IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
DIVISION OF ST. THOMAS AND ST. JOHN
PAUL M. MONTRONE REVOCABLE )
TRUST OF 2010, ) CASE NO. ST-2016-CV-00563
Plaintiff, )
VS. )
)
KEVIN COGAN, ) ACTION FOR DEBT
Defendant )
a
Pe S|
)
KEVIN COGAN )
Third Party Plaintiff, ) ACTION FOR FRAUD.
) CONSPIRACY, AND
vs ) CICO
)
MICHELLE MONTRONE COGAN and )
PAUL M. MONTRONE )
Third Party Defendants ) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
2 —————————E— eee
Cite as 2024 VI Super 52U
MEMORANDUM OPINION
ql THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff Paul M. Montrone Revocable Trust of
2010’s (“the Trust”) and Third-Party Defendant Paul M. Montrone’s (“Montrone”) Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment, filed on January 19, 2018. The motion is fully briefed ' For the reasons
set forth herein, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part
' Defendant Kevin Cogan filed an opposition on March 7, 2018. The Trust filed a reply on March 26, 2018
Paul M. Montrone Revocable Trust of 2010 v. Cogan
Case No. ST-2016-CV-00563
Memorandum Opinion — the Trust’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the statute of limitations
Page 2 of 13
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
q2 On September 21, 2016, the Trust filed a complaint with the court in an action for debt
against Defendant Kevin Cogan (“Kevin”) for the sum of $7,322,228.28, plus interest. The
complaint alleges that Kevin and Michele Cogan borrowed the total sum of $7,322,228.28 from
the Trust throughout the course of their marriage, through several promissory notes. The Trust
asserts that Kevin has failed to make any payments on the promissory notes and has subsequently
defaulted on the notes.”
3 Some of the funds from these notes were used by Kevin and Michele Cogan to build a
multi-million-dollar home on Parcel Nos. D-13 and D-14 Consolidated Estate Lovenlund, No. 2
Great Northside Quarter, St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Istands (“Casa Sul Mare”) during their marriage.
4 Kevin filed counterclaims and third-party complaints for fraud, criminal conspiracy, and
civil conspiracy against the Trust, Montrone and Michele Cogan (“Michele”). In his counterclaims,
Kevin asserts that the Trust, Montrone, and Michele made fraudulent misrepresentations to get his
signature on some of the promissory notes and attempted to divest Kevin of his property interest
in Casa Sul Mare.
qs This motion for summary judgment seeks summary judgment on Kevin’s counterclaims
and third-party claims on the basis that the statute of limitations on those counterclaims and third
party claims has expired.’
? This case is closely related to an acrimonious divorce proceeding initiated in 2016 by Kevin against Michele in
New Hampshire.
3 On December 6, 2017, the Trust and Montrone filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with this court. Any arguments
addressed in that motion will not be considered in this opinion, they will be decided in a separate opinion issued by
the court
Paul M. Montrone Revocable Trust of 2010 v. Cogan
Case No. ST-2016-CV-00563
Memorandum Opinion - the Trust's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the statute of limitations
Page 3 of 13
UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS‘
A. The Individual Parties
1. Kevin and Michele were married for twenty-three years
2. The Cogans built, owned and maintained a 14,555 square-foot mansion named Casa
Sul Mare ona cliff overlooking the Atlantic Ocean on the north shore of St. Thomas,
U.S. Virgin Islands
3. Paul Montrone, Michele’s father, is a successful businessman
B. The Trust
4. The Trust was created in 2010 pursuant to New Hampshire law
C. The Montrone Loans
5. Montrone began loaning Kevin and Michele money to fund construction of the
mansion in 2006
6. Between June 2006 and May 2008, Kevin and Michele, as co-obligors, executed a
series of nine promissory notes “payable to the order of Paul Montrone”
a. On June 1, 2006 Kevin and Michele executed a promissory note payable to
Montrone in the amount of $300,000.00 at an annual interest rate of 5.06%
4 According to V.I. R. Civ. P. $6(c)(2)(B), “a party opposing entry of summary judgment must address in a separate
section of the opposition memorandum each of the facts upon which the movant has relied pursuant to subpart (c)(1)
of this Rule, using the corresponding seria! numbering, either: (i) agreeing that the fact is undisputed for the purpose
of ruling on the motion for summary judgment only; or (ii) stating that the fact is disputed and providing affidavit(s)
or citations identifying specifically the location(s) of the material(s) in the record relied upon as evidence relating to
