SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
DIVISION OF ST CROIX
PEOPLE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
PLAINTIFF SK 2017 CR 023
v
QUANZA J HEATH
CITE AS 2022 VI SUPER 5 S
DEFENDANT
Appearances
Eric Chancellor, Esq
Virgin Islands Department of Justice
St Croix, U S Virgin Islands
For Plaintiff
Martial A Webster, Esq
Law Office of Martial A Webster Sr
St Croix, U S Virgin Islands
for Defendant
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
WILLOCKS Presiding Judge
T 1 THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Quanza J Heath 5 (hereinafter
“Defendant”) motion to dismiss, filed on September 21, 2021, and Defendant’s motion to suppress,
filed on September 21, 2021 On December 1, 2021, the People of the Virgin Islands (hereinafter
“People ’) filed their oppositions thereto As of the date of this Memorandum Opinion and Order,
Defendant has not filed his replies thereto
BACKGROUND
‘2 On the evening of January 24, 2014, at approximately 7 00 p m Detective Leon Cruz
(hereinafter ‘ Detective Cruz”) and Lieutenant Dino Herbert (hereinafter “Lieutenant Herbert ’)
were present at Defendant’s residence to conduct “a follow up investigation and as well in an
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attempt to make contract with [Defendant], whom [Detective Cruz] have the knowledge of
operating a two door Chevy Blazer, faded in color ” (Cruz Aff 1? 3A )I While Lieutenant Herbert
was talking to Defendant’s uncle, Armory Winston (hereinafter “Winston”), Detective Cruz
observed Defendant’s vehicle drive pass Defendant’s residence and informed Lieutenant Herbert
(Id 1| 3B ) Lieutenant Herbert asked Winston if that 5 his nephew driving the blazer ” (Id 1 3C )
Winston responded that he did not know (Id ) At that point, Detective Cruz confirmed that the
individual driving was Defendant and Detective Cruz and Lieutenant Herbert got into their vehicle
to pursue said vehicle (Id ) Detective Cruz and Lieutenant Herbert observed that the vehicle made
a lefi turn into a residential area with a dead end and as they followed the vehicle and made the
same left turn the vehicle was parked adjacent to the bush area facing south into their direction
with the head lights off (Id 1] 3D) The officers ordered Defendant to exit the vehicle and
Defendant exited the vehicle immediately and fled into the bush area nearby Defendant
reappeared shortly after, and the officers had a conversation with Defendant (Id 111] 3D, E) The
officers also requested a search of the immediate bush area where Defendant fled to (Id 1! 3B )
Police officer Jason Viveros (hereinafter “Officer Viveros”) along with his K9 dog searched the
bush area where Defendant had fled to and found a firearm (Id ) Subsequently, Forensic Detective
Darius George (hereinafter ‘ Detective George”) arrived to process the crime scene and “while
conducting a further search of the area[,] a clear sandwich bag containing live 40 caliber rounds
were also found in the bushes area adjacent to Defendant 5 vehicle hanging from the branches ’
(Id ) Defendant was then placed under arrest and transported to the Wilbur Francis Police Station
' A copy of Detective Leon 5 affidavit, dated January 3| 2014 was attached to Defendant s motion to suppress and
relied upon by Defendant therein for the facts in this matter
People v Heath
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(Id 11 3F ) A firearm records check was conducted and it was revealed that Defendant did not have
authority to carry or possess firearm(s) or ammunition(s) in the U S Virgin Islands (Id 1| 3G)
The firearm was identified as being a 40 caliber, Taurus PT 140 PRO with an obliterated serial
number with a chambered round (1) and a full magazine (10) (Id 1 3J ) The firearm was test fired
and it was revealed that it was an operable firearm (Id)
1] 3 On February 7, 2014, the People filed an information against Defendant based on the events
that took place on January 24, 2014, criminal case number SX 2014 CR 033 (hereinafter 2014
Case”) The information included the following five counts against Defendant Count I
unauthorized possession of a firearm, in violation of Title 14 V I C 2253(a), Count II possession
of ammunition in violation of Title 14 V I C 2256(a), Count III failure to report firearms obtained
outside or brought into the Virgin Islands in violation of Title 23 V I C 470(a), Count IV alteration
of identifying marks of a weapon in violation of Title 23 V I C 481(3), and Count V carrying or
using a dangerous weapon in violation of Title 14 V I C 2251(a)(1)
11 4 On June 5, 2014, Defendant filed a motion to suppress in the 2014 Case (hereinafter “2014
