IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
DIVISION OF ST. CROIX
RE
PEOPLE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS ) CASE NO. SX-2019-CR-00303
)
Plaintiff, ) CHARGE(S)
)
VS ) NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE BY
) MEANS OF A VEHICLE
DARYL E. JEAN-BAPTISTE ) 20 V.LC. § 504
) INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER
Defendant ) 14 V.1LC. § 924(2)
Cite as 2026 VI Super 10U
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
qi! Pending before the Court are
1. Defendant’s Motion for New Trial or, in the Alternative, Judgment for Acquittal, filed
February 19, 2026; and
2. People’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for New Trial or, in the Alternative, Judgment
for Acquittal, filed March 6, 2026
For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion will be denied
I BACKGROUND
{2 On November 15, 2019, the People filed an Information against Defendant, and the People
filed the Second Amended Information on February 7, 2023. In the Second Amended Information,
the People claim that on or about November 3, 2019, Defendant operated a black 2007 BMW on
Queen Mary Highway and caused the death of Davindra Ramsundar, Jr. The People alleged
violations of: 20 V.I.C. § 504 and 14 V.I.C. § 924(2). The Superior Court conducted a trial, with
Judge Ross-Edwards presiding, and on July 23, 2025, a jury unanimously found Defendant guilty
of Involuntary Manslaughter in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 924(2).' Defendant highlights that the
Court immediately remanded Defendant that same day
3 A central issue in this case concems a separate civil action for wrongful death, captioned
Davindra Ramsundar et al v. Daryl Jean-Baptiste et al, Case No. SX-2020-CV-00786. Attorney
Emile A. Henderson (through Yvette D. Ross-Edwards, P.C.) filed the Complaint for Plaintiffs on
November 2, 2020. On March 30, 2021, Defendant Daryl Jean-Baptiste (with Attorney Renee D
' The Record of Proceedings and court transcript show that the jury reached its verdict on July 23, 2025
People v. Jean-Baptiste 2026 VI Super 10U
Case No. SX-2019-CR-00303
Memorandum Opinion and Order
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Dowling as counsel) filed a Motion for Stay of all Proceedings in the civil action.” In 2022,
Attorney Henderson became a United States District Court Magistrate Judge, but Yvette D. Ross
Edwards, P.C. still officially remained as counsel for Plaintiff. On February 27, 2023, Attorney
Yohana M. Manning with Manning Legal Services P.C. entered an appearance for Plaintiff in the
wrongful death case.? But Yvette D. Ross-Edwards, P.C. still remained as a counsel of record for
Plaintiff (in addition to Attorney Manning) throughout Defendant Jean-Baptiste’s present criminal
case. Yvette D. Ross-Edwards, P.C. never formally entered into a stipulation for substitution of
counsel with Attorney Manning. Defendant Jean-Baptiste’s attorney, Attorney Dowling, also
served as counsel for Defendant Jean-Baptiste in both the present criminal case and the separate
Wrongful Death case
44 Notably, on July 30, 2025 (after the end of the criminal trial), Defendant filed (1) a
Stipulation for Substitution of Counsel where Attorney Kye Walker replaced Attorney Dowling
and (2) his Motion to Disqualify Trial Judge. On August 7, 2025, Judge Ross-Edwards (hereafter
referred to as the previous “trial judge”) issued an Order denying Defendant’s Motion to Disqualify
Trial Judge. The trial judge identified several reasons for denying the motion: (1) Defendant failed
to make the motion to disqualify before the trial and instead waited soon after the jury delivered
an unfavorable verdict, despite Defendant and counsel being aware of the separate Wrongful Death
case, and waiting until after the trial goes against the legislative intent 4 V.I.C. § 284; (2) filing the
motion after the verdict undermines the finality of verdicts; (3) Defendant waived the issue of
disqualification by waiting until after the trial; (4) even if Defendant did not waive the issue of
disqualification, Defendant was not prejudiced because an independent jury reached its own
impartial decision regarding Defendant's guilt; (5) no clear probability of bias or prejudice during
the trial by the trial judge exists; and (6) Defendant may still appeal the verdict. Additionally, the
trial judge states that she previously had no knowledge of Yvette D. Ross-Edwards, P.C. still
remaining as a counsel of record for Plaintiff in the Wrongful Death case, and Defendant raising
this issue of disqualification after the trial may have been determined to be a “strategic weapon if
the verdict was not in his favor.’
