IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE VIRGIN ESLANDS

TAMARA CHARLES IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
ue cocen DIVISION OF ST. CROIX

IN RE: Refinery Workers Toxic Tort | Master Case No. SX-2015-CV-198
Litigation. (Complex Litigation Division)

Re: SX-2006-CV-231,-221

Cite as: 

Appearances:
Thomas Alkon, Esq.
Law Offices of Thomas Aikon
PO Box 223032
Christiansted, V.1. 00822
For Plaintiffs

Korey A. Nelson, Esq., Charles Jacob Gower, Esq. and
Harry Rick Yelton, Esq.

Burns Charest LLP

365 Canal Street, Suite 1170

New Orleans, LA 70130

For Plaintiffs

J. Russell Pate, Esq.
The Pate Law Firm
PO Box 890

St. Thomas, V! 00804
For Plaintiffs

Warren T. Burns, Esq and Daniel T. Charest, Esq
Burns Charest, LLP

900 Jackson Street, Ste. 500

Dallas, TX 75202

For Plaintiffs

Jerry Hudson Evans, Esq.

Richard, Patrick, Westbook, & Brickman LLC
PO Box 1007

Mt. Pleasant, SC 29465

For Plaintiffs
In Re: Hurricane Workers Toxic Tort Litigation, SX-15-CV-198

Memorandum Opinion

Page 2

Carl A. Beckstedt Ill, Esq.

Beckstedt & Kuczynski LLP

2162 Church Street

Christiansted, V.1. 00820

For Defendants Hess Corporation and Hess Oi! New York Corporation
(formerly Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corporation)

Carolyn F. O’Connor, Esq. and Joseph T. Hanlon, Esq.

Wilson Elser Moskowitz Eldelman & Dicker LLP

200 Campus Drive

Florham Park, NJ 07932-0668

For Defendants Hess Corporation and Hess Oil New York Corporation (formerly
Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corporation)

W. Mark Wilczynski, Esq.,

Law Offices of W. Mark Wilxynski
P.O. Box 1150

St. Thomas, V.1. 00804-1150

For Litwin Corporation

James L. Hymes, Esq
Hymes and Zebedee

No. 10 Norre Gade

St. Thomas, V.1. 00804-150
For Litwin Corporation

MEMORANDUM OPINION
(Filed January 14, 2022)

Andrews, Jr., Judge
INTRODUCTION
1 Plaintiffs, each over 70 years of age, bring this action for damages
against defendant oil refinery companies. They allege, during their employment,

Defendants negligently exposed them to toxic substances which caused them to
In Re: Hurricane Workers Toxic Tort Litigation, SX-15-CV-198

Memorandum Opinion

Page 3

suffer disease and illnesses. Based upon their senior status, Plaintiffs moved to
expedite their trial date by invoking provisions of a newly enacted Virgin Islands
law, that is, Act No. 8468 (the Act). Defendants respond the new law violates the
separation of powers doctrine and should not be applied to complex cases. For
the reasons mentioned below, this Court concludes the trial preference provision
of the Act is mandatory and does not violate the separation of powers doctrine.
The Court will thus grant Plaintiffs’ request for a preferential trial setting.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND

(2 ~=‘Pilaintiffs, Kadar Mohansingh and James Hughes commenced the above-
referenced civil actions on March 14, 2006 against Hess Corporation (Hess), Hess
Oil Virgin Islands Corporation (HOVIC), Litwin Corporation, and Universal Oil
Products.' They seek damages for injuries allegedly suffered as a result of their

exposure to asbestos, silica, and catalyst dust while employed at Hess Oil Virgin

1 Plaintiffs’ cases are grouped under the instant master case (SX-2015-MC-00198). A
total of 10 active similar cases, including the instant plaintiffs, remain currently grouped
thereunder. Pursuant to the parties stipulation, this Court dismissed plaintiffs’ cases
against defendant Universal Oil Products on December 4" and 8", 2009. On April
26, 2020, this Court further dismissed plaintiff Hughes’ case (2006-221) against Hess
Corporation (Héss) and Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corporation (HOVIC). Consequently
the instant motion for preferential! trial setting by Mohansingh (2006-231) pertains only
to defendants Hess, HOVIC and Litwin; and the motion by Hughes pertains only to
defendant Litwin. The April 26, 2020 order also permitted Lynette Hughes to
substitute as plaintiff for her deceased husband, James Hughes.
In Re: Hurricane Workers Toxic Tort Litigation, SX-15-C\V-198