each such material fact, by number.” Defendant has failed to do that in this case. Thus, the Court may act in
accordance with V.I. R. Civ. P. 56(e), which permits the court to ...consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the
motion. However, the court only adopted the facts that are completely supported by the record
Paul M. Montrone Revocable Trust of 2010 v. Cogan
Case No. ST-2016-CV-00563
Memorandum Opinion ~ the Trust's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the statute of limitations
Page 4 of 13
b. On August 11, 2006, Kevin and Michele executed a promissory note payable to
Montrone in the amount of $500,000.00 at an annual interest rate of 5.21%;
c. On January 2, 2007, Kevin and Michele executed a promissory note payable to
Montrone in the amount of $500,000.00 at an annual interest rate of 4.58%;
d. On March 1, 2007, Kevin and Michele executed a promissory note payable to
Montrone in the amount of $500,000.00 at an annual interest rate of 4.86%
e. On June 7, 2007, Kevin and Michele executed a promissory note payable to
Montrone in the amount of $500,000.00 at an annual interest rate of 4.64%;
f. On August 3, 2007, Kevin and Michele executed a promissory note payable to
Montrone in the amount of $500,000.00 at an annual interest rate of 5.09%;
g. On October 1, 2007, Kevin and Michele executed a promissory note payable to
Montrone in the amount of $300,000.00 at an annual interest rate of 4.35%;
h. On November 13, 2007, Kevin and Michele executed a promissory note payable to
Montrone in the amount of $300,000.00 at an annual interest rate of 4.39%; and
i. On May 12, 2008, Kevin and Michele executed a promissory note payable to
Montrone in the amount of $500,000.00 at an annual interest rate of 2.74%
D. The First Consolidated Note
7. The total amount of principal Kevin and Michele borrowed from Montrone was $3.9
million
8. Kevin signed each note
Paul M. Montrone Revocable Trust of 2010 v. Cogan
Case No. ST-2016-CV-00563
Memorandum Opinion ~ the Trust's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the statute of limitations
Page 5 of 13
9. Kevin, Michele, and Paul Montrone agreed to consolidate the previous nine
promissory notes in a single new note with a lower interest rate. On August 20, 2009,
Kevin and Michele executed a promissory note in the amount of $4,314,779.00
10. The interest rate on the consolidated note was 0.83%
11. The previous nine promissory notes in the principal amount of $3.9 million were
marked “CANCELLED
E. The Trust Loans
12. On June 30, 2011, Kevin and Michele signed another note in the amount of
$300,000.00 with an interest rate of 0.46%, payable to the order of Paul M. Montrone
as Trustee of the Paul M. Montrone Revocable Trust of 2010
13. The June 30, 2011, note was given “FOR VALUE RECEIVED
14. On September 27, 2011, Kevin and Michele executed another note payable to
Montrone as trustee of the Trust in the amount of $200,000.00 with an interest rate
of 0.26%
F. The Second Consolidation Note
15. On June 1, 2012, the Trust and Kevin and Michele executed a promissory note in
the amount of $4,964,779.00, payable to the Trust, with an interest rate of 0.23% per
annum
16. Kevin Cogan signed the June 1, 2012 note
G. Kevin and Michele Continue to Borrow from the Trust
17. On September 24, 2012, Kevin and Michele borrowed cash pursuant to a promissory
note in the amount of $158,000.00 with an interest rate of 0.21%
Paul M. Montrone Revocable Trust of 2010 v. Cogan
Case No. ST-2016-CV-00563
Memorandum Opinion - the Trust’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the statute of limitations
Page 6 of 13
18. On April 10, 2013, Kevin and Michele borrowed cash pursuant to a promissory note
in the amount of $160,000.00 with an interest of 0.22%
19. In early 2014, Kevin and Michele owed nearly $2 million to the Bank of Nova Scotia
and Wells Fargo Bank for the construction loans
20. The Trust executed a promissory note dated February 28, 2014, in the amount of
$1,919,449.28 with an interest rate of 0.30%, payable to the Trust
H. Kevin Sues Michele for Divorce in New Hampshire
2t. In mid-2014, Kevin and Michele moved from St. Thomas to New Hampshire
22. Kevin filed for divorce on March 9, 2016
I. The Trust Demands Payment from Kevin and Michele
23. On July 22, 2016, the Trust served a written demand upon Kevin and Michele
declaring that they were in default on the entire amount due and owing
24. All the promissory notes state they “shall be construed and enforced in accordance
with the laws of the State of New Hampshire, without giving effect to its conflict of
laws provisions.’
