

**IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
DIVISION OF ST. THOMAS AND ST. JOHN**

PEOPLE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS,	)	CRIMINAL NO:
	)	ST-12-CR-281
Plaintiff,	)	
vs.	)	
	)	
CECIL ROUSE,	)	
	)	
Defendant.	)	

MEMORANDUM OPINION

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Cecil Rouse's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and the Secondary and Alternative Request for a New Trial.¹ For the reasons set forth herein, the motion will be denied.

I. Background

Cecil Rouse and Vida Rouse were married for more than thirty years, when divorce proceedings were scheduled for May 10, 2012. That morning Cecil Rouse shot Vida Rouse in her stomach, and then aimed the gun at their daughter's (Shenovia) head, but the gun did not fire. Vida Rouse fled the residence and was soon treated at the Schneider Regional Medical Center.

On June 6, 2012, the People of the Virgin Islands (the "People") charged Cecil Rouse in connection with the shooting.² On February 4, 2013, Rouse filed a notice of an intent to assert an insanity defense pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal

¹ Motion filed July 26, 2016. The People filed an opposition on October 7, 2016.

² The June 6, 2012 Information charged Cecil Rouse with (1) Attempted First Degree Murder (2) Unauthorized Use of a Firearm (3) Third Degree Assault—Domestic Violence (4) Unauthorized Use of a Firearm During the Commission of a Third Degree Assault (5) Third Degree Assault—Domestic Violence, and (6) Unauthorized Use of a Firearm During the Commission of a Third Degree Assault.

Procedure 12.2, which stated Dr. Leighmin Lu M.D. would testify that Rouse suffered from a “mental defect” at the time of the shooting, and “lacked the ability to distinguish between right and wrong.”

Trial commenced on November 3, 2015 before the Honorable Judge Adam G. Christian.³ The People’s case-in-chief included eye-witness testimony from Vida Rouse and their daughter, Shenovia, regarding the morning of the shooting. Also, during the People’s case-in-chief, they inquired of Rouse’s prior mental health and his mental state at the time of the shooting, for example:

The People: During your 33 years of marriage to the defendant, did you have ever (sic) know him to have mental health issues?

Vida Rouse: No

The People: Do you know if he ever received treatment for mental health issues while you were married?

Vida Rouse: No

Trial Transcript Vol. I, 51:6-13. Also, the Virgin Island Police Department Officer (“VIPD Officer”) who responded to the crime scene testified on cross examination:

Defense: And he was talking to you in partial and in full sentences sometimes, right?

VIPD Officer: That is correct.

Defense: And he was obviously agitated, isn’t that right?

VIPD Officer: At the time he was calm. He was clear. He was fluid...

³ Judge Christian left the bench before this post-trial motion was filed, and the matter was later reassigned to this judicial officer.

Trial Transcript Vol. II, 154:2-9. Following the close of the People's case-in-chief, Rouse moved for a judgment of acquittal. Rouse claimed that because he filed a notice of intent to plead insanity before the trial begun, the People had a duty to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt during its case-in-chief. The Court took the matter under advisement.

The Defense proceeded with its case by presenting a number of character witnesses, who testified to knowing the defendant intimately for years. Notably, on cross-examination at least two of those witnesses stated they had never known Cecil Rouse to have mental health issues.⁴ The Defense then introduced Dr. Lu, who testified Rouse was temporarily insane during the shooting, as follows:

Defense: Doctor, do you have an opinion based upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty as to whether the shooting was a consequence of this mental illness?

