of the same
ongoing criminal activity
1134 This case resonates with Tyson because it involves use of one firearm during criminal acts that
resulted in the death of one person and physical injury of another However, Tyson acted as a sole
perpetrator whereas Cozier acted with confederates who, allegedly, possessed two different firearms
amongst them Cozier is charged with aiding and abetting under each offense The Supreme Court of
the Virgin Islands has held that in order to establish the offense of aiding and abetting, the
Government must prove that the substantive crime has been committed and that the defendant knew
of the crime and attempted to facilitate it Brown v People 54 V I 496 505 (V I 2010) (quoting
United States v Frorup 963 F 2d 41 43 (3d Cir 1992)) Additionally the Court requires proof that
the defendant had the specific intent to facilitate the crime Id United States v Mercado, 610 F 3d
841 846 (3d Cir 2010) see also Merrlfield v People ofthe Vzrgm Islands 56 V I 769 775 (2012)
$35 Here, there were two firearms used The police collected approximately twenty Spent castings
from two different caliber firearms Following the reasoning of the cases outlined above, the Tyson
reasoning does not exculpate Cozier simply because he allegedly possessed one weapon The
presence and alleged participation of three other co conspirators who had another gun in their
possession extend to Cozier Unlike Tyson, where defendant was charged with multiple firearm
charges in perpetration of felony murder that stemmed from a single act of shooting, Cozier is alleged
to have committed separate acts of criminal conduct that laid foundation for separate prosecutorial
9 Tyson v People
59 VI 391 at 428 (2013) I9
People ofthe Virgin Islands v MlLaIah ( 0 (er Cite as 2022 V 1 Super 94U
Case No ST 21 CR 380
Memorandum Opinion
units of distinct crimes of violence with their own unique elements Therefore, since Cozier allegedly
partook in a series of different acts that resulted in murder robbery, grand larceny and other crimes
named in the Information the Tyson reasoning that targets only one criminal conduct would not apply
here
'l36 Summarizing the discussion above, this Court finds that under the Blockburger test, the
charges for use of a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence must stay within one
prosecutorial unit of the underlying crime of violence and its lesser included offenses In other words,
since assault in the first degree and assault in the third degree charges are lesser included offenses of
murder in the first degree under the Blockburger test it is reasonable to view these three charges as
one prosecutorial unit Accordingly, the respective charges for use of a firearm are within one
prosecutorial unit of the underlying charges and must be consolidated into one count
B Counts Eight, Ten, and Twelve are multiplicitous and consolidation of them is
appropriate
T37 With respect to counts eight (8) ten (10) and twelve (12) (each charging use of a firearm
during the commission of the underlying crimes of violence attempted murder and assault), the
same reasoning applies to the attempted murder of the security officer All three counts charge Cozier
with use of a firearm in furtherance of the underlying crimes of attempted murder in the first degree,
assault in the first degree and assault in the third degree that are charged in counts seven, nine, and
eleven, respectively For the reasons articulated below it is appropriate to consolidate counts eight,
ten, and twelve into one count
1138 In Connor the Virgin Islands Supreme Court rejected the defense 5 arguments that the assault
with a deadly weapon charge under § 297 is the same as {5 2251(a)(2)(B), the enhancement charge
The Court rejected that argument based on the rationale that an assault committed with a deadly
20
People ofthe Virgin Islands v Micatah ( 021er Cite as 2022 v1 Super 94U
Case No ST 21 CR 380
Memorandum Opinion
weapon constitutes the offense of assault in the third degree, and because it is a crime of violence, it
is also one of the crimes for which the possessor of a firearm may be convicted under § 2251(a)(2)(B)
The Supreme Court followed the Third Circuit 3 reasoning that provides “because the Legislature
was punishing the corresponding crime of possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of
the crime of violence, along with the primary offense of committing the crime of violence itself, its
intention to punish two offenses from the same act was clear Id at Fn 3 (citing Government of Virgin
Islands 1 Soto 718 F 2d 72 78 (3d Cir 1983)) Under Fontame v People of the VI 62 V I 643
654 (2015) the same legislative intent exists for § 2253 The Court held that the charge for
unauthorized possession of a firearm and the underlying crime of violence are “not multiplicitous
because the legislature clearly intended for additional sentencing where unauthorized firearms are
involved Id Compared to § 2251, § 2253(a) more narrowly proscribes unlawfiJI possession of a
firearm during the commission of a crime of violence Virgin Islands v Commisszong,
706 F Supp
1172 1989 (D V I 1989)
1139 Similar to first degree murder, an assault is a lesser included offense of an attempted murder
in the first degree Attempted murder in the first degree is defined in 14 V I C § 922(a)(2) and §
331(1) Section 331(1) provides