q5 On August 28, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion to Reconsider Order Denying Motion to
Disqualify Trial Judge, and on September 30, 2025, the trial judge granted Defendant’s Motion
for Reconsideration, granting disqualification under 4 V.I.C. § 284.° The trial judge stated that she
agrees with Defendant “that disqualification is proper based solely on the appearance of a conflict,
and not because the trial process was tainted.’ The trial judge additionally ruled: “Notably, the
court previously ruled that the trial and jury verdict was not tainted for the reasons stated in the
court’s August 8, 2025, decision. However, since the court did not decide the issue of a conflict
> The Court never issued an Order addressing the motion to stay, but the case also has not proceeded since
Defendant filed the motion to stay
3 Soon after, in April 2023, the Governor of the Virgin Islands nominated Judge Ross-Edwards to become a Judge of
the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands
4 Order 6
> On September 30, 2025, in the Order on Motion for Reconsideration, when ruling that she was disqualified, the
trial judge referred to 4 V.I.C. § 284(3). However, on September 30, 2025, in her Order of Recusal, the trial judge
recused herself pursuant to 4 V.I.C. § 284(4)
© Order on Mot. For Recons. 3
People v. Jean-Baptiste
2026 VI Super 10U
Case No. SX-2019-CR-00303
Memorandum Opinion and Order
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relative to deciding post-trial motions and sentencing, this ruling now addresses that issue
previously raised in the motion to disqualify, and grants disqualification.”
{6 After the trial judge granted this motion in September 2025, three additional judges later
recused themselves before the case finally arrived before this Court in January 2026 (over three
months later). On February 19, 2026, Defendant filed his Motion for New Trial, or, in the
Alternative, Judgment for Acquittal.®
II LEGAL STANDARD
A. Virgin Islands Rule of Criminal Procedure 33
{7 Virgin Islands Rule of Criminal Procedure 33° states that: “Upon the defendant’s motion
the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires. If the
case was tried without a jury, the court may take additional testimony and enter a new judgment.”
Additionally, “[a]ny motion for a new trial grounded on any reason other than newly discovered
evidence must be filed within 14 days after the verdict or finding of guilty, or within such further
time as the court may fix.”!' “Whether or not to grant a new trial is squarely within the Court's
sound discretion; however, motions for new trials are largely not favored and they should not be
granted unless there is a serious danger that an innocent person has been convicted.”!”
