SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
DIVISION OF ST CROIX
PEOPLE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
PLAINTIFF I SX 2019 CR 329
V
D MAHRI CHARLES I
CITE AS 2023 VI SUPER 3 [A
DEFENDANT
—J
Appearances
William Appleton, Esq
Virgin Islands Department of Justice
St Croix U S Virgin Islands
For People ofthe Virgin Islands
Jeffrey Moorhead, Esq
Jeffrey B C Moorhead P C
St Croix, U S Virgin Islands
For D Malm Charles
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
WILLOCKS, Senior Sitting Judge
1i 1 THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Rasselah Caeser s (hereinaf
ter
‘ Caeser”)' motion to suppress, filed on July 2 2020, in criminal case number SX
2019 CR 328,
which was joined by Defendant D Mahri Charles (hereinafter ‘ Charles
) in this instant matter,
criminal case number SX 2019 CR 329 On August I 1 2020 the People of the
Virgin Islands
(hereinafter “People”) filed its oppositions thereto
' There is a discrepancy between the spelling of Caeser in the information and Caeser’s filings to wit, the
information spelled it as “Caeser while Caeser’s filings spelled it as ‘ Caesar The Court will
use the spelling used
in the information Caeser since that is the initiating document and the spelling of the name
was never amended
This matter was subsequently dismissed without prejudice against Caeser
People ofthe VJ 1 Charles
SX 2019 CR 329
Memorandum Opinion and Order 2023 VI SUPER h
Page 2 of 21
BACKGROUND
fl2 On November 21, 2019, the Peopie filed a joint information against Caeser in case number
SX 2019 CR 328 and Charles in case number SX 2019 CR 329 based on the events that allegedly
took place on or about November 9 2019 as set forth in the affidavit of Police Officer Michael
Jules, Jr (hereinafter “Officer Jules ), dated November 20, 2019 2 The information charged both
Caeser and Charles with the following counts
Count One RESSELAH CHARLES and D MAHRI CHARLES did when not authorized
by law, have, possess, bear, transport, or carry either actually or constructively, open or
concealed a firearm in violation of Title 14 V I C § 2253(a) (UNAUTHORIZED
POSSESSION OF A FIREARM)
Count Two RESSELAH CHARLES and D MAHRI CHARLES when unauthorized by
law, did, possess, bear, transport, or carry either actually or constructively, open or
concealed, a firearm, under his control in a vehicle, namely a silver Acura TL, beating
license plate number CF] 632 in violation of Title 14 V I C § 2253(e)
(UNAUTHORIZED POSSESSION OF A FIREARM IN A VEHICLE)
Count Three RESSELAH CHARLES and D MAHRI CHARLES when unauthorized by
law, did, possess, bear, transport or carry, either open or concealed, on or about his person,
or under his control in a vehicle, a firearm, within one thousand feet of a school, in violation
of Title 14 V I C § 2253(1) (UNAUTHORIZED POSSESSION OF A FIREARM [N A
VEHICLE WITHIN 1000 FEET OF A PLAYGROUND)
’ A copy of Officer Jules affidavit was filed with the information In his affidavit, Officer Jules essentially stated (i)
On November 9 2019, Officer Jules and his partner were on saturated patrol walking in the vicinity of the cafeteria
of the Central High School when they came upon a parked vehicle that Charles and Caeser were sitting in with odor
of marijuana emitting from the vehicle (Jules Aff 1H] 2 3A 38 36) (ii) Charles was sitting in the driver 5 seat and
Caeser was sitting in the front passenger 3 seat (Jules Aff 111] 3B, 30) (iii) Upon walking up to the vehicle Officer
Jules observed a magazine with live ammunition on the floor near the driver 8 feet in plain view (Jules Aff ‘ 3A)
(iv) Charles exited the vehicle (Jules Aff 1] 33) (v) The defendants were placed in handcuffs and a search of the
vehicle was conducted (Jules Aff ' 3C) (vi) The following items were recovered from the search a firearm under
the driver 5 seat a half burnt marijuana cigarette from the compartment below the radio a vial containing green leafy
substances and several empty vial from a black backpack that belongs to Charles (Jules Aff 7 3C) (vii) The officers
inquired whether the defendants possessed a license to carry firearm in the U S Virgin Islands and they said no (Jules
Aff 1' 3H) (viii) The defendants were transported to the Wilbur H Francis Command Police Station (Jules Aff fl
3E) and (ix) The manjuana cigarette and the green leafy substances were field tested and both tested positive for
marijuana (Jules Aff ‘ 31)
People ofthe V I v Charles
5X 2019 CR 329
Memorandum Opinion and Order 2023 VI SUPER I [A
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Count Four RESSELAH CHARLES and D MAHRI CHARLES when not authorized by
law, did possess firearm ammunition, in violation of Title 14 V I C § 2256(a)
(POSSESSION OF AMMUNITION)
Count Five RESSELAH CHARLES and D MAHRI CHARLES when unauthorized by