“Whoever unsuccessfully attempts to commit an offense, shall, unless otherwise
specially prescribed by this Code or other law be punished by
(l) imprisonment for not more than 25 years, if the offense attempted is punishable by
imprisonment for life, or
Cozier is charged with attempted murder in the first degree in count seven of the Information
and with assault in the first degree and assault in the third degree in counts nine and eleven,
reSpectively Since an assault is a lesser included offense of attempted murder, the Pe0ple do not have
21
People 0fthe Virgin Islands v Micatah C OZIer Cite as 2022 V I Super 94U
Case No ST 21 CR 380
Memorandum Opinion
to prove additional elements in assault charges beyond those required to prove under attempted
murder in the first degree Furthermore because the assault charges fall within an attempted murder
charge, the respective firearm charges are lesser included offenses of the identical charge associated
with the attempted murder Therefore, counts ten and twelve are both lesser included offenses to count
eight, in that the People are not required to prove any additional elements to obtain convictions for
counts ten and twelve that are not required to obtain a conviction under count eight The firearm
charges in counts eight, ten, and twelve are similar to counts two, four, and six, consequently, the
Blockburger test is satisfied Therefore, consolidation is appropriate
C Count Fourteen stands alone as a single charge to Count Thirteen
1|40 With respect to count fourteen (14) (kidnapping), Cozier seeks to dismiss or consolidate this
charge into a single charge for all the underlying crimes of violence charged The kidnapping charge
arises from the defendant(s) forcing Gregorianna Julien back into the jewelry store by pulling her
back against her will prior to the robbery and shooting incidents For the reasons set forth below, this
Court finds that the kidnapping charge should stand in isolation from other underlying offenses
because kidnapping is a distinct charge and is not a lesser included offense of any of the underlying
offenses charged
1141 14 V I C § 1052(a) reads as follows
‘ Any person who seizes, confines, inveigles, entices, decoys abducts, conceals,
kidnaps or carries away any individual by any means whatsoever with intent to hold
or detain, or who holds or detains, such individual for ransom, reward or to commit
extortion or to exact from any person or entity any money or valuable thing, or any
person who kidnaps or carries away any individual to commit robbery, or any person
who aids or abets any such act is guilty of kidnapping for ransom and shall be
imprisoned for life ”
22
People ofthe Virgin Islands v Micazah ( ozwr Cite as 2022 V I Super 94U
Case No ST 21 CR 380
Memorandum Opinion
The People must prove completely different elements in the kidnapping charge that are
substantially distinct from those required to prove under murder or attempted murder Kidnapping is
not a lesser included offense of murder therefore, it comes with a separate prosecutorial classification
from murder and remains in exclusive association with count thirteen Therefore, since the kidnaping
charge is an independent offense with its own characteristic elements that require a different analysis,
this Court will not consolidate its corresponding firearm charge with the identical charges associated
with the other crimes of violence alleged in the Information that are distinct from the kidnapping
charge The People are within their prosecutorial discretion to charge this count separately in one
prosecutorial unit as neither judicial economy nor concerns of prejudice and justice demand its
dismissal at this stage Consequently, the Blockburger test is inapplicable here because all elements
of the crime are different
D Counts Sixteen, Eighteen, Twenty, and Twenty Two are not multiplicitous
1142 As it pertains to counts sixteen (16) eighteen (18), twenty (20), and twenty two (22), Cozier
also seeks to consolidate these charges into a single charge with the prior counts To determine
whether the respective counts must be consolidated or dismissed, this Court analyzed each underlying
offense separately and finds that counts l6, 18, 20, and 22 are not multiplicitous Count sixteen is
linked to the underlying crime of robbery in the first degree, count eighteen is linked to the underlying
crime of robbery in the second degree, count twenty is attached to the underlying crime of unlawful
entry, and count twenty two is attached to the underlying crime of grand larceny
"43 Robbery in the first degree is defined in 14 V I C § 1862 which provides
“A person is guilty ofrobbery in the first degree when in the course of the commission
of the crime or of immediate flight therefrom, he or another perpetrator of the crime
(1) Causes physical injury which is incapacitating in any way to any person who is not
a perpetrator of the crime; or
23
People ofthe Virgin Islands v Micazah Cozier Cite as 2022 V I Super 94U
Case No ST 21 CR 380
Memorandum Opinion
(2) Displays, uses or threatens the use of a dangerous weapon ”
Robbery in the second degree is defined in 14 V I C § 1863 which provides in the pertinent
part
“A person is guilty of robbery in the second degree when he forcibly steals property
and when
(1) He is aided by another person actually present or
(2) In the course of the commission of the crime or of immediate flight therefrom, he
