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March 1973

THE PANAMA CANAL ISSUE: FACT SHEET

Background of Treaty Negotiations

The United States operates, maintains and defends the Panama Canal under the terms of the Treaty of 1903, as amended in 1936 and 1955. This agreement granted in perpetuity "all the rights, power and authority...which the U.S. would exercise if it were sovereign" in the Canal Zone. This aspect of the treaty has long been an emotional issue in Panama and an irritant in U.S. - Panama relations. The riots in Panama of January 1964 brought to a head this long-standing dissatisfaction and caused Panama to break diplomatic relations with the U.S.

Less than four months later, in April 1964, relations were reestablished and negotiations were undertaken to revise the treaty relationship. Three draft treaties were negotiated between 1964 and 1967. In part they would provide for the U.S. to relinquish its sovereignty over the Zone, for operation of the canal by a U.S. - Panamanian authority, for increased payments to Panama to come from tolls revenue and for political integration of the Zone with Panama. Another major provision would give the U.S. an option to build a new, larger, sea-level canal in Panama, and other provisions dealt with defense arrangements. Ratification of these treaties was pending when, in 1970, the Torrijos government formally rejected them.

In October 1970, after a meeting between President Nixon and President Lakas of Panama, the White House reiterated that the U.S. was ready to discuss treaty relations whenever Panama was ready. These discussions began in late June 1971 and came to a standstill in March 1972.

Importance of the Canal to Panama

The canal is a prime source of revenue to Panama: approximately one-third of Panama's GNP (almost one billion dollars) is attributable to the canal, the Zone and other U.S. installations; almost fifty per cent of Panama's foreign exchange earnings from exports of goods and services derives from direct payments from these same sources; nearly one-third of Panama's employment is attributable to the canal: Panama's per capita income of almost \$700 is the highest in Central America and the fourth highest in Latin America.

Importance of the Canal to the U.S.

As one of the world's most strategic waterways, it has been of vital importance to U.S. national defense. It has been used for rapid and flexible deployment of military forces and for accelerated transport of vital raw materials and military supplies. U.S. flag vessels make up more than one-sixth of the canal's commercial traffic and more than 70 per cent annually of all trans-Isthmian traffic either originates or terminates in U.S. ports.

Panama Treaty Objectives

Panama seeks categorical territorial sovereignty and legal jurisdiction over various activities in the Canal Zone. It also seeks substantial increase in its share of canal profits, as well as greater indirect benefits through the opening of the Canal Zone to Panamanian commercial enterprise, increased use of Panamanian products and services in the canal operation and employment of more Panamanian citizens at key managerial levels.

U.S. Treaty Objectives

The U.S. seeks continued control and defense of the canal under a treaty arrangement that will include: the right to administer, operate and defend the canal for an extended period of time; clear provisions which would permit the expansion of the capacity of the canal to meet international shipping needs, either by the addition of third locks for the present canal or the construction of a second, sea-level canal; a treaty-binding guarantee that the canal will remain permanently open to all world shipping at reasonable tolls on a non-discriminatory basis; due consideration for U.S. security interests in negotiating the duration of a new treaty.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
12 June 1972

A Modern Treaty for the Panama Canal

Address by Ambassador David H. Ward¹

The story of the Panama Canal is well known to Americans, and it is one in which we rightly take considerable pride. The canal enabled ships to reduce the length of their voyages, sometimes by as much as 8,000 miles, thereby appealing to our liking for efficiency. Patriots were equally pleased by the construction episode. We conquered the jungle and the mosquito, where the French company had lost a fortune and 22,000 lives.

The canal enterprise was, and remains, unique. While it affords us special benefits, it likewise presents special problems of a political nature. These problems must be addressed constructively if a sound relationship with Panama is to continue and if we wish to keep alive the possibility of building a new canal in Panama in later years. We would be unwise, and do not wish, to ignore legitimate nationalist aspirations in Latin America. For these reasons we are negotiating a new treaty with Panama.

Any discussion of the problems we face today must begin, but by no means end, with a discussion of the convention of 1903. This treaty, although amended and reaffirmed in 1936 and 1955, governs the U.S. presence in Panama much as it did when the canal opened in 1914.

The treaty is 69 years old, and no one need be reminded of the great changes in the

world generally, and in Latin America in particular, that have taken place since that time. In 1903, because of various problems including those concerning health and sanitation, it was judged necessary for the United States to hold a 10-mile-wide zone under its control for construction and operation of the canal. Accordingly, the 1903 treaty provides that the United States can exercise all rights and powers in the Canal Zone it would possess if it were the sovereign and can exercise these rights in perpetuity. The treaty thus stops short of an explicit grant of sovereignty to the United States.

The builders of the canal set out to create a community with the necessary government services and utilities in which the large labor force could live and work in good health and good order. This task was accomplished as part of the process of building the canal, and that community exists today. At present, we have the necessary stores, housing, power and water facilities, courts, police, post offices, schools, hospitals, and the like, all under U.S. ownership.

The Canal Zone is thus in many ways independent of Panama and outside of its legal control. This fact has caused friction with Panama. The physical aspects of the zone have also been a cause of difficulty. The zone bisects Panama, adjoins Panama's two largest cities, Panama City and Colón, and occupies land that Panama would like to use for urban expansion. The two deepwater ports of Panama are in the zone, and travelers from

¹ Made before the Pan American Council at Chicago, Ill., on May 12 (press release 115). Ambassador Ward is Special Representative of the United States for Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations.

western Panama must pass through the zone to reach Panama City, which they are of course free to do.

Panama is paid an annual annuity of about \$2 million for the canal and received indirectly, through U.S. purchases and payment of wages to Panamanians, about \$167 million in 1971. This is about 65 percent of Panama's total foreign exchange earnings and the basis for about 35 percent of its gross national product. The direct payment is considered inadequate by Panama on the ground, among others, that tolls, which have never been raised, could be increased to finance a much greater payment.

Canal Zone operations today are under the overall supervision of the Secretary of the Army. A major general in the Army Corps of Engineers serves in the zone in a civilian capacity as Governor of the zone and President of the Canal Company. He is responsible for the governmental functions in the zone, the operation of the canal, the management of the housing and commercial services provided for the employees of the company, and the like. A U.S. court and a U.S. attorney also operate in the zone.

About 12,000 Panamanians and 4,000 Americans work for the canal operation. Approximately 7,500 Panamanians and 40,000 Americans live in the zone, and residence therein is limited to U.S. Government personnel and their families. About 13,000 of the Americans are military personnel stationed in the zone, and they and their families share the schools and hospitals run by the Canal Company.

This is the present situation. Panama believes it to be outdated and is pressing for the right to govern the zone, for an end to the provision whereby the U.S. rights continue in perpetuity, for full ownership of a good part of the lands in the zone, for a greatly increased annuity, and for certain limitations on U.S. military rights. Panama is not, however, seeking the right to operate the canal.

These matters have been under discussion for some years, and in 1967 negotiators of

the United States and Panama reached agreement upon three draft treaties to replace the 1903 treaty. These treaties were never ratified by Panama and were consequently never submitted to the U.S. Senate.

In 1971 negotiations resumed, and since the 1967 draft treaties were formally rejected by Panama, a new basis for agreement is being sought.

Broad Principles for Hemisphere Relations

Before reviewing the approach which the United States is taking to some of the specific problems presented by the negotiations, it is worth noting that the Panama Canal, although in many respects unique, is not an isolated foreign policy problem. Instead the U.S. approach to the negotiations springs from broader principles which we apply to Panama generally and to our other relations in the inter-American system and in the world.

President Nixon, in this year's foreign policy report to Congress, recognized that although our relations within the hemisphere have a special durability, it is time to lay the basis for a more mature political relationship.² He stated: "Henceforth a sense of hemisphere-wide community (can) be sustained only on a new, more realistic basis." His report also observes that the problems in our Latin American relationships are basically political and that the hemisphere is composed of nations increasingly assertive of their individual identities and less amenable to U.S. tutelage than in the past. Hence our policy is to eschew efforts to dominate and instead seek a mature partnership with Latin American nations, recognizing the limits on our ability to solve every problem that arises in the hemisphere. This policy is exemplified by four major themes laid down by the President. These find expression in our policy con-

² The complete text of President Nixon's foreign policy report to the Congress on Feb. 9 appears in the BULLETIN of Mar. 13, 1972; the section entitled "Latin America" begins on p. 358.

cerning the Panama Canal enterprise and Panama generally, and are as follows:

—First, a wider sharing of ideas and responsibility in hemispheric collaboration.

—Second, a mature U.S. response to political diversity and nationalism.

—Third, a practical and concrete U.S. contribution to economic and social development.

—Fourth, a humanitarian concern for the quality of life in the hemisphere.

These broad principles of course require sharpening in the specific case. In particular, a careful assessment of our national interest in the canal must be a primary guide to the course of action to be followed. Traffic passing through the canal continues to increase, and the U.S. portion of this traffic has been rising in absolute terms and as a percentage of the total. In 1970, 14 percent of total U.S. oceanborne trade passed through the canal, as compared with 10 percent in 1950. The canal is also of considerable military significance and is used by all but our largest naval ships and for logistical purposes. Our most important national interest in the canal enterprise is thus to insure that the canal remains available for our commercial and naval shipping.

Panamanian Aspirations and U.S. Interests

With these general and specific concerns in mind, the President has determined that a great deal can be done to meet legitimate Panamanian aspirations without jeopardy to our national interest in the canal.

