IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
                              DIVISION OF ST. THOMAS AND ST. JOHN

MAURICE         RICHARDSON                                                 )
                                                                           )
                            Petitioner.                                    ) CIVIL NO. ST-2018-MC-00035
                                                                           )
                   vs                                                      )
                                                                           )
WYNNIE        TESTAMARK,            DIRECTOR         BUREAU        OF      _)
PRISONS,                                                                   )
                                                                           )
                            Respondent                                     )
                                                                           )
a
                                           Cite as: 2025 VI Super 15U?
Appearances

RICHARD HARDGREAVES DOLLISON, ESQUIRE?
LAW OFFICES OF RICHARD H. HOLLISON, P.C
St. Thomas, VI
For Petitioner, Maurice Richardson

IAN S.A. CLEMENT,          ESQUIRE
Chief Deputy Attorney General
V.I. Department of Justice
St. Thomas, VI
For Respondent Wynnie Testamark,
Director of the Bureau of Corrections

                                  MEMORANDUM             OPINION        AND     ORDER

qi       THIS MATTER              came before the Court for oral arguments on February 2, 2024, on the

following



' The caption in this matter is amended sua sponte, pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil
Procedure.   In 2019, Governor Albert Bryan, Jr. named Wynnie Testamark, as Director of the Bureau of Prisons after
former Director Rick Mulgrave’s     resignation
? Because this matter was briefed pro se, certain legal arguments have not been fully presented.   As such, this opinion’s
precedential value is limited to the facts and arguments of this specific case and should not be read as dispositive of
similar arguments that may arise in future habeas proceedings. For example, no argument was presented challenging
the federal legal principles applied on direct appeal. Yet, in a future matter with a petitioner represented by counsel
a lawyer may present cogent reasons why the law of this Territory makes it inappropriate to apply such federal
precedents
3 Attorney Dollison was appointed solely for the purposes of filing the reply and presenting oral arguments; he had no
role in the briefing of the petition, which identified the issues upon which the petition was based
Richardson v. Testamark,   Director of the Bureau of Corrections
Case No. ST-2018-MC-00035
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Page 2 of 20
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                   (1)     Maurice Richardson’s (Richardson) Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed May

                           25, 2018

                   (2)     Respondent’s Informal Response, filed July 29, 2022; and

                   (3)   _ Petitioner’s Reply to Informal Response, filed November 23, 2022

        Richard H. Dollison, Esquire appeared on behalf of Petitioner, who was present at the Red Onion

        Correctional Center.       Ian S. A. Clement, Esquire, appeared on behalf of Respondent.                    All parties

        appeared remotely via Zoom. For the reasons outlined below, Richardson’s petition will be denied

               I         FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL                     HISTORY

        q2         The history and underlying facts of this matter have been thoroughly canvassed in prior

        opinions of various courts,’ and the following summary is limited to those facts that are material

        to the issues presently before the Court.           On March 26, 1994, at approximately midnight, Virgin

        Islands Police Department (VIPD) Officer Stephen Hodge was shot fourteen times outside his

        home in Lindberg Bay, St. Thomas, in the U.S. Virgin Islands

        3          VIPD in collaboration with the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) investigated Officer

        Hodge’s death.        As part of the investigation,         witnesses were identified and statements taken

        Forensic evidence, shell casings and a towel, were recovered at the scene

        94         Athnell Coker (Coker) provided a statement and disclosed that, four or five days after

        Office Hodge’s murder, Richardson told Coker that the murder was an ambush attack and that he




        * See generally Mosby v. Mullgrav      (“Mosby 1V”), 65 V.1. 261 (V.1. 2016); Harris v. Gov't of the V.1,   55 V.1.   1102
        (D.V.I. App. Div. 2011) (unpublished); see also Gov't of the V.1. v. Richardson (‘Richrdson IP’), 513 Fed. Appx..199
        (3d Cir. 2013) (unpublished); Gov't of the V.1. v. Mosby (“Mosby If’), 

 (3d Cir. 2013) (unpublished)
        Mosby v. Gov't of the V.1.     (‘Mosby f’), 55 V.1. 1138 (D.V.1. App. Div. 2011) (per curiam); Richardson v. Gov't of the
        VL.     “Richrdson P’), 55 VA. 1193 (D.V.I. App. Div. 2011) (per curiam); Mosby v. Mullgrav (‘Mosby II?’), ST-2015
        MC-00063, 

 (V.I. Super. Ct. Oct. 29, 2015) (unpublished)
Richardson v. Testamark, Director of the Bureau of Corrections
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
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        and others waited in the bushes until Officer Hodge came out of his house and they shot him

         Richardson also told Coker that Richardson stood over Officer Hodge and shot him with a shotgun

        5           Richardson then gave Coker a sawed-off shotgun wrapped in a towel that Coker buried in

        the yard behind his house.       Coker told VIPD that Richardson sent men to retrieve the shotgun from

        the yard.     VIPD never recovered a shotgun

        46          On June 17, 1995, Richardson was one of five people arrested and charged with Officer

        Stephen Hodge’s murder

        7           On August 6, 1996, the trial in Gov’t of V.I. v. Maurice Richardson, Criminal No. F1/1 996°,

        the underlying matter, began in the Superior Court® before the Honorable Judge Ishmael A. Meyers

        On August 19, 1996, a jury found Richardson guilty of Count I, conspiracy to commit murder, in

        violation of Title 14 V.I.C. § 551(1), Count II, first-degree murder, in violation of Title 14 V.I.C