Motion to Suppress”) whereby Defendant sought to suppress the evidence seized from him as a
result of the stop and search and the statements made during the search People qfthe V I v Heath
63 VI 80 85 (VI Super Ct July 10 2015) On September 16 2014 a suppression hearing was
held in the 2014 Case where Officer Viveros, Detective Cruz, and Detective George testified 1d ,
63 V I at 85 86 On July 10, 201 S, a memorandum opinion and an order were entered in the 2014
Case denying Defendant’s 2014 Motion to Suppress Id , 63 V I at 94 The factual background
stated in the July 10, 2015 memorandum opinion was consistent with Detective Cruz’s affidavit
People v Heath
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2022VISUPER 53
'5 On February 22, 2016, an order was entered in the 2014 Case granting the People’s motion
to dismiss without prejudice and dismissing the 2014 Case without prejudice
fl6 On January 24, 2017, the People filed an information in this matter against Defendant based
on the events that took place on January 24 2014 criminal case number SX 2017 CR 023 The
information included the same five counts previously included in the information of the 2014 Case
Count I unauthorized possession of a firearm, in violation of Title 14 V I C 2253(a), Count 11
possession of ammunition in violation of Title 14 V I C 2256(a), Count III failure to report
firearms obtained outside or brought into the Virgin Islands in violation of Title 23 V I C 470(a),
Count IV alteration of identifying marks of a weapon in violation of Title 23 V I C 481(a), and
Count V carrying or using a dangerous weapon in violation of Title 14 V I C 2251(a)(l)
11 7 On January 24, 2017, an arrest warrant was issued for Defendant for the charges included
in the information filed in this matter On January 27, 2017, Defendant was arrested
‘11 8 On February 8, 2017 an amended information was filed The amended information
removed Count V from the initial information
119 On September 21, 2021, Defendant filed this instant motion to dismiss and motion to
suppress The People subsequently filed their oppositions thereto
1'] 10 On March 16, 2022, this matter came before the Court for a hearing on the pending
motions At the hearing, the Court inquired whether the parties were familiar with Heath, 63 V I
80 the memorandum opinion entered on July 10, 2015 in the 2014 Case denying the 2014 Motion
to Suppress The Court gave the parties the opportunity to review Heath and ordered the parties
to file their respective supplemental brief within ten days
People v Heath
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1! 11 As of the date of this Memorandum Opinion and Order, neither party filed a
supplemental brief
DISCUSSION
I Motion to Dismiss
' 12 In his motion Defendant argued that that this matter should be dismissed because it is
barred by the statute of limitations In support of his argument, Defendant pointed out that (i)
“[t]he instant case results from the re filing of case number SX 2014 CR 00033 which was
dismissed without prejudice an offense allegedly committed on January 24, 2014 , (ii) the
statute of limitations of Count I Count 11 Count II] and Count IV was three years under Title 5
V I C 354l(a)(2), (iii) Defendant was arrested on January 27, 2017, three (3) days after the statute
of limitation had run on January 24 2017”; and (iv) “the Amended Information was filed on
February 8, 2017, after the statute of limitation had run (Motion 2 )
‘ 13 In their opposition, the People argued that this matter was timely commenced within the
statute of limitations and should not be dismissed In support of their argument, the People pointed
out that (i) ‘ [n]either the Virgin Islands Code nor the Virgin Islands Rules of Criminal Procedure
specifically defines what constitutes the commencement of a criminal action”;2 (ii) “[c]ourts have
held that either the issuance of a proper arrest warrant or the filing of an information, whichever
is earlier, commences a criminal action for purposes of Title 5 V l C 3541”;3 (iii) “the Virgin
Islands Supreme Court opined that the filing date of an information may be used to determine
2 The People referenced People ofthe V I v Hatcher 2020 V1 LEXIS l4 *5 (V1 Super Ct Feb II 2020)
J The People referenced People ofthe V I v Ayala 2017 V l LEXIS 22 (V l Super Ct Feb 6 20l7)' People ofthe
VI v./ames 2017 VI LEXIS [23 ‘4 5 (VI Super Ct March 2 20l7)
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Memorandum Opinion and Order 2022 VI SUPER
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when a criminal prosecution commences’ ,4 (iv) ‘ [a]n amended information violates the statute of