Referring again to the four themes of our Latin American policy, the first theme—a wider sharing of responsibility—is exemplified by the agreement of the United States to the assumption by Panama of greater and greater responsibility for the civil government of the Canal Zone. Supporting services such as grocery stores and restaurants would be operated in the zone by Panamanian entrepreneurs, and Panama would make use of zone lands in ways consistent with U.S. responsibility for operation and defense of the

canal. Panama would also play a greater role in defense of the canal.

The second point—a mature response to nationalism—is also met by the proposed changes just mentioned and by our agreement to set a date in the next century when Panama would have an option to terminate the treaty if a satisfactory new arrangement could not then be negotiated. This will end the perpetuity provision, which has been a substantial cause of dispute over the years. Treaty provisions to insure the continued right of the United States to make use of the canal would of course survive any such termination.

The third theme—a concrete contribution to economic and social development—is exemplified by our willingness to turn over to Panama substantial zone land and port facilities which are no longer needed for operation or defense of the canal, to open up certain retained lands to Panamanian development, and to raise the level of compensation to Panama by a substantial amount.

The fourth point—a concern for the quality of life in the hemisphere—is served by almost all of the changes that we have proposed to make and by the new relationship which will result from a new treaty.

The United States has, as does Panama, certain affirmative requirements of its own in the new relationship, and these spring generally from the national interest in the canal mentioned earlier. It is our position that a U.S. Government agency will continue the functions necessary to the actual operation of the canal and the conduct of governmental activities that will eventually be assumed by the Government of Panama. Tolls would remain under the control of Congress. The transition from a U.S. government in the zone to one that is generally Panamanian should be an orderly and deliberate one, and rights necessary to an effective operation of the canal will be needed. The United States must also retain the right to defend the canal. This will require the continued maintenance of military forces in the vicinity of the

canal. Finally, we seek a definitive option either to expand the existing canal by the construction of a new and larger lane of locks or to build a sea-level canal in Panama. Further explanation of this latter point is appropriate.

Future Increases in Facilities

In 1970 the Presidential Commission headed by former Treasury Secretary Robert Anderson, who has since 1964 also been the chief negotiator in Panama treaty matters, concluded that the best site for a sea-level canal in Central America was about 10 miles west of the present canal. This site is outside the present Canal Zone, and new treaty rights would be required. The Commission recommended that a decision on the \$3 billion canal be made at a date sometime in the future when the existing canal begins to show signs of becoming overburdened. The canal would have an initial capacity of 34,000 transits per year and could be expanded to accommodate in excess of 100,000 transits. This compares with the current annual usage of 14,000 transits and with the maximum capacity for the present canal of 26,000 transits. The Commission recognized that the great cost of the canal might make full amortization of its expense impossible but concluded that it had considerable political and military advantages.

There has been much discussion of danger to the ecology from a sea-level canal. The Commission concluded that the risk of adverse ecological consequences appeared to be acceptable but stated that long-term studies were needed and that tentative provisions should be made for a freshwater barrier in the midsection of the sea-level canal.

Another possibility is expansion of the existing canal by the addition of a third lane of larger locks. It appears unlikely, however, that this need to expand capacity will become pressing until around the end of this century.

There is some concern on the part of the Government of Panama that construction of a sea-level canal would create serious economic dislocations—a long period of inflation

during construction, followed by a drastic decline in employment and business activity in general when construction terminates and lock canal jobs are eliminated in the change-over to the sea-level canal.

An exhaustive study of the potential economic impact of a sea-level canal by the Stanford Research Institute in 1969 concluded that this problem of adjustment is one of manageable proportions. Over the long run a sea-level canal would attract more traffic than the existing canal, and the phasedown in employment would thereby be lessened. The institute concluded that after the adjustment period the growth of Panama's economy would continue at a higher level than would be true had the sea-level canal never been built. The sea-level canal would thus be a new and expanded facility to replace a lock canal that will eventually become obsolete. When it is considered that more than a third of Panama's gross national product flows from canal operations it is readily apparent why the creation of a new canal, with greater capacity, will be a tremendous long-term benefit to Panama.

Our approach to our treaty relationship with Panama thus reflects the constructive and forthcoming attitude that the United States has taken toward Panama in other matters. Panama has long been one of the highest per capita recipients of U.S. development assistance in the hemisphere, and this assistance, together with benefits from Canal Zone goods and services, has helped sustain a record of economic growth over the past decade that is one of the highest in Latin America. Congress has recently increased Panama's sugar quota and has provided \$90 million in loans and grants for the construction of the Pan American Highway through the Darien Gap.

Both through our treaty policy and in these other programs the United States has sought to foster a relationship in which the processes of change and national development can take place in an atmosphere of mutual respect and cooperation. We seek a mature and reasonable partnership with Panama

which will endure for the benefit of both parties and world commerce. We recognize Panama's aspirations to play a greater role in canal affairs and to assume responsibility

for the government of the Canal Zone. At the same time we seek full recognition by Panama of the national interest of the United States in the reliable, safe, and efficient operation of the Panama Canal.

THE SUN
18 February 1973

U.S. and its clients: The U.N. will look at the Canal Zone...

By LOUIS HALASZ

The new U.S. ambassador to the U.N., John A. Scali, scheduled to present his credentials Tuesday, won't even have time to warm up the chair vacated by George Bush before the hottest political potato seen here in years lands in his lap.

This is going to be a special six-day Security Council session in mid-March in Panama City, designed by the Panamanians to put pressure on Washington for a new Canal Zone treaty.

The ostensible purpose of the meeting, as described by the Panamanian foreign minister, Juan Antonio Tact, is "a consideration of measures for the strengthening of international peace and security and the promotion of international cooperation in Latin America." In plain words, the invitation to the U.N.'s most important body is to permit the Latin Americans an airing of their various complaints against the United States.

Pressure on U.S.

"A Security Council meeting should not be conceived as a means for bringing pressure on bilateral issues," Mr. Bush warned in the course of the Security Council meeting that approved of the Panamanian request for the special session. What he did not say, but U.S. session people admit in private, is that this type of pressure could only prove to be counter-productive in view of a richly financed House and a predominantly glib Congress.

The only consolation for Americans working in the U.S. mission here is connected with the new Cuban-American hiking agreement. People here believe that, President Nixon's contention notwithstanding, this deal is only an introduction to further changes in U.S. relations with Castro's Cuba. And if that is the case, the Cubans will not be too eager to exploit the anti-U.S. propaganda field in Panama City. In fact, sources familiar with Latin American developments in the U.S. speak of back-door Cuban hints right from the beginning that the Panamanian move had never really been to Havana's liking.

The Panamanian project was carefully prepared and exquisitely timed: The Security Council session will take place during the only month when Panama's ambassador to the U.N., Aquilino E. Boyd, is president of the council.

What the Panamanians will say was made clear by Ambassador Boyd as long as nine years ago when, at the behest of the Canal Zone "flag riots," he spoke in a Security Council session called to tackle the crisis. "The American population [in the Canal Zone] has always been characterized by its hostility toward the nation and people of Panama," he cried, adding that "North Americans living in the Canal Zone believe it is a fief of their own which can be handed down indefinitely from fathers to sons, and who have a complete lack of colonialism morality."

Divides the country

For was he less indignant recently when he complained that the zone was "a real enclave which is foreign to our national jurisdiction and which divides our territory into two parts," thus creating "a dangerous and potentially explosive situation." Even though the "Zonians"—as Americans living in the semi-exterritorial area of the canal are called—are known for their discriminatory attitude toward Panamanians and though there is a generally shared feeling here that the granting of a truly equitable new Canal Zone treaty by Washington has long been overdue, Mr. Bush valiantly defended the process of "active bilateral negotiations" presumably in progress between the U.S. and Panama and refuted the charge that the zone would be "a colonialist enclave."

Nevertheless, the echo of charges of U.S. colonialism is likely to be loud in a Security Council whose composition this year is the least friendly toward the United States in the history of the United Nations.

Most nations against U.S.

The two Latin American countries on the council, Panama and Peru, will not only be joined by most other hemispheric countries that undoubtedly will be present during the March session, but will enjoy the wholehearted

support of the council's African and Asian members—Guinea, the Sudan, Kenya, India and, perhaps with less fervor, Indonesia. Likely Soviet and Chinese reactions do not leave much to imagination, while the Yugoslavs are fully expected to align themselves with the most fiery line the Third World could offer. The Austrians have already made clear that their overall posture is that of total neutrality. Even though the Australians have lately been making friendlier noises toward Washington, their support of the U.S. is not likely to be wholehearted under the new, leftist Whitlam government. Thus the U.S. can only count on the support of Britain, and to a much lesser degree, on that of France.

This picture is so potentially explosive that many Latin American delegates are having private doubts about the advisability of the whole idea, even though their group, speaking through the Colombian ambassador, Augusto Espinosa, formally expressed "sympathy and solidarity" with the Panamanian request and unanimously agreed to support it. "So far we only agreed to support the request for a special Security Council meeting," said the Argentinian ambassador, Ortiz de Rozas, adding that there was no overall Latin American understanding about the specifics of the session due in March.

This Latin American caution was underlined in a tacit way by the Peruvian ambassador, Javier Perez Cuellar, who, while representing one of Latin America's "progressive"—that is, new leftist—governments, nevertheless restricted himself to the contention that a Security Council session in Latin America "is not a matter of disturbing the action of the regional organ."

