SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
                                       DIVISION OF ST CROIX

  JFROME NIATTHEW a,

                                                PLAINTIFF,

                               "0



                                                                 SK 13 CV 499
  R&M GFNFRAL CONTRACTORS, INC,
  HECTOR ROSARIO, AND JACQUELINE
  NIERCFDES,

                                            DEFENDANT?




                                                           ORDER

          AND NOW in accordance with the Memorandum Opinion of even date it is hereby

          ORDERED that the Plaintiff s Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED IN PART,

DENIED IN PART it is further

          ORDERED that the Plaintiff tile and serve a motion to amend accompanied by a proposed

amended complaint with the Memorandum Opinion within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS Upon approval

of the proposed amende complaint by the Court the Defendants will haw: an additional FOURTEEN

(14) DAYS to file an amended answer
                                                           ku—




          DONE and so ORDERF D this 42                      day of March 2020




Tamara Charl a                                                   HAROLD W L WILLOCKS
Clerk of th f. u t         z              /               ' esiding Judge of the Superior Court

By          ‘- 1 F ,                A; __       ’1   .r


            f                         ’     A
Dated ‘    on
            if         I                  L a
                             SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
                                     DIVISION OF ST CROIX

  JFROME MATTHEWS,

                                             PLAINTIFF,

                             \                                 SX 13 CV 499

  R&M GENFRAL CONTRACTORS, INC,                                Cite as 
2020 VI Super 033
  HFLTOR ROSARIO, AND JALQLELINF
  NIERCEDEQ,

                                          DEFENDANTS‘


FOR PUBLICATION

Appearances

JULITA K or LFON, ESQ '
Julita de Leon PLLC
F0; Plamwj‘

K GLENDA CAMERON, ESQ
Law Offices of K G Cameron
For Defendants



                                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

WILLOCKS Presiding Judge

fill      THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Plaintiff’3 Motion for Reconsideration of the Order

of October I9 2018 Dismissing the Plaintiff s Motion for Leave to Amend the Amended Petition

(hereinafter Motion for Leave to Amend ) and Granting Defendants Motion to Discharge and/or

Remove L15 Fem/ens (hereinafter Motion to Discharge Notice ) The Motion for Reconsideration was

filed November I? 2018 The Defendants filed an Opposition on December 4 2018




' At the publiLation 0t this opinion Attomcy (it. Leon has filed a Motion to Withdraw as Plaintiff s counsel
 Matrhensr R&M (renew! (01mm mm [m                                                    2020 V1 Qupcr 0W
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 MEMORAlNDLM OPINION
 Pagc 2 01 I7



                                            BACKGROUND
       A Leave to Amend

‘112     On July 14 2016 the Plaintiff moved the Court for a second amendment to the Amended

 Petition (hereinafter the Amended Complaint ) In spite of the first amendment in 2015 the Plaintiff

 wanted a second amendment to add facts that he did not know about earlier and to add two [sic]

 additional counts that are consistent with existing facts   (Mot for Leave to Amend the Amended Pet

 3 )The Plaintiff alleged that the additional facts are curative   and that the additional claims rely on

facts already pleaded in the [Amended Complaint]         (Id ) The claims to be added were conversion

unjust enrichment and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing (Id at 4 ) The Plaintiff went

on to state that because the new claims arise out of the identical operative facts as the initial Petition

the amendment does not substantially change the theory on which the case has been proceeding nor

would Defendants be required to engage in significant new preparation of this case for trial      (Id )

‘JB      In its Order dated October 17 2018 the Court denied leave fox a second amendment because

the Plaintiff gaVe no indication of the nature of the facts that were allegedly recently disc0tered and

because the claims for conversion unjust enrichment and breach of the duty of good faith and fair

dealing could and should have been included in the Plaintiff s first amendment (Order of the Court

at 2 (Oct 17 2018)) The Court determined that an additional amendment to the complaint would

cause discovery delays and that the Plaintiff s new claims should have been brought when he was

given the opportunity to do so in 2015 given their basis in facts that were admittedly already in his

knowledge (Id)

(114     The Plaintiff asserts that the Court misapplied Rule 15 of the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil

Procedure and erroneously determined that an additional amendment to the Amended Complaint

would cause undue delay (Mot for Reconsideration 1 2 ) According to the Plaintiff            the need for

clarification arose from facts that Plaintiff acquired during the course of discovery {and} the additional
Matt/ten s \ R&M General COIIIHR (or r Inc                                          2020 V1 Super 0'4?
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
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counts arose from allegations that were previously stated but became clearer with the advent of the

additional facts    (It! at 2)