limitations only if the amendment includes new charges 5 and the amended information filed in
this matter removed Count V and did not add any new charges (Opp 2 )
A Standard of Review
fi 14 The statute of limitations for commencing criminal prosecutions in the Virgin Islands is
governed by title 5, section 3541 of the Virgin Islands Code, which provides in relevant part
(a) A criminal action shall be commenced within the following periods
(1) For murder, felony child abuse felony child neglect, any felony sexual offense
perpetrated against a victim, embezzlement of public moneys, and thefalszficatzon
ofpublzc records, there is no limitation of the time within which a prosecution shall
be commenced
(2) For any felony other than specified above, action shall be commenced with three
years after its commission
Title 5 V I C 3541(a)(1) and (2)
As to what action constitutes the commencement of a criminal action, the court in Hatcher pointed
out
Neither the Virgin Islands Code nor the Virgin Islands Rules of Criminal Procedure
specifically defines what constitutes the commencement of a criminal action From time to
time, the Courts of the Virgin Islands have identified various stages in the criminal justice
process where it may be determined that the criminal action has commenced These stages
include the return of an indictment, the filing of an information or complaint or the issuance
of a warrant of arrest The District Court of the Virgin Islands held that a criminal action
commences with the return of an indictment or the filing of an information under the
provisions of 5 V I C § 3541 Government ofthe Vzrgm Islands v Moncayo, 31 V I 135,
142 (D V I 1994) The Superior Court of the Virgin Islands has identified different stages
of the criminal justice process where it may be determined that criminal action has
commenced Criminal actions are commenced when a grand jury issues an indictment or
when a prosecutor files a complaint or an information Denme v People of the Vzrgm
Islands, 66 V I 143, 151 (V I Super Ct 2017) Either the issuance of a proper warrant or
“ The People referenced Miller v People ofthe V I 54 V I 398 402 (V l 2010)
5 The People referenced Halcher 202 V1 LEXIS 14 at ‘16
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the filing of an information, whichever is earlier, commences a criminal action for purposes
of 5 V I C § 3541 People ofthe Virgin Islands v Correa 2017 V I LEXIS 42 (V I Super
Ct 2017) People of the Virgin Islands v Ayala 2017 VI LEXIS 22 (VI Super Ct
2017) Without finding whether the issuance of a warrant and the return of an indictment
are also proper considerations for the commencement of a criminal action, the Virgin
Islands Supreme Court has stated that the filing date of an information may be used to
determine when a criminal prosecution commences Miller v People ofthe Vzrgm Islands
54V] 398 402 (VI 2010)
Hatcher 2020 V I LEXIS 14 at *5 6
B Analysis
11 15 The parties do not dispute that the felony charges against Defendant in this matter are
governed by the three year statute of limitations Title 5 V l C 354l(a)(2) However, the parties
dispute as to what action constitutes the commencement of a criminal action
1] 16 The Court must note that Defendant’s argument in his motion that this matter must be
dismissed because Defendant was arrested after the expiration of the statute of limitations and that
the amended information was filed after the expiration of the statute of limitations was perfunctory
and made without supporting authority Defendant failed to cite to any applicable authority to
support his assertions that (i) the date of the arrest, and only this date, constitutes the
commencement of a criminal action and (ii) an amended information that removed an offense and
did not add a new offense violates the statute of limitation ‘ The Supreme Court of the Virgin
Islands has established that in order for a motion to be properly before the court, parties must
support their arguments by citing the proper legal authority, statute or rule ’ In re Catalyst Ling ,
67 VI 16 n 12 (VI Super Ct 2015) see Antzlles School Inc v Lembach
64 VI 400 n 13
(V I 2016) (‘ Members of the Virgin Islands Bar must be cognizant of their responsibility to
serve as advocates for their clients, which includes making all necessary legal arguments ”); see
also Simpson v Golden 56 V I 272 280 (V I 2012) ( The rules that require a litigant to brief
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and support his arguments before the Superior Court, are not mere formalistic requirements
They exist to give the Superior Court the opportunity to consider, review, and address an