OAS was omitted

The reference was to the fact that the Panamanian idea had not been promoted through the Organization of American States whose headquarters is in Washington and of which, of course, the United States is the most important member.

Ambassador Boyd does not keep it a secret that the omission of the OAS was intentional. "The 'realpolitik' sense of Latin America did not recommend it to Panama to present its case to the OAS, and we tried to avoid this channel," he said in an interview. What he meant was rather plain: Since a Panamanian request would have been blocked by

Washington in the OAS, he simply avoided going through it. "New York is 230 miles from Washington," chuckled Mr. Boyd. "Just imagine how it would be if OAS headquarters were in Panama City," he added.

In fact, one of the formal U.S. arguments against the Panamanian project is based on this avoidance of the OAS, which "represents a slap in the face of Chapter 8 of the U.N. Charter," regulating regional arrangements, as one U.S. source remarked. Comparison is made with the Security Council's special session last year in Africa in Addis Ababa, which had been arranged through that continent's regional body, the Organization of African Unity.

Keeping the lid on

A Security Council committee set up to deal with meetings away from headquarters went into a two-week closed huddle right after the formal approval of the Panama City project to discuss and draw up the specific agenda that should govern the forthcoming session. Latin American diplomats, working with their colleagues from other lands, are trying to sort out the many subjects that they would, and the others they would not, like to talk about. The general hope is that by some kind of understanding the lid could be kept on and the explosive session gotten over with so that U.S.-Latin American relations would not suffer a serious setback.

Whether such a bottling up could be safely engineered is another question, and many people here, aware of both the Latin American complaints and emotionalism, doubt that it could.

As Ambassador Bush already pointed out "the prospect of the [Security Council] meeting is stimulating a heated propaganda campaign in Panama." If such a heated atmosphere compels the Panamanian spokesmen to put on a good show for the benefit of the home audience to get a kind of emotional satisfaction out of the tight-fisted Yankees, it is more than problematical whether representatives of other Latin American countries, nursing a great variety of hurts, both real and imaginative, could afford not to follow suit.

Chats with Latin American sources even on the most cursory examination reveal a bewildering variety of complaints. Some of these deal with directly "colonial" type of problems and are certain to receive full African and generally Third World sympathy. Thus,

Venezuela could complain about the still colonial Dutch and French Guyanas; Guatemala about British Honduras; Argentina about the British Falkland Islands, or the black independent Caribbean countries about the French territories.

The French can anyway be sure of coming under fire for their atomic tests in the Pacific by the Andean seaboard nations of South America, while the Soviet Union would probably be scored for its refusal to ratify a Latin American denuclearization treaty.

A most damaging accusation may be brought up by the Panamanians themselves, who mutter that the U.S. is clandestinely transporting atomic weapons through the Panama Canal—an action specifically prohibited by the treaty which it has ratified.

Control over natural resources

But perhaps the most bothersome aspect of a runaway council session in Panama, at least in U.S.-hemispheric relations, would concern the Latin American claim for permanent sovereignty over natural resources. This is the customary U.N. jargon for charges of economic, "neocolonialist" exploitation to which the Latin Americans claim they are subjected at the hands of American private companies. Chile's President Salvador Allende already gave a good taste of this problem to the General Assembly last fall when he addressed it during his short New York stay in December, when he accused it and Kennicott Copper with both subversion and capitalistic exploitation.

Such charges are likely to be joined by Peru and Ecuador, who would voice their claims for national sovereignty over 200 miles of the coastal waters to protect their main food supply against alleged exhaustion by the American fishing fleet.

And if, despite the hijacking deal, Cuba were in, talking about the U.S. military base on its soil in Guantanamo, or demanding independence for Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands from American colonialism, the fur will really fly.

These are the rather awesome prospects of a special Security Council session in Panama next March. It is impossible to gauge the political residues of the encounter and the impact it may wind up having on U.S.-hemispheric relations. The only thing observers here are certain about is that the show will be worth watching.

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Il Globo
Rome, 10 January 1973

Pittermann: The Dialogue between Socialists
and Communists Plays into Soviet Hands

Dr. Bruno Pittermann, President of the Socialist International, yesterday attacked the Kremlin for having suppressed political parties in communist bloc countries while appearing to promote socialist-communist fronts in the West, as in the case of France.

In his end-of-the-year speech regarding relationships between communism and socialism, Pittermann declared that "In the Soviet press, a dialogue is encouraged. The Socialist International has left to the individual parties the free choice of deciding if and with which communist parties they want to carry out such discussions, since these discussions are possible only in democratic countries, where the communist parties enjoy the same rights as the others."

"In the countries where only the communist parties are in control there can be no discussion between the communist parties and the social democratic parties because the adherents of democratic socialism are oppressed and persecuted as enemies of the State. This situation makes unbelievable all communist statements that they grant legal equality to social democratic parties to represent the workers' interests."

"As long as this right is not also recognized in the countries under communist domination, this statement, which applies to democratic areas, can only be interpreted to mean that communists recognize the legal equality of democratic socialism only where they do not have the strength to rule unilaterally."

Pittermann continued "If the CPSU allows the French Communist Party and other communist parties to pronounce themselves in favor of the multi-party democratic system, while in the USSR and allied countries the domination of the communist party alone is maintained, either the ideological base of the communist parties will no longer be shared, or such statements are considered by the CPSU as tactics to facilitate the transition to the Soviet system."

"Certainly, despite the differences in the political systems (recognition of the legal equality of parties in democratic countries and refusal to recognize this equality in the countries dominated by the communists), situations develop in which, even though the departure points differ, they lead to analogous conclusions: such as demands that the Vietnam war end or for the convocation of a European security conference."

"The differences in viewpoint", Pittermann added, "show up in actual performance, for example, as regards the respect for the rights

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of man and the sovereignty of all European states in particular. Here the USSR could provide convincing proof of the credibility of its intentions, if it were to put an end to the occupation of Czechoslovakia. They remain incredible if the Soviets look for a scapegoat for a mistaken decision (Shelést) but continued to support the results of the mistaken policy. They remain non-credible if they recognize the legal equality of democratic socialism only where they do not at present have the power to impose a communist monopoly, but maintain it with an iron hand where they have such power."

Pittermann: il dialogo socialisti-comunisti fa il gioco sovietico

VIENNA, 9. — Il dr. Bruno Pittermann, presidente dell'«Internazionale Socialista», ha attaccato ieri il Cremlino per avere soppresso i partiti politici nei Paesi del blocco comunista mentre sembra voler favorire fronti socialcomunisti in Occidente, come avviene in Francia.

Nella sua relazione di fine anno sui rapporti fra comunismo e socialismo, Pittermann dichiara che «nella stampa dell'URSS si invita alla discussione. L'Internazionale socialista ha lasciato ai propri partiti libera facoltà di decidere se e con quali partiti comunisti vogliono condurre tali discussioni, poiché queste discussioni sono possibili soltanto nei Paesi democratici, dove i partiti comunisti hanno gli stessi diritti degli altri.

Nei Paesi dove dominano i soli partiti comunisti non può esistere alcuna discussione fra partiti comunisti e socialdemocratici, poiché i fautori del socialismo democratico vengono oppressi e perseguitati come nemici dello stato. Questa situazione rende non credibili tutte le dichiarazioni di parte comunista, secondo cui i comunisti concedono l'uguaglianza giuridica ai partiti del socialismo democratico nella rappresentanza degli interessi dei lavoratori.

Sino a quando ciò non verrà riconosciuto anche nei Paesi posti sotto dominazione comunista, questa dichiarazione, che vale per l'ambito della democrazia, può essere intesa soltanto nel senso che i comunisti riconoscono l'uguaglianza giuridica del socialismo democratico soltanto dove non hanno la forza di dominare da soli».

«Se il PCUS — ha continuato Pittermann — permette al partito comunista francese e ad altri partiti comunisti di professarsi per il sistema democratico di più partiti, mentre nell'URSS e nei suoi Paesi alleati viene mantenuta la dominazione del partito unico comunista, allora, o la base ideologica dei partiti comunisti non è più comune, oppure tali dichiarazioni vengono considerate dal PCUS come manovre per facilitare il passaggio al sistema sovietico».

«Certo, nonostante la diversità dei sistemi (riconoscimento dell'uguaglianza giuridica nei Paesi democratici e rifiuto di riconoscere questa uguaglianza nei Paesi dominati dai comunisti), si manifestano situazioni, in cui, pur essendo differenti i punti di partenza, vengono tratte conclusioni analoghe: come per la richiesta della fine della guerra nel Vietnam, o per la convocazione di una conferenza sulla sicurezza europea.

Le differenze dei punti di vista — ha detto ancora Pittermann — risultano nell'esecuzione, come, per esempio per quanto concerne il rispetto dei diritti dell'uomo e specialmente la sovranità di tutti gli stati europei. Qui l'URSS potrebbe fornire una prova convincente della credibilità delle sue intenzioni, se ponesse fine all'occupazione della Cecoslovacchia. Si rimane non credibili se si cerca un capro espiatorio per una decisione sbagliata (Seelest: n.d.r.) ma si continua a mantenere i risultati della politica sbagliata. Si rimane non credibili se si riconosce l'uguaglianza giuridica del socialismo democratico soltanto dove attualmente non si ha la forza di imporre il monopolio del comunismo, ma lo si mantiene ferreamente dove se ne ha la forza.