        §§ 922(a)(1) and (11), and Count IV, unauthorized possession of a firearm, in violation of Title 14

        V.IC.   §§ 2253(a) and (11).        On November 15, 1996,          Richardson was sentenced to five years on

        Count I, life without parole on Count II, and five years on Count IV, all to run concurrently.                        A

        written judgment and commitment was entered on November 22, 1996.’ A timely notice of appeal

        to the Appellate Division of the District Court of the Virgin Islands was filed December 2, 1996

        48          On September 16, 2011, the District Court entered a per curiam memorandum opinion,

        wherein the District Court concluded that Richardson failed to allege any errors warranting


        5 Harris was charged under St. Thomas Criminal Case Number F1/1996,             and the other Defendants were initially
        charged under separate case numbers (Case Nos. 375/95, 376/95,       377/95,   301/95) that were later dismissed without
        prejudice. Upon refiling of charges, all five Defendants were prosecuted under F 1/1996
        6 At the time of trial, the Superior Court was known as the Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands
        7 On June 28, 2024, in Richardson v. Gov't of the V.1., Case Number 2020-MC-00011,       Richardson was granted habeas
        corpus relief and resentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole on Count II.    No other changes were
        made to the previous judgment and commitment
Richardson v. Testamark, Director of the Bureau of Corrections
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         reversal of his convictions for murder, unauthorized possession, or conspiracy to commit murder

        and, therefore, affirmed Richardson’s convictions.* Richardson then appealed to the United States

        Court of Appeals        for the Third Circuit.            On   February      13, 2013,   the Third Circuit affirmed

         Richardson’s convictions.”

        49          On May 29, 2018, Richardson filed this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus alleging twelve

        grounds for habeas corpus relief.          The Respondent filed an informal response on July 29, 2022,

        and Richardson filed his reply on November 23, 2022.                    Oral arguments were heard on February 2,

        2024, and the matter was taken under advisement

               Il      STANDARD OF REVIEW

        410         “Habeas corpus is an equitable remedy whereby individuals who are restrained in violation

        of their constitutional rights may seek release.”!® Section 3 of the Revised Organic Act states that

        “{aJll persons shall have the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the same shall not be

        suspended except as herein expressly provided.”''                     In addition, the Virgin Islands Legislature

        “enacted chapter 91 of title 5 of the Virgin Islands Code [to] establish a procedure for seeking

        habeas corpus relief under Virgin Islands law,                 [which] codifies the right to habeas corpus and

        explains the process through which it can be obtained.”'?                         Under the statute, “every person

        unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a




        8 Richardson 1,55 V1. 1193
        ° Richardson H, 

        '° Ledesma v. Gov't of the V.1., 

, at *3, 

 (V.I. Super.              Ct.   Oct.   13,   2016)
        (unpublished) (quoting Monsanto v. Gov't of the V.1., 49 V.1. 163, 169 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2007))
        '! Revised Organic Act of 1954 § 3 and 

        '2 Rivera-Moreno v. Gov't of the V. L,   61 V.1.   279,   293-294,   

 (VI.       2014)
        (citing5 V.I.C. §§ 1301-25)
Richardson v. Testamark, Director of the Bureau of Corrections
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        writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or restraint.”'? “Any person

        who believes he or she is unlawfully imprisoned or detained in custody, confined under unlawful

        conditions, or otherwise unlawfully restrained of his or her liberty, may file a petition for a writ of

        habeas corpus to seek review of the legal of that imprisonment or detention.'*

        {11          “When presented with a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, [the Superior Court] must first

        determine whether the petition states a prima facie case for relief — that is, whether it states facts

        that, if true, entitle the petitioner to relief — and also whether the stated claims are for any reason

        procedurally barred.”!> The habeas petitioner “bears the burden of proving the facts supporting the

        petition or establishing grounds entitling him to relief.”'® “Ifa petitioner alleges that he is illegally

        imprisoned, the petition must state how the imprisonment is illegal.”'” “The petitioner must state

        specific factual allegations which require habeas relief rather than conclusory or speculative

        allegations.”'* In addition, “the habeas corpus petition is not a vehicle for directly appealing a

        conviction or relitigating trial.”'? As the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands has stated, “a writ

        of habeas corpus is an inappropriate medium to rehash                            issues” decided at trial or on direct

        appeal.”



         13 td.

         4) V.LH.C.R.     2(a)(1)
         '5 Rivera-Moreno., 61 V.1. at 311 (citation omitted)
         '6 Ledesma, 

, at *5-6
         '7 Id (citing 5 V.1.C.     § 1302(2))
         '8 Mitchell v. Wilson, 62 V.1. 326, 330 (V.1. Super. Ct. 2015); see also Townes vy. Jarvis, 

, 2009 U.S
        App. LEXIS 16244, *17 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Edwards v. City of Goldsboro,           {

 (4th Cir. 1999))
        '° Ledesma, 2016 V.1. LEXIS 167, *3-5 (citing Rodriguez v. Bureau of Corr.,           58 V.1. 367, 377 (V.1. 2013) (opining
        that      “[i]t is settled legal precedent that criminal defendants are barred from using [post-conviction collateral attacks
        like habeas] to relitigate issues decided on direct appeal” (internal quotations and citation omitted)));     Blyden v Gov't
        of the V.1., 64 V.L. 367, 377-78 (V.1. 2016)
         20 brahim v. Gov't of the V.1., Civ. No. 2007/76, 

, at *4, 

 (V.I. Jan
         18, 2008) (unpublished)
Richardson v. Testamark, Director of the Bureau of Corrections
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        12           “Ifthe court determines that the petition does not state a prima facie case for relief or that

        the claims are all procedurally barred, the court will deny the petition outright,” but “if it appears

        that the writ ought to issue,” the Superior Court “shall grant [a writ of habeas corpus] without

        delay.”?)      “Notably, the habeas corpus statute is procedural             — the issuance of the writ does not

        decide the issues or guarantee the petitioner is entitled to relief.”??

