IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
DIVISION OF ST. CROIX
PEOPLE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS )
) SX-2020-CR-166
Plaintiff, )
)
Vv )
)
STUART GARETH DREW )
Defendant )
)
Cite as: 2026 V.I. Super 17
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
q1 PENDING BEFORE THE COURT is the Defendant’s “Motion to Dismiss for Speedy
Trial Violation” filed on July 8, 2025. Upon consideration of the Barker factors, the Court
concludes that the Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial has not been violated
Therefore, the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss will be denied
FACTUAL HISTORY AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
q2 Defendant was arrested on June 25, 2020, in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic! and
charged with two counts of Rape in the First Degree in violation of 14 V.I.C. §1701(a)(2)(3);
Assault in the Second Degree/ DV in violation of 14 V.I.C. §296(3) and 16 V.L.C. §91(b)(1)
Simple Assault and Battery/ DV in violation of 14 V.LC. §299(a) and 16 V.I.C. §91(b)(1)&(2)
Destruction of Property/ DV in violation of 14 V.LC. §1266 and 16 V.I.C. §91(b)(9); and
Disturbing the Peace; Threats/ DV in violation of 14 V.I.C. §622(1) & 16 V.I.C. §91(b)(11). He
was advised of his rights on June 26, 2020. Bail was set at $100,000.00. The Court permitted the
Defendant to post $20,000.00 property bond upon the signing of an unsecured bond for the
remainder of the bail. As further conditions of bail, the Court ordered that the Defendant reside at
7-7 Est. Strawberry Hill and not leave the island of St. Croix without the Court’s permission;
report to the Office of Probation every Tuesday telephonically; remain employed; stay a
' The Court takes notice that at the time of the Defendant’s arrest, all in-court hearings and trials were suspended at
the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands. Emergency and other constitutionally required hearings were handled
remotely. Jury trials first resumed following a February 1, 2022, Administrative Order No. 2022-002 of the Virgin
Islands Judiciary permitting trial on a staggered basis. Full operations, including jury trials, resumed several months
after
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minimum distance of 1000 feet from the alleged victim; and surrender his passport, among other
conditions. Defendant posted bail and was released. On July 15, 2020, he appeared for
arraignment at which time he entered a plea of not guilty to each charge and asserted his right to
a speedy trial
q3 A hearing was held on November 18, 2020, at which the status of discovery was
discussed. On February 18, 2021, the Court held a status conference. The parties requested a trial
date while they resolved the matter of missing discovery. On June 23, 2021, Defendant filed a
Motion to Produce Medical Records. On August 3, 2021, the Court ordered that the People file
their response to the motion within twenty days. The People did not
q4 On January 26, 2022, Defendant filed a Motion to Show Cause for the People’s failure to
comply with the Court’s August 3, 2021, order. On March 8, 2022, the Court scheduled a show
cause hearing on the motion for March 15, 2022. This prompted the People to respond to
Defendant’s June 23, 2021, Motion denying possession of the victim’s medical records. On
March 15, 2022, the defense moved to continue the March 15, 2022, hearing, and the Court
granted the motion and rescheduled the matter for April 12, 2022. The April 12, 2022, show
cause hearing was rescheduled to April 20, 2022. At the show cause hearing, the Court denied
the Defendant’s request and ordered the parties to amicably resolve the issue regarding the
victim’s medical records
q5 The case went dormant for over two years. Neither party made any filings between May
2022 and August 2024. Then on September 6, 2024, the Court scheduled a status conference on
November 26, 2024. The status conference was later rescheduled by the Court to December 5,
2024. At the December 5, 2024, hearing, the Defendant expressed his speedy trial concerns and
gave notice that he would be filing a motion to dismiss. On December 17, 2024, a trial order was
issued scheduling the matter for trial on November 10, 2025
q6 Six months later, on July 8, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for Denial of
Speedy Trial Rights. On August 25, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars, and a
Motion to Compel Medical Records. The Court directed that the People respond to the pending
motions within fourteen days of the date of the Order. The People did not file a response to any
of the motions
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q7 On October 28, 2025, the Court held a pretrial conference. The People and defense
counsel made oral motions to continue the November 10, 2025, trial. Defendant’s motion was
predicated on defense counsel’s declining health and the People’s failure to produce certain
medical records. The Court granted the motion. Jury selection and trial were rescheduled to May
4, 2026. The People were also ordered to respond in three days to the motion to provide medical
records
48 = The final pretrial conference proceeded on April 24, 2026. At the pretrial conference, the
People requested continuation, arguing that it was not prepared to proceed to trial on May 4,
2026. Defense counsel also moved to continue the matter since she appeared in the case several
days prior and needed additional time to adequately prepare a defense for the Defendant
Because the Defendant joined in the motion to continue given her recent appearance, the Court
granted the motion so as not to prejudice the Defendant. The Court rescheduled the matter to
November 30, 2026
LEGAL STANDARD
q9 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides for the right of every
person to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury.? The right to a speedy trial attaches once
a defendant has been accused and is measured from the date of arrest or the filing of an
information or complaint, whichever comes first, to the date of trial.