NEW YORK TIMES
30 January 1973

Western communists embarrassed by letter of jailed Czech's wife

By Richard Davy

A challenging letter from Czechoslovakia to the world communist movement has been distributed by Australian communists after the West European parties shied away from it. Only the British Communist Party mentioned it briefly in the *Morning Star* on December 5.

The letter is from Mrs Anna Sabatova, wife of Dr Jaroslav Sabata, a leading Czechoslovak theoretician of the Dubcek reform period of 1968. In the wave of trials last year he was sentenced to six and a half years' imprisonment.

It is an important letter and could embarrass the French Communist Party in the March elections. Apart from exposing details of the trials and the suppression of dissent in Czechoslovakia it calls for a form of communism in which democratic rights would be assured not only for the working classes but also for other sections of the population.

Professor Sabata, a communist since the age of 19, stood by these ideas at his trial, maintaining that Marxism must adapt to the conditions of advanced industrial societies, that it must be based on democratic principles, and that Marxists must be willing to work with non-Marxists even after the struggle for power.

The unwillingness of the French communists, among others, to publish the letter shows their reluctance to bring these questions out into the open and to challenge the doctrines of the Soviet Union, thus casting some doubt on their commitment to a democratic alliance with the Socialists.

The letter says, in part:

Dear Comrades,

After careful consideration I am starting to write this letter a few hours after the court passed sentence on the last member of my family, my 21-year-old daughter Anna. She has been sentenced by the Brno regional court to three and a half years in prison. The sentences on my other children and on my husband are also unconditional terms of imprisonment.

It may perhaps seem strange that an individual Czechoslovak woman presumes to address such an important forum as the central committees and the membership of communist and workers' parties throughout the world.

I have decided on this step because in my country, Czechoslovakia, there are no official quarters at the present time to grant me a hearing. . . .

I have seen all my children put in prison. . . . I find myself as a mother in a unique and exceptional situation. Therefore in these the most grievous moments of my personal life, I am guided in what I do by my maternal feelings, my honour as a citizen and by the firm conviction which has led me for 25 years to work for socialism in the ranks of the Communist Party.

I am unfortunately aware of the complications which may arise for me, despite all the proclamations about internationalism, as a result of this public statement. I risk the possibility that I, too, may be arrested as a result of this act. I have nothing to lose, however. . . .

My husband, Dr Jaroslav Sabata, a communist since the age of 19, was head of the psychology department at the J. E. Purkyně University, Brno, until Spring 1968, then until the autumn of 1968 secretary of the Brno regional party committee. Later, until his arrest on November 20, 1971, he was employed as an iron worker with the firm, Inženýrsko - Průmyslové Stavby. He has been sentenced to six and a half years in prison.

This university teacher - a communist beloved by his students - who for 13 years also lectured at the university on Marxism-Leninism and prepared many of his students for joining the party, has now been nine months in detention under conditions which, out of consideration for the present holders of power in Czechoslovakia, I will not describe in detail.

I will say only that my husband, against doctor's orders (in 1964 he suffered infarct myocardia, and as a result he suffers from chronic inflammation of the stomach and duodenal ulcers), had to do heavy manual labour up to his arrest because he could get no other job. In prison in May, 1972, he had a heart attack. . . .

In this letter I should like to describe some of the circumstances that arose during the court hearings which I attended personally. . . . The building where the court sat was guarded as if the men on trial were a gang of hardened

criminals. Relatives and friends had to show their identity cards both in the public corridors of the regional court and outside.

The atmosphere around all the trials held in Prague and Brno in the summer months was marked by an endeavour to keep the proceedings as secret as possible, although they were officially announced as public trials.

That foreign journalists were not admitted will be known to you. But you probably do not know that admission to these public trials was granted to only one close relative of each defendant. . . .

In formal matters the bench followed the rules; the defendants could speak as they considered necessary. All who have been on trial are sincere supporters of the socialist order.

Dr Wolf, the chairman of the bench, said in his speech stating the grounds for the verdict: "Neither the bench as a body nor any individual member has formed the opinion that the men here convicted were enemies of socialism." That is to say that these communists were condemned for holding different political views, which, by words of mouth and in writing, they made known among themselves and to a few dozen others of similar political persuasion. . . .

My husband himself wrote some theoretical papers, for instance the material for discussion known as the "Little Action Programme", in which he tried to find common ground between communists and those socialists who do not hold Marxist views but support the socialist order in Czechoslovakia.

I would also point out that the "Little Action Programme" expressly states that the action of nationalization in February, 1948, was a necessary and just act about which there can be no discussion.

It is not true that my husband or any of the convicted communists favoured bourgeois democracy. All to a man are unequivocal supporters of socialist democracy based on the interests of the broadest masses and also controlled by the masses. My husband has always stressed as a matter of principle the need for control from below, that is by the will of the people.

Many communist and similar parties of the left, trade unions, and people of democratic, anti-imperialist opinion throughout the world, are justifiably concerned about the series of trials in Czechoslovakia. I am convinced that the communist and workers' parties, individual communists and Marxists, and all other advocates of socialism have an inalienable right

to speak out on matters concerning convicted communists, socialists and other citizens. The same right belongs to democratic public opinion in the world concerned with upholding basic human rights.

The international communist and workers' movement must find a common platform based on the substance and not on the superficial aspects of events in Czechoslovakia. In this connexion one must ask: why is the armed entry by night of the allied troops on to the territory of Czechoslovakia denoted as "international aid", while disagreement among many communist and left wing parties is regarded by our authorities as interference in our internal affairs, which, as distinct from "international aid", is something inappropriate and undesirable.

Why can the people of Czechoslovakia learn nothing of these expressions of disagreement from the legal press in this country? And I put a further question: Why were these trials kept secret if they were justified?

Finally I would add: not only can the protests of communist and left wing organizations, including anti-imperialist public opinion, after the hard fate of the Czechoslovak prisoners, I am convinced that now more than ever before it is the task of the day to work out and clarify political questions on a higher theoretical level, within the communist and workers' movement itself. We need especially to clarify how the power won by the working class is to be implemented further in the socialist countries. In my view, it is not logical to argue that these are issues solely concerning the parties governing in countries where power has been won by the working class under the leadership of the communist parties.

It is essential that communist parties and their allies in countries where the bourgeoisie still rule should be given prospects that will make socialism attractive to other strata and groups of the population beside the working class. One cannot make use of allies only during the fight for power and the first phase of building socialist society. In the interests of the world communist movement they must be assured of all democratic rights also in the later period, that is in the stage of socialist development which Czechoslovakia, for example, has now reached: and in such a manner that these rights will be genuinely, not merely formally, exercised.

THURGAUER ZEITUNG, Frauenfeld
6 December 1972

PRAGUE RELEASES JAROMIR MASARYK TO AUSTRIA

Exactly 7 months to the day after his forcible removal from Austria to Czechoslovakia, Jaromir Masaryk was given permission by the Prague authorities last weekend to leave for Austria. With this case, small, neutral Austria showed how fearless stubbornness can pay off, even against a stronger communist neighbor state.

Here are the antecedents: at the beginning of May of this year, Masaryk, an exiled Czech, drove from Vienna to the Austro-Czechoslovak border, to pick up his wife, a native of England, who had visited Masaryk's mother in Brno. He himself could not enter Czechoslovak territory. Masaryk went on foot to the no-man's land between the Austrian and Czechoslovak border guards. When a car with numerous Czechoslovak soldiers appeared there, he ran back, but was shot and seriously wounded. Masaryk was able to drag himself back into Austrian territory, but he was pursued by Czechoslovak border soldiers, knocked down, and brought back to Czechoslovak territory.

Various protest notes from the Austrian government against this serious infringement and demands for Masaryk's immediate release were not heeded by Prague. Party chief Husak even described this clear case of violation of sovereignty and kidnapping as a "completely legal act," and spoke of a "provocation and insult to the socialist system."

Now Vienna got tough. The Austrian government resolved to restrict relations with the CSSR to an "absolutely necessary minimum." The following weeks and months showed that this was not just tactical lip service: visits by ministers which had been planned before were cancelled, diplomatic and other contacts were boycotted. At trade fairs held in the CSSR, no official Austrian representatives appeared, cultural events were cancelled, the sports activity between the two neighbors as much as came to a complete standstill, even tourism was limited -- voluntarily by many Austrians. Various attempts at "reconciliation" from Prague were rejected with the stereotyped statement: first reparations for the kidnapping and border violation by unconditional release of Masaryk.

Now Prague has at last given in. The clear success of the line of firm principle taken in this case by Austria is particularly valued in diplomatic circles in Vienna, since Masaryk was not even an Austrian citizen, but an emigrant from the CSSR with a foreign passport.

Before Masaryk left Vienna on Tuesday with his wife, to return to their adopted country of South Africa, he wrote to thank the Austrian government. The Viennese foreign ministry says it is now satisfied: "Only now are we ready to normalize our relations with the CSSR again."

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WASHINGTON POST
18 February 1973

Lack of Snow

Soviet Wheat Crop Faces New Threat

By Frank Crepeau
Associated Press

MOSCOW—The Soviet Union is entering a critical period of bitter cold with inadequate snow cover to protect a delicate winter wheat crop that the country needs for agricultural recovery.

The year that Communist Party leader Leonid I. Brezhnev has called decisive for the five-year plan seems off to a bad start.