Memorandum Opinion

Page 4

Islands Refinery. See Complaints (SX-2006-CV-231, Mar. 14, 2006 and SX-2006-
CV-221, Mar. 14, 2006). On August 16, 2021, the Governor of the Virgin Islands
signed Bill No. 34-0076 into law. It subsequently became Act No. 8468 (the Act)
now codified at 5 V.I. § 31(b). On September 20 - 21, 2021, Plaintiffs Mohansingh
and Lynette Hughes (personal representative of James Hughes) filed motions for
preferential trial settings pursuant to the Act alleging they are over 70 years of age.
Both submitted proof of their age in the form of Virgin Islands drivers’ licenses.
Defendants Hess and HOVIC filed an opposition to Mohansingh’s motion on
October 18, 2021, and Mchansingh replied on November 18, 2021. Litwin filed
no response to the motion. On December 20, 2021, this Court held a hearing on
both motions and took the matter under advisement.

APPLICABLE LAW
13 The doctrine of separation of powers is implicitly incorporated into the law of
the Virgin Islands Territory by virtue of the division of power amongst the
legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government as provided in the

Revised Organic Act of 1954. Gerace v. Bentley, 

 (V.I. 2016);

Balboni v. Ranger Am. of the V.I., Inc.. 

, 1084 (V.1. 2019) (stating

Congress delegated certain powers to the Virgin islands Government and

“established a system of separation of powers within its branches.”); Todmann v.
In Re: Hurricane Workers Toxic Tort Litigation, SX-15-CV-198
2021 Vi Super 4P

Memorandum Opinion

Page 5

People of the V.I., 57 V.1. 540, 543 (V.I. 2012) ("The doctrine of separation of

powers applies with respect to the coordinate branches of government in the Virgin

Islands.” citing Smith v. Magras, 

 (3d Cir. 1997)). The doctrine

prohibits one branch of government from exercising powers of the other two. Bryan
v. Fawkes, 

 (V.I. 2014). The Organic Act functions as a de facto
constitution for the territory. Regarding the promulgation of procedural rules, it
provides:
The rules governing the practice and procedure of the courts
established by local law and those prescribing the qualifications and
duties of the judges and officers thereof, oaths and bonds, and the
times and places of holding court shall be governed by local law or
the rules promulgated by those courts.

(c). This provision vests the Virgin Islands Legislature and the

Virgin Islands Judiciary with concurrent authority to promulgate rules of procedure.

Gerace, 

; In Re Richards, 

 (3d Cir. 2000); Govt.

of the V.l_ v. Durant, 

 (V.I. 2008). However, it only permits the

Legislature to establish substantive law. Bentley, 65 V.!. at 302: Durant, 49 VJ. at
373 (stating “The ROA authorizes the local courts to create only procedural rules,
not substantive ones.”). As such, any substantive law created by the Virgin
Islands Supreme Court “must ultimately yield to the substantive statutes adopted

by the Legislature.” World Fresh Markets, LLC v. Palermo, 74 V.1. 455, 461 (V.I.

In Re: Hurricane Workers Toxic Tort Litigation, SX-15-CV-198

Memorandum Opinion

Page 6

2021). Conversely, any inconsistent or conflicting procedural rule adopted by the
Supreme Court “will always prevail over any procedural statute enacted by the
Legislature.” Id; see also Bentley, 

 (“conflicts between rules
promulgated by the judiciary and rules promulgated by the Legislature are resolved
in favor of the judiciary.”). Nevertheless, such legislatively promulgated rules are
given deference to the extent they are compatible with court rules. 

 (citing

Hickson v. State, 

 (1994)).