Dr. Lu: The shooting appears to be consequence of his frustration, anger, and his pent up feeling, and he slipped into that kind of dissociative state of mind and as a result of that he decided to kill himself and kill her to avoid from the divorce proceedings. So, legally in my opinion that fit into temporary insanity. Medically, *we only call it dissociative reaction.*

Trial Transcript Vol. III, 54:25, 55:1-12 (emphasis added). Following the testimony of Dr. Lu, the Defense rested and renewed its motion for judgment of acquittal, which the Court again took under advisement. The People, on rebuttal, attempted to discredit Dr. Lu's findings with their own expert witness. The People's

⁴ See Trial Transcript II, 203:6-19 (witness stating he knew Cecil Rouse for over 20 years, but answered "no" in response to ever knowing of Cecil Rouse to have mental health problems.); Trial Transcript II, 210:1-16 (witness stating he knew Cecil Rouse for over 30 years, but answered "no" in response to ever knowing of Cecil Rouse having mental health problems.)

expert, Dr. Laurie McPearce, a board certified psychiatrist, testified that dissociative reaction “isn’t a valid psychiatric or mental illness diagnosis that’s recognized in any of the current versions of the DSM 4, which is the diagnostical and statistical manual for diagnosing mental disorders.” Trial Transcript Vol. III, 104:20-24.⁵

The trial concluded on November 6, 2015, and the jury found Rouse guilty on all charges.⁶ Rouse now requests a judgment of acquittal, or in the alternative, a new trial based on two assertions. First, Rouse argues he is entitled to a judgment of acquittal because the People had to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt in its case-in-chief, rather than on rebuttal. Second, Rouse argues he is entitled to a new trial because the People committed prosecutorial misconduct in several instances.

II. Discussion

A. ROUSE’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL.

Rouse argues that he is entitled to a judgment of acquittal because the People did not prove sanity during their case in chief, but instead waited until rebuttal to put on such evidence.

In reviewing a post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal, a trial court must review the record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on the available evidence. The trial court is required to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury's verdict.

⁵ Dr. McPearce never interviewed or examined Rouse and did not offer any opinion as to his mental health on the day of the shooting.

⁶ The Third Amended Information, filed October 1, 2015, charged Cecil Rouse with (1) Attempted First Degree Murder (2) Assault in the First Degree (3) Unauthorized Use of a Firearm During the Commission of Attempted Commission of a Crime or Crimes of Violence (4) Third degree Assault—Domestic Violence (5) Third degree Assault—Domestic Violence (6) Possession of a Firearm without a License.

People of the Virgin Islands v. Faulkner, 57 V.I. 327, 333 (V.I. 2012) (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Under Virgin Islands law, “[a]ll persons are capable of committing crimes and offenses except ... persons who are mentally ill,” 14 V.I.C. 14. Therefore, “once some *evidence* of insanity is introduced, the prosecution has the burden of proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.” *Nibbs v. People of the Virgin Islands*, 52 V.I. 276, 284 (V.I. 2009) (emphasis added).⁷

Rouse argues that, “once the Government is on notice of an insanity defense the Government must present evidence of sanity in its case-in-chief or suffer acquittal by reason of insanity.” Def.’s Mot. for Jud. of Acquittal or New Trial 5. Stated differently, Rouse appears to assert that the notice of intent to plead insanity—which he filed before the trial commenced—is also evidence of insanity for purposes of the trial. This assertion is plainly and demonstrably false.

The objective of filing a notice of insanity pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 12.2, “is to give the government time to prepare to meet the issue, which will usually require reliance upon expert testimony.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 12.2 Advisory Committee’s Notes. Furthermore, a defendant may be prevented from asserting an insanity defense if he did not give proper notice to the government. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 12.2(a). However, at the time of trial, the Defendant still has to actually introduce evidence of his insanity

⁷ For the purposes of this Opinion, insanity and mental illness are interchangeable. See e.g. *Nibbs* at 284 (““if there is some evidence that defendant’s act was a consequence of mental illness, the government has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense was not the consequence of a mental illness.”)

defense. *See Nibbs*, at 284 (“Although a defendant is ordinarily presumed sane, *once some evidence of insanity is introduced*, the prosecution has the burden of proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.”) (emphasis added); *See also Petric v. People of the Virgin Islands*, 61 V.I. 401, 410 (“To satisfy the ‘some evidence’ test, the defense need only introduce a slight quantum of evidence.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, “[o]nce the defendant introduces ‘some evidence’ of mental illness, the defendant’s sanity at the time of the offense becomes an element of the crime, which, like all other elements of the crime, must be proven by the People beyond a reasonable doubt.” *Petric v. People of the Virgin Islands*, 61 V.I. 401, 410 (V.I. 2014).

