IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
DIVISION OF ST. THOMAS AND ST. JOHN

RWHEKHK
PEOPLE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS, )
)
Plaintiff, } CASE NO. ST-19-CR-210
)
v. )
)
KEELAN J. GERALD, )
)
Defendant. ) Cite as 2020 V.1. Super 77U
)
ALEXANDRA C. BYNUM, ESQ. JULIE SMITH TODMAN, ESQ.
Assistant Attorney General Territorial Public Defender
Virgin Islands Department of Justice P.O. Box 6040
34-38 Kronprindsens Gade St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands 00804
St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands 00802 Attorney for the Defendant

Attorney for the People of the Virgin Islands
CARTY, RENEE GUMBS, Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION

{1. BEFORE THE COURT is the “Defendant’s Motion to Suppress” filed by Defendant
Kéelan Gerald (“Gerald” or “Defendant") on December 30, 2019. In his motion, Gerald requests
suppression of all evidence seized because of an illegal seizure and search of his person, his
backpack, and lunch kit. The People based the search and seizure of Gerald on the suspicion that he
was-placing a leaf-like green substance, which appeared to be marijuana, into zip lock bags. The
People filed a response to Defendant's motion on January 9, 2020, and the matter came on for a
hearing on January 14, 2020.

12. | Based on the moving papers and the testimony adduced at the suppression hearing, this
Court finds the initial seizure was lawful and that the People’s search of the Defendant was not a
violation of Defendant's Fourth Amendment Rights. Therefore, this Court will deny Defendant’s

motion to suppress the evidence.
People v. Keelan Gerald Cite as 2020 V.L. Super 77U
Case No. ST-19-CR-210

Memorandum Opinion
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

13. On September 5, 2019, at approximately 5:00 pm, Officer Aliek Wescott, along with
Officer Shakim Mike, Officer Kyle Gabriel, Officer Teshaun Adams, and Detective Ivan
Christopher, all of whom were assigned to the Special Operations Bureau (SOB) of the Virgin
islands Police Department, were conducting a routine community oriented policing operation,
known as a “watk-and-talk,” of Oswald Harris Court housing community. (Mot.Hr’g Tr.10).
Oswald Harris Court is known to be a high crime area where there are many instances of drug
trafficking as well as discharging of firearms. (Mot.Hr'g Tr.9). Officer Wescott testified that he
saw a mafe wearing a blue shirt and a black hat, sitting on a bench tocated between Oswald Harvis
Court Building #1 and Building #2. (Mot.Hr’g Tr.1t). Police later identified this male as Keelan
Gerald.

14. Officer Wescott testified that from approximately 10 to 15 feet away, he observed Gerald
putting what appeared to be a green leaf-like substance into a zip lock bag in plain view. (Mot.Hr’g
Tr.19). In order to ensure the safety of himself and the other officers, Officer Wescott approached
Gerald and directed him to put his hands on his head. (Mot.Hr’g Tr.20). Officer Wescott testified
that once he approached, he observed that Gerald had what appeared to be one large zip lock bag of
marijuana in his hand and multiple empty smaller {dime-sized) zip lock bags on his lap, and
appeared to be putting the green teaf-like substance into the smaller bags from the larger one.
(Mot.Hr’g Tr.12). Gerald later testified that he had one large zip lock bag of marijuana in his hand
and two empty smaller (dime-sized) zip lock bags on his lap. (Mot.Hr’g Tr.35). Officer Wescott
further stated that he asked the Defendant if he had any other narcotics on his person. The

Defendant replied, “No, I just came here to smoke a joint.” (Mot.Hr'g Tr.14).
People vy. Keelan Gerald Cite as 2020 V.E. Super 77U
Case No. ST-19-CR-210

Memorandum Opinion
15. At that point, Officer Wescott patted down the Defendant and recovered some money from
Defendant’s left pants pocket as well as a clear latex glove from his rear left pants pocket.
(Mot.Hr’g Tr.25), Officer Wescott then searched the latex glove and found a clear plastic bag of
crack cocaine inside the glove. /d. Officer Wescott then searched Defendant's backpack and lunch
kit. He recovered one clear plastic bag containing multiple zip lock bags of crushed tobacco, a black
scale, glass jars, and one pack of Apple brand zip lock bags. The lunch kit contained small empty
zip lock bags, a thermos with more small empty zip lock bags inside of it, and three more small
empty zip lock bags which were filled with the green leafy substance. (Mot.Hr’g Tr.17).
16. The green leaf-tike substance tested positive for marijuana and weighed approximately 13.1
grams. The white rock-like substance tested positive for crack cocaine and weighed approximately
3.4 grams. Gerald was advised of his Constitutional rights and arrested for possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute.