law, did, possess, bear, transport, or carry, either open or concealed a firearm, loaded or
unloaded, with altered or obliterated identification marks in a public place where persons
are gathered in violation of Title 23 V I C § 481(b) (ALTERATION OF IDENTIFYING
MARKS OF A WEAPON)
Count Six RESSELAH CHARLES and D MAHRI CHARLES used or possessed with
intent to use, drug paraphernalia, for the purpose of packaging small qualities of controlled
substances namely marijuana, in violation of Title 19 V I C § 630(a) and § 593(15)(l)
(POSSESSION OF A DRUG PARAPHERNALIA)
(Information )
1] 3 On July 2, 2020, Caeser filed a motion to suppress On September 23 2020 Charles filed
a motion for joinder OfCaeser s motion to suppress The People subsequently filed their opposition
thereto
114 On March 17, 2021, this matter came before the Court for a suppression hearing The
People presented Officer Jules as a witness and the defendants did not present any witnesses At
the end of the suppression hearing, the Court granted Charles’ request to present arguments by
writing, which the People did not object
11 5 On April 12, 2021, the People filed a motion to dismiss this matter without prejudice
against Defendant Caeser, which the Court subsequently granted by an order entered on April 15,
2021 and this matter was dismissed without prejudice against Caeser
11 6 On September 17, 2021, Charles filed a post suppression hearing brief
‘1 7 As of the date of this Memorandum Opinion and Order the People has not filed a post
suppression hearing brief
People ofthe V I I Charles
SX 2019 CR 329
Memorandum Opinion and Order 2023 VI SUPER 3 SA
Page 4 of 21
DISCUSSION
I Motion for Joinder
T, 8 It appears that this motion was never granted As such, the Court will grant nunc pro tune Defendant
Charles September 23, 2020 motion for joinder
[I Motion to Amend
19 At the beginning of the suppression hearing, the People orally moved to amend the
infomation as follows (i) to include the description and/or identification of the firearm to Counts
I, II, III, IV, and V; and (ii) to include the description and or identification of the drug paraphernalia
to Count VI Neither Caeser nor Charles objected to the People orally moving to amend the
infomation Thus the Court ordered the People to proceed with its motion, and the People stated
the proposed amendment for each count 3 Thereafier, the Court granted the People 3 motion and
ordered the People to file the written amended infomation within five days from the date of the
hearing As of the date of this Memorandum Opinion and Order, the People has not filed a copy
of the amended information as ordered The Court will order the People to file the written amended
information again on an expedited basis
3 The People proposed the following amendments
Count I Add, after ‘ a firearm,” to wit, 21 Taurus model PT 145 PRO 45, semiautomatic pistol
Count II Add, after open on concealed a fireann,’ namely, Taurus model PT 145 PRO 45, semiautomatic
pistol under his control in a vehicle
Count III Name the firearm as Taurus model PT 145 PRO 45 semiautomatic pistol
Count IV Add 45 auto cartridges loaded with Hydra Shok bullets
Count V Add a Taurus model, PT 145 PRO 45 semiautomatic pistol
Count VI Name the drug paraphernalia as five small vials
(HrgTr162025171201820 251914)
People ofthe V I 1 Charles
fififiiflnfifilfizgpinion and Order 2023 VI SUPER I SA
Page 5 of 21
III Motion to Suppress
1] 10 [n his motion to suppress which was joined by Charles Caeser argued that the evidence
and statements were obtained as the result of the illegal search on November 9, 2019 and should
be suppressed (Memo ) Caeser made the following assertions in support of his argument (i) He
‘ denie[d] that anyone ever consented to the search of the car without a warrant, and that there was
no reasonable suspicion or probable cause to search and seize him under the facts of the case ”
(Id , at 3); (ii) The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable search and seizure by
government (Id , 3 5), and (iii) ‘ In this case, [Officer Jules] articulated no reason establishing the
probable cause to seize Defendant Caeser ’ and ‘ failed to articulate even a reasonable suspicion to
search the vehicle or Defendant Caeser ’ (1d , at 5 )
1] 11 In its opposition the People argued that the Court should deny the motion to suppress
(Opp 4 ) The People made the following assertions in support of its argument (i) “[A]long with
the reasonable suspicion that there may be marijuana in the vehicle and the magazine of the
vehicle being in plain view the search of the vehicle in this case was lawfixl and the evidence
found in the lawful search of the vehicle should not be suppressed ” (Id ); (ii) “The V I Supreme
Court has determined that since possession ofmarijuana is still unlawful in the Tern'tory, marijuana