14 The distinction between a procedural and a substantive law is not always
easily discernible. Substantive laws create and define rights, duties, and

obligations. Durant, 49 V.!. at 373. Procedural rules regulate the judicial process

for enforcing such substantive rights, duties, and obligations and the process for
justly administering remedies and redresses for disregard or infraction of such
rights, duties, and obligations. Id.; see Todman, 57 V.I. at 544. For example, laws,
such as 5 V.I.C. § 1451(d), which provide for the apportionment of fault are
substantive since they define the rights, duties, and obligations between those to

whom they apply. World Fresh Markets, 74 V.I. at 462. On the other hand, a rule,

such as 5 V.I.C. § 547, which permits a defendant to require a non-resident plaintiff
to post a bond in order to maintain a lawsuit and to secure a stay of action pending

posting of the security, is procedural. Bentley, 

. Similarly, evidentiary
In Re: Hurricane Workers Toxic Tort Litigation, SX-15-CV-198

Memorandum Opinion

Page 7

rules are generally procedural in nature. Ventura v. People of the V.I., 64 V.|. 589,

613 (V.I. 2016). With these principles in mind the Court analyzes the Virgin
Islands preference statute.
LEGAL ANALYSIS

{5 Plaintiffs seek a preferential trial setting pursuant to the senior status
provision of the Act. They assert the Act mandates this Court to grant their
motions and set preferential trial dates no later than 180 days from the filing of their
motions, that is, by March 21, 2022. Mot. for Preferential Trial Setting, pp 2-3.
Defendants respond the statute is a procedural rule that conflicts with Virgin
Islands Rules of Civil Procedure 16 and 92 through 96 and thus violates the
separation of powers doctrine. Opp. p 3 - 6. p 2.¢

16 The critical issue raised by the parties’ contentions is whether the Act
constitutes procedural vs substantive law. If the Act constitutes substantive law,
it will prevail over any potentially conflicting court created procedural rule.
Conversely, if it is procedural in nature, this Court must then determine whether

the Act conflicts with any court created procedural rule. The issue regarding the

2 Defendants also respond that further proceedings in the Mohansingh case should be stayed
since that matter is subject to a valid arbitration agreement. Opp. at 1-2. This Court, however,
has determined that there is no valid arbitration agreement that governs the proceedings in the
Mohansingh case. As such, this issue is moot. See Order Denying Motion to Compel,

In re: Refinery Workers Toxic Tort Litig., 

, January 13, 2022.

In Re: Hurricane Workers Toxic Tort Litigation, SX-15-CV-198

Memorandum Opinion

Page 8

validity of the Act under the separation of powers doctrine is one of first impression.
This Court concludes that Act 8468 is a valid exercise of legislative power to enact
substantive law and does not contravene the separation of powers doctrine.

1) Act 8468 Constitutes Substantive Law.

{’ Act 8468 provides in pertinent part:

(1) A party to a civil action who is over 70 years of age or older may
petition the court for a preference, which the court shall grant if it finds
that the party has a substantial interest in the action as a whole.

(2) A party to a civil action who is over 65 years of age or older may
petition the court for a preference, which the court shall grant if the
court makes both of the following findings:

(A) The party has a substantial interest in the action as a
whole; and

(B) The heaith of the party is such that a preference is
necessary to prevent prejudicing the party’s interest in the
litigation.

(3) In its discretion, the court may also grant a motion for preference
that is accompanied by clear and convincing medical documentation
that concludes that the movant, who is a party, suffers from an illness
or condition raising substantial medical doubt of survival of that party
beyond six months, and that satisfies the court that the interests of
justice will be served by granting the preference.

(4) Upon the granting of such a motion for preference for an elderly
party, the court shall set the matter for trial not more than 180 days
from that date that the elderly party moves for preference. There shall
be no continuance beyond 180 days from the granting of the motion
for preference except for physical disability of a party or a party’s
attorney, or upon a showing of good cause stated in the record. Any
In Re: Hurricane Workers Toxic Tort Litigation, SX-15-CV-198

Memorandum Opinion

Page 9

continuance shall be for no more than 30 days and no more than one
continuance for physical disability may be granted to any party.

(5) Upon the granting of such a motion for preference for a terminally
ill party, the court shall set the matter for trial not more than 90 days
from that date that the terminally ill party moves for preference and
there shall be no continuance beyond 90 days from the granting of the
motion for preference except for a physical disability of a party or a
party's attorney, or upon a showing of good cause stated in the record.
Any continuance shall be for no more than 30 days and no more than
one continuance for physical disability may be granted to any party.