(115    The Plaintiff argues that the rule allowing amendment of a complaint is narrow and that the

Court 3 ruling is contrary to the plain language and purposes of Rule 15 and contradicts the relevant

case law all of which require this Court to grant leave freely when justice so requires         (Id at 3

4 ) According to the Plaintiff despite the delay that amendment will cause there is no prejudice to the

Defendants and the Plaintiff should not be penalized for a lack of ruling on the Motion for Leave to

Amend for two years after it was filed (Id at 4 ) The Plaintiff also claims that the Defendants knew

of the additional claims once the Motion for Leave to Amend was filed and could have conducted

discovery appropriately since written discovery did not end until January 20l8     (Id at 4 )

‘1[6    The Plaintiff further alleges that the Court misread the Motion for Leave to Amend and

disregarded the redlined version of the proposed second amended petition that the Plaintiff filed

causing the Court to determine that the Plaintiff had not indicated what additional facts may be

included (It! at 3 ) Upon further review the Court notes that the Plaintiff submitted a redlined version

of the proposed amendment on July I4 2016 The Court has compared the proposed amendment to

the Amended Complaint of 201 S and noted the relex ant differences discussed in more detail below

317     Another of Plaintiff’s arguments is that the new claims are not new changes per se but rather

 new theories of recovery made clear by discovery       (Id ) Additionally the Plaintiff states that     a

review of the case relied upon by the Court confirms that the undue delay determination focuses on

the length of the time that has passed since Plaintiff filed his complaint     (Id (citation omitted»

However the Plaintiff then states that no consideration was given to the two year delay in addressing

the Plaintiff s motion to amend [n]or was there any consideration given to the fact that this was the

second time that Plaintiff was requesting permission to amend his complaint and the request came

during discovery      (Id at 6) The Court is uncertain whether these statements are contradictory
Matt/wits 1 R&M Garcia] Cannot tors 1m                                                       2020 V1 Super 01%
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Paar. 4 01 17

regarding the undue delay analysis or whether the Plaintiff believes that a two year delay in ruling on

the motion somehow makes it more viable Court will assume for the sake of argument that the Plaintiff

believes the Court s decision to deny an additional amendment was based on the length of time

between the filing of the proposed second amended petition in 2016 and the Court 5 ruling in 2018

118       In response the Defendants note that the Plaintiff s initial complaint as well as the Amended

Complaint were filed with the assistance of counsel though the Plaintiff attempts to give the

impression that he 1acked counsel entirely from 2013 to 2015 (Opp n 6 ) The Defendants also argue

that the allegation that the Court improperly considered the burden to itself as undue is misguided

because pursuant to TOUSS‘UIIZI 
1 Stewart 67
 V I at 946 47 delay in seeking an amendment is undue

when it places an undue burden on the trial court (Opp n 7 ) The Plaintiff s allegedly new facts and

claims also could have been brought at an earlier date and these facts were not cited in the Motion for

Leave to Amend or in the present Motion to Reconsider (1d at 8 ) The Defendants indicate that a

redlined proposed amended complaint does not appear on the record with exception to the one filed

with the Amended Complaint (Id )7 The Defendants further argue that the Plaintiff explicitly states in

the Motion that his Amended Complaint and the proposed second amended complaint are based on

the same factual allegations     meaning that amendment is not necessary or is untimely (It! citing Mot

at 6 ) Finally the Defendants assert that the new claims are barred by the doctrine of futility (Opp n

9J

       B Release of LlS Pendens

({[9      Prior to commencing this action the Plaintiff placed a Notice of Liv Pendem upon a parcel of

real property owned by Defendant Mercedes In an order dated October 17 2018 but separate from

that denying leave to amend the Court ordered the notice released because it found no indication in

the Amended Complaint that any of the Plaintiff‘s claims affect the title of Mercedes property (Order


7 Here the Court again notes that a redlined proposed second amended petition was filed with the Motion for Lease to
Amend on July 14 2016
Mar/liens r R&M General (,mmmmrr 1m                                                  2020 VI SuperO‘H
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MEMORANDI M OPINION
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of the Court Granting Mot to Discharge 3 4 (Oct 17 2018)) The Plaintiff argued against discharging

the notice of [IS perm/ens on the grounds that he has a sufficient legal interest in the property because

of his allegations that profits of R&M General Contractors Inc were used to purchase various real

property on St Croix and in the Dominican Republic (Pl ’s Opp n to Mot to Discharge 3 (May 25