I. LEGAL DISCUSSION

A. Standard for Analyzing a Motion to Suppress.

17. “The proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth
Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure.” United States y. Murray,

 (D.V.I. 2010) (quoting Rakas v. illinois, 

 (1978). If the
seatch or seizure is warrantless, the burden shifts to the People to demonstrate that the search or
seizure was permissible under an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Under
the Fourth Amendment, people have the right “to be secure in their persons, houses...against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Terry v. Ohio, 

 (1968)
{adding that this “right of personal security belongs as much to the citizen on the streets” as to a

citizen in her home). In Thomas v. The People of the Virgin Islands, quoting the U.S. Supreme
People v. Keelan Gerald Cite as 2020 V.1. Super 77U
Case No. ST-19-CR-210

Memorandum Opinion

Court, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court noted that searches conducted without a warrant are “per
se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions.” See Thomas v. People of the Virgin Islands, 63 V.1. 595, 605 (V.1.
2015) (quoting Katz v. United States, 

 (1967). !

18. The Fourth Amendment analysis typically proceeds in three Stages. First, the Court asks
whether a Fourth Amendment event, such as a search or a seizure, has occurred. Next, the Court
considers whether that search or seizure was reasonable. If the search or seizure was unreasonable,
the Court must then determine whether the circumstances warrant suppression of the evidence.
People of the V.I. v. Graham, No. SX-18-CR-130, 2020 V.1. LEXIS 12 (Super. Ct. Feb. 11, 2020)
(quoting United States v. Smith, 

 (3d Cir. 2009)). In order to pass
constitutional muster, a warrantless search must be shown to fall within one of the few narrowly
defined exceptions to the warrant requirement. Government v. Fabiani-Ogno, 20 V1. 404 (Terr. Ct.
1984). However, while the Fourth Amendment ensures an individual's rights to be secure
unreasonable search and seizures, it does not require a police officer to ignore a possible crime.
People of the V1 vy Archibald, 50 V.1. 74,84 (Super. Ct. 2008) (quoting United States y. Chabet,
S31 F. Supp. 1063 (D.V.1. 1982)).

B. Decriminalization of Marijuana Does Not Affect Analysis on the
Reasonableness of the Seizure

{9. The issue here is whether the decriminalization of marijuana has an effect on this seizure.
Two years ago, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court addressed this exact question in People y. Looby,

 *5 (2018), when they searched through the legislative history and text of Act

No. 7700. In rationalizing the decriminalization of marijuana, the Legislature reasoned that it would

' Courts hold this protection in no higher regard, than when the search in question is executed at the home of the
defendant, noting “the physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment
is directed.” l/ntted States v Mallory, 765 F 3d 373, 382 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Payton v. New York, 

 (1980).

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People v. Keelan Gerald Cite as 2020 V1. Super 77U
Case No. ST-£9-CR-210

Memorandum Opinion

free up criminal justice resources to deal with more serious crimes, reduce court costs in
prosecuting marijuana possession, and considered the potential health benefits of marijuana. 2014
V.L Sess. Laws 191, § 2(a). However, the legislature concluded, as other states have concluded, that
while the possession of marijuana of one ounce or less no longer gives the officers the power to
arrest, it still remains unlawful. People v. Ramos, 

 (N.Y. App. Ist Dep’t 2014)
(noting that an officer’s suspicion that a driver is smoking marijuana “can justify a traffic stop).?
Furthermore, marijuana remains a Schedule [ controlled substance under Title 19, §595 of the
Virgin Islands Code. Looby, 

 at *5. Section 607a(b)(2) allows for the police to
confiscate the marijuana when it proscribed “any person who pessesses one ounce or less of
marijuana. ..is subject to forfeiture of the contraband. /d. Further, §607(a)(b)(3) provides that “any
person under the age of eighteen at the time of the offense, who possesses one ounce or less of
marijuana...is subject to forfeiture of the contraband. /d. To hold otherwise would undermine the
intent of the legislators in providing a mechanism for the officers to “ticket offenders and seize
contraband as evidence they suspect of violating 19 V.1.C. §607(a) or 20 V.1.C. §493."3 People yv
Cannergeiter, 65 VI. 114, 134 (Super. Ct. 2016).

C. Officers’ Interaction with Defendant Amounts to a Seizure Based on
Articulable Facts That Criminal Activity was Afoot

$10. Courts determine whether a seizure took place based on an exertion of the police use of
physical force or submission to a show of authority. Brendlin v. Cal, 

 (2007); The
question in every case, based from the Defendant’s perspective, is whether a reasonable person

would feel free to leave or decline the officers’ request or otherwise terminate the encounter given

* See also State v. Randy J., 150 N.M 683, 693 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that the odor of marijuana emanating
from the vehicle combined with the odor of marijuana would fead a reasonable officer to believe he was driving under
the influence), Jenkins v. State, 

 (Del. 2009) (Holding that Jenkins’ behavior and the strong
marijuana odor were sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest Jenkins for Driving Under the Influence).