               Ill      ANALYSIS

        {13          In support of his petition, Richardson contends the following:??                (1) insufficiency of the

        evidence to include witness credibility,           unreliable testimony, and lack of forensic evidence;”* (2)

        ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) the Court’s failure to grant a new trial after co-defendant

        Harris’ conviction was overturned;”° and (4) Richardson was denied a fair trial in accordance with

        traditional and fundamental standards of due process.?”


        2! Rivera-Moreno.,    61 V.1. at 311 (citing 5 V.LC. § 1304)
        2 Ledesma, 2016 V.1. LEXIS 167, *3-5 (citing Rivera-Moreno, 61 V.1. at 312)
        ?* Richardson enumerates twelve challenges, or “errors,” in his petition. Petition for Habeas Corpus (May 25, 20218)
        The Court finds that a few are overlapping or address the same challenge. Therefore, the Court will address those
        similar challenges together to avoid repetitiveness
        4 Id., p. 4-5 (The witness “recanted his testimony at the end of trial, stating that he made a mistake in identifying
        Pedro Harris         This is the second error. It became evident that the government had a weak case          *); p. 6
        (“During pretrial hearings, the government said that they recovered the shotgun and sent it to the FBI lab in Virginia
        for testing but that the test came back negative as being the weapon used to kill Officer Hodge. After that, no weapon
        was ever mentioned again, and no gun was presented to the jury. This was the third error.”); p. [5 (‘And after all that
        testimony about this weapon, mind you, the government never even showed a gun at all during the trial. This was the
        twelfth error.”)
        25 Id., p. 3 (Richardson’s “lawyer was Elmo Adams, Esq. This is the first error.”)
        26 Id., p. 15 (“Pedro Harris, had his conviction vacated because the prosecutor knowingly used false testimony to
        obtain a conviction. This was the eleventh error.”’)
        27 Id. p. 8 (“This was the fourth error—failure to preserve evidence that could potentially exonerate the accused.”); p
         10-11 (“The trial court excluded the statements as inadmissible hearsay, concluding they were not trustworthy or
        reliable. This was the seventh error.”); p. 13 (“Once the trial court declared that Paniagua was unavailable, it also
        found that his taped confession was inadmissible hearsay. This was the eight error.”) p. 9 (‘Gent Mosby’s lawyer
        filed a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum to secure Paniagua’s appearance at trial and the trial judge signed the
        writ. Later, however, the trial court went back . . . on the issue of Paniagua appearing to testify in court        This
        was the sixth error—denial of a defense to an accused          *); p. 14 (“With the exclusion of this critical evidence,
        coupled with the trial court’s refusal to allow the taped confession, it is clear that 1, Maurice Richardson, was denied
        a trial ‘in accord with traditional and fundamental standards of due process.’     This was the ninth error.”). p. 9 (“[A]t
Richardson v. Testamark, Director of the Bureau of Corrections
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        414       Although Richardson already argued these issues on appeal to both the Appellate Division

        of the District Court of the Virgin Islands and United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

        as well as challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, those appeals do not prevent Richardson

        from raising them again as part of a habeas petition before this Court.”

                  A          Richardson’s     claim    of the insufficiency of the evidence, including witness
                             credibility, unreliable testimony, and           the lack of forensic evidence does not
                             provide a basis for habeas relief.”°

        415       “When considering challenges to the sufficiency of evidence, the question is ‘whether any

        reasonable jury, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, could

        find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.””’ Review for sufficiency of the evidence

        “is extremely deferential to the jury's verdict and requires that [this Court] view the evidence in

        the light most favorable to the People, and reversal is ‘confined to cases where the failure of the




        first the trial court seemed prepared to allow the identity of SKS to be revealed but later adopted a contrary course
        This was the fifth error—failure to admit potentially exculpatory evidence.”); p.t4 (“The trial was unfair because |
        did not get to confront SKS because the government failed to disclose his identify. This was the tenth error.”)
        8 Mosby IV, 65 V.1. at 267, 2016 V.1. Supreme LEXIS 28, at *8 (“Recently, this Court held that’[w]here a petitioner
        properly raised an issue on direct appeal to this Court, and this Court rejected it on the merits, the petitioner is
        procedurally barred from re-litigating that issue through a habeas petition.’   However, in that same decision, we
        reaffirmed the holding of Hughley that there is no procedural bar to raising an issue in a habeas petition if the direct
        appeal had been taken to the Appellate Division or the Third Circuit pursuant to their former appellate jurisdiction
        over the Superior Court.” (quoting Biyden, 64 V.I. at 378))
         ° Because a reviewing Court must consider all the evidence before the jury, even evidence later deemed to have been
        improperly admitted,    the Court considers Richardson’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
        convictions first.   Corraspe v. People, 

, 452 & n.19 (considering sufficiency of the evidence first and
        considering all evidence before the jury); Ambrose v. People, 56 V.1. 99, 107 (V.1. 2012); Galloway v. People, 57 V1
        693, 700 n.3 (V.I. 2012); Rawlins v. People, 61 V.1. 593, 604 (V.1. 2014) (‘[E]ven though we hold in the following
        section that the admission of J.J.’s and Melendez's testimony violated the Confrontation Clause, we consider all
        evidence that was before the jury during deliberations in addressing a sufficiency challenge, even if that evidence was
        improperly admitted.”    (citing Cascen v. People, 