2017)) The Plaintiff also argued that the claims brought in his proposed second amended petition

which the Court did not approxe constitute an interest in the property because the claims iniohe the

equitable recovery principles of unjust enrichment and constructive trust (See “I at 4) The Court

considered the Motion for Leave to Amend immediately prior to the Motion to Discharge and both

orders were signed and entered the same day Since the Court denied the Motion for Leave to Amend

the Court did not consider the argument pertaining to the equitable remedies in the proposed second

amended petition (Order of the Court Granting Mot to Discharge at 2 )

([110    According to the Plaintiff the Court s simultaneous ruling created an injUstice to the Plaintiff

(Mot 6 ) The Plaintiff states that because the Motion for Leave to Amend was pending for nearly a

year before the Defendants filed the Motion to Discharge          it was unclear whether the amended

complaint was the operative complaint      (Id at 7 ) The Plaintiff further states that the Court should

have granted Plaintiff his motion for leave to amend and then decide [sic] the Defendants motion to

discharge the [is perm/en [sic]   (It!) This is in fact what the Court did though both rulings were

entered the same day

‘1“ i    In the Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration the Defendants assert that the Plaintiff s

complaint regarding the [15 pendants amounts to no more than mere disagreement with the Court 5

interpretation of the law    (Opp’n at 10 citing In re Estate ofMelc/zzor 2012 VI LEXIS 73 at *9

(V I Super 2012)) The Defendants state that the Plaintiff does not reference a legitimate reason as

outlined in Rule 6 4 of the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure for the Court to reconsider its
Malt/rem i R&M (I€I1€I(IIC()IIII(I(IUIS Inc                                            2020 V1 Super 033
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Page 6 of 17

position (Opp n at 10) For the purposes of this Motion the Court will assume that the Plaintiff’s

Motion is based on a clear error of law

                                                        LAW
(1112      A motion to reconsider must be based on one of four principles 1 ) a change in controlling law

2) availability of new evidence 3) the need to correct a clear error of law or 4) failure of the court to

address a specific issue that was raised by a party prior to a ruling V I R Civ P 6 4 Here the Plaintiff

alleges that the Court made errors of law It is appropriate to grant a motion for reconsideration based

on error of law      when the initial decision overlooked dispositive factual or legal matters presented to

it      Smith 1 Law 0171(0) of Karin A Bent       P C 2018 V I LEXIS l3 >r16 (V I Super Ct 2018)

(citing 0 Neal 1      PMST LLC 2012 V I LEXIS 62 (V 1 Super              Ct 2012))     Furthermore when

assessing these types of motions for reconsideration the Court looks for the moving party to offer the

specific legal authority it claims the Court either failed to apply correctly or failed to apply in totum in

its original decision      Smith 2018 V I LEXIS at *16 (citing Jefielson 1             (”wide Bax Resort

Condwnmmm Ass n Inc           No 2010 97 2010 U S Dist LEXIS 146841 *4)

                                               DISCUSSION
        A Leave to Amend

(1113     The Plaintiff s Motion for Leave to Amend was made pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure prior to the adoption of the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure in March 2017

Rule 1’5 of the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure is substantially similar or identical to Rule 15

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Pursuant to Rule 15 amendments made before trial and which

cannot be made as a matter of course require the written consent of the opposing party or leave of the

Court V IR Ci» P [5(a)(2) The court should freely give leave whenjustice so requires Id Under

this standard amendment should be allowed in order to provide an opportunity to have any requests

for relief considered on the merits if the assertions in the proposed amendment are the proper subject

for relief    Toussrantr Steward 67V! 931 944 (VI Sup Ct 2017) (discussing SuperiorCourt Rule
Man/rem r R&M (renew! (animators I!“                                                      2020 Vi Quper 0N
SX 201 3 CV 499
MFMORANDUM OPINION
Page 7 of l7


8 which also indicates amendment should be permitted when justice so requires )              More succinctly

when the pleading presents a proper claim for relief leave to amend should be freely given            Id

(“14          Although the standard allowing amendment when justice so requires is extremely liberal and

strongly favors the granting of leare to file an amended pleading the trial court has discretion to deny

leave to amend due to reasons such as undue delay bad faith or dilatoriness repeated failures to correct

any deficiencies in the pleading futility of amendment undue prejudice to the [non ]moving party

etc         Toursamr 67 V I at 946 (citations omitted) Accordingly the Court will undertake a three prong

analysis 1) whether the proposed claims are proper claims for relief 2) whether the Court has

discretion to deny lane to amend and 3) whether the Court 5 discretion was abused in denying leave

to amend

        l     The Plaintiff s proposed claims for conversion and unlust enrichment are not proper claims
              for relief