B. Virgin Islands Rule of Criminal Procedure 29
48 Rule 29 of the Virgin Islands Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, in pertinent part that
[i]f the jury has returned a guilty verdict, the court may set aside the verdict and enter an
acquittal.”'? In reviewing this court’s post-conviction denial of a judgment of acquittal, the
Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands stated that “[i]n assessing the sufficiency of evidence to
sustain [the defendant’s] conviction, ‘we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
People,’ and affirm the conviction if ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’”!* Milligan was based on the analogous Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. A district court, when expounding on the analogous Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 29, explained in United States v. Cerilli:'°
A trial judge can grant a motion for judgment of acquittal only when the evidence
as a whole is insufficient to support a conviction as a matter of law. However, where
there is evidence upon which a jury may reasonably base and find guilt beyond a
7 Order on Mot. For Recons. 4
8 Notably, Defendant’s present motion closely resembles his previous motion for disqualification
° Rivera v. People, 77 V.1. 514, 519, 2023 VI 1, 4] 1 (2023)
0 V 1. R. CRIM. P. 33(a)
"VT. R. CRIM. P. 33(b)(2)
'2 People v. Stuart, 2022 VI SUPER 93U, § 19 (V.I. Super. Nov. 18, 2022) (footnotes and quotations omitted)
3V.1, R. CRIM. P. 29(c)(2)
\4 Milligan v. People, 69 V.1. 779, 796 (V.1. 2018)
'5
418 F. Supp. 557 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (citations omitted)
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Case No. SX-2019-CR-00303
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reasonable doubt, the trial judge can not intrude on the function of the jury as the
trier of fact. The evidence need not be of such overwhelming magnitude that the
jury must inevitably find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; there need only be
sufficient, legal evidence which when viewed in a light most favorable to the
government, a jury can reasonably and in good faith make a finding of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.'¢
19 Further, when making this determination, “[the Court] must view the evidence in a light
most favorable to the government; it is not for the trial judge to assess the credibility of witnesses,
nor to weigh the evidence, nor to draw inferences of fact from the evidence.””'’ The trier of fact
may base a conviction on purely circumstantial evidence, and circumstantial evidence “need not
be inconsistent with every conclusion but that of guilt, provided that such circumstantial evidence
provides the jury with a basis upon which to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.”!?
Il. ANALYSIS
A. A new trial is not warranted
410 Defendant claims that a new trial is warranted in the interest of justice because of the
appearance of impropriety posed by the previous trial judge presiding over the trial. First,
Defendant states that due process requires the absence of bias by the judge. The U.S. Supreme
Court has stated that: “A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness
of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of law has always
endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness. To this end no man can be a judge in his
own case and no man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome.”!®
Defendant cites Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., which states in pertinent part
The judge's own inquiry into actual bias, then, is not one that the law can easily
superintend or review, though actual bias, if disclosed, no doubt would be grounds
for appropriate relief. In lieu of exclusive reliance on that personal inquiry, or on
appellate review of the judge’s determination respecting actual bias, the Due
Process Clause has been implemented by objective standards that do not require
proof of actual bias. In defining these standards the Court has asked whether, “under
a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness,” the interest
“poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden
if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented.””°
Furthermore, “objective standards may also require recusal whether or not actual bias exists or can
be proved. Due process ‘may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who
'6 fd, at 565 (citations omitted)
'7 United States v. Boatwright, 425 F. Supp. 747, 750 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
'8 United States v. Miah,
433 F. Supp. 259, 264 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd,
571 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1978)
'9 In re Murchison,
349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)
20 Caperton vy. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,
556 U.S. 868 (2009) (citations omitted)
People v. Jean-Baptiste
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Case No. SX-2019-CR-00303
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would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties.””!
G11 Second, Defendant cites specific U.S. Virgin Islands rules applicable to recusal.?? For
instance, 4 V.I.C. § 284 states
No judge or justice shall sit or act as such in any action or proceeding
(1) To which he is a party or in which he is primarily interested
(2) When he is related to either party, or to an officer of a corporation which is a
party, by blood or marriage within the third degree;
(3) When in the action or proceeding or in any prior action or proceeding involving
the same issues, he has been of counsel for any party to the action or proceeding;
or
(4) When it is made to appear probable that, by reason of bias or prejudice of such
judge, a fair and impartial trial cannot be had before him.??
“But ‘[t]he question is not whether the judge is impartial in fact. It is simply whether another, not
knowing whether or not the judge is actually impartial, might reasonably question his impartiality
on the basis of all of the circumstances.’
Similarly, Defendant also cites Virgin Islands Supreme Court Rule 213.2.11. It states
(A) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the
judge’s impartiality* might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to
the following circumstances
(1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party’s
lawyer, or personal knowledge* of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding
(6) The judge
(a) served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or was associated with a
lawyer who participated substantially as a lawyer in the matter during such
association
q!2 Lastly, Defendant asserts that the trial judge, in addition to her law firm representing the
2! Jd. at 886 (citing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136)
2 Id. at 889-90 (citation omitted) (“The Due Process Clause demarks only the outer boundaries of judicial
disqualifications. Congress and the states, of course, remain free to impose more rigorous standards for judicial
disqualification than those we find mandated here today.”’)