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People v. Keelan Gerald Cite as 

Case No. ST-19-CR-210

Memorandum Opinion

the circumstances. United States v. Drayton, 

 (2002); Florida v. Bostick, 

 (1991) (Holding that the police’s conduct controls whether a reasonable person on a bus
would feel free to leave); People v. Prentice, 64 V.1. 79, 88 (Super. Ct. 2016).

(il. in the present case, the Defendant was clearly seized. Officer Wescott and his fellow
officers approached Gerald, ordered Gerald to put his hands on the top of his head. Gerald
immediately complied and was then searched. If a reasonable person in the Defendant’s position
would not feel that they were free to leave at their will, we conclude that the SOB officers’
interaction with the Defendant amounts to a seizure.

D. Officer Wescott had Requisite Reasonable Suspicion to Search and Seize
Defendant’s Person.

112. The Defense argues that officers lacked requisite reasonable suspicion to conduct a search
under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. | (1968). The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places, and
wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable "expectation of privacy," he is entitled to be free
from unreasonable governmental intrusion. Terry v. Ohio, 

 (1968). Accordingly,
the Fourth Amendment protects a person's expectations of privacy that society has recognized as
reasonable. Simmonds v. Virgin Islands, 53 V.1. 549, 574 (V.I. 2010) (Swan, J. dissenting).
Defendant was sitting in an open area on a public bench. He was putting marijuana into zip lock
bags in plain view. It was 5:00 pm, a time where it is not unreasonable to expect others to come
home from their jobs and pass by the bench, especially since it is between two apartment buildings.
Since a reasonable person would not expect privacy in such an area, the Defendant did not harbor a
reasonable expectation of privacy on the bench at Oswald Harris Court.

713. Under Terry v. Ohie, 

 (1968), an officer may, consistent with the Fourth
Amendment, conduct a brief investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable

suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. In determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such

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People v. Keelan Gerald Cite as 2020 VI. Super 77U
Case No. ST-19-CR-210

Memorandum Opinion

circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
“hunch,” but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light
of his experience. /d. at 27. The Defense argues that Officer Wescott had no basis for reasonable
Suspicion to search the Defendant. The Defense proposes that the officer “provided no facts to
Support removing items from Mr. Gerald’s person” and that since Officer Wescott did not test the
marijuana, and oniy observed a green leaf-like substance from approximately ten to fifteen feet
away, he had no basis to search Defendant. The Defense argues that there was no field test of the
substance and therefore there is no reasonable suspicion to believe that the substance was
marijuana. To support his argument, the Defense states that “if the officer’s Suspicion is without
factual foundation and articulabte facts, then reasonable suspicion is lacking; and no degree of good
faith, hunch, or intuition can substitute for it.” United States vy. Smith, 

 (11th Cir.
1986).

14. This Court disagrees with the Defense’s argument. In order to satisfy the standard of
reasonable suspicion, it is not necessary that the suspect actually has done or is doing anything
illegal; reasonable suspicion may be “based on acts capable of innocent explanation. People of the
VEE v. Thomas, 2014 V.1. LEXIS 28 (Super.Ct.2014) (quoting United States v. Whitfield, 

 (3d Cir, 2010) (citing United States v. Valentine, 

 (3d Cir.2000)). Officer
Wescott stated that he had training in the recognition of marijuana and also the packaging used for
the distribution of marijuana. (Mot.Hr’g Tr.6). The area that Defendant was sitting is a high crime
area. The Defendant’s gestures appeared to be the actions of someone who was preparing marijuana
for distribution and sale. Taking an objective look at the totality of circumstances supports a finding
of reasonable suspicion, hence the Court concludes that Officer Wescott had the requisite

reasonable suspicion and probable cause to search and seize Defendant's person.
People v. Keelan Gerald Cite as 

Case No. ST-19-CR-210

Memorandum Opinion

115. Officer Wescott testified that he initially observed the Defendant from a ten-fifteen feet
distance. (Mot.Hr’g Tr.19). Officer Wescott further testified that it was from that distance that he
was able to see the Defendant sitting on a bench and putting a green leafy substance into a zip lock
bag. /d. This observation constitutes reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Officer
Wescott further testified that once he saw the green leafy substance, he went to engage. /d. Officer
Wescott testified that once he was close to the Defendant, he was able to see that Gerald had one
large zip lock bag of marijuana in his hand and what appeared to be several small baggies on his
lap. (Mot.Hr’g Tr.i2). It is at this time that Officer Wescott's reasonable suspicion ripened into the
requisite probable cause.