([[15         A proper claim for relief is a claim upon which relief may be granted and is not futile Manure

r Hers OI] Virgin Islands Corp 69 V I 519 S28 29 (VI Super Ct 2018) lfthese are proper claims

for relief then the liberalin of Rule 15 will apply

        (I) Come: mm

‘lll6        The Plaintiff s first additional claim is for conversion a tort claim As put in Pappar t Hotel

on the Cm Time Sharing Assm ration 69 V I 7r (V I Super Ct 2015)

              [c]onve1sion is an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so
              seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be
             required to pay the other the full value of the chattel Thus comersion consists of the
             wrongful exercise of dominion or control Over the property of another in a manner
             inconsistent with that of the owner s rights Also the essence of conversion is not the
             acquisition of the property rather it is the wrongful deprivation of that property
             Consequently the tort of conversion constitutes the exercise of wrongful dominion and
             control over the property to the detriment of the rights of its actual owner It is
             uncontroverted that money which is personal property may be the subject of a
             conversion

69 V I 3 (citations omitted)
Muir/lens r R&M General Cowman/r [m                                                     2020 VI Qttper 0T4
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Page 8 ol 17

$117       Though by definition conversion would generally be appropriate where a party has claimed the

loss of control of money to their detriment it cannot be a proper claim of relief because it is barred by

the gist of the action doctrine

           The gist of the action doctrine is designed to maintain the conceptual distinction
           between breach of contract claims and tort claims by precluding plaintiffs from
           recasting ordinary breach of contract claims into tort claims The difference between
           contract and tort claims [is] as follows Tort actions lie for breaches of duties imposed
           by law as a matter of social policy while contract actions lie only for breaches of duties
           imposed by mutual consensus agreements between particular individuals

Pollara r Chateau St Clair LLC 2016 VI LEXIS 49 J‘22 23 (V1 Super Ct 20l6) (adopting the

gist of the action doctrine by Banks analysis)

3118       The gist of the action doctrine bars tort claims

           (I) arising solely from a contract between the parties,
           (2) where the duties allegedly breached were created and grounded in the contract itself
           (3) where liability stems from a contract or
           (4) where the tort claim essentially duplicates a breach of contract claim or the success
           of which is wholly dependent on [the] terms of a contract

VI Port/lurk r Cal/Mood 2014 V I LEXIS ll                 l4 (V I Super Ct 20l4)

‘lll9      In this case the cause of action sounds in contract and the Plaintiff s claims are all based on

the alleged breach of the agreement that he would ICCClVC forty percent of company earnings (See

generally Amended Complaint and PI s proposed second amended complaint ) The conversion claim

and the duties and liabilities claimed by the Plaintiff all arise from the contract Therefore the

conversion claim is essentially a duplicate of the breach of contract claim which cannot succeed on its

own and is therefore not a proper claim for relief


        b ) Breach of the Dun of Good Faith and Fan Dealing

$120
            lender the duty 0! good laith and 3 iii dealing may contract imposes upon each party
            {duty of Good with and flirdcaling in its performance and its enforcement Good laith
           means trithlulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified
           expectations of the oter part) it LXLludes a \dllLlV of ty pes of condtrtt LlldrlLlLlllLd
Matthew 1 R&M Geneva] COMUG’A’IOH 1m                                                     2020 VI $1er on
ex 20H CV 499
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Fag; 9 0t 17

           as inmlxino bad with News; titty \iolatc tommunit) sittndtttds at (hum) fdiamss
           0t chiSOfldbiLnth

(Handrail [its (a i [Omit] 63V] 1 21(V] Slile'Cl 201")

(1121      Hum tin Pi 11min has 10de bunch 01 with at slamming Item {in DdLmEmIs fiiillh. to

shit; tin procuds 0i in; mm: Ming busimss Sim; t: duty of good idilh 1nd fair dc flinty maths to