5 V.1.C. § 31(b)(1-5). In determining the classification of Act 8468 this Court
considers the purpose and effect of the Act. The Bill Summary states that its
purpose is:
to grant elderly persons and the terminally ill preference in court
proceedings with the goal of concluding the court proceedings
before the person passes away.
34" Legislature, Bill No. 34-0076, Bill Summary, June 21, 2021. During the
August 3, 2021 full body hearing on the bill, senators expressed concern that it

takes many years to process civil cases through the court system, and that seniors

and the terminally ill often die before seeing their day in court.? This Court likewise

3 Senator Franklyn Johnson stated, “I definitely support this measure here to make sure that
seniors who are ailing get their day in court before they pass on.” Livestream.com/legittv/34",
4:19:27 to 4:19:40, August 3, 2021. Similarly, Senator Steven Payne stated, “and as it relates
to our seniors, we all know that civil matters can be, your honor, in court proceedings for 20, 30
and or even 40 years. This speaks volumes to the forward thinking of the bill sponsor.”
Livestream.com/legittv/34", 4:32:48 to 4:33:22, August 3, 2021. Senator Carrion echoed
similar sentiments when he said, “the intent of this bill is commendable because it really focuses
on our seniors and those that are terminally ill that many times they die before they see their
civil case be settled.” Livestream.com/legittw/34", 4:46:12 to 4:46:38, August 3, 2021.

In Re: Hurricane Workers Toxic Tort Litigation, SX-15-CV-198
2021 Vi Super 4P

Memorandum Opinion

Page 10

takes judicial notice that the typical civil case takes at Jeast fours years to achieve
judicial resolution. The delay exists due to the plethora of cases routinely filed in
this court. It is quite evident that the Legislature perceived the existence of an
increased risk of death before trial to persons over the age of 70 and the terminally
ill which would deprive them of the opportunity to recover damages that may be
due to them. To minimize the risk, the Legislature created a right for the elderly
and the terminally ill to petition the court for a trial preference as reflected in
Sections 31(b)(1), (2), and (3). At the December 20, 2021 hearing on Plaintiffs’
Motion for Trial Preference, Defendants conceded that these provisions — which
mandate the court to grant a trial preference where the plaintiff is 70 or more years
of age and has a substantial interest in the litigation — constitute substantive law.
However, they argue that Section 31(b)(4), which mandates the setting of a trial
date within 180 days, is procedural law. This Court finds that further analysis of
the circumstances surrounding the statute’s enactment and effect shows
otherwise.

98 The Legislature's concern transcended the mere grant of the right to a
preferential or expedited trial date. The deeper concern was to ensure the receipt

of a trial before the litigant dies in light of existing delays in setting civil trial dates.

In Re: Hurricane Workers Toxic Tort Litigation, SX-15-CV-198

Memorandum Opinion

Page 11

To address this concern, they “defined” the contours of the preference by setting
a 180-day trial deadline. By incorporating this deadline, the Legislature did-more
than merely create a general trial preference. They made a social policy
determination that the elderly and the terminally ill should be entitled to a right to
have their cases heard in court within 180-days of their request. Without a
mandatory deadline the grant of a trial preference would do little to achieve the
goal of “trial before death.” The setting of preferential trial dates would be left to
each judge’s discretion and could vary substantially depending on the assigned
judge. Nothing would prohibit a judge, for example, from setting a preferential trial
date for two (2) years after the filing of a preference motion. This would abrogate
clear legislative intent and likely deprive qualifying litigants of the substantive right
to receive claimed damages during their lifetime. Accordingly, Section 31(b)(4),
which mandates a 180-day deadline, defines, and must be construed as a
constituent part of, the trial preference right created in Sections 31(b)(1), (2) and
(3). Together, they constitute a new substantive law. Such legislatively created
substantive law prevails over any conflicting court created procedural rule that may
exist and does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. See World Fresh

Markets, LLC, 74 V.I. at 461 (stating “a doctrine of law created by this Court must

ultimately yield to the substantive statutes adopted by the Legislature.”)
in Re: Hurricane Workers Toxic Tort Litigation, SX-15-C\V-198

Memorandum Opinion

Page 12

2) Act 8468 Does Not Conflict with Any Procedural Rule.

12 Even if Act 8468 were to be construed as a procedural rule, it would violate
the separation of powers doctrine only if it conflicted with a judicially created
procedural rule since the legislature has concurrent authority to create procedural
rules. Bently, 

 at 302 - 303. Such legislatively created procedural rules
are given deference to the extent they are compatible with judicially created
procedural rules. 