LEGAL STANDARD
96 Rule 56 of the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure contains the legal standard on a
ruling for a motion for summary judgment. V.1. R. Civ. P. 56(A) provides that
A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense - or the part
of each claim or defense - on which summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court should
state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the motion
Paul M. Montrone Revocable Trust of 2010 v. Cogan
Case No. ST-2016-CV-00563
Memorandum Opinion - the Trust's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the statute of limitations
Page 7 of 13
Additionally, V.1. R. Civ. P. 56(c){1) states that “{eJach summary judgment motion shall include
a statement of undisputed facts in a separate section within the motion.” The undisputed fact shall
be “supported by affidavit(s) or citations identifying specifically the location(s) of the material(s)
in the record relied upon regarding such fact.” V.I. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)
q7 A moving party for summary judgment bears the burden of showing no genuine issue of
any material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. V.1. R. Civ, P. 56(a)
After the moving party has met its burden, the opposing party “must present actual evidence
showing a genuine issue for trial.” 4/lahar v. 2DD Bjerge Grade, LLC, 2022 VI SUPER 18U, at
*15(V.L Super. Ct. Feb. 10, 2022) (citing Williams v. United Corp., 50 V.I. 191, 194 (V.1. 2008))
The opposing party “must provide more than a scintilla of supporting evidence to survive a motion
for summary judgment.” /d. (citing Anderson v. Am. Fed'n of Teachers, 67 V.1. 777, 788-89 (V.1
2017) (citing Perez v. Ritz-Carlton (Virgin Islands), Inc., 59 V.1. 522, 527-28 (V.I. 2013)). As
such, “[t]he non-moving party may not rest upon mere allegations but must present actual evidence
showing a genuine issue for trial.” Greenleaf Commons, LLC v. St. John Day Spa & Salon, LLC,
2021 VI SUPER 2U, at *8 (V.1. Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 2021) (citing Anthony v. FirstBank Virgin
Islands, 58 V.1. 224, 229 (V.1. 2013) (quoting Williams,
50 V.I. at 194-95))
q8 V.I. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2)(B) provides that “‘a party opposing entry of summary judgment
must address in a separate section of the opposition memorandum each of the facts upon which
the movant has relied.” Additionally, the opposing party must either agree “that the fact is
undisputed for the purpose of ruling on the motion for summary judgment only” or it must state
“the fact is disputed and providing affidavit(s) or citations identifying specifically the location(s)
Paul M. Montrone Revocable Trust of 2010 v. Cogan
Case No. ST-2016-CV-00563
Memorandum Opinion - the Trust's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the statute of limitations
Page 8 of 13
of the material(s) in the record relied upon as evidence relating to each such material fact, by
number.” V.E. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2)(B)
19 In Antilles School, Inc. v. Lembach, 64 V.1. 400 (V.1. 2016), the Virgin [sland Supreme
Court held that a judgment as a matter of law is appropriate after “considering all of the evidence
the court concludes that a reasonable jury could only enter judgment in favor of the moving
party.” /d. at 409. Summary judgment is a “drastic remedy” and only proper where “the pleadings,
the discovery and disclosure materials on file ... show that there is no genuine issue as to material
fact[.]” Rogers v. Gov't Employees’ Ret. Sys. of United States Virgin Islands, 2022 V.1. LEXIS 45,
at *14 (V.1. Super. Ct. 2022) (citing Anthony, 58 V.I. at 228) (quoting Williams, 50 V.1. at 194)
q10 As the moving party, the Defendants have the initial burden of demonstrating that there are
no genuine issues as to any material fact
DISCUSSION
411 | The Trust and Montrone move for summary judgment on the basis that Kevin’s fraud and
civil conspiracy counterclaims and third-party claims are barred by the statute of limitations 5
Because the promissory notes state that they “shall be construed and enforced in accordance with
the laws of the State of New Hampshire, without giving effect to its conflict of laws provisions,”
the court must address what laws should apply
412 | The Trust and Montrone argue that, for Kevin’s fraud and civil conspiracy claims, the
Virgin Islands statute of limitations should apply, not the New Hampshire statute of limitations,
because the statute of limitations is procedural law; therefore, the forum’s statute of limitations
5 The Trust and Montrone are only seeking summary judgment on the counterclaims for fraud and civil conspiracy
based on the statute of limitations. The Trust and Montrone are not seeking summary judgment on Kevin's CICO
counterclaim and third-party claim in the motion addressed herein.