argument”) “It is not the Court's job to research and construct legal arguments open to parties
In order to develop a legal argument effectively, the facts at issue must be bolstered by relevant
legal authority; a perfunctory and undeveloped assertion is inadequate ’ VI Tax: Assoczatzon v
West Indian Company lelted 2016 V I LEXIS 170 *4 (Super Ct Oct 18 2016)
(citing Charles v CB] Acquzsztzons LLC 2016 V I LEXIS 62 *27 n 66) The Court declines to
make such argument on Defendant s behalf See Joseph v Joseph 2015 V I LEXIS 43 *5 (V I
Super Ct Apr 23, 2015) ( [I]n general, the Court will not make a movant's arguments for him
when he has failed to do so ”) Here, the People filed the information in this matter prior to the
expiration of the statute of limitations In Miller, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court indicated that
the filing date of an information may be used to determine when a criminal prosecution
commenced 54 V I at 402 (citing Gov tofIhe Virgin Islands v Moncayo 31 V I 135 140 (D V I
1994)) 5 Defendant gave no reason why the Court should depart from Miller, and the Court sees
" A few courts have found that the Virgin Islands Supreme Court’s assertion that the filing date of an information may
be used to determine when a criminal prosecution commenced to be in apparent tension and conflict with Moncayo,
the case it cited to in support of its assertion See e g People ofthe Virgin Islands v Cummings, 2016 V l LEXIS 60
*3 n 3 (V l Super Ct May 9 2016) ( The Virgin Islands Supreme Court has suggested the key date is the filing of
the information (although it did so in apparent tension with Moncayo, its putative source) ”), People of the Vngm
Islands v James 2017 VI LEXIS I23 *5 (VI Super Ct March 2 2017) (However the Supreme Court of the
Virgin Islands cited Moncayo for that assertion, doing so “in apparent tension with Moncayo its putative source[ ] )
The Court disagrees
In Moncayo the arrest warrant was issued on April 29, I988, and the information was filed on June 14 I993 The
Moncayo court noted
Counsel for the government argues that where a criminal limitation statute does not provide specifically for
the action to be commenced with the return of an indictment or the filing of an information, the action is
'commenced‘ for purposes of the statute of limitation with the issuance of an arrest warrant found on
probable cause The Court agrees, and concludes that the limitation period in this case was tolled by the
issuance of the arrest warrant and under the facts of this case its reasonably prompt execution The Virgin
Islands statute is silent on what act Specifically the return of an indictment or filing of an information or
the issuance of an arrest warrant would commence the prosecution of a crime Though generally
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no reason to do so Moreover, as noted above, the amended information removed an offense and
did not add a new offense The amended information would have raised statute of limitations issues
only if it charged a new offense for which the statute of limitations had expired See Hatcher 2020
V l LEXIS 14 at *10 (“The Virgin Islands has also adopted the principle that an indictment or
information which charges a greater offense also charges all lesser included offenses ”); see also
Fontame v People ofthe Virgin Islands 62 V I 643 650 (V I 2015) (finding that the jury may
convict for a lesser included offense even if not charged in the Information) Thus, the amended
information did not violate the statute of limitations Accordingly the Court concludes that this
criminal action was timely commenced, and the Court will deny Defendant’s motion to dismiss
11 Motion to Suppress
11 17 In the memorandum of law in support of his motion to suppress, Defendant argued that,
based on the facts “gleaned from the affidavit of Detective [Cruz],” the Court should suppress “any
the finding of an indictment or the filing of an infomation is the first step in a criminal case
when, as is usually the case there are preliminary proceedings the prosecution is commenced and
the statute is tolled at the time a complaint is laid before a magistrate and a warrant of arrest is
issued
21 Am Jur 2d Criminal Law, § 230, p 417 (collecting cases) Here, the arrest warrant issued on April 29,
1988 constitutes the commencement of the action
31 V l at 142 (emphasis added)
Accordingly the Moncayo court concluded that ‘the arrest warrant, issued on April 29, 1988 constitutes the
commencement of the action ” Id The Moncayo court never stated that the filing date of an information may not be