is contraband and as such, is subject to seizure by law enforcement, regardless ofamount 4 (Id ),
(iii) [R]easonable suspicion the predicate for a stop and fiisk does not depend on whether the
People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant is ‘guilty instead reasonable suspicion
is a matter of constitutional and evidentiary concern turning no whether an officer reasonably
4 The People referenced People ofthe V I v 1.001)) 68 V I 683 694 (V I 2018)
People ofthe V I 1 Charles
SK 2019 CR 329
Memorandum Opinion and Order 2023 VI SUPER 1 US
Page 12 of 21
marijuana remains unlawfiJl in this Territory, officers may establish reasonable suspicion to
conduct a Terry stop if the officer relied upon his or her experience and training to detect the
presence of that contraband ’1 68 V I at 698 Based on the totality of the circumstances the Court
finds that an officer trained to identify the odor of marijuana and experienced in making drug
arrests possessed reasonable suspicion to approach and conduct an investigatory stop, or Terry
stop, afier the officer smelled marijuana As such the Court finds that the Terry stop was [awful
and pennissible under the Fourth Amendment
(Hr g Tr 10 1 3) and (ix) The two male individuals were the only individuals in the parking lot at the time they were
doing the walkthrough (Hr g Tr 10 4 5 )
'7 In Loobv, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court explained
Further, although a person in possession of an ounce or less of marijuana may now avoid criminal
penalization, the presence or absence of criminal penalization does not disturb our constitutional frisk and
seizure inquiry This is because reasonable suspicion the predicate for a valid stop and frisk does not
depend on whether the People proved beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant is guilty ; instead,
reasonable suspicion is a matter of constitutionai and evidentiary concern turning on whether an officer
reasonably concludes that evidence of contraband or of a crime may be present Gumbs 64 VI at
508 Notwithstanding enactment of Act 7700 the scent of marijuana (which remains contraband subject to
seizure in this Territory) alone may be sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion or even “probable cause
to conduct further investigation into possible criminal acts or evidence of contraband Lmted States 1 Ramos
443 F 3d 304 308 47 VI 755 (3d Cir 2006) ( It is well settled that the smell of marijuana alone if
articulable and particularized, may establish not merely reasonable suspicion but probable cause ) Untied
Staten Humphrzes 372 F 3d 653 658 (4th Cir 2004) ( [T]he odor of manjuana alone can provide probable
cause to believe that marijuana is present in a particular place ) United Staten White, 593 F 3d 1 199, 1203
(11th Cir 2010) (“[T]he smell of marijuana alone may provide a basis for reasonable suspicion ”) United
Sums t EILms 300 F 3d 638 660 (6th Cir 2002) United States 1 Kerr 876 F 2d 1440 1445 (9th Cir
1989) (noting that the presence of the odor of contraband may itself be sufficient to establish probable
cause ) (citations omitted) United States 1 Russell 670 F 2d 323 325 216 U S App D C 165 (D C Cir
1982) (stating, [p]lain view we think it safe to say, encompasses plain touch, and probably ‘plain smell
as well ) Therefore, we agree with the Superior Court that because possession of marijuana remains unlawful
in this Territory officers may establish reasonable suspicion to conduct a Tera stop if the officer relied upon
his or her experience and training to detect the presence of that contraband
Looby 68 VI at 697 98
Charles referenced a plethora of cases in his brief to support his motion but failed to address Looby which was
referenced by the People in their opposition
People ofthe V I v Charles
iiiliglilfilfilizgpinion and Order 2023 v1 SUPER 31A
Page I3 onI
b Whether the Terry Stop Transformed Into a De Facto Arrest
1] 19 While the Court finds the Terry stop was lawful, the Court must now address Charles
contention that the Terry stop transformed into a de facto arrest when he was handcuffed and was
not free to go
1] 20 “It is well established that during an investigative stop, police officers may take measures
reasonably necessary to protect themselves and maintain the status quo Consequently, [t]here is
no per se rule that pointing guns at people, or handcuffing them, constitutes an arrest ’ Blyden, 53
V I at 648 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted) In Blyden the Virgin Islands
Supreme Court found the fact that the police immediately drew their weapons, ordered Blyden to
the ground, and handcuffed him did not transform his detention into an illegal arrest if the officers
had reasonable suspicion ‘ that criminal activity [was] afoot and that the persons with whom [they