or another participant in the crime causes physical injury to any person who is not a
participant in the crime
The crime of unlawful entry is defined under 14 V I C § 445 that provides
“Whoever, under circumstances or in a manner not amounting to burglary, enters a building
or any part thereof, with intent to commit an offense, shall be imprisoned not more than 1
year ”
Finally grand larceny is defined in 14 V I C § 1083(a)(1)
“(a) Whoever takes property
(1) which is of $500 or more in value
commits grand larceny and shall be imprisoned for not more than 10 years ”
‘|44 Applying the Blockburger test, the charge of robbery in the first degree has its own unique
elements from robbery in the second degree Namely the elements of this crime as charged, require
that the People prove that Cozier or another perpetrator mcapacztated their victim by physically
injuring another person or, in the alternative, displayed, used, or threatened the use of a dangerous
weapon On the other hand, the charge of robbery in the second degree requires that the People
establish that a perpetratorforczbly steals property and that he is aided by another person actually
present or, in the alternative, that Cozier or another perpetrator, during the crime or during flight
therefrom, caused physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime All the elements
of robbery in the first degree are completely different from the elements of robbery in the second
degree Robbery in the first degree requires an additional element of physical incapacitation resulting
24
People ofthe Virgin Islands v Mu azah C ozzer Cite as 2022 V I Super 94U
Case No ST 21 CR 380
Memorandum Opinion
from physical injury or, in the alternative, display, use, or threats with a firearm These are different
from elements from forceable stealing with the help of another person actually present or, in the
alternative, causing a physical injury to a victim that does not rise to the level of physical
incapacitation Thus, elements of both robbery in the first and in the second degree do not overlap as
robbery in the second degree is not a lesser included offense of robbery in the first degree Therefore,
the People would have to prove two separate offenses Consequently, both counts of use of a firearm
that are attached to the underlying crimes of robbery in the first degree and robbery in the second
degree serve as their enhancement Accordingly, the charges must remain
1145 The elements ofunlawful entry require that a defendant enters a building with intent to commit
an offense These elements are distinct from those that the People must prove under any of the other
underlying charges, including robbery In other words, one does not have to unlawfully enter premises
in order to rob another person The crime of unlawful entry is predicated on lack of permission to
enter the premises of another or any part thereof while having the intent to commit a crime As a
result, the People would have to prove that Cozier lacked permission from the store operator to enter
the premises and committed a felony Considering the analysis above, elements of unlawful entry do
not merge into any of the underlying offenses Therefore the respective count of use of a firearm
during the commission of unlawful entry should remain in place as an enhancement, as intended by
the Virgin Islands Legislature
$46 The elements of grand larceny require that a defendant unlawfully takes property in an amount
of $500 or more The elements of grand larceny are distinct from those that the People must prove
under any of the underlying charges discussed above For instance, grand larceny elements do not
imply the use of force and/or violence to deprive someone of their property When charging a suspect
with the crime of grand larceny, the People are required to establish that the suspect took property
25
People ofthe Virgin Islands v Micazah ( o zer Cite as 2022 V 1 Super 94U
Case No ST 21 CR 380
Memorandum Opinion
in an amount of $500 or more The elements of this crime are distinct from those charged under 14
V I C §§ 1862 1863 Therefore the charge of use of a firearm should remain as an enhancement to
the underlying crime of grand larceny
1147 Considering the analysis above, the Blockburger test is inapplicable here because all elements
of the crimes listed are different from each other Consequently count sixteen, eighteen, twenty, and
twenty two remain in an exclusive relationship with their respective underlying crimes of violence
named in counts fifteen seventeen, nineteen, and twenty one as individual units of prosecution
Therefore, since robbery in the first degree, robbery in the second degree, unlawfiil entry, and grand
larceny charges are all independent offenses with their own unique elements that require separate
analysis, the Court will not consolidate their corresponding charges for use of a firearm into one
charge For the reasons stated above, the People are within their prosecutorial discretion to charge
counts sixteen, eighteen, twenty, and twenty two as enhancements and separately as neither judicial
economy nor concerns of prejudice and justice warrant their dismissal at this stage
E Distinction between “multiplicity of charges” and “multiplicity of sentences”
1|48 This Court recognizes that Defendant is concerned about potential risks of prejudice or
