IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
                              DIVISION OF ST. CROIX


 IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
 NYDIA HESS aka NIDIA AMELIA                              CASE NO. SX-2018-PB-00007
 BARBOSA MARTINEZ aka NYDIA
 AMELIA STOWELL
                                            Deceased



                                    Cite as 2026 VI Super 1SU

                         MEMORANDUM            OPINION AND ORDER
        Pending before the Court is First Bank Puerto Rico’s (“First Bank”) Motion to Reopen
Case and Resume Probate Proceedings filed September 16, 2025, and its Renewed Motion to
Reopen Case and Resume Probate Proceedings dated February 25, 2026 (the “First Bank
Motions”). For the reasons set forth herein the First Bank’s Motions are denied and this matter
is closed

                          FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
        This matter was opened in 2018 pursuant to the Petition of Yvette M. Hess.           Letters
Testamentary were issued to her on or about February 21, 2018. The Estate’s First Quarterly
Account was filed on August 15, 2018.     First Bank, through its attorney, filed a Creditor’s
Claim almost two years later, on June 8, 2020. Around the time of the filing of First Bank’s
Creditor’s claim and following numerous failures of the Executrix to comply with previous
orders, the Court ordered that the Estate file a motion to substitute the Executrix, and to comply
with previous orders.    The Estate failed to do so, and the matter was dismissed           without
prejudice for lack of prosecution on October 14, 2020. As noted above, First Bank appeared
in the proceedings prior to dismissal and was represented by counsel yet waited almost five
years   to move   to reopen   the case    and resume   probate   proceedings.   In its supplemental
memorandum, First Bank cited 15 V.I.C. §236(a)(2) as the basis for its Motion; and in support,
it cited Matter of Est. of Gibbs, 

 for the proposition that “[t]he Supreme
Court has held that when a dismissal is without prejudice, the parties may reopen a closed case
on motion once the defect that led to the dismissal is cured.” While the Supreme Court in
explaining why dismissal without prejudice is not a final order for purposes of appeal, indeed
noted that a plaintiff may attempt to cure a defect and thus avoid the need for appeal by moving
to amend the complaint or filing a new complaint as part of a new case, Gibbs does not hold
that a non-party may reopen a case, or even that a plaintiff can file an amended complaint at
any time no matter how long they wait.         The Court does not find this case dispositive or
particularly helpful to answer whether First Bank’s        5-year delay    in seeking to reopen    is
reasonable

                                         LEGAL STANDARD
        ‘The decision to re-open a case is traditionally within the discretion of a court. The
court must consider the timeliness of the motion, the character of the testimony, and the effect
of the granting of the motion.” People of the Virgin Islands v. Clark, 54 V.1. 154, 158 (V.I
Super. Ct. 2010) (citing U.S. v. Ali, 

, *8 (3d Cir. 2007); United
States v. Kitheart, 

 (3d Cir. 2000)). In Log Enters. V. Snell, 2018 V.1
In the Matter of the Estate of Nydia Hess                                            

Case No. SX-2018-PB-0007
Memorandum Opinion and Order
Page 2 of 5


Super 25U, 

 (February 25, 2019) the plaintiff similarly filed a motion to
re-open a case years after it was closed while offering no reason in its motion why the Court
should do so. /d *pS. There the Court considered the applicability of Rule 60(b).          This Court
will follow suit
                                               ANALYSIS
            “The ‘reasonable time’ inquiry, which applies to all 60(b) motions, is fact-specific and
allows the court to consider ‘(1) whether any party opposing the motion has been prejudiced
by the movant’s delay in seeking relief, and (2) whether the moving party had good reason for
failure to take appropriate action sooner.’” Log Enters. 3-4 citing Peter Bay Owners Ass'n v,
Stillman,     

 (D.V.I.   2002) (quoting Christian v. All Persons Claiming
Any Right, Title, or Interest in all Props. Known and Described, 

, 

 (D.V.I.      1997) (citing 11 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller     & Mary Kay Kane,     Federal
Practice and Procedure § 2866 at 382-83 (2d ed. 1995)). Here the first prong is inapplicable
because these are not adversary proceedings, so the Court’s focus will be on the second prong,
and upon the effect of granting the motion
        A.     Reasonableness        --Whether Movant has Good Cause for the Delay