q10 The Sixth Amendment is extended to the Virgin Islands by the 1954 Revised Organic Act
of the Virgin Islands and has the same force and effect as in any state.4 The 1954 Revised
Organic Act explicitly states that
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be represented by counsel
for his defense, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to have a copy
thereof, to have a speedy and public trial, to be confronted with the witnesses against
him, and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.°
2U.S. Const. Amend. 6
3 See U.S.C.S. Const. Amend. 6; Alexander v. Gov! of the Virgin Islands, 78 V.1. 969, 979 (2024) cert. denied sub
nom., Alexanderv, Territory of Virgin Islands, 145 S. Ct. 243,
220 L. Ed. 2d 69 (2024)
448 ULS.C. §§ 1541 et seq
5 Id.
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As such, the law is clear that people in the Virgin Islands are equally afforded the right to a
speedy trial despite the territory not having a local, speedy trial act
q1i =In applying the Sixth Amendment standard to a claim of speedy trial violation, the Court
shall evaluate four factors initially adopted in Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514 (1972): (1) the
length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant has asserted his or her
right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay. No single factor is dispositive
and whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial was violated is based on the totality of the
circumstances.’ The prejudice to the Defendant, however, is given greater scrutiny and weight
since it goes directly to the impairment of the Defendant’s ability to present a defense.®
q12 For Sixth Amendment violations, the only possible remedy is dismissal.? While this
remedy has been recognized as “severe and unsatisfactory”, the Strunk Court pointed out that in
cases for violation of constitutional standards, such a severe remedy is not unique but necessary,
particularly “in light of the policies which underlie the right to a speedy trial.”'® Thus, should
the Court find a Sixth Amendment violation, dismissal of all charges is the only remedy
ANALYSIS
A. THE DELAY IS PRESUMPTIVELY PREJUDICIAL
413 The first step when deciding whether Defendant’s speedy trial right has been violated is
to determine the length of the delay. The length of delay is measured “from the earlier period of
the date of an arrest or the filing of an (information, or complaint],” until the start of trial.'' This
factor acts as a threshold in the Sixth Amendment inquiry because “there must be a delay long
enough to be ‘presumptively prejudicial.’”!* The longer the delay, the more “presumptively
® Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. See also, Francis v. Virgin Islands, 63 V.1. 724, 746 (2015); Alexander,
78 V.I. 969, 978
(reaffirming the application of the four Barker factors in the Virgin Islands to a claim of violation of the Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial)
7 See Francis, 63 V.I. at 755
3d.
® Strunk v. United States,
412 U.S. 434, 440 (1973) (citing Barker,
407 U.S. at 522)
10
Id.
" Carty v. People of the V.I, 56 V.E. 345, 365 (2012)
'? United States v. Loud Hawk,
474 U.S. 302, 314,
106 S. Ct. 648,
88 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1986) (quoting Barker, 407
USS. at 530}
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prejudicial” to the rights of a defendant, and the more that weighs in favor of examining the
remaining three Barker factors.'? In Carty, this Court recognized that a delay of over twelve
months is “presumed to be sufficiently prejudicial to require evaluation of the three remaining
factors.”!4
414 = In this case, the Defendant was without a trial date for well over 60 months. Defendant
was arrested on June 25, 2020. His first trial date was scheduled for November 10, 2025. The
trial was later continued for medical reasons and rescheduled to May 4, 2026. Then, on April 24,
2026, at the final pretrial conference, the People admitted it was not ready for trial. The
Defendant had new counsel appear in the matter one week before trial. In order not to prejudice
the Defendant, the court continued the matter to November 30, 2026. The Court concludes that
the initial four-year delay before the Defendant even got his first trial date is presumptively
prejudicial
B. THE DELAY IS NON-MALICIOUS AND RELATIVELY NEUTRAL AND DOES
NOT WEIGH IN FAVOR OF SPEEDY TRIAL VIOLATION
415 Once the court has determined that the delay is sufficiently lengthy to trigger a speedy
trial analysis, it must consider which party is responsible for the delay(s) and why there was a
delay. The reason(s) for the delay(s) impacts the weight given a particular delay.!° Delays
attributed to the People weigh in favor of a defendant’s speedy trial claim, while delays
attributed to the defendant do not.'® As explained by the United States Supreme Court in Barker,
different reasons for the delay must be weighed differently.'!’ In the Court’s evaluation
deliberate attempts by the prosecution to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense weigh
heavily against the prosecution.'* But, neutral reasons such as negligence or overcrowded courts
weigh less heavily against the prosecution, and a valid reason, such as tracking down a missing
8 Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-652 (1992)
“4 Carty, 56 VI. at 365; see also, Doggett,
505 U.S. at 652 (post-accusation delay is presumptively prejudicial as it
approaches one year); Francis, 63 V.I. at 748 (an approximately 15-month delay required examination of
remaining Baker factors)
'S Francis, 63 V1. at 748
'8 Id. (citing Doggett,
505 U.S. at 657 and Barker,
407 U.S. at 531)
17 Td
18
Id.