 (V.I. 2014)));   Cascen,   

   (“[W]hen an
        appellate court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence, it must consider all the evidence the jury had before it
        including any evidence that is later determined to be inadmissible,” (quoting Ambrose, 56 V.1. at 107)); e.g, Thomas
        v, People, 63 V.1. 595, 603-05 (V.1. 2015) (considering evidence that was ultimately deemed to have been admitted
        in violation of the defendant's right to be free from unlawful search and seizure when conducting a sufficiency of the
        evidence review); see also Ponce v. People, 72 V.1. 828 (V.1. 2020) (Swan, J., concurring)
        %* Merrifield v, People, 56 V.1. 769, 774 (V.1. 2012) (citing Smith v. People, 51 V.1. 396, 397-98 (V.1. 2009))
Richardson v. Testamark, Director of the Bureau of Corrections
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
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        prosecution is clear.’ This Court must affirm a jury's verdict as long as substantial evidence was

        presented at trial to allow a rational trier of fact to convict, under the standard of beyond a

        reasonable doubt, when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution el

        “In order for the evidence to rationally support a verdict, there must be a logical and convincing

        nexus between the evidence—both direct and circumstantial—and the guilty verdict. A trier of fact

        acts rationally if, in light of reason and everyday experience, the evidence, properly presented,

        rationally and logically supports the existence of the facts establishing the elements of the crime.’2”

        ql6       “[T]he evidence is not insufficient because testimony from witnesses may be contradictory

        or evidence may be in conflict, which, in reality, means that the finder of fact must have made a

        credibility determination and weighed the evidence presented.”*? A jury is entitled to accept some,

        all, or none of a witness’s testimony in its role as the fact finder with sole responsibility for

        credibility determinations.        Furthermore, “[{a] motion for writ of habeas corpus is not the proper

        forum for challenging the credibility of witnesses.”**




        3! Greer v. People, 74 V.1. 556, 575 (V.1 2021) (quoting Gonsalves v. People, 70 V.1. 812, 830 (V.1. 2019), and citing
        Fahie v. People, 62 V.1. 625, 630 (V.1. 2015); Webster v. People, 60 V.1. 666, 678-79 (V.I. 2014); Cascenv. People
        60 V.1. 392, 401 (V.I. 2014))
        2 fd. at 575—76 (footnote omitted) (citing Gov't of the V.1. v. Williams, 

 (3d Cir. 1984); Davis v.
        People, 69 V.1. 619, 652, 653 n.25 (V.I. 2018) (Swan, J., concurring); Tot v. United States, 

        (1943)); cf Greer, 74 V.I. at 576 (“A verdict is irrational if there is a lack of connection between the facts offered in
        evidence and the essential elements of the crime charged.     Indeed, when the logical connection between the record
        evidence and the elements of the crime is so strained as not to have a reasonable and rational relation to everyday
        experience, common sense, and the circumstances of life as they are in reality, the verdict cannot stand.”        (citing
        Thompson v. Louisville, 

 (1960); Tot, 

; Jackson v. Virginia, 

        (1979); United States v. Jones, 713 F.3d a336, 339-40 (7th Cir. 2013)))
        ¥ 

 at 577 (citing Marcelle v People, 55 V.1. 536, 547 (V.1. 2011); Smith v. People, 5t V.1. 396, 401 (V.1. 2009))
        4 Destin v. Gov't of the V.1, ST-2017-MC-00017, 2017 VI LEXIS 127, at *9, 

 (V.I. Super. Ct
        Aug. 9, 2017) (unpublished) (quoting Dowling v. Gov't of the V.1, 44 V.1. 256, 264 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2002)); see
        Codrington v. Gov't of the V.1.,   ST-2016-MC-00038,     

, at *10, 

,     at *4 (V.I
        Super. Ct. Nov. 23,   2016) (unpublished) (“[A]n issue which is raised in the trial court, and upon which conflicting
        testimony develops,   cannot serve as a basis for habeas corpus.” (citation omitted))
Richardson v. Testamark, Director of the Bureau of Corrections
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        ql7          Generally, “[a]ny final determination regarding the believability of witnesses at trial and

        the weight to be accorded such testimony, is within the sole province of the jury.”*> However,

        “{w]hile the general rule that the credibility of witnesses is not open to question on appeal holds

        true, courts of appeals are entitled to ‘disregard the jury's reliance on a witness's testimony when

        that testimony is inherently incredible or improbable.’ ‘Testimony is deemed inherently incredible

        or improbable where it is either so manifestly false that reasonable [people] ought not to believe

        it, or it must be shown to be false by objects or things as to the existence and meaning of which

        reasonable [people] should not.’ Rivera v. People outlines factors that are relevant to attacking the

        credibility of testimony on appeal.              In this assessment, factors to be considered are: (1) whether it

        was physically           impossible for the witness to have observed                 that to which    she testified; (2)

        considering the laws of nature, whether it was impossible for the events to which the witness

        testified to have happened; and (3) whether the testimony is of incredible dubiousness.                             To be