was contract [in tumult [Emmi £00500!th a mops; Liaim to} Mid

        c) Unjust Enrtclmieni

            Amust 0! nation tut quantum mum: dist) know: as tiniustmrithtmnt “in main nil)
           “L in a Last “but [In ddLnddnt nuiuls} somLthina of \niiilt. to which it: is not
           mlitELd 1nd which in shtmEd Imam to tin piaintiff Walk“ 1 “aims 3 (‘1 (i\
           M) 2010 0040      VI       ZOHVH 168““) It j>(VI Apt 28 20M)(quotino
           Maw t Morales 57 V i 627 635 I19 (V i 2013)) we also I limit V Fulfil/a (up 3
           Oman has [In Holding ”C (it No 9 60 20HWI i7i087 it 2(i)Vl Jm it)
           20H} (unpubEishLd) ( Quantum muuit is {in twin!) to: a quasi with 1U with} a
           than), 0! uniust Lnrichmant it is not a in; st tndim luv 1| litany ) i niust minimum
           is an qulildbifi. quasi LUINEdLl was; of mien imposinq liability “hLiL [hka is no
           mtoruablL LtmlldLE batman (ht. ptutits but Rink». diLEdlLS that “It. pfaintiit ”an
           wmputs‘ttion to: SLIWLLS punide (1m (011mm Q] («mime (nn 1 J Roland
           Dasha I] 6: Sum [in 7-17 A 2d 600 607 (Md 2000)(quoting Dunnat rile t Mt ( mmuk
           at; (a 2i i Supp 2d 527 $35? (I) Md ”98”

           BtLduBt. uninst unithmuat is an LL]lEiIdbit. ILde) it      iii“ nil thillildbik tannins   is
           inappioptiak “hm. a but lama) is atttilttbh. See Mitsulmlu Int! (mp ‘l ( animal
           1: ml: Sale 5 NE 1d 1507 I318 (E HE} Cit 1994){ It is aximnatit Eh It Lquittbk Riki
           is only M ‘10th “in“. than is no (ELiquidk tummy at in“ ) we gcnualh I DAN
           HOBBS REVIEDII S 750 $2 807 if (2d Lt] 1993’) DBL to this. and» til Ibiiit) of
           ultlitabk ILInLdiLh Man a itgai Itflkd}; is tuttitdhit my); Omani In!» is thtt no
           [aquitabitl quasi communal claim can mist “but .1 LOHIIdLl mists humus} {ht pdiEiLs
           umLunnw tin. s um subiut math: on “Smith [In qu tsi Lonltactudi Lluim usts shut
           lam! mmdits an .mtildbkt to a plaintiffi in a bunch 0! Leanna action ( 1m ( 0msz
           1;] (“mime (mt 747 A ”a! at 607 This (Marius know] as [ht haunt by “mum
           wk is bdsui on Elk plinciplt that punks in L0fllidLllldl with).          at; not uttitlLd to
           tilt, lLflILdiLS ttxttilahlt [fluid a itidiLittil) imposLd quasi LOHIldLl humus. tin. turns
           of that agiumant txprtss and impikd doling that rLspLLtiu iiohts (1min and
           prutations [um/t V Pollam (up 20! 3 WI l7l087 at 2 (quotino Delta [let \
           Bugs Cit App I\()2()06 0104 20!] W1 446%”IE it 3 {DV¥AppDi» Supt 22
           201E); ALLOIdiW‘lV      in] Liaim i0: uniust unithnknt cannot stand v» has an pruss
           tontraLtuai winning!“ insts bLtMLLn {hL pattius Bade! (quite! (fit SHIN”!!! 1
           [cl/nines 517 l\ E 2d I216 1219 till App Ct E987) a“ (rim My”: i Allumm Prod
           (a 73 F 1d 779 786 (8th Cir 1996) ( Mummy “but in pruss LODBaLI LXists
           bLtVsLUI {ht palms unjust minimum is not d\ aiitibit. as a mums 0| ItLOV my )
Maithensr R&M (161161111 Conn-cu tots Inc                                            3020 V] Super 033
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Page to of 17

Caruumum 62: Rate: (mp 1 Bantu Popular tie Prtwto Rim 6l V! 247 2‘31 (V l Sup Ct 20H}

(lootnotcs omitted)


3&2       like Lonxcision tiniestenrichmentisnotapiopci claim lot and Thotmhthe Defendants m 1}

[we united something ofmluc (e g money or property ) to nhichthcy are “OILIIIlULd the Plaintiff s

cause oi action is in contract him not quit,» lhc Plaintiff aliens the existence of a contract new an

the parties which demands th it the HALIHILS of tin~ business be ditidcd to”) percent to the Plaintiff

kitty pencil! to Delcndant Rastuio and twenty percent to [)LiLi‘tddnl Muccdcs (Amended Compl

(1110) As per the Plaintiff s proposed second intended compile}:         Defendants h or. failed to sin

Piaintiit his 40% and retained Plaintill s 40% for Elicmschcs As a result Detendttnts hart been

uniustly enriched at [he expu‘tsc oi Plaintiff   (Pl s Proposed Second Amended Vctilied Petition at W