were] dealing [was] armed and presently dangerous 53 V I at 648 49 (quoting Terry, 392 U S
at 27 30 (‘ [T]here must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons
for the protection of the police officer where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an
armed and dangerous individual regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the
individual for a crime ’)
1] 21 Through the testimony of Officer Jules, the People established that Officer J ules observed
Charles, who was sitting in the driver 3 seat, moving like he was placing something underneath
his seat, that upon Officer Jules shining his flashlight on the floor area of the vehicle Officer Jules
saw in plain view a black magazine with live ammunition in it in the floor area of the driver 5 seat,
that Charles exited the vehicle of his own volition, that Officer Jules detained Charles in handcuffs,
that Officer Jules advised Charles of his rights, that Officer Jules asked Charles some questions
People offhe V I v Charles
SX 2019 CR 329
Memorandum Opinion and Order 2023 V] SUPER 2 “A
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and Charles responded, that one of the questions asked was whether Charles has a license to carry
a firearm in the U S Virgin Islands and Charles said no and that Officer Jules detained the
defendants ‘ just to be on the safe side because based on his experience, a magazine comes with
a firearm '3 Under these circumstances, the Court concludes that the officer had reasonable
grounds to believe that the defendants were likely armed and dangerous As a result, the officers’
actions in handcuffing the defendants did not transform the initial stop to an arrest requiring
probable cause See Blvden, 53 V I at 648 ( It is well established that during an investigative stop
police officers may take measures reasonably necessary to protect themselves and maintain the
status quo ’); see also People of the I I 1 Pemberton, 71 V l 251, 1] 46 (V [ Super Ct Aug 30,
20! 9) (“The use of handcuffs does not automatically transform a Terry stop into an arrest, provided
it is warranted by the circumstances especially when officer safety is at issue ’)
‘3 At the suppression hearing, Officer Jules further testified (i) When he approached the vehicle he observed Charles
who was sitting in the driver 3 seat, moving like he was placing something underneath his seat (Hr g Tr 10 6 16)
(ii) When he approached the vehicle and was by the driver 5 side fender, he turned on his flashlight to illuminate the
area (Hr g Tr l0 17 25)' (iii) He shone the flashlight as he was approaching to make sure he could see there were
other occupants in the car (Hr g Tr 22 l4 18); (iv) He illuminated the floor area of the vehicle and saw a black
magazine with live ammunition in it (Hr g Tr l I 2 6); (iv) The black magazine with the live ammunition was on
the floor area of the driver 5 seat in plain view it was not under the seat (Hr g Tr 23 I7 25 28 12 17), (v) Charles
exited the vehicle of his own volition (Hr g Tr I l [0 l 1) (vi) He asked Charles if he had or ever had a license to
possess a firearm in the Virgin Islands and Charles said no and That’s it s not mine (Hr g Tr l l [2 17); (v) He
asked Caesar if had or ever had a license to possess a firearm in the Virgin Islands and Caesar said no (Hr g Tr 12 l6
17) (vi) He advised Charles of his rights and asked Charles some questions, which Charles answered (Hr g Tr 25 3
14) (v) Both defendants were detained and placed in handcuffs (Hr g Tr 30 3 4) (vi) He advised the defendants that
he was detaining them and that they are not under arrest (Hr g Tr 40 10 19); (vii) He detained the defendants just
to be on the safe side’ because “normally with a magazine, based on [his] experience, a magazine comes with a
firearm (Hr g Tr 40 3 9 )
When the Court asked Officer Jules to clarify the order of the events, Officer Jules clarified that after he saw the
magazine with the live rounds in the vehicle he advised the defendants that he was going to detain them then he
placed them in handcuffs then he asked the defendants if they had a license to carry a firearm in the U S Virgin
Islands and they both said no He explained that he asked them in advance if they have a license to carry a firearm
because when you have a magazine, a magazine is normaily accompanied with a firearm ’ and [s]o [he] asked them
in advance if they have a license to carry a firearm (Hr g Tr 35 I8 36 15 )
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Memorandum Opinion and Order 2023 VI SUPER 33A
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c Whether the Term; Frtsk was Lawful
fi 22 A Terry fn'sk is a limited search done ‘ only for detection of a dangerous weapon in the
interest of officer security ’ and ‘ [iIt by no means authorizes a search for contraband evidentiary