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witness, need not be given any weight at all.'? Administrative or institutional delays- such as
delays caused by the court - may be attributed to the People, but, due to their neutral rather than
deliberate nature, will weigh less heavily in favor of violation.”°
416 In this case, the record shows that approximately four years (forty-eight months) months
passed since the Defendant’s arrest without a trial date. At the time of his arrest, Defendant was
vested with the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. His request for a speedy trial at his
arraignment reaffirmed his intention to benefit from this basic constitutional right. On February
18, 2021, the Defendant and the People requested that the Court set a trial date. This is the
Defendant’s second speedy trial request. Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Court could
not schedule the trial. The COVID-19 pandemic caused the shutdown of normal court
operations. In-court hearings and jury trials were not being scheduled. It was not until
Administrative Order No. 2022-002 dated February 1, 2022, issued by the Virgin Islands
Judiciary, that jury trials were permitted on staggered schedules. Because this period was
beyond the control of the People or the Defendant, this delay will not be considered and weighed
against either party for purposes of determining if there was a speedy trial violation and is
deemed a neutral factor
417 In December 2024, Defendant renewed his motion for a speedy trial. Within days of the
demand, the Court scheduled jury selection and trial for November 10, 2025. There were no
objections to the trial date. Approximately two weeks prior to the trial date, defense counsel
moved for a continuance, citing his medical ailments and constraints as the reason. The People
joined in the motion, and the continuance was granted. Since both parties requested the
continuation of the November 10, 2025 trial date, this factor will be weighed against both parties
q18 In this case, a new trial date was scheduled for May 4, 2026. No party objected. During
that period, defense counsel passed away. New counsel appeared for the Defendant days prior to
trial. Defense counsel requested a new trial date to allow sufficient time for her to prepare for
trial. The People also moved for a continuance. Neither party objected to the Court rescheduling
to a November 30, 2026, trial date. Since both parties requested that the trial be continued, this
factor also weighs against the People and the Defendant. Ultimately, the Court finds that there is
19 Td.
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no evidence that the People were the cause of the delays in the matter being heard at trial. There
is also no evidence that the People gained an unfair advantage such that the defense was
hampered in preparing or presenting its case. Based thereon, the Court finds that the delays in
this case occurred for non-malicious and relatively neutral reasons or at the Defendant’s request
Hence, the Court does not weigh this factor in favor of dismissal
C. DEFENDANT TIMELY ASSERTED AND PERSISTED IN HIS RIGHT TO
SPEEDY TRIAL
G19 The third Barker factor requires the court to determine whether the Defendant initially
asserted his speedy trial rights and continued to maintain that right against all efforts of delay. In
assessing this factor, the court considers the defendant’s responsibility to assert the right to
a speedy trial at every opportunity.’ In other words, this factor requires a demonstration that the
defendant manifested his desire to be tried promptly.27 When represented by counsel, a
defendant shows that he has asserted his speedy trial rights when he can identify by motion or
direct evidence his assertion of that right and, when a formal assertion of his rights would render
some chance of success.”?_ An assertion of speedy trial rights can also be demonstrated in the
form of an objection to a continuance.”4
420 Here, Defendant first asserted his right to a speedy trial on July 15, 2020, when he
appeared for arraignment. On February 18, 2021, he requested a trial date, which the court
accepts as another assertion of his speedy trial right. Then on December 5, 2024, he again
demanded a speedy trial and requested a trial date. These instances evidence the Defendant
persistence with his right to a speedy trial. The delay in scheduling trial during the first two
years after the Defendant arrest, however, was primarily due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the
Court’s cessation of scheduling jury trials. Eventually, a trial date of November 10, 2025, was
set. As stated earlier, this date was continued partly at the Defendant’s request. The subsequent
May 4, 2026, trial date was also continued at the Defendant’s request. Defendant’s counsel
7° See Alexander, 78 V.1. at 980, 985 (citing Rodriguez v. People of the Virgin Islands, 71 V.1. 577, 596 (V.1. 2019))