         THIS MATTER HAS BEEN CLOSED FOR 5 YEARS since entry of this Court’s Order
of Dismissal on October 14, 2020. 4 years, 10 months, 27 days elapsed before First Bank’s
first motion was filed. V.I. R. Civ. P. 60(b) provides six reasons to relieve a party from a final
judgment, order or proceeding. The first reason being “excusable neglect” is not applicable
because (i) First Bank appeared in the proceeding prior to dismissal and provides no
justification for why it did nothing for five years after the matter was dismissed; and (ii) even
if there was excusable neglect, First Bank waited more than a year to seek relief. Reasons two
through five inapplicable on their face, leaving “any other reason that justifies relief’ pursuant
to Rule 60(b)(6) as the only potentially viable vehicle under Rule 60(b)

       In Log Enters. the Court held that a 7-year delay to seek to reopen the matter was
unreasonable and declined to do so noting that other courts had declined to reopen matters for
as little as a 7-month delay citing Virgin Islands Bldg. Specialties, Inc. v. Buccanneer Mall
Assocs. 197 F-R.D. 256, 259 (D.V.I. App. Div. 2000). The Court noted Rule 60(b)(6) is not
used to circumvent the time restrictions in Rule 60(b)(1)-(3), because “Rule 60(b)(6) does not
confer a standardless residual discretionary power and is available only in cases evidencing
extraordinary circumstances.” /d at p. 7 citing Brin v. Dessout, V. 1. LEXIS 52 at 15
Accordingly, relief under this section is generally limited to circumstances where the movant
can show actual injury beyond their control which prevented timely action to protect that
party’s interests. Griffith v. Carpenter, 

 at *5 (V.L. Super. Ct. June 7, 2012
(unpublished).      First Bank does neither, nor, as discussed below, it has failed to meet its burden
to show that its five-year delay was for reasons beyond its control which prevented timely
action to protect its interests
        1.     First Bank has Not Demonstrated Any Injury Beyond Its Control Preventing
               an Earlier Motion

        In its Motion First Bank gives no justification for reopening the proceedings other than
stating its desire to cure defects that led to the dismissal in the first place (which the Court notes
In the Matter of the Estate of Nydia Hess                                         2026 V1 Super 15U
Case No. SX-2018-PB-0007
Memorandum Opinion and Order
Page 3 of 5



were in large part the Administrator’s failure to accept or reject creditors claims including that
of First Bank) and to continue probating the Estate’s assets and liabilities’. Instead of informing
the Court why it failed to seek to reopen the proceedings contemporaneous with the dismissal
and references factors outside of its control prevented it from doing so, First Bank merely
argues that there will be no prejudice (and possibly there could be a benefit) to the heirs by
reopening the estate. It further argues that there has been no prejudice by the delay. First Bank
finally makes the conclusory argument—-without any explanation or justification—that it
would be prejudiced if the Estate is not reopened. As discussed below, it will not
     b. Effect of Granting the Motion

             1.   Reopening the Estate will unnecessarily allow the movant to sidestep
                  personal service on the heirs and take advantage of the probate court’s
                  summary proceedings in lieu of foreclosure

        The Virgin Islands Rules of Probate, and Title 15 of the Virgin Islands Code provide
summary procedures for creditors claims to be adjudicated in order to streamline the probate
process, swiftly wind up a decedent’s affairs, and avoid the potential for dawn out litigation in
multiple forums which could otherwise delay final adjudication of an estate. The process is
simple in that Creditors merely file a claim which must be accepted or rejected by the
Administrator; and in the event a claim or claims are rejected, a hearing is held with respect to
the validity of the claim. As part of that process the creditor is not required to serve its claim
or any summons or complaint upon the heirs as it would be required to do in civil litigation;
and at the conclusion of the proceedings (which are held on an accelerated timeline) the Court
will reach a decision that is treated as a final judgment for purposes of appeal. The Court
understands that truncated process may be preferable to Frist Bank. However, opening (or in
this case reopening) probate for the sole purpose of foreclosure is contrary to the purpose of
the Magistrate Division’s probate jurisdiction especially in light of the availability of another
forum for redress of First Bank’s grievances
           2. Reopening the Estate to allow First Bank to foreclose on estate property
               will unnecessarily place a civil foreclosure matter on the Court’s probate
                  docket when it could otherwise be brought on the civil docket as any other
                  foreclosure would typically be brought

        The bank has other more appropriate tools at its disposal outside of probate. Indeed, the
bank can file a civil action for foreclosure against the unprobated estate of Nydia Hess and
John Does, and therefore may achieve its desired result in the general jurisdiction court.      See