23-V.J. CODE ANN. tit 4, § 284
4 Alexander vy. People, 65 V.1. 385, 395 (2016) (citing Rice v. McKenzie,
581 F.2d 1114, 1116 (4th Cir. 1978))
People v. Jean-Baptiste
2026 VI Super 10U
Case No. SX-2019-CR-00303
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Ramsundar family, “no doubt constituted structural error.””> The Supreme Court of the Virgin
Islands has elaborated upon structural errors
Such structural errors include the total deprivation of the right to counsel, see
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the case being presided over by a
biased judge, see Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), and the unlawful exclusion
of members of a certain race from a jury, see Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254
(1986). In other words, a structural error differs from a trial error in that it denies
“basic protections” such that “a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a
vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment may
be regarded as fundamentally fair.” Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986)
see also Gessner H. Harrison, State v. Harrison, The Harmless Error Doctrine, and
Criminal Sentencing in Arizona, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1395, 1411 (1999) (observing
based on Supreme Court precedent, that “structural defects automatically require
reversal” and that the presumption of an adverse effect on a defendant arising from
a structural defect “is insurmountable”).”°
Defendant claims that the structural error from his trial requires that the verdict be vacated and a
new trial granted.?”
4i3 In Opposition, the People state that a new trial is not warranted as there was neither bias
nor appearance of impropriety by the previous tral judge presiding over the trial. For instance, the
People write how a jury decided the case and not the trial judge, the trial judge denied having any
knowledge of this separate case, and Defendant failed to demonstrate that any alleged impropriety
influenced the verdict. “The evidence convicted Defendant and not the fact that Judge Yvette Ross
Edwards presided over the trial.””?*
14 Asapreliminary matter, because the previous trial judge is disqualified from deciding the
post-trial motions, this Court will independently make its own rulings on the post-trial motions
Also, with this motion filed several months after the trial, even with time extensions granted by
the trial judge, this Court has concerns that Defendant may have exceeded the deadline timeframe
outlined by Rule 33(b)(2). However, regardless of any procedural timing issues, this Court will
nonetheless decide Defendant’s motion on the merits
415 First, this Court views Defendant’s raising the issue of potential bias or appearance of
impropriety with the trial judge only after receiving an unfavorable verdict as near
“gamesmanship.”’ For instance, the trial judge stated that she did not initially recuse herself
because before the trial she lacked knowledge of the Wrongful Death case or of Yvette D. Ross
25 Mot. For New Trial or, in the Alternative, J. for Acquittal 16
26 Rivera-Moreno v. Gov't of Virgin Islands, 61 V.1. 279, 319-20 (2014)
7 Notably, in Defendant’s motion, Defendant does not claim to have additional evidence, and Defendant also does
not allege fraud or claim a lack of jurisdiction through Rule 33
28 Response to Def.’s Mot. For New Trial or, in the Alternative, J. for Acquittal 4
2° Burt v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 79 V.1. 801, 811 n.4 (2024)
People v. Jean-Baptiste 2026 VI Super 10U
Case No. SX-2019-CR-00303
Memorandum Opinion and Order
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Edwards, P.C.’s involvement in it and that she had no direct involvement in the civil case.*° In
contrast, Attorney Dowling had such knowledge throughout the case by serving as counsel for
Defendant in both the criminal and civil cases.*' Attorney Dowling would have been aware of the
situation early on in the case. However, Defendant (including counsel) inexplicably fails to account
for why Defendant did not raise the alleged critical issue of the structural error with the trial judge
before the trial, particularly if Defendant viewed this issue so major as to warrant a whole new
trial
ql6 Lastly, this Court finds that the judge presiding over the trial did not prejudice Defendant
because an independent jury reached its own impartial decision regarding Defendant's guilt.*? The
jury found Defendant guilty of Involuntary Manslaughter in violation of Title 14 V.I.C. § 924(2)
based upon the evidence presented at trial.*? “We have held that these provisions require criminal
convictions to rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the
crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.””*4 Defendant has also not alleged that
the jury had biases against Defendant.** Accordingly, Defendant’s instant motion for a new trial
will be denied
B. The Court will deny Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
417 Ajury found Defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter. “Manslaughter is the unlawful
killing of a human being without malice aforethought.””’* “Involuntary” is elaborated upon as “in
the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony; or in the culpable omission of some
legal duty; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner,
or without due caution and circumspection.”?