Petric demonstrates that a notice of intent to assert an insanity defense is not also evidence of such insanity. Petric filed a notice of intent to assert an insanity defense three months before his trial commenced. *Id.* at 405. Then at trial, Petric called psychiatrist Dr. Derek Spencer to testify during his case in chief. Dr. Spencer testified that Petric had been suffering from an untreated psychiatric disorder and his actions the day of the crime were driven by delusional beliefs. *Id.* at 405. Petric also called his mother as a witness, and she testified the family had a history of mental health disorders, including paranoid schizophrenia. *Id.* at 406. When determining if Petric had provided a sufficient amount of evidence to properly raise an insanity defense, the Supreme Court did not analyze Petric’s notice of intent to assert an insanity defense, which was filed three months before his trial began; but instead found “the testimony of Dr. Spencer and Petric’s mother clearly amounted to ‘some evidence’ sufficient to raise the insanity defense. *Id.* at 410.

It is undisputed that the People have the “*ultimate burden* of proving the defendant's sanity,” *Nibbs*, at 285, which does not exist only during their case in chief, but may also be accomplished during rebuttal. *See Nibbs*, at 293 (“[the defendant] presented evidence establishing that he committed the charged criminal acts in consequence of his mental illness, and the People *failed to meet their burden of rebutting* that evidence.”)⁸

Undoubtedly, the Defense did not introduce evidence of insanity until the testimony of Dr. Lu. Thus, the People’s burden to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt began after the testimony of Dr. Lu. During rebuttal, the People called its own psychiatrist, Dr. McPearce, who testified that disassociate reaction is not a recognized disorder.

For all these reasons, Rouse’s argument that he is entitled to a judgment of acquittal, based upon the People’s failure to prove sanity during their case-in-chief, is rejected.⁹

⁸ Although the defendant in *Nibbs* did not file a notice of insanity, the court still found the People had proper notice as *Nibbs* had filed a copy of his psychiatrist’s report with the court and the parties stipulated to the admission of the psychiatrist’s report even though he did not testify. Regardless, the People’s notice of the defendant’s intent to assert a defense of insanity was ultimately inconsequential to the People rebutting the evidence of insanity introduced during the trial. The Supreme Court held that the evidence presented at trial demanded a finding that *Nibbs* was not guilty by reason of insanity as the People’s attorney, defense counsel, the trial court judge, the psychiatrist and the sole witness at trial all recognized that *Nibbs* had a continuing history of a mental disorder.

⁹ Even if the People had failed to prove that Rouse was sane at the time of the offenses, Defendant would not be entitled to a judgment of acquittal. Instead, Rouse would be found not guilty by reason of insanity. *Petric*, at 413-14.

B. ROUSE IS NOT ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL BASED ON THE REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF THE PEOPLE'S EXPERT WITNESS.

Rouse asserts the People did not meet their burden of proving Rouse was sane beyond a reasonable doubt because the People's expert witness, Dr. McPearce, only attacked Dr. Lu's diagnosis, but did not examine Rouse or render an opinion regarding the sanity of Rouse,

In *Petric*, the Supreme Court noted that the "most obvious way the People can satisfy its burden of proving the defendant's sanity at the time of the offense is by introducing its own expert medical testimony to challenge the defense expert's medical conclusions." *Petric*, at 410. However, the People are "not required" to do so. *Id.* "No case... holds, as a matter of law, that the Government must meet defendant's psychiatric testimony with psychiatric testimony of its own." *Petric*, at 411. (citing *United States v. Shackelford*, 494 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1974)). Therefore, "the fact that the government failed to produce expert testimony to substantiate its position of sanity does not mean that it has failed to meet its burden." *Id.*