There was no snow cover at all by Jan. 1 in the Ukraine and the central Russian black earth region, where most of the nation's 63 million acres of winter grain is planted. They could not even scrape together enough snow in Moscow to provide the traditional troika rides during "Russian

winter" celebrations that mark the year's turn.

Lack of snow wasn't so bad with the unseasonably warm temperatures of November and December. But now temperatures all along the grain belt are plunging to from 5 above to 22 degrees below zero—and only about two inches of snow has fallen.

Reports in provincial papers indicate that what snow has fallen was whipped off by high winds. Farmers would like a good six inches of snow to insulate the sprouted winter grain from killing frost and to provide moisture for next spring.

Lack of snow cover plus penetrating frosts last winter started the Soviet Union down the road to the worst harvest since 1969. Only 168

million tons of grain were reaped, more than 20 million tons below plan.

Enough snow could yet fall to hold the winter kill of grain to the normal 10 or 20 per cent. Last winter the Russians had to reseed about one third of the crop.

Winter grains normally provide about 40 per cent of the Soviet grain crop. A summer drought over vast areas in 1972 completed what Soviet officials called "once in a century" crop failure and led to purchase of some \$2 billion worth of grain in the West, much of it from the United States.

In an effort to recoup, Soviet planners have set 1973 agricultural and grain targets that most Western experts consider unrealistic.

The 1973 plan calls for a 12.6 per cent increase in gross agriculture production. That follows two years in which the percentage showed a net deficit and compares with an annual average growth of 4.3 per cent over 1971-75.

For grain this year, planners call for 197.4 million tons, a figure never before achieved and 10 million tons above the record harvest of 1970. The planners need a perfect year to achieve that goal.

The chaos of the 1972 harvest and wheat weather set back fall planning and best estimates are that farmers planted about 10 million acres less of winter grain than planned.

WASHINGTON POST
1 February, 1973

Lack of Machines Perils Soviet Crop

MOSCOW, Jan. 31 (AP) — Pravda said today that lackadaisical production of farm implements may jeopardize the crucial spring sowing and announced dismissal of a top supply official for "violating state discipline."

The Communist Party newspaper observed in a front-page article that "the struggle for a

good harvest is waged not only in the fields" but in factories and supply organizations as well.

It added that farmers will need 48,000 new tractorized sowers, 53,000 cultivators, 18,500 fertilizer spreaders and "many thousands" of other pieces of equipment for this year's spring planting.

The spring field work is all the more important this year because of a disastrous fall harvest, which forced the Soviet Union to buy nearly \$2 billion worth of grain, most of it from the United States.

Production of tractors and fertilizer spreaders is going fairly well at plants in Minsk, Kharkov, Chelvabinsk, Altai

and Riga, Pravda said, but "the plan is jeopardized" by poor output of a factory in Novosibirsk scheduled to produce 22,000 sowers this year.

In a brief separate note on the back page, Pravda said a top supply official, Sergei V. Shevchenko, had been relieved of his post for "violating state discipline."

THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER
13 February 1973

Erich Strauss, an
expert on Soviet
agriculture, on the
latest grain crisis

Sickle under a hammer

THE state of Soviet agriculture has again become a highly political subject. With rising living standards, consumers are clamouring for more of the most valuable foods such as fruit and vegetables, meat, milk, butter, cheese and eggs. Following the dismissal of some important but essentially technical officials, the crisis has now claimed the Minister of Agriculture himself. The Minister, V. V. Matskevich, was a veteran of many battles in the past. He was Khrushchev's personal *bête noire* and dismissed by him in 1961, only to be reinstated within a few months of Khrushchev's fall. The fact that he has been replaced by D. Polyanski, a member of the governing body of the Communist party, indicates the importance attached by the top leadership to the situation.

In the main European grain-growing areas of the Soviet Union a combination of excessive winter frosts, summer drought and bad harvesting weather has cut wheat supplies and reduced the total grain harvest by 13 million tons below its 1971 level which was itself not particularly favourable. The Government was able to offset the whole shortfall in its home supplies by buying wheat on the world market but this depleted the large stocks held in Canada and the United States and has had dramatic repercussions on world grain prices. The dollar price of American wheat in Rotterdam is more than half up on a year ago; as far as Britain is concerned, the increase was even steeper because of the devaluation of sterling since June 1972. The price of other types of grain, such as maize, has risen roughly in the same proportion.

In a country of the dimensions of the Soviet Union, with its extreme "continental" climate, local crop failures are more the rule than the exception. Usually they are offset by

good harvests in other parts; catastrophic conditions in all grain-growing areas occur relatively rarely. The last time this happened was in 1963. Last year, the harvest suffered most in the main grain-growing areas of the European Soviet Union and fairly good crops were obtained in Kazakhstan, Siberia and the Urals.

The large fluctuations in weather conditions and crops were one of the reasons why the Soviet planners chose five years as the time span for the original Five Year Plans, because good and bad harvests were expected to cancel out over this period. Since the middle sixties, crop production targets have actually been set in the form of five-year averages: in the plan period 1966-70, grain production just managed to beat its target of 167 million tons for the period as a whole as the result of an exceptionally good crop in 1970.

In the light of past experience, the target for the current period 1971-5 was by no means over-ambitious; the average grain output of 195 million tons was about one sixth up on 1966-70, compared with an increase of well over a quarter between 1961-5 and 1966-70. As the crop in 1970 was 186 million tons, the target appeared well within reach, but 1971 produced only 181 million tons and last year's official total was 168 million tons. With two years out of five already gone, grain output during the next three years would have to average 209 million tons in order to fulfil the plan. This looks at the moment most unlikely.

The last occasion when the Soviet Union faced a severe grain crisis was in 1963, when output plummeted by almost a quarter to only 107½ million tons. This disaster discredited Khrushchev who was the acknowledged architect of the country's agricultural reconstruction after the death of Stalin and contributed to his fall a year later. The immediate damage was minimised

by massive grain imports from the West but the expansion of livestock production was hampered for years: its 1962 level was not regained in total until 1965 and the national pig herd (which was most severely affected by the disaster) exceeded its 1962 size for the first time in 1971.

The present setback is not nearly so serious but Soviet agriculture still suffers from a relatively low volume of production per head of the population, generally accompanied by high costs, periodical food difficulties and limited raw material supplies for important consumer industries. The long years of neglect and exploitation of the land have created an enormous backlog of investment needs: during the past three years capital investment in agriculture was of the order of £22,000 millions. But output in 1971 was no higher than in 1970, and in 1972 it actually fell by more than 4½ per cent. Even though this was largely due to bad weather, it means that in spite of the increase in capital investment Soviet agriculture remains far too dependent on a capricious and severe climate.

Yet it is difficult to believe that the recent change of Ministers will lead to a radical change in policies which have been pursued ever since Stalin's death twenty years ago. The Soviet Government will probably continue to pour more resources into agriculture, even though the return may remain for some time depressingly low. In spite of the difficulties in the harvest field, supplies of most types of food through the public trade system (with the exception of vegetable oil) have actually gone up in 1972, though there is a substantial unsatisfied demand for some important foodstuffs. But the Soviet consumer, who has had to be patient for so long, will again have to accept jam tomorrow for some years longer than he could fairly have expected.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
9 February 1973

Top Soviet priority: agriculture

By Leo Grulow
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Moscow

Agriculture — after last year's crop failure in Russia — has edged out heavy industry and consumerism as the main concern of Soviet economists.

Western observers placed the total cost of the harvest failure and its effect on the economy at 20 billion rubles (\$24 billion). This is the equivalent of 1 ruble out of every 10 that will be spent in the Soviet Union this year.

Now the weather threatens to repeat last year's toll of the winter grain. High-ranking Politburo member Dmitri S. Polyansky has been placed in charge of the Ministry of Agriculture to cope with the situation.

What steps can he take?

Geography, weather, and climate account for most of the trouble. Russia's population used to be concentrated in a relatively fertile wedge, narrowing from the Ukraine and Central European Russia toward the far tip of the wedge at Vladivostok.

This area produced grain surpluses when Russia had a smaller population to feed. But even this fertile region seemed subject to drought at least once every decade.

As the population increased, as it turned away from farming to industry, and as it spread into inhospitable northern areas (the latest being the new Siberian oil and gas fields), it made greater food demands upon the limited amount of fertile land in the south.

Of all the many newly developed regions, only one — the plains of Kazakhstan in Central Asia — provided a substantial addition to the country's farmland.

Beyond the natural limitations of geography, climate, and weather, however, Soviet agriculture suffers manmade deficiencies. If the Kremlin considers the problem sufficiently urgent, Mr. Polyansky may be able to give agriculture a higher priority and shift resources to correct the manmade deficiencies.

The first item on the agenda is to improve agriculture's mechanical equipment. Despite great advances in supplying Soviet farmers with machinery, United States farmers have almost 2½ times the number of tractors and trucks used in Soviet agriculture, and 35 percent more grain combines.

The average Soviet tractor has to serve more than four times as much acreage as the American. It is, moreover, out of service more often. A typical newspaper report from

Rostov tells how lack of a few pounds of spare parts stalled 160 heavy tractors last autumn. Farm-repair-shop workers complain of lack of lifts and other tools.

Orders have already gone out to step up the supply of spare parts for farm machinery.

The head of the Russian Republic farm-machinery supply association was dismissed for "violation of state discipline" — a grave charge — even before Mr. Polyansky took over the farm ministry. And it is obvious that Mr. Polyansky is putting on the heat to correct troubles that have plagued farm-machine operators for years.