confusion of jury instructions that may be caused by multiple charging However, strong
consideration is given to the Court’s interpretation of the legislative intent behind section [04 that
allows for multiple charging of criminal conduct as means of prosecutorial charging discretion
Defendant 5 concern, therefore, lacks merit because multiple charging does not imply multiple
sentencing or punishments While the Double Jeopardy Clause “protects criminal defendants against
multiple prosecutions or punishments for a single offense, section 104 speaks to multiple
punishments for the same act Castillo v People 59 V I 240 284 n 1 (2013) (Hodge C J
concurring) Section 104 thus provides greater protections than the Double Jeopardy Clause’ and
26
People ofthe Vzrgm Islands v Micazah Comer Cite as 2022 V I Super 94U
Case No ST 21 CR 380
Memorandum Opinion
“dictates that despite the fact that an individual can be charged and found guilty of violating multiple
provisions of the Virgin Islands Code arising from a single act or omission, that individual can
ultimately be punished for only one offense Estzck v People, 62 V I 604, 620 21 (2015); Williams
at 821 n 9 (2012) Hodge 870 at 199 (2017) The purpose of the constitutional protection against
duplicative punishment is “to ensure that the sentencing discretion of courts is confined to the limits
established by the legislature See Untied States v Kennedy 682 F 3d 244 255 (3d Cir 2012) (citing
Ohio v Johnson 467 U S 493 499 104 S Ct 2536
81 L Ed 2d 425 (1984)) In other words
multiple charging” is not identical to “multiple sentencing” because the consequence of “multiple
charging” does not ultimately result in multiple punishments and violations of the Fifth Amendment
as a result This Count views “multiple charging” as one of the means given to the government within
the spectrum of their prosecutorial discretion Therefore, it is within prosecutorial discretion to charge
a defendant with multiple counts in the Information as long as the government performs within the
framework of the legislative intent behind a charge in question and while balancing constitutional
considerations
IV CONCLUSION
1|49 For the reasons elucidated above, this Court finds that it is in the interest of justice to
consolidate charges of use of a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence into one count
of the prosecutorial unit that charges the crime of felony murder Therefore, counts four and six shall
be consolidated into count two The same reasoning applies to attempted murder, therefore, counts
ten and twelve shall be consolidated into count eight as a part of the prosecutorial unit that charges
the crime of attempted murder Since the remaining counts of the use of a firearm for the underlying
crimes of kidnapping, robbery in the first degree robbery in the second degree, unlawfiil entry and
27
PeopIe ofthe Vtrgm Islands v Mzcalah Cozzer Cite as 2022 V I Super 94U
Case No ST 21 CR 380
Memorandum Opinion
grand larceny are distinct crimes with distinct elements, it is proper for their respective firearm
charges to remain Hence, counts fourteen, sixteen, eighteen, twenty, and twenty two shall remain as
charged in the Information An appropriate order of even date follows
Dated Novemberfl, 2022 ( Renee bs Carty
&
Judge of the perior Court
of the Virgin Islands
ATTEST
Tamara Charles
Clew C a urt /
// 4
/ M
By / 2,14%
Latoya C acho
’fl Court Cl rk Supervi r /// /9/ @fl‘
28
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
DIVISION OF ST THOMAS AND ST JOHN
PEOPLE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS )
Plaintiff ;
v ) CASE NO ST 21 CR 380
MICAIAH COZIER ;
Defendant ; Cite as 2022 V I Super 94U
)
ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court upon the “Motion to Dismiss” filed on March 22,
2022, by Defendant Micaiah Cozier (“Defendant”) Defendant moves this Court to dismiss eleven
counts two (2), four (4), six (6), eight (8), ten (10), twelve (12), fourteen (14), sixteen (16),
eighteen (18), twenty (20), and twenty two (22) or in the alternative, to consolidate the counts into
one charge The People of the Virgin Islands (“the People”) filed their Opposition on March 29,
2022 Consistent with the Memorandum Opinion of even date it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendant 5 Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in
part, and it is fithher
ORDERED that Counts 4 and 6 are CONSOLIDATED into count 2 and it is further
ORDERED that Counts 10 and 12 are CONSOLIDATED into count 8' and it is further
ORDERED that firearm charges under Counts l4, 16, 18, 20, and 22 shall remain, and it
is fithher
ORDERED that within one week of the date of entry of this Order the People SHALL file
the First Amended Information consolidating the respective counts and the same shall be done for
the other three co defendants, and it is further
People ofthe Virgin Islands v Mrcatah Comer Cite as 2022 V 1 Super 94U
Case No ST 21 CR 380
Order
ORDERED that copies of the Memorandum Opinion and this Order shall be directed to
Assistant Attorney General Anna B Scott, Esquire, Nicole Lynn King Richardson, Esquire, Carl
R Williams, Esquire, David J Cattie, Esquire, and Marital A Webster, Sr , Esquire
/
Dated November /( 2 , 2022
enee Gu s Carty
Judge of the Sn erior Court
of the Virgin Islands
ATTEST
Tamara Charles
Clerk of the Court
By /
7‘: Latoya macho
Court Clerk Superv or [K / /fl Jfléfl
2