material, or anything else in the absence of probable cause and reasonable grounds to arrest
People ofthe V I v Bethe] 2017 VI LEXIS 12] at *9 (Super Ct Aug 3 2017) (quoting Terry
392 U S at 26 27) “The search for weapons approved in Ten) consisted solely of a limited patting
of the outer clothing of the suspect for concealed objects which might be used as instruments of
assault [against the officer] ” Blyden, 53 V I at 650 (quoting Stbron v New York, 392 L S 40 at
65 (1968))
11 23 In this case, there was no mention of the officer patting down Charles for a protective
search Instead, Officer J ules testified that the vehicle and Charles’ backpack inside the vehicle
were searched after the defendants were detained However, the search of the vehicle and Charles
backpack inside the vehicle exceeded the scope of the search sanctioned by Terry since it went
beyond the limited patting of the outer clothing of the suspect for concealed objects which might
be used as instruments of assault [against the officer] ’ Blyden, 53 V l at 650 As such, while there
is nothing for the Court to decide as to the lawfulness of the Terry frisk since there was no pat
down of Charles the Court must determine whether the search of the vehicle and Charles’
backpack inside the vehicle was lawfiJl
d Whether the Search ofthe Vehicle and Charles ’ Backpack [nszde the
Vehicle was Lawful
1| 24 In Arizona v Cant, the United Supreme Court explained that ‘[w]here no arrest is made,
we have held that officers may search the car if they reasonably believe "the suspect is dangerous
and may gain immediate control of weapons," Mzchzgan v Long, 463 U S 1032, 1049 (1983)
People ofthe V] 1 Charles
8X 2019 CR 329
Memorandum Opinion and Order 2023 V1 SUPER ‘ I SA
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because ‘ [i]n the no arrest case, the possibility of access to weapons in the vehicle always exists,
since the driver or passenger will be allowed to return to the vehicle when the interrogation is
completed ’ 556 U S 332 352 (2009) In other words, under Long if an officer possesses a
reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed and dangerous, he may conduct a brief protective
sweep of the suspect's vehicle, but the search is “limited to those areas in which a weapon may be
placed or hidden '4 Long 463 U S at 1049 On the other hand, [i]f there is probable cause to
believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity, Umtea’ States v Ross, 456 U S 798, 820
21 (1982) authorizes a search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found
Art ona v Cant 556 U S 332 347 (2009)' see Browne v People 0fthe VI 56 VI 207 217
(V I 2012) (“Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, law enforcement may
seize and search an automobile without a warrant if probable cause exists to believe it contains
evidence of criminal activity ) “Probable cause exists when, under the totality of the
circumstances, a reasonable person could believe there is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place and ‘ [t]he test of reasonableness cannot be
fixed by per se rules, each case must be decided on its own facts Browne, 56 V I at 217 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted) In Ross, the United States Supreme Court explained
'4 The Long court explained
Our past cases indicate then that protection of police and others can Justify protective searches when police
have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger, that roadside encounters between police and suspects
are especially hazardous, and that danger may arise from the possible presence of weapons in the area
surrounding a suspect These principles compel our conclusion that the search of the passenger compartment
of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the
police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on "specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the officer in believing that the suspect is
dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons See Terry, 392 [*1050] U S at
2l [The] issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief
that his safety or that of others was in danger " Id at 27 [f a suspect is dangerous he is no less dangerous
simply because he is not arrested
463 U S at 1049 50
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Memorandum Opinion and Order 2023 VI SUPER k SA
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The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile thus is not defined by the nature of the
container in which the contraband is secreted Rather, it is defined by the object of the
search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found If
probable cause JUStifiCS the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of