        ‘incredibly          dubious,’   testimony       must   be   inherently    improbable     with    a complete      lack   of

        circumstantial evidence or be coerced, equivocal, and wholly uncorroborated.”>°

        q!8        Richardson raises three challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence.                   First, he argues that

        witness Sorhainodo misidentified Pedro Harris and recanted his testimony, which Richardson

        claims the Government knew the testimony to be false and still presented it during trial.5’? Second,




        35 Dowling, 44 V.1. at 264; see Gov't of the V.L. v. Robinson, 30 V.1. 428, 

 (3d Cir. 1994); Barber v. CSX
        Distrib.   Servs.,   

 (3d Cir.    1995) (Evaluation of witness credibility is the exclusive function of the
        jury     . ”); Codrington, 2016 V.1. LEXIS 190, at *10
        36 Gonsalves, 70 V.1. at 853, 

, 4 68 (V.I. 2019) (quoting Phillip v. People, 58 V.1. 569, 583-84 (V.I. 2013)
        and citing Rivera v. People, 64 V.1. 540, 554-556 (V.1. 2016))
        37“To establish a due process violation based on a state’s solicitation of, or failure to correct, false evidence, a
        defendant must show:        (1) the falsity and materiality of testimony, and (2) prosecutor’s knowledge of such falsity.”
        Rodriguez,     58 V.1. at 375 (citing Bell v. True, 

 (W.D.   Va. 2006))
Richardson v. Testamark, Director of the Bureau of Corrections
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        Richardson challenges the credibility of witness Coker’s testimony arguing that Coker is a “drug

        abuser” and he was “convicted just on the testimony of a dried-out drug addict when no other

        evidence was presented, and the drug addict who buried the gun could not even produce the gun

        to show the jury.” Lastly, Richardson argues that “during pretrial hearings, the government said

        that they recovered the shotgun and sent it to the FBI lab in Virginia for testing, but the test came

        back negative as being the weapon used to kill Officer Hodge.                    After that no weapon was ever

        mentioned again, and no gun was presented to the jury.”?* None of these arguments challenge any

        specific element of any of the crimes for which Richardson was convicted

        419        Rather, Richardson’s challenges are a general attack on the overall evidence in support of

        conviction.     However, none of the arguments establishes a lack of evidence from which a jury

        could      have convicted     Richardson.       Coker’s     testimony,    taken as credible, established that

        Richardson      confessed    to all the elements         of the three crimes      for which     he was convicted

        According to Coker, Richardson admitted planning the unlawful murder of the victim by using a

        firearm.     Further, Coker testified to Richardson appearing and seeking assistance in burying the

        firearm; this is direct evidence that Richardson possessed a sawed-off shotgun.                          As Coker’s

        testimony about Richardson’s confession survived multiple credibility attacks, such confession is

        considered extremely strong evidence of guilt.*? Considering this, the failure to produce the actual




        38 Habeas Pet. p. 6
        9 Richardson I, 55 V.1. at 1215 (‘A confession, especially one that survives the multiple attacks that can be made
        upon its admissibility, has traditionally been regarded as extraordinarily reliable evidence of the defendant's guilt.”
        (quoting Gov't  of the V.L, v. Harris, 

 (3d Cir. 1991)))
Richardson v. Testamark, Director of the Bureau of Corrections
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        sawed off shotgun at trial does not undermine the jury’s verdict, as first-hard witness testimony of

        seeing a defendant with a firearm is sufficient to establish possession beyond a reasonable doubt.*°

        20          Similarly, Richardson does not make any argument that any witness’s testimony was

        impossible or inherently incredible.          Coker’s testimony was corroborated by the other physical

        evidence of the crime scene and, thus, does not meet the standard to be disregarded as inherently

        incredible.    Furthermore, Richardson has not argued that it was impossible for Coker to have heard

        his confession.    Rather, Richardson seeks to rehash the jury’s credibility determination, which this

        Court is prohibited from doing

        421      Lastly, Richardson asserts that the prosecutor’s use of the false identification of Harris

        requires reversal of his convictions.        Unlike Harris, whose only connection to the conspiracy was

        a questionable in-court identification that was later recanted, Richardson’s conviction in no way

        rested on the recanted identification.           Absent some argument indicating how the removal of

        testimony identifying Harris rendered other evidence insufficient to convict Richardson (and the

        Court being unable to identify how the evidence                 was insufficient), the convictions          must be

        affirmed.     Because Richardson has not identified a single element of a single crime for which he

        was convicted that is lacking in evidentiary support, he has not made a prima facie case entitling

        him to issuance of a writ of habeas corpus




        “° E.g., Corraspe, 2024 V1 21, 4956-61; Nibbs v. People, 73 V.1. 617, 624-26 (V.1. 2020); A. Davis. V. People, 69 V.1
        600, 610-1 (V.1. 2018); M4. Davis v. People, 69 V.1. 619, 663-67 (V.I. 2018) (Swan, J., concurring); cf S. Powell v
        People, 70 V.1. 745 (V.1. 2019) (defendant testified and admitted to using firearm but no firearm produced)
Richardson v. Testamark, Director of the Bureau of Corrections
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                  B          Richardson’s allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel does not establish
                             a prima facie case for habeas relief.

        q22       “The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides the accused the right to

        have assistance of counsel for his defense in criminal prosecutions.”*! “Proving ineffective

        assistance of counsel presents a high bar.’”“? To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of

        counsel, a petitioner must establish that his trial counsel's performance “fell below an objective

        standard of reasonableness and that counsel’s performance prejudiced him or her resulting in an

        unreliable or fundamentally unfair outcome in the proceeding.’ There is a “strong presumption

        that counsel's conduct falls within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”** “Tactical

        decisions      about    which    competent      counsel    might     disagree    do     not     qualify    as objectively

        unreasonable.”