82 84} Since the Pl tintiil h is lilUde a riol ition oi LON“ let that is a proper Icmcd) at l1“ 1nd to

brim? it dupiicatc. claim in equity such as unjust enrichment is prohibited in this matter [niust

enrichment is thclcimt not lplt){)ci cl rim tor iciiei


      2   The Court can exercise its discretion to deny leave to amend because of undue {May and
          dilatoriness

$23       As per the above discussion only one of the Plaintiff s three proposed claims is a proper ciaim

for relief As such the Court is not required to give leave to include the claims for conversion and

unjust enrichment With regard to breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing the Court 5 next

inquiry is whether it has discretion pursuant to the factors outlined Tousrainr to deny leave to amend

in spite of the general liberaiity of Rule IS

5B4       The Court may consider the following non exclusive factors in exercising its discretion to deny

amendment to a pleading        undue delay bad faith or dilatoriness repeated faiittres to correct any

deficiencies in the pleading futility of amendment undue prejudice to the [non imoving party etc

Toussamt 67 V I at 946 (citations omitted)
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MFMORAINDUM OPEN ION
Page ll of 17


        The passage of time alone is not undue delay Delay in seeking to amend a pleading
        becomes undue when allowing the amendment places an unwarranted burden on the
        trial court Whether allowing an amendment to a pleading will unduly burden the trial
        court involves consideration of the number of opportunities to amend that have been
        granted by the trial court the reasons for and the purposes of prior amendments the
        stage of the litigation and other appropriate factors relating to the trial court s
        management of the case specifically and its docket and procedures generally Id at 946
        47 (citations omitted


(“2‘5   In its ruling of October 17 2018 the Court denied leave to amend because of undue delay (See

Order Denying Leave to Amend at 3 Oct 17 20l8) The Court noted that the Plaintiff had already

had an opportunity to amend and that the case had progressed so significantly that the inclusion of

additional claims would unnecessarily postpone trial (Id ) The Plaintiff stated in his Motion for Leave

to Amend and in the present Motion for Reconsideration that the new claims are based on facts

previously known (Mot to Amend at 3 Mot for Reconsideration at 5 6 ) He also alleges that the new

claims do not substantially alter the theory of recovery (Mot for Reconsideration at ‘3 ) Since two of

the three claims are not even viable the Court has to agree that the theory of recovery is not

substantially altered The only proper claim for relief is breach of the duty of good faith and fair

dealing and that is already implied in contract


([[26   In fact for each of the new claims the Plaintiff essentially reiterates that pursuant to the by

laws of the corporate agreement the Plaintiff has a right to forty percent of company earnings and that

the Defendants wrongfully withheld his portion to his detriment (Pl 5 Proposed Second Amended

Verified Petition W78 89) There are no new relevant facts stated by the Plaintiff that give additional

support any of the claims The most significant addition to the alleged facts that the Court can find is

the allegation that the Plaintiff was contacted by an employee of the Department of Licensing and

Consumer Affairs in 20] 2 regarding a complaint against the company and this contact alerted Plaintiff

to the Defendants alleged wrongdoing (Id at (H 15 I7 )
Matthews 1 R&M General Con/lat It»: Inc                                            2020 VI Qupcr 03}
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Page l2 of 17


(1127   Even though the Plaintiff has only amended the complaint once these alleged facts have been

known to the Plaintiff since 2012 and the Court is of the opinion that the proposed claims for

conversion and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing could and should have been included

in the 2015 amendment The Court finds undue delay and dilatoriness because each claim even those

which are not proper claims for relief could have been brought in the 2015 amendment Even a minor

amendment to the pleadings will require the Court to give the Defendants an opportunity to respond

which will stretch this case even further requiring changes to the joint scheduling order and to the

Court s calendar


‘1]28   The Court has also considered the other factors articulated in Tousscum and can find no

indication of bad faith or of repeated failure to correct deficiencies since this is not a matter of the

petitions being procedurally deficient but rather the Plaintiff seeking to make additional claims The

Court also cannot make a finding of undue prejudice to the Defendants because the Court would give

them the opportunity to respond to the amendment and to conduct discovery as necessary


(“29    With regard to futility   the Court considers if the proposed amendment is frivolous would be

barred by the statute of limitations or would survive a motion to dismiss          Abdallah 1 Abdel

Rahman 2015 VI LEXIS 102 *l? (VI Super Ct 2015) See Hart ogr United C021) 20]] VI

LEXIS 9‘5       10 (VI Super Ct 2011) (stating that      [flutility refers to the complaint even after

amendment failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted ) citing In re Burlington Coat