‘In its supplemental memorandum, First Bank cited 15 V.1-C. §236(a)(2) as the basis for its Motion
and in support, it cited Afatfer of Est. of Gibbs, 

 for the proposition that “[t]he
Supreme Court has held that when a dismissal is without prejudice, the parties may reopen a closed
case on motion once the defect that led to the dismissal is cured.”   While the Supreme Court in
explaining why dismissal without prejudice is nota final order for purposes of appeal, indeed noted
that a plaintiff may attempt to cure a defect and thus avoid the need for appeal by moving to
amend the complaint or filing a new complaint as part of a new case, G/bbs does not hold that a
non-party may reopen a case, or even that a plaintiff can file an amended complaint at any time no
matter how long they wait. The Court does not find this case dispositive or particularly helpful to
answer whether First Bank’s 5-year delay in seeking to reopen is reasonable
In the Matter of the Estate of Nydia Hess                                                       2026 VI Super 15SU
Case No. $X-2018-PB-0007
Memorandum Opinion and Order
Page 4 of 5



First Bank v. Moses~ 

 (Granting Motion to Amend Complaint to Substitute
Unprobated Estate as Defendant.). While public policy favors a gathering of all creditor’s
claims in one place for swift and consistent adjudication when wrapping up a decedent’s affairs,
that public policy is not served when there are no active probate proceedings, competing
creditors claims, or estate assets that require distribution

         First Bank seeks to restart probate mid-stream where notice to creditors was provided
and published almost a decade past, and to pursue its foreclosure matter in summary fashion
as a claim against the estate. In doing so, First Bank seeks to dispose of what appears to be the
only asset of the estate. If pursuit of a creditor’s claim to foreclose with jurisdiction resting on
stale notices’ and consents does not technically violate the heirs’ right to due process, it
certainly stretches it to the breaking point. Moreover, the reopening of probate for First Bank’s
intended purpose would invert the purpose of the creditor’s claim process—placing procedure
that is typically ancillary to the disposition of the estate in the driver’s seat and sole purpose of
its administration
                                                   CONCLUSION
        First Bank not shown that it faced any impediment to bringing its motion immediately
after the     Court   dismissed     the     matter    for failure   to prosecute.   Accordingly,      it has   not
demonstrated the reasonableness of its Motion, especially in light of 15 V.I.C. §236b(2) which
provides that if a principal creditor does not apply for administration of the estate within 40
days   from     decease,     they   shall     be     deemed    to   have   renounced    their     right   to   the
administration.     Moreover, the consequences of reopening an estate to allow a bank to
foreclose would be to add to an overcrowded docket in a court of limited jurisdiction (which
has no jurisdiction over foreclosure matters) when the movant’s claim can be brought in the
general jurisdiction court where it typically forecloses on mortgages that are in default. Further
consequences would be to allow First bank to foreclose on estate property without service, or
with stale service upon the heirs and other creditors. First Bank has not demonstrated the
reasonableness of its delay and given the due process concerns in favor of the heirs, and the
Court’s concerns with respect to the management of its probate docket, the Court will not
exercise its discretion to reopen this long-closed matter.            First Bank is not left without recourse
It may bring a civil action to foreclose in Superior Court following the Court’s guidance in
First Bank v. Moses. Accordingly, it is hereby

          ORDERED that First Bank’s Motion to Reopen Case and Resume Probate Proceedings
and its Renewed Motion to Reopen Case and Resume Probate Proceedings are DENIED; and
it is further

        ORDERED            that First Bank’s Motion to Appoint Kurt Petri, Esq. as Administrator of
the Estate is DENIED AS MOOT;                 and it is further


* Indeed, in that matter First Bank argued that a probate proceeding is not a prerequisite to
foreclosure actions, and that having no administrator appointed is of no consequence

‘In its Supplemental Memorandum First Bank argues that reopening the estate will avoid duplicate
proceeding noting in FN1 that notice to creditors has already been published. The court does not
rule on whether said notices would continue to be effective
In the Matter of the Estate of Nydia Hess                                           

Case No.   SX-2018-PB-0007
Memorandum Opinion and Order
Page 5 of 5


           ORDERED        that a copy of this Memorandum      Opinion   and Order    be directed    to
Attorney Claire E. Anaclerio; and it is further

           ORDERED       that the Clerk shall mark this matter CLOSED




                        7                                            gas
DATED: April %o' , 2026                                                 (
                                                  HON.   CHRISTOPHER M. TIMMONS,               SR
                                                         Superior Court Magistrate Judge

ATTEST
TAMARA CHARLES
Clerk of the Court

By:     | Tel    eon            prt
        Probate Officer II
Date:      APR   2 0 2026