Here, the victim, Vida Rouse, and a VIPD Officer were among the witnesses who testified for the People regarding Cecil Rouse's sanity; Vida Rouse testifying that he had no history of mental illness, and the police officer testifying Rouse was clear and calm and fluid when police arrived at the scene. Rouse does not dispute that he shot his wife, and then pointed the gun at his daughter. Therefore, the only issue at trial was whether he and whether the People proved that element beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury received conflicting testimony surrounding Rouse's

mental health the morning of the incident. The defense expert, Dr. Lu, testified that on the day in question, Rouse suffered temporary insanity in the form of *dissociative reaction*. However, the People's expert, Dr. McPearce, rejected that diagnosis, testifying that dissociative reaction is not a psychiatric or mental illness diagnosis recognized in any of the current versions of the diagnostic and statistical manual for diagnosing mental disorders. Therefore, the jury had two expert opinions, and had the option to accept either one.

Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury's verdict, the Court finds the People met their ultimate burden to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, which was rational based on the available evidence. The Court notes that Dr. McPearce testified that Dr. Lu's diagnosis of acute hysterical and dissociative reaction is not a valid psychiatric or mental illness diagnosis that is recognized in any of the current versions of the DSM 4 which is the diagnostic and statistical manual for diagnosing mental disorder.¹⁰ Dr. McPearce further opined that acute hysterical and dissociative reaction describes someone's personality basis, but it is not a personality disorder,¹¹ and there wasn't anything in the report of any kind of dissociative experiences either before, during or after the event.¹² Therefore, the jury was presented with sufficient expert testimony that it could have decided to rationally accept Dr. McPearce's

¹⁰ Trial Transcript III, 104:17-24.

¹¹ Trial Transcript III, 104:25 to 105:4, 105:4 – 10, and 110:17 – 24.

¹² Trial Transcript III, 105:4-7.

testimony and reject Dr. Lu's. In addition, at least one police officer responding to the scene said that Rouse was clear and calm. In finding Rouse guilty of all counts,¹³ the Court concludes that the jury rationally rejected Dr. Lu's diagnosis and testimony after accepting Dr. McPearce's testimony.¹⁴

Therefore, the Court finds that Rouse is not entitled to a judgment of acquittal or a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity. Therefore Rouse's request for a judgment of acquittal, based on the testimony of the People's expert, will be denied.

C. ROUSE IS NOT ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BASED UPON PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT.

"Rouse complains of multiple instances of prosecutorial misconduct that individually and in combination resulted in an unfair trial." Def.'s Mot. for Jud. of Acquittal or New Trial 10.

"A claim of prosecutorial misconduct during trial requires a court to resolve two questions: whether the prosecutor's comments were in fact improper and, if so, whether the remarks prejudiced the defendant's right to a fair trial." *Monelle v. People of the Virgin Islands*, 63 V.I. 757, 770 (V.I. 2015). The prejudice of improper statements may be mitigated if a general or specific curative instruction is given by the court. *Id.* at 771. ("the evidence was sufficient to establish that the prosecutor's

¹³ The jury was properly instructed on their options: finding Rouse guilty, not guilty, or not guilty by reason of insanity.

¹⁴ The court notes that *Nibbs* and *Petric* presented very different defendants than Rouse. Both *Nibbs* and *Petric* had long term continuing mental health illnesses. In this case, no witness offered any testimony that Rouse had suffered any mental illness before the day in question. Rouse's alleged mental illness on the other hand only occurred on the day of the shooting and was alleged to be a temporary condition.

statements did not influence the jury's verdict, *especially considering the specific and general curative instructions provided by the trial court.*") (emphasis added) *See e.g. Castor v. People of the Virgin Islands*, 57 V.I. 482, 496 (V.I. 2012)") ("Although this kind of general instruction is not as effective as an immediate curative instruction would have been, we have previously held that this kind of instruction is properly considered as mitigating any prejudice to a defendant when dealing with prosecutorial misconduct claims.").

In addition, if a prosecutor's improper statement is "brief" and "isolated", it weighs against prejudice. *See DeSilvia v. People of the Virgin Islands*, 55 V.I. 859, 873 (V.I. 2011) ("the statement was brief and isolated, encompassing only two sentences of the prosecution's entire closing argument") (Citing *United States v. Weatherly*, 525 F.3d 265, 273 (3d Cir. 2008) (relying on fact that improper statements were brief and isolated in finding they were not prejudicial)).