        23        For a court to determine that “trial counsel's conduct fell outside the zone of reasonable

        professional assistance,” a petitioner “must also affirmatively prove that his counsel's conduct

        prejudiced him in the proceeding so that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

        unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’*°




        “| Castillo v. People., 59 V.1. 240, 282, 2013 V.1. Supreme LEXIS 34, at *66 (VI. 2013). The Sixth Amendment of
        the U.S. Constitution establishes that, in all criminal prosecutions, “the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
        public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district
        shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
        confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
        have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.” It is well established that the “protections of the Sixth Amendment
        to the Constitution of the United States [have been extended] to the Virgin Islands.”         Rivera v. People., 64 V.1. 540,
        561-562, 

 (V.1. 2016)
        *® Suarez v. Gov't   of the V.1., 56 V.1. 754, 759-760, 

 (VI. 2012)
        3 Williams y. People, 78 V.1. 691,   700 (V.I. 2024) (citing Blyden, 64 V.1. at 381)
        “4 Suarez, 56 V.1. at 760 (citing Bell v. Cone, 

 (2002))
        5 

 at 760 (citing /brahim, 2008 V.1. Supreme LEXIS 20, at *2; Bell, 

)
        ‘6 fd. at 760 (citing Corraspe v. People, 53 V.1. 470, 479-80 (V.1. 2010); Hill v. Lockhart, 

 (1985))
Richardson v. Testamark, Director of the Bureau of Corrections
Case No. ST-2018-MC-00035
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Page 13 of 20
                                                  2025 VI Super 15U

        24       Richardson alleges that Court appointed counsel “was no criminal defender, he was a paper

        pusher who came to court, and raised no defense on my behalf, other than to adopt what the fellow

        defense counsels said.       I don’t think he even did an independent filing of any motion for relief on

        my behalf before the trial Court.4? Richardson does not say what defense counsel failed to present

        Simply being dissatisfied with counsel’s trial strategy is not enough to prove ineffective assistance

        of counsel, and Richardson has completely failed to identify a single action by trial counsel that

        was deficient and has, likewise, failed to demonstrate prejudice warranting reversal for ineffective

        assistance of counsel

        {25      Courts give deference to counsel and their performance of their duties; “[i]t is all too

        tempting for a defendant to second guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence,

        and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to

        conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable.”“®                        In the absence of

        specific identified instances of conduct falling below the professional standard of a defense

        attorney, Richardson has failed to make any argument that would warrant a reversal of his

        convictions




        47 Habeas Pet. p. 3
        “8 Strickland v. Washington, 

 (1984).    “To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, [a
        petitioner] must demonstrate that ‘counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that
        counsel's performance prejudiced [her] resulting in an unreliable or fundamentally unfair outcome in the proceeding.’
        ‘The proper measure of [an] attorney['s] performance ... [is] simply reasonableness under prevailing professional
        norms,’ and, therefore, review of counsel's performance is generally highly deferential, as there is a presumption that
        ‘under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ Accordingly, [a petitioner}
        must overcome this presumption by pointing to acts or omissions of counsel that fell outside the realm of
         professionally competent assistance’ to satisfy the first element of the two-part test." 4. Powell v. People, 59 V.1
        444, 453 (2013) (quoting Stanislas v. People, 55 V.1. 485, 494 (V.I. 2011); Strickland, 

, and citing
        Corraspe, 53 V.1. at 479-80)
Richardson v. Testamark, Director of the Bureau of Corrections
Case No. ST-2018-MC-00035
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
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                                                     2025 VI Super 15U

                    Cc        Richardson’s challenge to the Court’s failure to grant a new trial after co
                              defendant Harris’ conviction was overturned is not a basis for habeas relief.

        {26         Adefendant’s conviction is not automatically reversed upon the reversal of a codefendant’s

        conviction.          Instead, a codefendant has the option to “incorporate the arguments of another

        [codefendant] by reference[; but]blanket adoption of all issues raised by [a codefendant] does not

        suffice [w]hen . .. many of the factual predicates of [the codefendant’s arguments] on appeal apply

        only to [that specific codefendant], not to [the codefendant presently before the Court—]the Court

        will not parse the arguments                to determine which of them might be relevant to [the present]

        appeal.”*?          Richardson must point out specifically how the reversal of the conviction of his

        codefendant Harris undermines Richardson’s own conviction such that reversal is warranted

        {27         Richardson argues that the “misidentification of Pedro Harris is really important to my case,

        it points out the fact that evidence was falsified, the government knew it was falsified and took

        advantage of the falsified evidence to win convictions.”°° And because of this, Richardson claims

        that “. .        Pedro Harris, had his conviction vacated because the prosecutor knowingly used false

        testimony         to obtain a conviction.”>'          However,      “the case against Harris turned on [a false]

        identification.       Without [this false] in-court identification, Prosecutor Davis would have asked the

        jury to convict Harris based on Daniel’s testimony alone[; which], as a matter of law[,] such

        evidence would not suffice to sustain a conviction, much less one for murder or conspiracy to



        *° Richardson I, 55 V.1. at 1201 n.3 (citing U.S. ex rel. LaCorte, SmithKline Beecham Clinical Laboratories, 