used to determine when a criminal prosecution commenced or that only the date of issuance of the arrest warrant may
be used to determine when a criminal prosecution commenced In fact as noted above, the Moncayo court recognized
that “the finding of an indictment or the filing of an information is the first step in a criminal case” but in that matter,
the court concluded that the limitation period was tolled by the issuance ofthe arrest warrant Id Thus the Court finds
that there is no tension or conflict, apparent or otherwise, for the Virgin Islands Supreme Court’s citation to Moncayo
in Miller for its assertion that the filing date of an information may be used to determine when a criminal prosecution
commenced
To be clear, the Court is simply acknowledging that, in arriving at its decision in MIIIeI, the Virgin Islands Supreme
Court indicated that the filing date of an information may be used to determine when a criminal prosecution
commenced whether that is the only date or whether the date of issuance of the arrest warrant may also be used to
determine when a criminal prosecution commenced were not discussed in Miller
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and all evidence obtained from the unconstitutional search and seizure of Defendant, including
any statements he may have made at the time of his seizure ” (Memo 5 ) Defendant further
asserted (i) “There is no question that the police did not have a warrant to arrest or search
[Defendant] ” (Motion 4), (ii) ‘ [t is also clear that [Defendant’s] encounter with the police officers
constituted a seizure under Terry and the Fourth Amendment ”7 (Id ), (iii) The seizure of
Defendant of not voluntary ” (Id ); (iv) Detective Cruz’s affidavit and probable cause sheet ‘failed
to articulate any reasonable suspicion to believe a crime was afoot, or any particularized
justification for the stop and seizure of Defendant ” (Id ), (v) “[T]he discovery of a firearm, without
more, does not constitute sufficient legal grounds to arrest”8 and according to Detective Cruz’s
affidavit, “he did not determine Defendant did not have license to possess a firearm until police
made a check after the arrest ” (Id at 5 )
ii 18 In their opposition, the People argued that the Court should deny Defendant’s motion to
suppress The People made the following assertions in support of their argument (i) “There is no
difference between the instance case and [the 2014 Case], other than the fact that the People
dismissed one of the charges against [Defendant] and that “the two cases[, this matter and the
2014 Case,] involve identical facts, identical charges, and identical parties [and] are the same
case ”9 (Opp I ); (ii) “Because this suppression issue was previously decided as a matter of law,
and [Defendant] has alleged nothing new in his filing, the motion to suppress the evidence should
be denied under the law of the case doctrine ” (Id at I 2); (ii) Defendant was not seized in
7 Defendant referenced UnlIedSIaIeS v Hensley 469 U S 22] (I985) UnitedStates v Velasquez 885 F 2d l076 (3d
Cir 1989) cert denied 494 U S lOl7(l990)
2 Defendant referenced United States v Ublles 224 F 3d 2|3 (3d Cir 2000)
9 The People referenced Heath, 63 V l 80, Virgin Islands Tax Assocmuon v Virgin Islands Port Authority, 67 V l
643 (V l 2017) People oflhe Virgin Islands v Miller 53 V I I62 (V 1 Super Ct May 4 20l0)
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violation of his constitutional rights '0 (Id at 2 3), and (iii) The gun was not seized in violation of
Heath 5 constitutional rights " (Id at 3 )
1| 19 Both Defendant and the People confirmed that this matter and the 2014 Case are based on
identical facts and identical charges against Defendant by the People '2 Defendant had previously
filed the 2014 Motion to Suppress which was denied Heath 63 V I at 90 In Heath the court
made the following findings (i) ‘[T]he Court finds that the police officers conducted an
investigatory stop at the time Heath submitted himself to the officers' show of authority when they
ordered him to approach the police vehicle and “that any encounter between the officers and
Heath prior to this time was not a stop under the Fourth Amendment ” [d , 63 V I at 89; (ii) “Based
on the officers' observation of Heath hunched down in his vehicle at night, as well as Heath's flight
upon the officers' identification of themselves, the Court finds that the officers had a reasonable
belief that Heath retreated to the bush area under suspicious circumstances and, therefore, the
officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct a lawful investigatory stop to quell that