Rouse specifically cites the People's opening statement and closing argument rebuttal as instances of prosecutorial misconduct. The Defense objected three times during the People's opening statements, and also during the People's rebuttal closing argument.

The Defendant's objections during the People's opening statements were based on asserting facts that were not in evidence,¹⁵ commenting that the defendant did not

¹⁵ Trial Transcript I, 35:23-24

testify,¹⁶ and improperly speaking about the burden of proof.¹⁷ The trial court sustained the first objection, and after the second objection reminded the jury “at all times the People have the burden of proving the Defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Defendant has no burden of proof, and the Defendant need not testify and you cannot hold that against the defendant.” Trial Transcript I, 38:9-24. The Court simultaneously denied Rouse’s oral motion for a mistrial.

In regards to the final objection during the opening statement, the Court stated during sidebar “I believe the instructions I gave earlier and the instruction I will give at the end will make it very clear that the defendant has no burden of proof.” Trial Transcript I, 40:22-25. True to its word, the Court reiterated the proper burden of proof during the final jury instruction including:

“I just want to clarify something that may have caused some confusion. I indicated that the Government has the burden of demonstrating that the defendant was not under the influence of any mental illness at the time of the crimes charged...[if Rouse] committed any of the crimes as a result of that illness...you must find him not guilty by reason of insanity.”

Trial Transcript Vol. IV, 54:10-19. The Defendant also believes the People made statements during their closing argument rebuttal that “invoked matters that were not part of the record, and sought to appeal to the jury’s emotions and prejudices.” Def. mot to dismiss 11. For example, the People suggested Cecil Rouse was referred to Dr. Lu for strategic purposes; Defendant objected, and the Court responded, “It’s

¹⁶ Trial Transcript I, 36:12-13

¹⁷ Trial Transcript I, 39:12-16, 40:12-18

argument. It's argument. He can go on. It's argument."¹⁸ The Court now notes that Dr. Lu testified that Mr. Rouse was referred to him by Attorney King, his counsel.¹⁹ Therefore, the Court finds that evidence of the referral was on the record and the People had the right to make that argument during closing; doing so was not improper.

Defendant also claims the People's argument that Cecil Rouse had ruined the life of both Vida Rouse and the daughter²⁰ was improper. The Defendant objected, and the Court advised the People to "stick to what's in the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom."²¹ The Court finds the Court addressed the Defense's objections sufficiently during the trial. Furthermore, any potential prejudice associated with these statements was not only mitigated by the final jury instruction, but the statements at issue were also "brief" and "isolated," making up only a small portion of the closing argument.

Finally, Rouse suggests that the People committed prosecutorial misconduct through "vouching," for Vida Rouse (discussed below), which in conjunction with the other prosecutorial statements warrants a mistrial. Def.'s Mot. for Jud. of Acquittal or New Trial 13. "Improper 'vouching' occurs where a prosecutor suggests that she has reasons to believe a witness that were not presented to the jury." *Francis v.*

¹⁸ Trial Transcript III, 171:22-23.

¹⁹ Trial Transcript III, 56:2-3.

²⁰ See Trial Transcript III, 173:18-23.

²¹ See Trial Transcript III, 174: 2-4.

People of the Virgin Islands, 56 V.I. 370, 386-387 (VI. 2012). The prejudice resulting from vouching may also be mitigated by a curative instruction or strong independent evidence of guilt. *See Mulley v. People of the Virgin Islands*, 51 V.I. 404, 416 (V.I. 2009) (“Because of this strong independent evidence of Mulley's guilt, the prosecutor's remarks, even if improper, cannot constitute plain error.”) (citing *See United States v. Lew*, 875 F.2d 219, 223-24 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that vouching does not rise to level of plain error when strong additional evidence of defendant's guilt is presented, even when defense has challenged the credibility of government's witnesses.))