Mineral fertilizer problems also demand attention. Output has grown rapidly quadrupling in a decade, though still only about 75 percent of the amount spread on American fields. The trouble is not so much quantity as quality, however. The farms receive too little phosphate in ratio to nitrates — sometimes only half the desired proportion.

But the most urgent need, as Western observers here see it, is for incentives.

Soviet ideologists talk of bringing the countryside up to the urban level — another way of saying that the farmer is low man on the totem pole.

Much has been done to raise his living standard. Television sets, radios, washing machines, nurseries, a guaranteed minimum wage, and old-age pension plans have greatly improved the peasants' lot.

Nevertheless, the collective farmer still earns only about 75 rubles a month (about \$1,000 a year), compared with the average nationwide wage of over 130 rubles monthly (\$1,900 a year).

State and collective farmers augment their earnings with income from their small private garden plots and limited private livestock raising. Westerners cite the higher efficiency of this restricted private farming — another tribute to incentives, for the farmer can charge whatever he can get for his privately raised produce.

If this private farming were allowed to grow substantially, however, it would bring about a sharp rise in prices of farm products, which the cities could not afford. Even if it were so inclined, the Kremlin could not take this line without imperiling the economy.

The problem, therefore, is to raise state rewards for the farmer in hope that this would pay off in higher productivity. In the past, when the government has raised collective-farm payments — as it did in 1965 when it raised the price of grain — the effect was to spur output.

The difficulty is that the country has little to offer the farmer at a time when the economy is slowing down after the crop failure. Some kind of pump-priming incentive may be called for. Whether it can be afforded at this time is doubtful.

One reform already under way and designed to free farmers' initiative is the so-called "Zveno" system. The "Zveno" (literally: link), smaller than the brigade which is the most common unit in farm work, is also called an "unassigned mechanized team."

The team is given a plot of land, machinery, and general goals, and left largely to work on its own initiative. Whereas brigade workers are paid by the job and the time put in, the "zveno" is paid according to the harvest results obtained, usually without a ceiling on earnings.

Mr. Polyansky has been considered an advocate of the unassigned-teams, which up to now has been introduced gradually, haltingly, and experimentally.

Finally, with the need to develop feed crops for the livestock which may be depleted in the wake of the low harvest last year, the Agriculture Ministry seems to be paying more attention to high-protein feeds.

Corn, which former Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev introduced on a wide scale, is getting more prominence, although it is unlikely that Mr. Polyansky will repeat Mr. Khrushchev's mistake of spreading it into regions climatically unsuited.

The American farmer Roswell Garst has interested the Agriculture Ministry in developing sorghum plantings, and other feed crops will be introduced on a wider scale also.

TIME MAGAZINE
19 February 1973

Agriculture Scapegoats

The U.S.S.R.'s perennial agricultural crisis has once again taken its toll in fall guys. This time the Kremlin abruptly removed Vladimir Matskevich, 63, as Minister of Agriculture. A two-time loser, Matskevich had been fired from the same job in 1960 for "mismanagement," then shunted off to be chairman of Nikita Khrushchev's much criticized "virgin lands" project before being restored to the agriculture ministry five years later. Earlier this month *Izvestia* reported that Sergei Shevchenko, the ministry official in charge of farm machinery, had also been discharged for "violating state discipline"—Soviet jargon for quarreling with the boss or gross incompetence. Sovietologists predicted other top agriculture officials would also lose their jobs.

Although the Soviet Union's capricious weather and its inefficient collective farm system are the basic causes

for crop failures, such scapegoats as Matskevich and Shevchenko serve handily to divert public discontent away from top Kremlin leaders. And shortages in 1972 of basic foodstuffs provided ample grounds for discontent, as citizens queued for bread in major Soviet cities last fall (TIME, Oct. 30). A recent Soviet statistical report showed that grain production fell 30 million tons below expectations in 1972, while the potato crop was down 14.5 million tons. That disaster forced the Soviets to contract for \$2 billion worth of agricultural products from the U.S., Canada and other countries, temporarily relieving shortages.

Prospects for the 1973 harvest look almost as dismal. A virtually snowless winter has deprived huge areas in central and western Russia of the snow cover that ordinarily protects grain from killing frost. Massive planting this spring is scarcely expected to make up for the damage to winter wheat,

which might force the Kremlin to turn to the West again for heavy imports of grain.

Matskevich's successor turned out to be First Deputy Premier Dmitri Polyansky, 55, who has had overall policy charge of agriculture for several years in the Politburo, but now assumes daily operational control of the Soviet Union's \$100 billion investment in farms. Some specialists view his appointment as a demotion. They speculate that it may be a canny move to unseat him from the Politburo altogether, reflecting an obscure Kremlin power struggle.

"If Polyansky accomplishes anything," says a top U.S. State Department expert, "it will have taken a miracle." English Kremlinologist Robert Conquest thinks that Polyansky, a former protégé of Khrushchev's, has been maneuvered into a position of "succeed or else." Says Conquest: "Since he can't succeed, he will be the next fall guy."

THE TIMES, London
5 December 1972

Russia reaps the harvest of Marxist mistakes

After the Soviet Union's bad harvest this year one is forced to conclude that the world cannot afford Russian communism much longer. What the Russians do to themselves is their own affair, with or without the five principles of peaceful coexistence, but the continuing inefficiency of their ideological agriculture could have serious consequences for the rest of mankind.

One is the almost inevitable increase in the price of bread in this country due to their recent large grain purchases overseas. To that extent the housewife in Britain will have to subsidize Russian inefficiency.

The long-term consequences could be calamitous. In spite of the so-called green revolution, the ghost of Malthus could once again be raised.

The reasons are plain to see. In the thirties, western Europe and other deficiency areas were fed from three geographical regions, Latin America, North America and eastern Europe including the Soviet Union. Latin America led with about 9 million metric tons of grain a year, and North America and eastern Europe each exported about 5 million tons.

Today, for Malthusian reasons, Latin America is barely self-sufficient. The Soviet Union, and much of eastern Europe, must now import vast quantities of grain from time to time not so much because of poor weather but because of the adverse influence of Marxist thought on agriculture.

This was the conclusion of Mr Orville Freeman when he

was the United States Secretary of Agriculture. Any reader who doubts this should look at the much improved North American performance. Grain exports have been increased 12 times and more in less than four decades, and in spite of greater home consumption.

As Mr Freeman wrote in *Foreign Affairs Quarterly* five years ago, there has been no contest in agriculture. "The United States, with scarcely 6 per cent of its people still on the farm, is feeding 200 million Americans, 60 million Indians and the equivalent of at least another 100 million people in other parts of the world."

"The Soviets, by contrast, with close to half of their labour force still tied to agriculture, are importing grain to provide bread for their people. If we were as far ahead of the Russians in the space race as we are in agriculture, we would by now be running a shuttle service to the moon." Mr Freeman was hardly exaggerating. The United States this year expects to harvest about 260 million tons of maize and wheat compared to the Soviet harvest of 167 million tons.

The world has been saved from periodic famine not so much by the free market economy as the freedom of American science and native shrewdness which the system encourages. The Homestead Act of 1862, the Hatch Act of 1887, the research of Land Grant Colleges and the Department of Agriculture, the Extension Service and price supports have created an American cornucopia.

Myth has been surpassed by reality, and to such an extent

that the increasing surpluses became politically embarrassing for a time. Millions of tons of excess grains were held in expensive storage, and sowing was cut back, but in the sixties the embarrassment became a blessing when the Indian monsoon again failed. Altogether President Johnson provided nearly 15 million tons.

Since then world consumption has gradually increased, and not only because of larger populations. The high-protein diet of North Americans requires about one ton of grain a person a year, most of it as cattle and poultry feed. European and Japanese requirements have also risen.

But as Mr Freeman warned as long ago as 1967, it has become much more difficult for the United States to achieve any abrupt increases in production to meet additional demand. At that time Mr Lester Brown, an economist in the US Department of Agriculture, calculated that the foreseeable North American grain surplus was all that stood between an expanding world and starvation.

Australia and New Zealand have become secondary suppliers. The green revolution has helped. Nevertheless, because of Malthus and Marx much of the world still depends upon the North American bread basket, a situation of potential danger.

For instance, what would happen if future Russian crop failures coincided with Indian famines? One can argue that the Malthusian ghost has been raised many times, and that the world still survives. Certainly it

has adjusted to crises, although the cost in human terms has not been calculated.

This is the reason why I suggest that the world cannot much longer afford Russian communism, or rather the ideological straitjacket which continues to paralyse Russian agriculture.

But what can be done? The Soviet Union is a super power, and while it can divert sufficient foreign exchange from other urgent requirements with presumably depend-upon North American grains to maintain the ideological purity of its farmers.

Yet the Russian leaders must be embarrassed by their dilemma. They have sought foreign help in industry, and might now be prepared to admit that Marx after all was a city boy who knew nothing about farming. They might just be persuaded to import American agricultural know-how rather than grain.

I have a suggestion should this prove to be the case. The next time the United States negotiates a grain deal it should quietly make a condition, as it did with India, that a greater effort be made to improve Soviet agriculture.

Every grain shipment could be accompanied by one of the 40,000 agronomists, entomologists, plant geneticists and other experts employed by the United States Department of Agriculture. Given the opportunity, they should surely make it possible for the west to live with the Soviet Union as it is now learning to do in other fields.