. Defendants identify no specific conflicting judicially
created procedural rule. Instead, they argue generally that the Act restricts the
court's discretion to set deadlines and otherwise manage its civil cases as
permitted via V.|. R. Civ. P. 16 and 92 through 96. This Court disagrees.

710 Atthe outset the Court notes that the Act creates a preference not for all civil
litigants, but only for a limited class of persons (i.e. those 70 or more years of age
and the terminally ill). As such, any impact on civil case management is minimal.
Rule 16 governs judicial management of civil cases. It requires the issuance of a
scheduling order within 90 days of service of a complaint upon the defendant or
60 days after the defendant appears. V.I. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(2). Similarly, Rule 93
requires that the court hold an initial management conference within 60 days of
opening a master case and to issue a case management order within 28 days of

the conference. V.1. R. Civ. P. 93(c)(1) and (4). It is quite possible to comply with
in Re: Hurricane Workers Toxic Tort Litigation, SX-15-CV-198

Memorandum Opinion

Page 13

these deadlines within the 180-day time period mandated by the Act. Further, the
Act itself provides the Court with discretion to alter the filing date of the motion for
preference. It provides, in pertinent part

(6) Unless the court otherwise orders:

(B) at any time during the pendency of the action, a party who
reaches 70 year of age may file and serve a motion for
preference.

(C) at any time during the pendency of the action, a party who
is diagnosed as terminally ill with less than six (6) months to
live may file and serve a motion for preference.

5 V.I.C. 31(b)(6) {emphasis added). Thus, although the statute provides that a
party may file a motion for trial preference “at any time during the pendency of the

action," this Court could still manage preference cases by, for example:

1) issuing an order requiring the filing of a 60-day notice of intent to seek a
trial preference; or

2) issuing an order precluding the filing of a motion for trial preference
before the date set in the Rule 16 scheduling order, or in the Rule 93
case management order, for completion of the plaintiff's deposition.

Nothing in the Act precludes the exercise of such management discretion by the
court to control the timing of the preference motion. Accordingly, Act 8468
presents no conflict with existing judicially created procedural rules.

711 At least two similar statutes have survived constitutional challenges.

California’s preference statute provides in pertinent part:
In Re: Hurricane Workers Toxic Tort Litigation, SX-15-CV-198

Memorandum Opinion

Page 14

(a) A party to a civil action who is over 70 years of age may petition the court
for a preference, which the court shall grant if the court makes both of the
following findings:

(1) The party has a substantial interest in the action as a whole.

(2) The health of the party is such that a preference is necessary to
prevent prejudicing the party's interest in the litigation.

(c) Unless the court otherwise orders:

(1)...

(2) At any time during the pendency of the action, a party who
reaches 70 years of age may file and serve a motion for
preference.

(f) Upon the granting of such a motion for preference, the court shall set
the matter for trial not more than 120 days from that date and there shall
be no continuance beyond 120 days from the granting of the motion for
preference except for physical disability of a party or a party’s attorney,
or upon a showing of good cause stated in the record. Any continuance
shall be for no more than 15 days and no more than one continuance
for physical disability may be granted to any party.

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 36(a). In Rice v. Superior Court, 

 (Cal.

App. 1982), the California Court of Appeals was called upon to determine whether
the statute was mandatory and, if so, whether it impermissibly violated the inherent
powers of the trial court to regulate the order of its business. The court considered
that the stated purpose of the statute was:

...to safeguard to litigants beyond a specified age against the legislatively
In Re: Hurricane Workers Toxic Tort Litigation, SX-15-CV-198

Memorandum Opinion

Page 15

acknowledged risk that death or incapacity might deprive them of the
opportunity to have their cases effectively tried and the opportunity to
recover their just measure of damages or appropriate redress.

. The court further considered that the preference statute: 1) was narrow
in scope as it pertained to a small class of litigants; and 2) permitted the court a
120-day window to set a trial date. It thus concluded:
... given that section 36, subdivision (a) provides a substantive right to older
litigants, trial courts are not unduly hampered in ordering their business
when allowed such a period within which to set trial. Therefore, we cannot
construe subdivision (a) as impermissibly infringing upon the administrative
power of trial courts.