2" Alexander, 78 V.I. at 970
22 Id
23 Id
28 Td.
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passed away in early January 2026. It took the Defendant four months to have new counsel
appear on his behalf. That appearance occurred one week before trial, accompanied with a
request for a continuance
G21 In July 2025, Defendant moved to dismiss the charges against him on speedy trial
grounds. This motion represented the Defendant’s fourth assertion of his speedy trial rights in
the six years since the inception of this case, but his second in the two years since the Court lifted
the COVID-19 pandemic restrictions of in-court hearings and jury trials. The Court is satisfied
that Defendant exercised diligence in asserting his right to speedy trial. Therefore, this factor
weighs in favor of Defendant
D. THERE IS MINIMAL PREJUDICE TO THE DEFENDANT
22 The Barker factor of prejudice caused by the delay is the most important of the four and
must be demonstrated by the defendant.”> In evaluating prejudice, the court considers the three
interests the right to speedy trialis designed to protect: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial
incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the
possibility that the defense will be impaired.”® Of these three interests, the most important is
limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired.’
1. Defendant’s Pretrial Conditions are Slightly Prejudicial but are not Oppressive
923 In Francis, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court quoted the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Marion, which found that “[a]rrest is a public act that may seriously interfere with the
defendant’s liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and that may disrupt his employment, drain
his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety
in him, his family and his friends””* None of these concerns were raised by the Defendant
424 Here, Defendant appears to argue that the long delay impaired his ability to present a
defense, although that argument has not been fully developed. Nonetheless. Giving the
Defendant the benefit of the doubt, it appears that he is arguing that while the alleged victim has
25 Rodriguez,71 V.I. at, 610; Brown, 55 V.1. at 504
. Penh 63 VI. at 753-54; citing Carty, 56 V.I. at 367
8 Francis, 63 V1. at 753-54
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since relocated and moved on with her life, he remains constrained by charges hanging over his
head hampering his ability to move forward with his life. The record does not support this
argument. First, Defendant did not spend significant time on pretrial detention. He was released
before his arraignment and permitted to work with limited restrictions on his daily movements
Second, he was not subjected to a curfew. The only restriction on his movements on island was
that he maintains a distance of 1000 feet from the alleged victim. This allowed him to attend
religious, social and employment related activities so long as he stayed away from the victim
The Court does not find this oppressive. Third, the other condition that imposed some
restrictions was that Defendant had to surrender his passport and could not travel without
permission of the Court. However, the record is void of any request for travel modification that
was denied. Thus, outside of being aware of pending charges, the Defendant was not subjected
to unreasonable restraints on his freedom. Finally, Defendant’s pretrial conditions also required
him to report to the Office of Probation, but it was by telephone and not oppressive. In total,
considering the nature of the charges faced by the Defendant, the pretrial conditions imposed
were not restrictive or oppressive and did not preclude the court’s consideration of necessary
modifications. All circumstances considered; the Court determines that this factor minimally
weighs in favor of the Defendant
2. Defendant has not Provided any Evidence to Support _a Finding that He is
Prejudiced from having to Live in a State of Prolonged Anxiety, Suspicion, and
Hostility.