Paul M. Montrone Revocable Trust of 2010 v. Cogan
Case No. ST-2016-CV-00563
Memorandum Opinion — the Trust’s Motion for Partiat Summary Judgment on the statute of limitations
Page 9 of 13
should apply. Kevin does not assert an opposition to applying the Virgin Islands statute of
limitations. While both the Virgin Islands and New Hampshire have identical elements for claims
of fraud and civil conspiracy, their statute of limitations differ. In New Hampshire, the statute of
limitations for fraud and civil conspiracy claims is three years. See R.S.A. 508:4. Whereas the
statute of limitations for fraud and civil conspiracy claims in the Virgin Islands is two years. 5
V.LC. § 31(5)(A). See Brouillard v. DLJ Mortg. Capital, Inc., 63 V.1. 788, 795 (V.1. 2015)
413 In the Trust and Montrone’s other motion for summary judgment, the court will apply
Virgin Islands law to the substantive issues raised regarding the fraud and civil conspiracy claims
Therefore, the Virgin Islands statute of limitations would apply as well, as it is both the applicable
substantive law and the procedural law of the forum court
ql4 In their motion, the Trust and Montrone only address four promissory notes: the June |,
2012 consolidation note, the September 24, 2012 note, the April 10, 2013 note, and the February
28, 2014 note
I There is only a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the statute of limitations
for the fraud claim on the June 2012 consolidation note
q1S The Trust and Montrone argue that the two-year statute of limitations for Kevin’s fraud
claims has mun for these four notes because the statute of limitations started to run when the alleged
misrepresentations were made, i.e. June 1, 2012, September 24, 2012, April 10, 2013, and February
28, 2014. Therefore, the statute of limitations on Kevin’s fraud claims expired on June 1, 2014,
September 24, 2014, April 10, 2015, and February 28, 2016, respectively
416 However, Kevin argues that, for fraud claims, the statute of limitations does not begin to
accrue until the party discovers the fraudulent misrepresentation. Kevin claims that he did not
discover the fraudulent misrepresentations related to the June 2012 consolidation note until after
Paul M. Montrone Revocable Trust of 2010 v. Cogan
Case No. ST-2016-CV-00563
Memorandum Opinion — the Trust’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the statute of limitations
Page 10 of 13
litigation for this matter had commenced. In fact, Kevin even states that he did not know of the
fraud until after he had already filed his counterclaims for fraud. He does not state when he
discovered the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations regarding the September 24, 2012 note, the
April 10, 2013 note, or the 2014 note, nor otherwise argue or infer that he discovered the alleged
fraud on these three notes after he signed them
$17 According to 5 V.LC. § 32(c), “in an action upon fraud the limitation shall be
deemed to commence only from . . . the discovery of the fraud However, in Martin v. Martin,
54 V.I. 379 (V.I. 2010), the Court specifies that the claims for fraud and misrepresentation
commence when the defendant discovered or should have discovered the alleged fraud. /d. at 391
418 | The Trust and Montrone contend that if it is true, as Kevin asserts, that he did not have
access to the account into which the funds were deposited, he should have known the moment the
notes were executed. Nevertheless, Kevin’s sworn statement that he did not discover the alleged
fraud on the June 2012 consolidation note until he was involved in divorce proceedings in 2016,
creates a material issue of fact regarding when Kevin knew or should have known that his signature
was allegedly procured by fraud. Therefore, the court must deny the portion of the motion seeking
summary judgment on the June 2012 consolidation note
q19 Unlike the June 2012 consolidation note, Kevin does not make any assertions regarding
the date(s) he discovered the alleged fraud in the remaining three notes, nor does he otherwise
suggest that the statute of limitations started to run on a date other than the date he signed the notes
Therefore, the court can only consider the arguments from the Trust and Montrone: that Kevin
should have discovered any alleged fraudulent misrepresentations made regarding the September
24, 2012 note, the April 10, 2013 note, and the February 28, 2014 note when he executed the notes