 (emphasis supplied). This same rationale applies to the Virgin Islands
preference statute.
Ti2 Similarly, the Illinois Legislature promulgated a statute which provides:
(a) A party who is an individual and has reached the age of 70 years shall,
upon motion by that party, be entitled to preference in setting for trial
unless the court finds that the party does not have a substantial interest in
the case as a whole.
(b) The court may, in its discretion, grant a motion for preference in setting for
trial where a party shows good cause that the interests of justice will be
served by granting a preference in setting for trial.

734 ILCS 5/2-1007.1. In Davidson v. Davidson, 

 (Ill. App. 1993),

the Illinois Appellate Court addressed the issue of whether the statute “is
unconstitutional as conflicting with the Supreme Court's rule making powers and

whether the statute impermissibly interferes with a trial court's ability to control its
In Re: Hurricane Workers Toxic Tort Litigation, SX-15-CV-198

Memorandum Opinion

Page 16

own calendar." Davidson, 

. Although, it considered the statute
procedural, the Illinois Appellate Court concluded that it did not conflict with any of
its supreme court rules nor interfere with the court's ability to control its calendar.
It recognized the legislative “intent to advance for trial the cases of senior citizens
who might otherwise not be able to have their cases heard, without infringing upon
the inherent powers of the judiciary” and found that the statute was constitutional.

 at 538 - 539. As explained above, this Court likewise discerned no conflict
between Act 8468 and judicially created procedural rules.

3) The Provisions of Act 8468 are Mandatory.

W713 The language of Act 8468 is quite clear. It states, “the court shall grant” the
petition for trial preference if it finds the party has a substantial interest in the
litigation. 5 V.I. § 31(b)(1). The statute further mandates the setting of a trial date
within 180-days from the filing of the motion for preference. 5 V.I. § 31(b)(4). The
mandatory nature of the Act is quite apparent as this Court has previously found.

See In Re Asbestos, Silica, Catalyst Dust Claims |, SX-2021-CV-058, Nov. 16,

2021, at *7, 

 (holding “this Court finds that the provisions of
Act 8468 are mandatory.”). Here, Plaintiffs submitted proof that they are over
the age of 70 years. Pursuant to their complaints, they would be the sole

beneficiaries of any money damages awarded. See Complaints, p 8. Plaintiffs
In Re: Hurricane Workers Toxic Tort Litigation, SX-15-CV-198

Memorandum Opinion

Page 17

thus have a substantial interest in the outcome of this action. Such interest
coupled with their age require the setting of a trial date, under the Act, of no later
than 180 days from the filing of Plaintiffs’ motion, that is, by March 21, 2022. 5
VIC. § 31(b)(4). This Court is thus duty bound to, and will, set a trial date within

the statutory parameters.

CONCLUSION
114 This Court concludes that Act 8468 constitutes substantive law and does not
violate the separation of powers doctrine. it also does not conflict with any
judicially created procedural rule. Accordingly, the Court will grant Plaintiffs

motion for trial preference. An order consistent herewith will be entered

contemporaneously.
ALPHONSO G. ANDREWS, JR.
ATTEST: Superior Court Judge
TAMARA CHARLES

“Nhe COURT

COURT CLERK

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS

TAMARA CHARLES IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
CLERK OF THE COURT DIVISION OF ST. CROIX

IN RE: Refinery Workers Toxic Tort | Master Case No. SX-2015-CV-198
Litigation. (Complex Litigation Division)

Re: SX-2006-CV-231, -221

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS FOR PREFERENTIAL TRIAL SETTING

This matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motions for Preferential Trial
Settings filed on September 20 — 21, 2021, Defendants’ Opposition thereto filed
on October 18, 2021, and Plaintiffs’ Reply filed on November 18, 2021.
Consistent with the Memorandum Opinion filed in this matter on even date
herewith, it is hereby

ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motions for Trial Preference are GRANTED;
and it is further

ORDERED that a consolidated trial is scheduled in the Hughes and
Mohansingh matters, i.e., SX-2006-CV-221 and SX-2006-CV-231, for 9:00 a.m.

on Monday March 21, 2022 at the Superior Court in Room 203.

AA

DATE: January 14, 2022 ALPHONSO G. ANDREWS, JR.
Superior Court Judge

ATTEST:

TAMARA CHARLES

“Mt COURT

COURT CLERK