Farm/i Sec Ling      I 14 F 3d 1410 1414 (3d Cir I997) As already established the Plaintiff s claims

for conversion and unjust enrichment are not proper They would not survive a motion to dismiss

because the cause of action does not support a quasi contractual claim like unjust enrichment and the

Plaintiff cannot merge tort claims with contract claims However breach of the duty of good faith and

fair dealing would survive because the second proposed amended complaint is well pleaded and the
Mart/ten“ R&M General (0111HK Ims Inc                                                  2020 VI SuperOiZ
SX 2013 CV 499
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Page 1% of l7

Plaintiff s alleged facts taken as true sufficiently support the inclusion of this particular claim In

addition Virgin Islands precedent makes clear that such a duty is implied in every contract


<H30       In sum the claims for conVersion and unjust enrichment are not proper claims for relief and it

would be futile to include them in the second proposed amended complaint Further though breach of

the duty of good faith and fair dealing is a proper claim to give leave to amend cause undue delay and

place additional burden on the Court The final question is whether in light of these circumstances

the Court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend


       3   The Court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend but will allow the Plaintiff to
           include a claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing
€131        A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or irrationally fails to consider

judicial recognized factors constraining its exercise of discretion relies on erroneous factual or legal

premises or commits an error oflaw         Molloi I lndependeme Blue Crow ‘56 V I 155 168 (V I Sup

Ct 2012) quoting United States l Thompson Rii (we 56] F 3d 345 348 (4th Cir 2009)


$32        In this case the Court did not deny leave to amend arbitrarily or irrationally and provided

justification for its decision The Court noted in its ruling that leave to amend should be freely given

subject to the factors discussed above including undue delay For this reason the Court also did not

commit an error of law but rather exercised its sound discretion The Court also stated that the Plaintiff

did not give an indication as to the nature of the new claims and facts to be added to the complaint

Upon reView the Court has noted the differences between the Plaintiff 5 Amended Complaint and

proposed second amended petition and has found the changes to be minimal other than the inclusion

of the three new claims two of which are not proper claims for relief The Plaintiff does not add any

relevant supporting facts but merely restates those previously known


(H33       In light of all the circumstances it is apparent that the Court did not abuse its discretion and

though the Court admits that it did initially overlook dispositive legal matters presented by the
Mall/tens t R&M Gene/u] Comma [OI s [m                                               
2020 VI Super 03
%
8X 20]? CV 499
MEMORAADUM OPlNl0l\
Page 14 of 1?

Plaintiff namely that conversion and unjust enrichment are not proper claims for relief that oversight

did not harm the Plaintiff because to have considered the claims more thoroughly as done here would

not have been to the Plaintiff s benefit However having now reviewed the new claims and determined

that the only viable claim is for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing which should not

require any additional discovery on the part of the Defendants due to its implied nature the Court shall

allow the amendment as to that particular claim and give the Defendants time to respond to it The

Court will order the Plaintiff to submit a new proposed amended complaint in accordance with this

opinion that will be approved upon review


       B   Discharge of the Notice of Lrs Pendens

$4         The Plaintiff also requests that the Court reconsider its order to remove the Notice of L15

Pendent placed on a parcel of real property belonging to Defendant Mercedes The Plaintiff takes issue

with the Court s ruling because he believes that the Court’s simultaneous consideration of the Motion

for Leave to Amend and the motion to discharge the notice caused him prejudice (Mot to Reconsider

at 6 i The Court can think of no way in which the Plaintiff was prejudiced As the Plaintiff points out

the Court may consider motions in whichever order it chooses (Id ) Regardless the Motion for Leave

to Amend was considered before the Motion to Discharge

€135       Further the Plaintiff s opposition to the motion to discharge relied on the argument that his

proposed second amended compiaint gave him a legal interest in the property particularly the

allegation that company profits were used to purchase various real property However the property in

question was never identified in any version of the complaint The Plaintiff also asserts that his claim

for unjust enrichment and a request for a constructive trust in the proposed second amended complaint

constitutes legal interest in the property The Court wholly disagrees As already discussed at length

unjust enrichment is not a proper claim for relief upon a contract cause of action Ev en if it were proper

in this case the claim would still not affect title to any defendant s property
Matthews 1 R&M General COIIIHKIOIY [m                                                   2020 VI guperms
SX 2013 CV 499
MEMORANDL M OPINION
Page l5 of l7

(1136    A notice of [is pendens is a notice that there is a court action affecting title to real estate or a

judgment requiring the execution of a conveyance of real estate See 28 V IC § [30 In other words

 [a] notice of [is pantie/is makes the public aware that certain property is the subject matter of litigation