 (3d Cir.1998)); see People v. Poleon, 50 V.1. 144 (V.1. Super. Ct. 2008) (“[T]he acquittal of the one of two
        defendants on conspiracy charges does not require the reversal of the conviction of the other defendant if there is
        sufficient evidence upon which the jury could find that the convicted defendant conspired with someone other than
        the codefendant.”);     People v. Browne,   54 V.1.   61,   73-85, 93-95 (V.I.   Super.   Ct.   2010) (considering motions   for
        judgement of acquittal with regard to evidence against each defendant)
        5° Habeas Pet. p. 5
        5! Habeas Pet. p. 15
Richardson v. Testamark, Director of the Bureau of Corrections
Case No. ST-2018-MC-00035
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Page 15 of 20
                                                    2025 VI Super 15U

        commit murder.”*? In contrast, Richardson was connected to the crimes by the uncontradicted

        testimony of Coker.         Additionally,   Richardson fails to make any factual connection between the

        absence of an identification of Harris and a failure of evidence as to his own guilt.            Taking away

        the false identification of Harris does not impact Coker’s credibility or the details of Richardson’s

        confession to Coker.        Therefore, Richardson has failed to make a prima facie case for issuance of

        a writ of habeas corpus on this basis; and reversal of Richardson’s convictions is not warranted

                      D.   Richardson’s due process right to a fair trial were not violated

        428      The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.            Constitution prohibit the government

        from depriving an inmate of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.** A defendant's

        rights to procedural due process are applicable to the Virgin Islands through Section 3 of the

        Revised Organic Act: “No law shall be enacted in the Virgin Islands which shall deprive any

        person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or deny to any person therein equal

        protection of the laws.”*4

        (29      In Malone v People, the Court held that a defendant must demonstrate that he was convicted

        in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process.             The Court established a three

        prong test that requires a defendant to show: first, that he was deprived of the opportunity to present

        evidence in his favor; second, that the excluded testimony would have been material and favorable

        to his defense; and third, that the deprivation was arbitrary or disproportionate to any legitimate

        evidentiary or procedural purpose.”>°


        » Harris, 55 V.1. at 1129
        3 U.S. CONST, amend V, XIV. Revised Organic Act of 1954 § 3
        54 Cartyv, People, 56 V.1. 345, 364 (V.1. 2012)
        55 Malone v. People, 53 V.1. 408, 421, 

, 

 (V.I.   2010) (citing Gov’?
        of the V.1. v, Mills, 

 (3d Cir. 1992))
Richardson v. Testamark, Director of the Bureau of Corrections
Case No. ST-2018-MC-00035
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
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                                                  2025 VI Super 15U

        430      Richardson argues that “the government disclosed reports and recordings of a confidential

        informant, SKS, and his investigation of Paniagua between April and June 1994, around the time

        of Office Hodge’s murder.         But the tapes have disappeared                  The tapes reveal that during one

        meeting between Paniagua and SKS, Paniagua essentially confessed that he had been involved in

        the murder of Officer Hodge.”°®            Additionally, Richardson argues that “after the government

        shared this information, all the defense counsels requested that the government disclose the

        identity of SKS, so they could determine if they wanted to call him as a witness                           At first the

        trial court seemed prepared to allow the identity of SKS to be revealed,                      but it later adopted a

        contrary course of action.”>” Lastly, Richardson argues that the “with the exclusion of this critical

        evidence     (Paniagua’s     testimony)     coupled      with   trial   court’s     refusal   to   allow   the   taped

        confession . . .”*8 and “being unable to confront SKS, because the government did not disclose his

        identity, Richardson was denied a fair trial.”*?

        431      Richardson argues that the Court improperly found Paniagua unavailable and excluded his

        alleged taped confessions as hearsay; thus, Richardson was prevented from presenting Paniagua’s

        confession to the jury.      However,     Richardson does not specifically argue how presenting either

        Paniagua or the tape to the jury would be favorable or material to his case, especially where

        Paniagua denies that it is his voice on the tapes.        Facially, a confession to a crime is evidence likely

        to raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the fact finder.             However, Richardson does not present




        56 Habeas Pet. p. 8
        57 Habeas Pet. p. 9
        58 Habeas Pet. p. 14
        5° Habeas Pet. p. 14
Richardson v. Testamark, Director of the Bureau of Corrections
Case No. ST-2018-MC-00035
MEMORANDUM         OPINION AND ORDER
Page 17 of 20
                                                   2025 VI Super 15U

        any argument as to how the exclusion by the Court of the tapes was arbitrary or disproportionate

        to the underlying purposes of the rules of evidence

        432       The evidence presented to the jury was as follows:                there were four men® seen outside

        Officer Hodge’s home and it was determined that four different firearms were used.°'                        The fact

        that Paniagua may have confessed and later denied his voice on the tapes does not contradict the

        evidence against Richardson.            More importantly, Richardson does not argue how the prior

        disposition of these exact arguments in Richardson v. Gov't of the V.1, 

 (D.V.1. App

        Div.    2011) (per curiam), was         incorrect.     While this Court has discretion to consider               issues

        previously argued to the Appellate Division and/or Third Circuit, establishing a prima facie case

        for habeas relief certainly requires that a petitioner identify some basis or argument for why the

        prior ruling should be disregarded

        {33       Upon review by the Third Circuit, the court addressed “[t]hree arguments relate to the

        Paniagua       tape   recording.    Richardson       argue[d]   that the    Superior    Court   violated   his   Sixth

        Amendment right to compulsory process when it denied his motion for a writ of habeas corpus ad

        testificandum requiring Paniagua to testify, that the Superior Court erred by determining that the

        tape was inadmissible hearsay, and that the Superior Court incorrectly denied his motion to

        disclose the identity of the CI who recorded the conversation.               These arguments” were determined

        to be “meritless for the same reasons articulated in” Gov't                of V.I. v. Mosby, 

, (3d Cir. 2013).