€18 |The People presented evidence that Defendant drove a car that caused a collision and
resulted in the death of an individual. Among the several exhibits and testimonies presented, the
evidence included a video pertaining to the collision and testimony from Officer Christopher, who
testified how Defendant stated he had been driving at 60 miles per hour at the time of the collision,
even though the area had a speed limit of 35 miles per hour.*®
” Notably, an issue concerning bias alleged by Defendant boils down to the attomeys with Yvette D. Ross-Edwards
P.C. and Manning Legal Services P.C. for Plaintiff in the Wrongful Death case not filing a stipulation for
substitution of counsel before Judge Ross-Edwards presided over this criminal case, even though the Wrongful
Death case had in effect functioned as if it had been stayed after Defendant’s Motion For Stay, filed in March 2021
*! According to Attorney Dowling’s notices of appearance, she started representing Defendant in 2020 for the
present criminal case and in 2021 for the civil case
% A trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice. Duncan v. State of La., 391 U.S
145, 149 (1968)
8 The jury instructions expressly communicated to the jury to not permit outside matters to influence their decision
4 United States v. Gaudin,
515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995) (citation and footnote omitted)
5 Additionally, Defendant has not elaborated upon how, #f at all, the trial judge’s involvement influenced or tainted
the jury’s decision. See Benjamin v. AIG Ins. Co. of Puerto Rico, 56 V.1. 558, 569 (2012); see People v. Todmann
No. ST-08-CR-44,
2012 WL 13220115, at *6 (V.I. Super. July 25, 2012); see generally Joseph vy. Virgin Islands, 60
V.1. 338 (2013); see MeKernan v. Superintendent Smithfield SCI,
849 F.3d 557, 565 (3d Cir. 2017)
14 V.LC. § 924
14 VLC. § 924(2)
8 Officer Christopher also testified to smelling alcohol when communicating with Defendant after the collision
People v. Jean-Baptiste
2026 VI Super 10U
Case No. SX-2019-CR-00303
Memorandum Opinion and Order
Page 8 of 8
419 Defendant argues that: (1) the People presented no evidence that Defendant was driving in
the wrong lane or that the deceased was in the correct lane as the lanes are not visible in the video;
(2) the People failed to identify the cars or drivers from the video; (3) the People failed to present
an accident reconstruction at trial; and (4) the People presented no depiction as to where the point
of impact occurred.*”
{20 Based upon the evidence presented, this Court finds that, in a light most favorable to the
government, a jury could reasonably and in good faith make a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt
421 Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for New Trial or, in the Alternative, Judgment for
Acquittal, filed February 19, 2026, is DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that a copy of this Order shall be directed to Assistant Attorney General Kippy
Roberson and Attorney Kye Walker
DATED 3(1a/z026 {piste 1 Arann avd
DENISE M. FRANCOIS
Judge of the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands
ATTEST
TAMARA CHARLES
Clerk of the Court
BY 03/20/2026
LATOYA/CAMACHO
Court Clerk Supervisor / /
* Mot. for New Trial or, in the Alternative, J. for Acquittal 18