suspicion ” Id 63 V I at 90; (iii) “[T]he Court finds that the officers’ actions in detaining Heath
until they completed the search of the bush area was reasonable and did not violate Heath’s
constitutional rights ’ 1d , 63 V I at 91, (iv) Since the bush area [that the officers searched] was
not used for any residential purposes and society would not reasonably expect the same privacy in
'0 The People referenced Simmonds v People 53 V1 549 (2010) Terry v Ohio 392 U S 1 (I968) People ofthe
VII‘gM Islandsv Prentice 64 VI 79 (VI Super Ct Feb 23 20l6)
" The People referenced Heath, 63 V l at 93
'2 [n Defendant s motion to dismiss Defendant stated that ‘ [t]he instant case results from the re filing of case number
SX 20l4 CR 00033 which was dismissed without prejudice an offense allegedly committed on January 24 20 l 4 ’
(Motion 2) In the People 5 opposition to Defendant s motion to suppress the People stated that ‘[t]here is no
difference between the instance case and [the 20|4 Case] other than the fact that the People dismissed one of the
charges against [Defendant]” and that the two cases[, this matter and the 2014 Case,} involve identical facts identical
charges, and identical parties [and] are the same case ’(Opp l )
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Memorandum Opinion and Order 2022 VI SUPER i
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that area as within a home the Court finds that the bush area [that the officers searched] was an
open field” and ‘ [t] bus, the officers did not need reasonable suspicion nor probable cause to
search it, and their search did not implicate Heath's reasonable expectation of privacy in anything
protected under the Fourth Amendment ” Id , 63 V I at 92; and (v) “Because a legal search of the
open field bush area yielded a firearm the officers’ seizure of that firearm was lawful under the
open fields and plain View doctrines ”‘3 Id , 63 V I at 94
'3 Under the plain view doctrine, “the warrantless seizure of incriminating evidence is permissible when three
conditions are met (1) the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment in aniving at the place from which the
evidence could be plainly viewed; (2) the item's incriminating character must be immediately apparent, and (3)
the officer must have a lawful right of access to the object itself” Heath, 63 V l at 93 (citing Horton v California
496 U S l28 I36 I37 (I990) [T]he United States Supreme Court has permitted officers to seize items which
are ‘dangerous in themselves” including weapons even when their incriminating natures are not immediately
apparent Id (clung United States v Fredeuck l52 Fed Appx 470 472 (6th Cir 2005)( At the same time that the
Court has permitted officers to seize items whose ‘incriminating character is ‘immediately apparent under the plain
view exception to the warrant requirement, it has permitted officers to seize objects dangerous in themselves ”’ (citing
Coolidge v New Hampshire 403 U S 443 472 (197]) (plurality)))‘ 0mm! States v Bishop 338 F 3d 623 626 (6th
Cir 2003)( The Supreme Court also has indicated that the plain view exception permits the warrantless seizure of
‘objects dangerous in themselves ”’))
In Heath the court made the following findings as to the three conditions of the plain view doctrine
In this case, the first condition is met Because the bushy area at 167 Hannahs Rest is an open field the
officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment by searching it Initially, the second condition does not appear
to have been met in this case that the item 5 incriminating nature be immediately apparent upon the officers
discovering it For instance the officers did not testify that they knew at the time of the seizure that the
Defendant was a felon and therefore could not legally possess a gun See United States v Ublles 224 F 3d
213 2&7 (3d Cir 2000) (opining that mere possession of a firearm is not a crime in the Virgin Islands), see
also People ofthe Vtrgm Islands v Murrell 56 V l 796 (V l 2012) Similarly the officers did not claim that
they noticed that the weapon had an obliterated or otherwise altered serial number when they retrieved it
from the open field Despite these seeming deficiencies, the United States Supreme Court has permitted
officers to seize items which are “dangerous in themselves including weapons even when their
incriminating natures are not immediately apparent UnIIedSIatesv Flederick |52 Fed Appx 470 472 (6th
Cir 2005) ( At the same time that the Court has permitted officers to seize items whose incriminating
character’ is immediately apparent under the plain view exception to the warrant requirement, it has