AMRITA BAZAR PATRIKA, Calcutte
25 December 1972

Ideological Agriculture

THE SOVIET UNION'S performance on the agricultural front this year, as also on umpteen occasions in the past, smacks of doctrinaire policies yielding bad harvest. The onus of rationalising the bad performance is on the authorities at the Kremlin, but it is certainly not on Marx or his Das Kapital. It is surprising, however, that some sophisticated political observers have made the facile conclusion that

after the Soviet Union's bad harvest this year "one is forced to conclude that the world cannot afford Russian communism much longer." Isn't it the same kind of simplistic observation, also often made by others, that after what America has done to Vietnam it would be difficult for the world to afford capitalism much longer?

In the name of Marxism or Communism, the Soviet

scientists and managers have been perpetuating their inefficiency. And by continuing inefficiency of their "ideological agriculture" the men of affairs at the Kremlin are only allowing their embarrassment to pile up. The embarrassment would, moreover, be matched by world resentment owing to the inevitable outcome of all this that housewives in other countries would have to subsidise Russian inefficiency.

The price of bread in England and some other countries is already higher than in the recent past and the import of foodgrains from the West by the USSR is bound to be on the increase for any length of time in the future. Soviet imports of foodgrains, by having this unpalatable impact on, say, British bread price, would exasperate a whole range of countries the goodwill and confidence of whom the USSR can ill afford to ignore.

AMRITA BAZAR PATRIKA, Calcutta
9 January 1973

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

AGRICULTURE IN USSR

Sir,—Your third editorial under the caption 'Ideological Agriculture' (December: 25-26) makes both amusing and interesting reading, particularly the flinching attempt to redeem the Marxian doctrines on peasantry and his disciples' interpretation and application of same into practice. Soviet Union's bad harvest is not entirely attributable to the vagaries of weather and it is easy to make a scapegoat of the scientists and managers, as indeed Stalin used to make and, I presume, the Soviet rulers still continue to make, — in spite of deStalinization — for it eminently suits the 'ideomaniac' rulers of the Soviet State to lay the entire blame at the door of "bureaucrats" in order to save the pristine purity of their ideology and the infallibility of the party. The king can do no wrong and the party cannot commit any mistake. Soviet ideological agriculture has been chronically sick ever since the ill-conceived "collectivization" was forced upon the peasantry.

In fact, the disaster started with the implementation of the

First Five-year Plan some forty-five years ago when Stalin, being inspired by the theoretician's and founder's dogmatic zeal, decided to turn the peasants into State-controlled proletarians. To gauge the magnitude of the agrarian tragedy, one must look again at the monstrous costs of collectivization. "Of all Soviet innovations", observed Eugene Lyons in his famous book 'Workers' Paradise Lost', "this is the one for which the people paid most and received least" (page: 202). Stalin himself told Churchill that collectivization took more lives than the war.

Farming is a creative process, calling for deep interest and loving care. But the peasants have never resigned themselves to their communized fate. They work for the state as little and as indifferently as they can. In 1965, Soviet Russia farmed 75 per cent more crop land than the USA, using four times as many farm workers, and produced less than half as much grain, for a population nearly 20 per cent larger. More than 40 per cent of the labour force of the USSR is on land, com-

pared with about 7 per cent in the USA. But the Soviet problems are those of deficits, the American those of surpluses. Grain production in the USSR per inhabitant is at about the 1910-1914 average. John Strohm, an American specialist who studied the problem on the spot in the USSR, wrote in 1964: "A good Illinois farmer can work ten times the acreage, feed twenty times as many hogs, take care of thirty times as many chickens as Russian collective farmers. One U.S. farmer feeds himself and twenty-seven others with a high protein diet; one Soviet farmer feeds himself and four others with a 75 per cent starchy diet."

A few years ago the Soviet economic journal 'Voprosy Ekonomiki' calculated an annual loss of 250 million man-hours through absenteeism by some 700,000 collective farmers. This does not decidedly imply that Russians are hopelessly inferior farmers. Before the revolution, scratching the soil with primitive ploughs, they fed the country and generated huge exports. Even now, in the "private sec-

tor" — the concession made by Stalin, unwittingly to provide a sort of laboratory test of the validity of private against public farm — the farmers have outproduced the collective fields on a spectacular scale. The peasants who perform wretchedly on the public land perform amazingly well on their own plots, and they derive more income from it in the open market. According to the Government's own figures (Voprosy Ekonomiki, 1966), private plots with a mere 3 per cent of the nation's sown acreage accounted for 30 per cent of the gross harvest other than grain; 40 per cent of all

cattle-breeding, 60 per cent of the country's potato crops, 40 per cent of all vegetables and milk and 63 per cent of all meat products. And the peasant family draws its food — 90% of potatoes, 80% of vegetables, almost all of its milk, eggs and meat, not from the socialized farms but from its own plot.

The debacle of communistic experiment in agriculture is by now too well-known to bear repetition of further analysis. Human nature and economic laws hardly conform to the ideological straitjacket. The inefficiency to which you attribute Soviet had harvest is built into

the structure of ideological agriculture or for the matter of that ideological economy itself. If foreign policy can afford to ignore ideology, it is imperative for an economy to eschew it.

Finally, the only feasible solution for the agricultural disaster, as the leaders know fully well, would be to return to some form of private farming. This they will not, because they dare not, undertake. Totalitarian industry and political life, they have ample reasons to believe, could not survive side by side with a free agriculture!

U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT
11 December 1972

NOW A RISING THREAT OF WIDESPREAD HUNGER

Drought, flood, war halted a promising growth in food production. Also, people are increasing faster than crops. Upshot: want instead of plenty.

World food production, which appeared healthy and growing only a few months ago, has suddenly shrunk close to the point of global crisis.

No mass starvation is reported—but there is widespread hunger, with belts being tightened in many countries. Authorities warn that another poor crop year in 1973 could be disastrous.

Behind this development are atrocious weather, political disruption and evidence of governmental bungling. In many areas the setback has canceled gains of the "green revolution" that used new seeds and modern equipment to bring a sharp increase in agricultural output.

Result: Food production in many poor countries did not improve enough this year even to keep pace with the rise in population, let alone raise the quality of substandard diets.

After a decade in which the world's supply of grain rose twice as fast as the population grew, per capita grain production in 1972 dropped about 6 per cent. The chart on page 30 gives the details.

The unexpected decline in crop yields is stepping up demands on agricultural stockpiles held by the United States, which has managed to escape serious losses in the rapid reversal of farming fortunes.

"Worst in 100 years." Russia was hit first when a vicious cycle of insufficient snow cover, a late spring, drought and autumn rains slashed grain production to some 30 million metric tons short of target. Soviet officials call it "the worst harvest in 100 years."

Rather than reduce food consumption as it has in the past, Russia chose to buy an estimated 27 million tons of grain from the West—most of it from the U. S.

Experts suspect China also may be having farm troubles this year.

American agricultural officials say a reported drought in corn and wheat fields of North China and a similar lack of rain in rice areas of South China are bound to reduce output.

Visitors to China report the people look better fed than ever, but appearances can be deceiving. A U. S. farm expert observed:

"Any crop shortfall is a serious matter in China, because their population increases something like 12 to 15 million people a year. They have to keep producing more food just to stay even."

For about 12 years, China has relied largely on Canada and Australia for grain. Imports have averaged more than 4 million tons a year.

But this year, China also has purchased 400,000 tons of wheat and 300,000 tons of corn from the U. S.—the first such trade between the two countries in 23 years. Market rumors abound that Peking is seeking more American grain if the price is right.

India: poor crops. India is another country believed to be headed soon for the world grain market to replace foodstuffs lost in a poor crop year.

When 1972 began, Indian officials proudly announced that they had built up reserves of more than 9 million tons of food grains. Henceforth, they asserted, India no longer would need the cut-rate "food for peace" shipments from the U. S. on which the country had relied for many years.

India, like several other underdeveloped nations, was delighted at increased production from new "miracle seeds" that multiplied rice and wheat yields.

Nature, however, crossed up both the Government and farmers. The summer monsoons came to India some weeks late, and rainfall was lighter than normal. Grain yields could fall as much as 20 million tons short of needs, and reserve stocks already have been halved.

Experts point out that India was due for a bad crop year, since the country's traditional "famine cycle" runs five years, and food production had risen ev-

Riots and hoarding. Power shortages, breakdown of some key irrigation fa-

cilities and bureaucratic errors have further worsened India's food situation. Riots over food prices and hoarding already have broken out in at least two States.

International grain traders say that India will have no choice but to come to the U. S. for wheat to feed a population growing at nearly 3 per cent a year. Reports persist that India will need at least 2 million tons of grain.

Some top Indian officials, however, vow that they would rather starve than "beg" from the U. S. Relations between the two countries have been strained ever since the Indian-Pakistani war over Bangladesh.

A shortage of food is rated the most critical of many problems plaguing Bangladesh, which has received some 925 million dollars in foreign aid this year, about one third of it from the U. S.

Authorities fear that as many as 200,000 people may starve this winter in Afghanistan due to drought and Government neglect.

Cases of starvation have been reported in Indonesia, where the rice crop is expected to fall about 425,000 tons short of demand of 12 million tons.

Cambodia, which once exported rice, is forced to import half a million tons of it in 1972 because of bad weather and disruptions by military operations.