        © Richardson II, 

 (“Witnesses Bernice Celestine,    Eustace Sorhaindo, and Shorn Pennyfeather
        all heard gun shots the evening of the murder and saw four men dressed in black near Officer Hodge’s home shortly
        before or after his murder.’’)
        6! td. at 201 (four firearms)
        8 

 at 202
Richardson v. Testamark, Director of the Bureau of Corrections
Case No. ST-2018-MC-00035
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Page 18 of 20
                                                  2025 VI Super 15U

        {34       The Third Circuit explained its ruling.        “Mosby contends that the required showing would

        have been met if he had been given a chance to confront Paniagua's denial of involvement in the

        murder with the recording, which the parties agree constitutes hearsay. We are not persuaded. The

        favorability determination must be based on a witness's actual testimony and admissible evidence

        This is so because defendants cannot circumvent the rules of evidence by calling witnesses solely

        to impeach them with evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible.”

        435      The Court further explained that “[t]he record supports the Superior Court's conclusion that

        the statements on the tape were untrustworthy.            There is simply no evidence to support the tape's

        suggestion that a hit man was brought to the Virgin Islands.                If anything, the evidence at trial

        suggests that a hit man was not involved because of the multiple guns used in the killing.                 Mosby

        does not explain why the officers would pay a hit man $50,000 to join them in murdering a police

        officer, rather than to simply kill the officer himself. Furthermore, the record does not provide any

        reason to conclude that the Superior Court was clearly unreasonable in determining that the

        circumstances did not indicate trustworthiness.           There is evidence supporting the conclusion that

        the CI was financially motivated to fabricate evidence and had been an unreliable informant in the

        past.   Furthermore, the tape does show that Paniagua's statement was not spontaneous and was

        made when he had reason to enhance his criminal reputation to the CI by sounding ‘all powerful.’

        Accordingly,    the Superior Court's ruling that the statements on the tape were inadmissible hearsay

        was not an abuse of discretion.”




        % Mosby 11, 

 (citing United States v. Sebetich, 

 (3d Cir.1985))
        4 Mosby II, 

Richardson v. Testamark, Director of the Bureau of Corrections
Case No. ST-2018-MC-00035
MEMORANDUM         OPINION AND ORDER
Page 19 of 20
                                                    2025 VI Super 15U

        36       Lastly, “[a] defendant is generally not entitled to the identity of a CI when ‘the informant

        was not an active participant or eyewitness, but rather a mere tipster’ to the reported offense.                    Here,

        SKS was very similar to a tipster because he had no role in the murder of Officer Hodge and only

        happened upon the information in the tape as a part of an unrelated drug investigation.                        SKS thus

        could not provide any information beyond what was already on the tape, thereby rendering his

        identity of minimal value to the preparation of Mosby's defense.                    The Superior Court's denial of

        Mosby's request to disclose SKS's identity was not, therefore, an abuse of discretion.”®©

        {37      Ultimately, Richardson appears to claim error in the denial of the disclosure of the identity

        of SKS because defense could have called SKS to testify that Paniagua confessed to conspiracy to

        murder Officer Hodge.          However, a confession must be corroborated such that it is determined to

        be reliable. As such, SKS’s testimony about Paniagua’s confession to SKS would have been

        subject to a very similar reliability analysis (a corroboration analysis) already conducted with

        regard to the recording, which was determined to be unreliable hearsay.°”

        {38      With regards to SKS’s identity, Richardson raises the inability of counsel to determine if

        SKS should be called as a witness.           However, the fundamental lack of reliability of the confession

        renders any evaluation of SKS’s credibility irrelevant because, no matter how credible SKS, the

        confession would be uncorroborated hearsay without sufficient indicia of reliability

        439      Absent at least some attempt to overcome the lack of reliability of the confession, any

        concern about evaluating SKS as a witness is premature.                   Because Richardson has not presented


        6 fd. at 257-58 (citing United States v. Jiles, 

 (3d Cir.1981); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S
        53, 62 (1957) (explaining that disclosure of confidential informants' identities is guided by the balancing of “the public
        interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual's right to prepare his defense’’))
        6 Richarson 1, 55 V.1. at 1210-15
        §? Richarson I, 

-15
Richardson v. Testamark, Director of the Bureau of Corrections
Case No. ST-2018-MC-00035
MEMORANDUM         OPINION AND ORDER
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        any new arguments that would undermine confidence in the prior dispositions of these same

        arguments and has failed to counter the prior determination of a lack of reliability, Richardson has

        failed to make a prima facie case for habeas relief.

                  Accordingly, it is hereby

                  ORDERED        that Richardson’s petition for writ for habeas corpus is DENIED; and it is

        further

                  ORDERED that a copy of this Order shall be directed to counsel of record and by certified

        mail on Maurice Richardson at Red Onion BOC, Inmate No.               1415436, Central Mail Distribution

        Center, 3521 Woods Way, State Farm, Virginia "7

        Dated: June b 2025                                                   Lo
                                                                 HON. SIORIDHM. TEJO
                                                                 JUDGEOF     THE SUPERIOR COURT
                                                                 0           IN ISLANDS

           ATTEST

           TAMARA CHARLES
           Clerk of      fhe

           BY
                      DONNA     D. DONOVAN
                      Court Clerk Supervisor 06 / 09 / 2025