Rouse argues that the People committed vouching during their closing arguments by speaking about a private conversation with Vida Rouse, which occurred months before the trial. Specifically, the People stated “I also want to address the point about this allegation that [Vida Rouse] had told [Cecil Rouse] the morning that he shot her that [on of the daughters] was not his daughter. First of all, [Vida Rouse], when she testified in this courtroom denied it. *And I brought that up with her months ago, I asked her...*”²² Defendant objected, and the Court stated, “Attorney Connor, you can't go there. Only stick to what's in evidence, please.”²³ Defendant also immediately moved for a mistrial. The Court found the People's vouching was way out of bounds and constituted misconduct. However, the Court found that the vouching did not “raise[] to the level that it so poisoned the jury panel and warrants

²² Trial Transcript Vol. III, 172:3-9.

²³ Trial Transcript Vol. III, 172:11-13.

the ultimate sanction of a mistrial.”²⁴ The Court is still of the same opinion, especially considering the Court gave a final curative instruction to repeatedly tell the jurors “what is evidence and what is not evidence.” *Id.* at ¶ 11.²⁵ *Francis v. People* at 287. Finally, strong independent evidence of guilt was introduced through other witnesses, which also mitigates the prejudice from the People’s statement. For example Shenovia’s eye-witness testimony regarding the shooting, and the witnesses who testified they knew Cecil Rouse for more than twenty years, but had never known him to have mental health problems.²⁶ In addition, the People were attempting to vouch for Vida Rouse on a topic she had already given testimony on.

In sum, while some of the People’s statements may have been improper, the Court finds that the misconduct does not rise to the level that it so poisoned the jury panel, nor did it render the trial unfair or affect Rouse’s substantial rights. *Francis v. People* at 387. Because the evidence is strong, and the curative instructions adequate, the prosecutor’s conduct did not deprive Cecil Rouse of a fair trial. A rational trier of fact could have found Cecil Rouse guilty of all the charged crimes based on the available evidence. Therefore, Cecil Rouse’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and the Secondary and Alternative for a New Trial will be denied.

²⁴ Trial Transcript Vol. III, 178:20-21 and 179:8-10.

²⁵ Judge Christian stated “In addition the...jurors will be instructed tomorrow morning with my final instructions that will repeatedly tell them what is evidence and what is not evidence.” See Trial Transcript Vol. IV, 8 ¶ 4-6, 8-9 (“The following items are not evidence and may not be considered in your deliberation...The statements and arguments of the lawyers for the parties in this case.”)

²⁶ See footnote 4.

III. Conclusion

The People did not have the burden of introducing evidence of the Defendant's sanity during its case in chief. Through the testimony of Dr. Leighman Lu, the Defendant introduced evidence that he suffered a mental illness, in the form of disassociate reaction, at the time of the incident. Thereafter, the People had the burden to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. The People called a psychiatrist, Dr. Laurie McPearce, who testified that disassociate reaction is not a recognized disorder in any of the current versions of the diagnostic and statistical manual for diagnosing mental disorders. Therefore, the jury had two expert opinions, and had the option to accept either one. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury's verdict, the People met their ultimate burden to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury rationally accepted Dr. McPearce's testimony and rejected Dr. Lu's diagnosis. Therefore, Rouse is not entitled to a judgment of acquittal.

Defendant's request for a new trial based upon the prosecution's misconduct will also be denied as the prosecutor's statements were brief and isolated and the Court gave sufficient curative instructions to the jury. While some of the People's statements may have been improper, the misconduct does not rise to the level that it so poisoned the jury panel, nor did it render the trial unfair or affect Rouse's substantial rights as the evidence against him was strong and the curative instructions were adequate. Therefore, Rouse is not entitled to a new trial.

An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be entered.

DATED: May 16, 2017



Kathleen Mackay
Judge of the Superior Court
of the Virgin Islands

ATTEST:

ESTRELLA H. GEORGE
Clerk of the Court

BY: 

LORI BOYNES TYSON
Chief Deputy Clerk 5/16/17