In Burma, the rice crop dropped by an estimated 30 per cent this year. In addition to poor weather, observers blame inept distribution and low farm prices set by the Government.

U. S. food shipments to South Vietnam have doubled this year, but local deliveries still are erratic because of poor transportation equipment and Communist success in cutting supply lines.

Laos has an annual rice deficit upward of 100,000 tons, even though 60 per cent of the population grows its own food. The U. S. has pumped in about 25 million dollars in foodstuffs in the last five years.

Floods in Philippines. While farmers in some countries had to contend with war or drought, the Philippine Islands were struck this year by the worst floods in their recorded weather history. Damage is estimated at 450 million dollars, including the loss of 75,000 tons of stored rice.

On top of the flooding, Filipino farmers began experiencing trouble with new types of rice which had promised to make the country self-sufficient in that crop.

In 1971, the Philippines had to import rice for the first time in three years—some 450,000 tons. Imports are expected to be almost doubled this year.

Nations of the Western Hemisphere have not been exempt from crop problems in 1972, either.

Drought and other weather setbacks are expected to cut Brazil's wheat crop to half this year, forcing a sharp increase in imports. The same factor is causing Uruguay to raise its grain imports by some 25 per cent.

In Chile, just about every type of food is scarce. Production on farms and ranches has plummeted while extremists seize land, destroy crops and kill livestock. Some of the produce that does come off farms rots in warehouses, because the transportation and distribution networks break down.

Observers believe that Chile has enough food to maintain its people on spartan diets until next spring. Reports from Santiago say that unless the Marxist-dominated Government straightens things out by then, widespread hunger will become a serious possibility.

While countries short of food resort to imports for survival, some nations that traditionally produce surplus crops are having problems of their own.

Australia, one of the world's major wheat shippers, has been undergoing a drought that has cut production by nearly one third. Reserves are the lowest in several years, and grain traders speculate that Australia may have trouble filling all its export orders.

Same as 1971. Canada, another big grower, expects 1972 wheat production to be the same as 1971 despite a 10 per cent rise in planted acreage. Canadian wheat stocks are declining for the fourth straight year as part of an intentional cutback, but added acreage should raise production again in 1973.

Canadian authorities also are buying huge new railroad cars and upgrading tracks to carry heavier grain loads for export. Officials are reported considering adding storage facilities in Vancouver, the nation's main port, to handle shipments to Russia and the Orient.

Although not hurt to the extent of many countries, U. S. farmers also are having weather trouble. Prolonged autumn rain and snow have delayed harvest of corn, soybeans and grain sorghums in several States, causing losses estimated as high as a million dollars a day.

Strong U. S. position. Despite these problems, however, the U. S. finds itself in a strong position to meet growing export demand for food.

This country's grain production for the marketing year ending next June 30 is expected to drop by 16 million tons from last year's record of 235 million tons, largely because of reduced acreage. Total supplies, however, are up because of big

carry-overs. American farmers have about 170 million acres in food and feed grains and still have another 60 million acres they could use for production if needed.

The U. S. Department of Agriculture was expected to announce its 1973 feed-grain program in early December. Informed sources said the program would be designed to permit farmers to expand planting of crops in biggest demand—with the twin aims of raising farm income and trimming part of the 4-billion-dollar cost of the Government farm program.

Increasing calls for grain are expected to cut world wheat stocks from this summer's 50 million tons to less than 34 million tons by next July. That would be the slimmest reserve in seven years.

As shown by the chart on this page, rising demand for wheat has brought sharp increases in prices. Total U. S. agricultural exports are expected to reach nearly 10 billion dollars this marketing year, far above the old record of 8 billion dollars in the preceding year.

This country's net farm income for 1972 is projected close to 19 billion dollars—another record.

Gloomy U. N. report. But while American farmers prosper, a report from a United Nations agency shows that many people elsewhere are short of food.

The U. N.'s Food and Agricultural Organization says that, for the second consecutive year, the world's underdeveloped countries are falling behind in the race to match food output with growing populations.

These less-developed nations, surveys show, increased their food production this year by only about 1 per cent while 4 per cent growth is needed to feed the population and upgrade diets a little.

"This is extremely serious," declared Addeke H. Boerma, director general of the Food and Agricultural Organization. "One can regard the failure of a single year as exceptional. But two failures in successive years . . . cannot be shrugged off as a temporary misfortune."

U. N. experts estimate that roughly the same number of people remain undernourished today as there were 10 years ago—between 300 million and 500 million. Up to one third of the people in the less-developed countries suffer from malnutrition, authorities report.

Principal victims: children under the age of 5, whose physical and mental growth can be retarded by lack of essential protein and calories.

The U. N. investigation disclosed that, on a global basis, average daily consumption of calories and proteins changed little between 1965 and 1970.

An average American, the study showed, still receives 86 per cent more protein and 90 per cent more calories per day than people in some countries of Asia.

Need for upgrading. International agricultural experts say farming prac-

tices in underdeveloped countries must be upgraded quickly. They especially urge land reform to provide production incentives, plus a big infusion of modern technology and equipment.

In parts of Asia, it still takes about 70 people to match the output of a single American farmer.

Agricultural-exporting nations such as the U. S., Canada, Australia and Argentina cannot meet world food needs forever, U. N. authorities warn.

Officials assert that if 1973 brings crop reversals on the scale of 1972, the result could be mass famine. **[END]**

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THE FUTURE OF COMMUNIST POWER, (Book)
by Brian Crozier, London 1970

*WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRATIC
FEDERATION (WIDF)*

The WIDF has never been as effective as some other front organizations, for it has been under communist control from the start, and no non-communist body of any standing has ever joined it. It was founded in Paris in December 1945 at a communist-convened Congress of Women. The WIDF was expelled by the French government in January 1951 and moved to the Soviet sector in Berlin.

*INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF
JOURNALISTS (IOJ)*

Founded in June 1946 at a Congress in Copenhagen, the IOJ initially represented nearly all unionized journalists of the world. As usual, the Communists captured the key posts, and by 1950 all non-communist unions had withdrawn. In 1952, the non-communists re-created the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) which had merged with the IOJ in 1946. The original headquarters were in London; now they are in Prague.

*WORLD FEDERATION OF SCIENTIFIC WORKERS
(WFSW)*

The headquarters are in London, although the Secretary-General works from an office in Paris. The WFSW was founded in 1946 at a conference in London, organized by the British Association of Scientific Workers. Most of the official posts are held by Communists.

*INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF DEMOCRATIC
LAWYERS (IADL)*

Many non-communist lawyers were among those who attended the inaugural meeting of the Association in October 1946 in Paris. The association was expelled from France in 1950 and set up headquarters in Brussels.

*INTERNATIONAL RADIO AND TELEVISION
ORGANIZATION (OIRT)*

The last of the 1946 crop, the OIRT was founded at a conference in Brussels. It has since transferred its headquarters to Prague. In 1950 the British Broadcasting Corporation set up a rival body, the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) which all leading non-communist organizations have since joined, having deserted the OIRT. In effect, the Organization is now a semi-governmental one, since most of its affiliates are radio and television centres in the communist countries.

*INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF RESISTANCE
MOVEMENTS (FIR)*

The FIR incorporates an earlier organization founded in Paris in 1947, the International Federation of Former Political Prisoners of Fascism (IFAPP). The earlier body was founded in Vienna in 1952, the founding place—in 1952.

March 1973

NOTEWORTHY EVENTS

March 10	Czechoslovakia	The 25th anniversary of the death of Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk. Masaryk was found dead below his office window and the communists claimed he had committed suicide. During the 1968 "Prague Spring" the uncensored Czech press presented a considerable amount of evidence that he had been murdered at the Soviets' behest.
March 15-21	Panama	UN Security Council Meeting. Panama is host to a meeting which is billed as an effort "to strengthen peace and security in Latin America in accordance with the UN Charter." Panama has been actively seeking international support for its position in Canal treaty negotiations with the United States, and is therefore expected to raise the issue during the meeting.
April 3	USSR	"Doctors' Plot" explodes, 1953. Pravda announced the release of nine doctors (six Jewish) who had been arrested and charged in January 1953 with the deaths of Andrei Zhadanov and other Soviet luminaries. Stalin's death on March 5th saved them from execution and saved Soviet Jews from another pogrom.

April 4,
1972

USSR

Soviet officials in Stockholm refused to issue a visa to a Swedish Academy representative for travel to Moscow to present the 1970 Nobel Prize for Literature to Alexander Solzhenitsyn. On 9 April the author issued a statement to a group of Swedish correspondents that the refusal put "an irreversible and final ban against any kind of presentation of the Nobel Prize on the territory of my homeland." Solzhenitsyn, unable to collect his prize money or royalties, or to publish in the USSR, is now surviving through the charity of his friends. Recently a number of Western authors offered to give him their uncollected Russian royalties, but Soviet authorities have turned down such offers saying Solzhenitsyn is a "rich man."

April 9-14

Norway

World Conference for Support of Victims of Apartheid and Colonialism. About 200 participants are expected at this UN-OAU sponsored Conference.

April 13

USSR-Japan

In 1941 the Soviet Union and Japan concluded neutrality treaty which was in force until USSR declared war on August 8, 1945, six days before Japan surrendered. USSR asserted its sovereignty over the Kuriles and Sakhalin Islands. The Soviet Union has not signed a peace treaty with Japan and still holds the Northern Territories.

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