permitted officers to seize objects dangerous in themselves (citing Coolidge v New Hampshire 403 U S
443 472 91 S Ct 2022
29 L Ed 2d 564(197l)(p|urality)))' UMIIedSIalesv Bishop
338 F3d 623 626
(6th Cir 2003) ( The Supreme Court also has indicated that the plain view exception permits the warrantless
seizure of ‘objects dangerous in themselves ”’) Accordingly, because the seized firearm in this case is an
object dangerous in itself, the second condition has been met The third condition has also been met in this
case The officers had a lawful right of access to the object itself because it was in an open field when they
retrieved it See United States v Waterfleld, 2006 U S Dist LEXIS 37630 at ‘23 24 (S D Ohio June 8
2006) ( Because an open field search is a search conducted from a lawful vantage point evidence need only
be immediately apparent as incriminating in order to be seized without a warrant )
Heath 63 V] at 93 94
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Memorandum Opinion and Order 2022 VI SUPER 5 i
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1| 20 Having reviewed Heath, the Court is in agreement with the reasoning and conclusions in
Heath and adopts the analysis, findings, and conclusions therein as though the same were set forth
herein More specifically, the Court concludes in this matter that the officers’ investigatory stop
was lawful, that the officer 5 actions in detaining Heath until they completed the search of the bush
area did not violate Heath’s constitutional rights, and that the officers discovered the firearm and
ammunitions pursuant to a lawful search However, the Court must note that the issue of the arrest
raised in Defendant’s motion to suppress in this matter was not addressed in Heath to wit,
Defendant argued that the discovery of a firearm, without more, does not constitute sufficient
legal grounds to arrest” and according to Detective Cruz’s affidavit, “he did not determine
Defendant did not have license to possess a firearm until police made a check after the arrest ’ '4
(Motion 2 ) The Court will address this issue now
A Whether the Arrest of Defendant was Lawful
1 Standard of Review
1121 “The Fourth Amendment requires that any arrest be based on probable cause,” People of
the Virgin Islands v Maitm 2019 V I LEXIS 148 *12 (V I Super Ct Oct 25 2019) and
[t]he Fourth Amendment is applicable in the Virgin Islands pursuant to § 3 of the Revised
'4 It is unclear whether the issue of the arrest raised in Defendant s motion to suppress in this matter was previously
raised in the 2014 Motion to Suppress
In his motion Defendant cited to Ublles in support of his assertion that the discovery of a firearm without more
does not constitute sufficient legal grounds to arrest ’(Motion 5 ) In Ublles, the court stated that ‘[i]t is not necessarily
a crime to possess a firearm in the Virgin Islands, see V 1 CODE ANN tit 23, § 470; nor does a mere allegation that
a suspect possesses a firearm as dangerous as firearms may be justify an officer in stopping a suspect absent the
reasonable suspicion required by Ten'y ” 224 F 3d at 217
In Heath, Ublles was discussed in the context of the plain view doctrine and the wanantless seizure of incriminating
evidence the court did not discuss whether the arrest of Defendant was lawful when the officers did not determine
that Defendant did not have authority to carry or possess firearm(s) or ammunition(s) in the U S Virgin Islands until
after the arrest See supra, footnote l3
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Organic Act of 1954 People thhe Virgm Islands v Glasford 2022 V1 LEXIS 40 at *10 (VI
Super Ct Apr 19 2022) (citing People of the Vzrgm Islands v Armstrong 64 VI 528 530 n l
(V I 2016) (citing Revised Organic Act of 1954 § 3 48 U S C § 1561 reprinted m VI CODE
ANN Historical Documents Organic Acts and U S Constitution at 87 88 (1995 & Supp 2013)
(preceding V I CODE ANN tit 1)) Arrest by a peace officer with and without warrant in the Virgin
Islands is governed by title 5, section 3562 of the Virgin Islands Code, which provides in relevant
part “A peace officer may make an arrest in obedience to a warrant delivered to him, or may,
without a warrant, arrest a person (1) for a public offense committed or attempted in his
presence, (2) when a person has committed a felony, although not in his presence, (3) when a
felony has in fact been committed and he has reasonable cause for believing the person to have
committed it, (4) on a charge made, upon a reasonable cause, of the commission of a felony by the
party; or (5) at night, when there is reasonable cause to believe that he has committed a felony ”