every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the Obj ect of the search
456 U S at 824 25
1! 25 Through the testimony of Officer Jules the People established that the vehicle and a black
backpack in the vehicle that belongs to Charles were searched after the defendants were detained,
that the defendants did not consent to the search, that the vehicle was searched first and resulted
in a firearm recovered under the driver’s seat and a burnt cigarette recovered underneath the stereo,
that Charles backpack was searched thereafter and resulted in five small vials (four empty; one
contained green leafy substances), that the burnt cigarette turned out to be a marijuana cigarette
and the green leafy substances turned out to be marijuana, and that Charles made some statements
afier being advised of his rights '5
As noted above, Officer Jules testified that he is trained to identify the odor of marijuana,
that he personally smelled marijuana when he came up to the vehicle, and that the two male
individuals were the only individuals in the parking lot at the time Officer Jules and his partner
were doing the walkthrough Under these circumstances, Officer Jules had probable cause that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in the vehicle See Looby, 68 V I at 697
‘5 At the suppression hearing Officer Jules further testified (i) After he detained Charles and placed Charles in
handcuffs he advised Charles of his rights then he asked Charles some questions and Charles answered his questions
(Hr g Tr 25 5 l4 )- (ii) One of the questions he asked Charles was whether Charles has a license to carry a firearm in
the U 8 Virgin Islands and Charles said no (Hr g Tr 35 18 36 15) (iii) After the defendants both said they did not
have a license to carry a firearm in the U 5 Virgin Islands, the vehicle was searched (Hr g Tr l9 19 25, 30 l 1 16)
(iv) A black backpack that belongs to Charles was also searched (Hr g Tr 20 5 l3)' (v) The officers did not get
permission from the defendants to the search of the vehicle (Hr’g Tr 30 4 22), (vi) A firearm was recovered under
the driver‘s seat of the vehicle, a burnt cigarette was recovered underneath the stereo, and five small vials (four empty,
one contained green leafy substances) were recovered from the backpack (Hr g Tr 19 22 20 3) (vii) Subsequent
field test revealed that the green leafy substances were marijuana (Hr g Tr 20 14 16); (viii) The burnt cigarette turned
out to be a marijuana cigarette (Hr g Tr 20 17 21 l )
People ofthe V I v Charles
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Memorandum Opinion and Order 2023 VI SUPER IQL
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( Notwithstanding enactment of Act 7700, the scent of marijuana (which remains contraband
subject to seizure in this Territory) alone may be sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion or
even ‘ probable cause to conduct further investigation into possible criminal acts or evidence of
contraband ) Under Ross, the officers were permitted to search every part of the vehicle and its
contents that may conceal evidence of criminal activity, including Charles’ backpack in the
vehicle While conducting a legitimate search of the vehicle and Charles’ backpack, the officers
recovered the firearm from under the driver’s seat, the marijuana cigarette from underneath the
stereo, and the five small vials (four empty; one contained green leafy substances) from Charles
backpack The Court finds no need to suppress the evidence recovered
Even assuming arguendo that the scent of marij uana was insufficient to establish probable
cause in this instance the Court still finds no need to suppress the evidence recovered As noted
above, Officer Jules testified that he personally observed in plain view a black magazine with live
ammunition, that based on his experience a magazine comes with firearm, that the defendants
were not arrested but detained in handcuffs out of concerns for the officer 5 safety Under these
circumstances, the Court finds that the officers were permitted under Long to conduct a brief
protective sweep of the vehicle limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or
hidden to wit, Officer J ules had reasonable suspicion that the defendants were likely armed and
dangerous and may gain immediate control of weapons since the defendants were not arrested at
that time and thus, the possibility of access to weapons in the vehicle existed once the interrogation
was completed and the defendants were allowed to return to the vehicle As such, the search of the
vehicle under the driver 5 seat was justified since it is an area in which a weapon may be placed
or hidden Once the firearm was recovered, coupled with the fact that both defendants had already
People ofthe V I v Charles