E. Officer Wescott did not Violate Defendant’s Fourth Amendment Rights by
Removing Glove with Crack-Cocaine from Defendant’s Pocket

"16. The Defense argues that because nothing in the Defendant's pockets felt like a weapon,
Officer Wescott violated Defendant's Fourth Amendment Rights by removing the items from his
pockets. If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose
contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect's
privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer's search for weapons; tf the object is
contraband, its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical considerations that
adhere in the plain-view context. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 

 (1993). In Dickerson,
the Supreme Court held that officers violated Defendant's Fourth Amendment Rights when they
retrieved a lump of cocaine from respondent's pocket. The Court reasoned that if police are lawfully
in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent,
and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant. Je.
The Court further stated that regardless of whether the officer detects the contraband by sight or by

touch, however, the Fourth Amendment's requirement that the officer have probable cause to

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People v. Keelan Gerald Cite as 2020 V.L. Super 77U
Case No. ST-19-CR-210

Memorandum Opinion
believe that the item is contraband before seizing it ensures against excessively speculative seizures
The Dickerson Court concluded that because the incriminating character of the contraband was not
immediately apparent to the officer, and he was only able to determine that the item was contraband
after manipulating it, the search was invalid,
ql7. Unlike Dickerson, where there was no probable cause to search Defendant, Officer Wescott
testified that he had already seen three zip lock bags and marijuana on the Defendant’s lap. Officer
Wescott also testified that he was trained in the Police Academy to recognize and identify different
drugs, as well as paraphernalia associated with drug trafficking. (Mot.Hr’g Tr.6). Officer Wescott
further testified that he was trained to recognize marijuana, both in its earth and unearthed form.
(Mot.Hr’g Tr.7). It was only after observing the three zip lock bags and the marijuana that Officer
Wescott searched Gerald’s person. (Mot.Hr’g Tr.13). By the'time the search of Gerald’s person
took place, it was apparent that a crime had been committed. Officer Wescott had probable cause to
search the Defendant’s pockets, thus Officer Wescott did not violate Defendant’s Fourth
Amendment Rights by removing the glove with crack-cocaine from Defendant's pocket.

F. Officer Wescott did not Violate Defendant’s Fourth Amendment Rights by

searching Defendant’s Backpack and Lunch Kit.

918. Under Terry v. Ohio, 

 (1968), an officer may, consistent with the Fourth
Amendment, conduct a brief investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Officer Wescott searched Geratd’s backpack once he had
already recovered the marijuana and the cocaine as well as the drug paraphernalia. He therefore had
probable cause to believe that there was contraband in the backpack and in the lunch kit. Officer

Wescott had probable cause to believe that there was contraband in the backpack and in the lunch
People v. Keelan Gerald Cite as 2020 V.1. Super 77U
Case No. ST-19-CR-210

Memeorandum Opinion
kit, therefore the search of Defendant’s backpack and lunch kit did not violate the Defendant's
Fourth Amendment Rights.
Il. CONCLUSION
419. Based on the foregoing reasons, this Court is satisfied that the People have met their burden
in demonstrating that the search of the Defendant and his backpack were reasonable. Since the
People believed that the Defendant was engaging in illegal activity and because the Defendant was
partaking of this activity in a public place and had no reasonable expectation of privacy, the search
of the Defendant was not unconstitutional. Furthermore, because the People had probable cause to
believe that Defendant's backpack contained contraband, the search of the backpack was not a
violation of the Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.

Accordingly, the Court will deny the Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized.

An Order accompanying this Memorandum Opinion follows.

) f
Dated: August / 4 2020 ZG MCE. Sit

Renée G Carty
udge of the Sugerior Court
of the Virgi fands

ATTEST:
Tamara Charles
Clerk of the Court

By Ad aie athe Zearm LIA

pe r Lori Boynes-Tyson
Court Clerk Supervisor fF 20) 202 oO

10
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
DIVISION OF ST. THOMAS AND ST. JOHN

PEOPLE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS, )
)
Plaintiff, ) CASE NO. ST-19-CR-210

)
v. )
)
KEELAN J. GERALD, )
)

Defendant. ) Cite as 2020 V.1. Super 77U
)
ORDER

AND NOW, for the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, it is
hereby

ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to suppress is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that copies of this Order shall be distributed to Assistant Attomey General

Alexandra C. Bynum, Esquire and Julie Smith Todman, Esquire.

)
Dated: August 14. , 2020 Kncall {t L

~ Eo s Carty
ATTEST: udge of the Sup¢rior Court
Tamara Charles of the Virgin’ Islands
Clerk of the Court

te DD grate Larrllh ATRUECOPY

Lori Boynes-Tyson

Chief Deputy Clerk ¥ /2.0/ 2020