Title 5 V I C 3562 Reasonable cause or probable cause ‘exists when at the moment of arrest
police have knowledge of facts and circumstances grounded in reasonably trustworthy information
sufficient to warrant a belief by a prudent person that an offense has been or is being committed
by the person to be arrested ” Phipps v People of the Virgin Islands, 54 V I 543 559
(2011)(Swan J concurring) see Blyden v People of the Vzrgm Islands
53 VI 637 651 (V I
2010) (“Probable cause exists where facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's
knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense
has been committed by the person to be arrested ”)
People v Heath
SX 20|7 CR 023
Memorandum Opinion and Order 2022 VI SUPER 5 i
Page 15 of 16
2 Analysis
‘7 22 Here, it was reasonable for the officers to conclude that Defendant had just committed a
crime based on the officers’ knowledge of facts and circumstances More specifically, the officers’
observation of Defendant hunched down in his vehicle at night and Defendant’s flight into the
bush area upon the officers' identification of themselves, plus the recovery of the firearm from the
bush area that Defendant fled into and the recovery of the ammunition from the bush area by
Defendant’s vehicle ripened the officer’s reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk Defendant into
probable cause to arrest Defendant on the evening of January 24, 2014 See Title 5 V I C 3562(3)
and (5) (“A peace officer may make an arrest in obedience to a warrant delivered to him, or may,
without a warrant, arrest a person (3) when a felony has in fact been committed and he has
reasonable cause for believing the person to have committed it; or (5) at night, when there is
reasonable cause to believe that he has committed a felony ”), see also, Blyden, 53 V l at 651
(“Probable cause exists where facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge are
sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been
committed by the person to be arrested ’) Accordingly, the Court concludes that the arrest of
Defendant was lawful
' 23 Based on the foregoing, the Court will deny Defendant’s motion to suppress '5
'5 in their opposition the People argued that Defendant s motion to suppress should be denied under the law of the
case doctrine Courts in this jurisdiction have consistently recognized that, under the law of the case doctrine “a
court is loath to revisit legal issues which it previously decided in the same case” and [2113 articulated in this
jurisdiction, [u]nder the law of the case doctrine when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should
continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case ”’ Virgin Islands Tax: Assocmtion, 67 V l
at 67] However it is unclear and the People failed to explain why this matter should be considered as a subsequent
stage of the 20|4 Case and not a separate case given that the 2014 Case was dismissed and a new information was
filed in this matter Nevertheless based on the Court 5 ruling, the Court need not address this issue at this juncture
I
Pea];1e v Heath
ililflgll-anfingzgpinion and Order 2022 VI SUPER ii
Page 16 of 16
CONCLUSION
11 24 For the reasons stated above the Court will deny Defendant’s motion to dismiss, deny
Defendant’s motion to suppress, and schedule a calendar call in this matter Accordingly, it is
hereby
ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss, filed on September 21 , 202] , is DENIED
It is further
ORDERED that Defendant s motion to suppress, filed on September 21, 2021, is
DENIED And it is further
ORDERED that the parties shall appear on w Q} 2022 at
q (2” mm m via Zoom, for a calendar call in this matter
DONE and so ORDERED this ?_ék day of June 2022
ATTEST Mfl 17/M
Tamara Charles HAROLD W L WILLOCKS
Clerk of the Court Presiding Judge of the Superior Court
MW
Court Clerk Supew-ieorZZ’
Dated Q1 g [m
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
District of St. Croix
People of the Virgin Islands v. Quanza Heath Case Number: SX-2017-CR-00023
Charges: 14 V.I.C. 2253(a) - Possession Of An
Unlicense Firearm
14 V.I.C. 2256(a) - Possession Or Sale Of
Ammunition
23 V.I.C. 470(a) - Failure To Report
Firearm/Ammo Purchase
23 V.I.C. 481(b) - Possession Of Unlicensed
Firearm/W Obliterated Sn
NOTICE of ENTRY
of
Memorandum Opinion and Order
To: Eric Chancellor, Esq. Martial A. Webster, Sr., Esq.
Please take notice that on June 08, 2022
a(n) Memorandum Opinion and Order
dated June 7, 2022 was/were entered
by the Clerk in the above-titled matter.
Dated: June 08, 2022 Tamara Charles
Clerk of the Court
By:
Janeen Maranda
Court Clerk II