{25 Since June 26, 2020, the Court ordered that the Defendant be released upon the posting of
a $20,000 property bond and an $80,000 unsecured bond. He continued to remain in compliance
with his release conditions. His release was never under consideration for revocation
Nonetheless, it is settled that even if the accused is not incarcerated prior to trial, he or she still
lives “under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion, and often hostility” which must be considered when
evaluating prejudice to the defendant.”? This burden is the Defendant’s to establish
{26 Here, the Defendant has not met this burden. The Supreme Court in Rodriguez was clear
that generalized (or no) statements of anxiety will not satisfy this factor
2° See Barker, 407 U.S. at 533; Marion, 404 U.S. at 320
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[H]e cannot rely on “[v]ague allegations of anxiety to state a cognizable claim” under the
Sixth Amendment. Hakeem, 990 F.2d at 762; accord United States v. Simmonds, 536
F.2d 827, 832 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 854,
97 S.Ct. 148,
50 L.Ed.2d 130 (1976)
United States v. Shepherd, 511 F.2d 119, 123 (Sth Cir. 1975); State v. Flowers,
503 A.2d
1172, 1178 (Conn. 1986); Wasson, 879 P.2d at 422; State v. Bailey,
572 A.2d 544, 556
(Md. 1990). Instead, he needs to demonstrate a “particular prejudice,” Francis I, 63 V.1
at 754; accord Turner v. United States, 622 A.2d 667, 679 (D.C. 1993), such as a “severe
mental disturbance,” United States v. Dreyer, 533 F.2d 112, 116-17 (3d Cir. 1976); see
State v. Wheaton, 528 A.2d 1109, 1111-12 (R.I 1987) (explaining that defendant
demonstrated prejudice where testimony described “the deterioration of defendant's
mental and physical well-being”), or some other “specific impact on his health or
personal or business affairs” caused by the delay. Gayden v. United States, 584 A.2d 578,
585 (D.C. 1990) (alteration, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted); see Morris v
Wyrick, 516 F.2d 1387, 1391 (8th Cir. 1975) (explaining that anxiety and concern do not
establish prejudice, where “the defendant neither asserts nor shows that the delay
weighed particularly heavily on him in specific instances”); Weis v. State, 694 S.E.2d
350, 362 (Ga. 2010) (“[A]nxiety and concern will not weigh in a defendant's favor in the
absence of unusual circumstances suggesting he suffered excessive anxiety and concern
impacting his health or finances.”). And as the Superior Court correctly found,
Rodriguez's assertions that he was “miserable” and “anxious” are insufficient under this
particularity standard. Rodriguez II, 2012 WL 12896259, at *5; see Jackson, 542 F.2d at
409 (“Allegations of anxiety and depression alone ... do not result in a constitutional
violation.”); United States v. Avalos, 541 F.2d 1100, 1115 (Sth Cir. 1976) (same); United
States v. Graham, 538 F.2d 261, 265 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 925 (1976)
Bailey, 572 A.2d at 556 (same).°°
The Defendant in this case has not placed on the record any evidence that suggests that the
pretrial conditions under which Defendant was placed or the delay caused him to live under a
cloud of anxiety, suspicion, and often hostility. Absent an affirmative showing, the Court finds
that this factor weighs minimally in favor of granting the Defendant’s motion
3. The Defendant has not Shown a Particularized Harm to His Ability to Receive a
Fair Trial and Levy a Proper Defense.
427 In considering whether a defendant was prejudiced, the most important consideration is
whether the defendant can point to a particularized harm to his or her ability to receive a fair trial
°° Rodriguez, 71 VI. at 611
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and levy a proper defense. *! It is not enough to simply claim harm, but the defendant must
identify that harm and explain how that harm has hampered his ability to advance a defense
{28 In this case, Defendant has not shown that his pretrial conditions have significantly
screeched his life to a halt such that his financial challenges have impacted his ability to secure a
proper defense. Although Defendant is represented by retained counsel, he has not argued that he
has had to incur additional expenses because of the delays or could not afford legal
representation because of the delay. In fact, Defendant has not mounted a defense that the
current pretrial conditions and delay have impeded his ability to have a fair trial. Since the
Defendant is unable to point to a particular prejudice that impacted his ability to receive a fair
trial, the Court finds that the Defendant has not met his burden to prove prejudice on this issue
This factor weighs in favor of dismissing Defendant’s motion
CONCLUSION
429 In balancing the four Barker factors and viewing the totality of the circumstances in this
case, the Court concludes that Defendant has failed to prove that his speedy trial rights under the
Sixth Amendment were violated. While the delay is presumptively prejudicial, the reasons for
the delays were not intentional, and in some instances, neutral at best. Finally, Defendant has not
met his burden of showing that he was prejudiced by the delay
Accordingly, it is hereby,
ORDERED that the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Speedy Trial Violation is
DENIED
DONE AND SO ORDERED this /4__ day of May 2026
Lh gol Vs
ee DAMES
Cpe BALM LE
7 HON. YVETTE ROSS-EDWARDS
ATTEST Superior Court Judge
TAMARA CHARLES
Clerk of the;Court
YW jy WA
By: 7
Court Clerk4¥
Dated 5/20/2026
*" See Alexander, 78 V.I. at 987; See also Barker, 407 U.S. at 534 (giving more weight to prejudice against the
defense rather than prejudice related to pretrial conditions or anxiety)