SBP I LLCt Family Flops Ca) 1171766”? LLC 20l0VI LEXIS 76 >‘3 citing Black sLaw Dictionary

at 950 (8th ed 2004) Thus [rs pendent is appropriate in cases such as those invoking an action for

specific performance to purchase real property declaration of the existence or extinguishment of an

easement appurtenant or interpretation of covenants that run with the land etc SBP I LLC 20l0Vl

LEXIS at ‘3 4 (stating that classic example where a notice of In pendens is warranted in is a case for

specific performance requiring the conveyance of property) citing Del Valle l Mortgage Bank of

Cali/bum: 2009 U S Dist LEXIS 105898 at ’25 (E D Cal 2009) Ross l Canada LIfeAtsurame

C0      
1995 US Dist LEXIS 18623
 at *5 (ED Pa 1995) E St CIoerem/z Club I Caube Isle 17

V I 119 l22 (Terr Ct I980) (finding that an easement appurtenant is incidental to any estate the

possessor of the dominant tenement may have )' Bcl of DIM l Como] Int 1 28 V I 57 7% (Terr Ct

I993) (finding that an unfavorable ruling regarding covenants that run with the land would be

prejudicial to successors in interest to property)

(H37     L15 pendens is not appropriate in the present contract dispute because whether the Defendants

breached the contract does not affect the title to Defendant Mercedes property EV en if the Plaintiff

receives a favorable judgment the Plaintiff will be entitled to monetary damages not equitable relief

in the form of conveyance of property Moreover the Court has given the Amended Complaint and

the proposed second amended petition thorough review and can find absolutely no reference made by

the Plaintiff to a constructive trust Ultimately whether the Plaintiff has requested a constructive trust

as a remedy is a non issue because his prayers for relief include any relief the Court deems appropriate

9138     The Plaintiff also asserts in the Motion to Reconsider that the time period between when the

motions to amend and to release the notice of [1s pendens were filed and when they were ruled on
Matt/reusr R&M General (01mm tors [m                                               2020 Vi Super 033
SX 2013 CV 499
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Page 16 of 17

prejudiced the Plaintiff because the Plaintiff thought he could rely on his proposed second amended

complaint to support his argument against discharging the notice (Mot for Reconsideration at 6 7 )

This argument is also unpersuasive The Court has already discussed how the proposed amendments

do not support the filing of a notice of [IS pendens Beyond that it is unreasonable for a litigant to

believe that an unapproved amended complaint is operative

it”     In granting the Defendants motion to discharge the notice of In" pendens the Court considered

whether any of the Plaintiff s claims affect real property and found that they do not The Court also

noted thatjudgment would not be made hollow if the notice of [15‘ pendent was discharged because the

Plaintiff s potential recovery is not tied to any specific real property but rather to monetary

compensation in general The Court further reminded the Plaintiff that a favorable judgment would

give the Plaintiff the opportunity to file ajudgment lien against the property if necessary Finally in

requesting reconsideration the Plaintiff offered no legal authority that he claims the Court failed to

apply or apply correctly Thus the Court s ruling did not involve a clear error of law and the Court

will not reconsider its ruling

                                           CONCLUSION

(“40   As discussed abore the Court has reviewed its denial of the Plaintiff” s 2016 Motion for Leave

to Amend and its grant of the Defendants 2017 Motion to Discharge With regard to the leave to

amend the Court has more thoroughly considered the Plaintiff 5 proposed changes and determined

that two of the three additional claims he wishes to bring are not proper claims for relief However the

Court has found that the claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing is proper and even

though the Court maintains its position that there was no error of law or abuse of discretion in denying

leave to amend will allow the new claim because to do so will not unduly burden the Defendants and

the time needed to fully respond to the amended pleading should be minimal
Mutt/mu r \ R&M Gemini (01mm tors 1m                                                 2020 VI Quper 03?
SX 20H CV 499
MFMORAl‘qDUM OPINION
Page l7 of 17

‘114l   With regard to the discharge of the notice of In pendens the Court will not reconsider its

position because [15 pendenr is not appropriate in a case such as this where the litigation does not affect

the title to real property In granting the discharge the Court has considered local jurisprudence on the

matter and is confident that it has not committed an error of law An order consistent with this opinion

is forthcoming
                                                 /


        DONE and so ORDERED this [2                   day of March 2020


ATTEST           /’
Tamara Char}!                                           HARD D W L WILLOCKS
Clerk of th ' /                     ;          ' esiding Judge of the Superior Court
            /         //   /     /               ’2
By         A/ /                         I/i
        fCo r Clerk lpMSO                \

Dated                          k A. 1‘   2‘