lilénzlgl'gncdfitflogpinion and Order 2023 VI SUPER E “A
Page 19 of 21
indicated that they did not have a license to carry a firearm in the U S Virgin Islands, Officer
Jules’ reasonable suspicion ripened into probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained
evidence of criminal activity See Browne, 56 V I at 217 Because the officer’s reasonable
suspicion had ripened into probable cause at that point, Ross permitted the search of every part of
the vehicle and its contents that may conceal evidence of criminal activity, including Charles’
backpack in the vehicle While conducting a legitimate search of the vehicle and Charles’
backpack, the officers recovered the marijuana cigarette from underneath the stereo and the five
small vials (four empty; one contained green leafy substances) from Charles’ backpack In Long,
the Lnited States Supreme Court stated that ‘ [i]f, while conducting a legitimate Terry search
the officer should as here, discover contraband other than weapons, he clearly cannot be required
to ignore the contraband, and the Fourth Amendment does not require its suppression in such
circumstances Long 463 U S at 1050 see Gumbs v People ofthe V I 64 V l 491 509 (2016)
Similarly, in this instance, the Court finds no reason for the officers to ignore the contraband
discovered while conducting a legitimate search and that the Fourth Amendment does not require
the suppression ofthe mariJ uana cigarette and the five small vials (four empty; one contained green
leafy substances)
d Whether the Statements Made by Charles are Adm:ss:ble
1] 26 The Court must now address Charles’ contention that he made statements without being
given his Miranda” rights ‘ The requirement to administer warnings in advance only attaches to
” In Blyden, the Virgm Islands Supreme Court explained,
In Mzranda 1 An om: 384 U S 436 478 79 (1966) the United States Supreme Conn held that
when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in
any significant way and is subjected to questioning the privilege against self incrimination is
Jeopardized Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege and unless other hilly
effective means are adopted to notify the person of his right of silence and to assure that the exercise
People ofthe V! i Charles
SX 2019 CR 329
Memorandum Opinion and Order 2023 VI SUPER E hA
Page 20 of 21
statements which are the product of custodial interrogation Castillo, 59 V I at 265 Assuming,
without determining, that the statements Charles made in reSponse to Officer Jules questions,
while detained in handcuffs by the vehicle, stemmed from custodial interrogation, the People
established through the testimony of Officer Jules that Charles made the statements after being
advised of his rights to wit, Officer Jules advised Charles of his rights before he asked Charles
several questions to which Charles made statements in response thereto 17 There is nothing in the
record to indicate that Charles did not understand his Miranda rights ‘ [A] suspect who has
received and understood the Mzranda warnings and has not invoked his Miranda rights, waives
the right to remain silent by making an uncoerced statement to the police ’ Blya’en, 53 V I at 662
(quoting Berghuts v Thompkms 560 L S 370 389 (2010)) Accordingly the Court finds that
these statements do not need be suppressed as violative of Miranda
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby
ORDERED that Charles 3 motion for joinder is GRANTED NUNC PRO TUNC It is
fin‘ther
of the right will be scrupulously honored the following measures are required He must be warned
prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used
against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney and that if he cannot
afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires
Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation After
such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may kn0wingly
and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement But unless
and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence
obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him
53 VI at66l n 19
' See supra footnotes l3, l4
People ofthe VI 1 Charles
8X 2019 CR 329
Memorandum Opinion and Order 2023 VI SUPER I SA
Page 21 of 2]
ORDERED that, within five days from the date of entry of this Memorandum Opinion
and Order, the People shall file a first amended information consistent as granted at the
suppression hearing And it is further
ORDERED that Charles motion to suppress all the evidence and statements, as a joined
motion to Caeser’s motion, is DENIED
Mt
DONE and so ORDERED this ll; day of March 2023
ATTEST 2% fl %42P
Tamara Charles HAROLD W L WILLOCKS
Clerk of the Court Senior Sitting Judge of the Superior Court
By fig; ”3,4 ( 1&4—
ourt Clerk Supemserfl
Dated 34 /&4 £03 3