Paul M. Montrone Revocable Trust of 2010 v. Cogan
Case No. ST-2016-CV-00563
Memorandum Opinion - the Trust's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the statute of limitations
Page 11 of 13
Because this case was filed on September 21,201 6,° the two-year statute of limitations bars Kevin’s
claims for fraud in relation to the September 24, 2012 note, the April 10, 2013 note, and the 2014
note. Therefore, the court finds that the Trust and Montrone are entitled to summary judgment on
Kevin’s fraud claims for the September 24, 2012 note, April 10, 2013 note, and February 28, 2014
note. Therefore, Kevin’s counterclaim and third-party claim for fraud on those three notes will be
dismissed
Il There is only a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the statute of limitations
for the civil conspiracy claim based on the June 2012 consolidation note
420 The Trust and Montrone argue that the two-year statute of limitations for Kevin’s civil
conspiracy claims has run for the four notes dated June 1, 2012, September 24, 2012, Apni 10,
2013, and February 28, 2014, because the statute of limitations started to run on the dates the notes
were signed, Therefore, the Trust and Montrone argue that Kevin would have had to file his civil
conspiracy claims by June 1, 2014, September 24, 2014, April 10, 2015, and February 28, 2016,
respectively. Kevin’s response is silent and does not contest that the statute of limitations had
expired on his civil conspiracy claims
{21 The statute of limitations for a civil conspiracy claim is the same as the underlying tort it
is based on. McKinley Fahie v. Ferguson, 2021 VI SUPER 38U, at *21 (V.1. Super. Ct. 2021)
Therefore, based on the conclusions made above, the date the statute of limitations commenced on
the June 2012 consolidation note is in dispute, and thus summary judgment will be denied. But the
two-year statute of limitations bars Kevin’s prosecution of the claims for civil conspiracy on the
remaining notes
© Some courts hold that the statute of limitations is tolled when the complaint is filed since Kevin’s counterclaims
were mandatory counterclaims. But the court need not decide which date is the operative date since the statute of
limitations on Kevin's counterclaim for civil conspiracy had expired before the Trust instituted this suit
PaulM. Montrone Revocable Trust of 2010 v. Cogan
Case No. ST-2016-CV-00563
Memorandum Opinion — the Trust’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the statute of limitations
Page |2 of 13
422 Therefore, the court finds that it must deny summary judgment on the civil conspiracy
claim on the June 2012 consolidation note based upon the statute of limitations. But the court finds
the Trust and Montrone are entitled to summary judgment on civil conspiracy claims, based upon
the statute of limitations, on the September 24, 2012 note, the April 10, 2013 note, and the February
28, 2014 note. Therefore, Kevin’s counterclaims for civil conspiracy on those three notes will be
dismissed
CONCLUSION
423 The court finds that there is no dispute of material fact that the statute of limitations on
Kevin Cogan’s counterclaims for fraud and civil conspiracy associated with the September 24,
2012 note, April 10, 2013 note, and the February 28, 2014, had run before the claims were filed
Therefore, the Trust and Montrone are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Kevin Cogan’s
counterclaims for fraud and civil conspiracy associated with those three notes. However, there is
a dispute as to when the statute of limitations commenced for the fraud and civil conspiracy claims
associated with the June 2012 consolidation note. Therefore, the Trust and Montrone are not
entitled to judgment as a matter of law regarding those claims. Accordingly, Plaintiff and Third
Party Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted in part and denied in part
Paul M. Montrone Revocable Trust of 2010 v. Cogan
Case No. ST-2016-CV-00563
Memorandum Opinion — the Trust's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the statute of limitations
Page 13 of 13
An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will immediately follow
DATED: December pa 2024 fer ee Liza eC
Kathleen Mackay
Judge of the Supersidr Court
ATTEST of the Virgin island$
TAMARA CHARLES
Clerk ofthe Court }
Vey
BY: epeeZa i! oe
LATOYA CAMACHO
urt Clerk Supervisor [a Lg. (J00U