IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
DIVISION OF ST. CROIX
NAOMI LENHARDT and CLAUDIA
LENHARDT.
Plaintiffs,
CASE NO. SX-2006-CV-00511
v.
TANYAH BARNETT, DENISE LENHARDT.
FLOYD E. LENHARDT, and ALL PERSONS
CLAIMING ANY LEGAL OR EQUITABLE
RIGHT, TITLE, ESTATE, LIEN, OR OTHER
INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY DESCRIBED
IN THE COMPLAINT ADVERSE TO
PLAINTIFFS’ TITLE, OR ANY CLOUD ON
PLAINTIFFS’ TITLE HERETO
Defendants
Cite as: 2025 V.I. Super 2 P
MEMORANDUM OPINON
[1] THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant Denise Lenhardt’s pro se April 10,
2024, unopposed “Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute or Alternatively Entry of Default”
The Court will grant the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
{2] Plaintiffs Naomi Lenhardt and Claudia Lenhardt filed their Complaint on August 10, 2006
The Compiaint alleges that Denise Lenhardt was occupying rental units, either personally or by
allowing other people to reside therein, at property jointly owned by Naomi Lenhardt, Denise
Lenhardt, and Tanyah Barnett. Plaintiffs also allege that the unauthorized rentals resulted in waste
On September 6, 2006, Defendants Tanyah Barnett and Denise Lenhardt filed an Answer denying
the claims. On October 16, 2006, Plaintiffs filed for entry of a default against Defendant Floyd
Lenhardt, which was entered the next day. Defendants claim that, before the action, Floyd
Lenhardt had already transferred his interest in the underlying property to Denise Lenhardt
pursuant to an October 5, 2005, Quitclaim Deed
[3) The parties engaged in extensive motion practice, which included the filing of summary
judgment and partition motions. Of note, Defendants filed a July 9, 2007, Opposition to Plaintiffs’
Motion for Summary Judgement stating that Naomi Lenhardt, Denise Lenhardt, and Tanyah
Memorandum Opinion 2025 V.I. Super 2 P
Lenhardt, et. al. v. Barnett, et. al.,
SX-06-CV-51]
Page 2 of §
Barnett jointly appointed a third-party property manager. An attached affidavit from Denise
Lenhardt alleges that the property managers were still collecting reduced rent, at their discretion,
and, when the action was initiated, were taking one tenant to court for nonpayment
{4] | Momentum in the case ended after the Court granted Plaintiff's Counsel leave to withdraw
on March 28, 2012. In that motion, Plaintiffs’ counsel advised that Claudia Lenhardt no longer
wished to pursue the matter, and Naomi Lenhardt had become increasingly uncooperative and
nonresponsive. Since then, Plaintiffs have been served with Court Orders to appear at hearings
Plaintiffs have failed to show up to nine status hearings held on May 2, 2019, November 7, 2019,
February 10, 2021, May 11, 2022, August 17, 2022, February 15, 2023, May 15, 2023 January
31, 2024, and September 4, 2024. Plaintiffs have also ignored an October 10, 2014, Order from
the Court to move the case forward within fourteen (14) days. Plaintiffs have not entered a pro se
appearance or otherwise obtained substitute counsel
LEGAL STANDARD
[5] The Plaintiffs are ultimately responsible for prosecuting their case. See Ventura v Virgin
Islands Hosp. & Health Facilities Corp., 2021 V1 SUPER 92U, { 14 (Super. Ct Aug. 30, 2021)
see also, Ferguson v. Francis, 2024 VI SUPER 30U, § 20 (V.I. Super. Aug. 19 2024). Ifthe
plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to
dismiss the action or any claim against it. V.I. R. CIV. P. Rule 41(b). Unless the dismissal order
states otherwise, a dismissal under V.I. R. CIV. P. Rule 41(b) operates as an adjudication on the
merits
[6] Dismissal for failure to prosecute is an “extreme” sanction and must be reserved for
instances in which it is justly merited. Halliday v. Footlocker Specialty, Inc., 53 V.1. 505, 510
(2010). As such, in evaluating a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, courts in the Virgin
Islands evaluate the six Poulis factors
(1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the
adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery;
(3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney
was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal,
which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of
the claim or defense
Id. at 510 (2010) (quoting Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir
1984)). Only when all six factors strongly weigh in favor of dismissal as a sanction is a dismissal
for failure to prosecute justified. Id. at 511. Nonetheless, the power to dismiss for failure to
Memorandum Opinion 2025 V.I. Super 2 P
Lenhardt, et. al. v. Barnett, et. al.,
$X-06-CV-51I
Page 3 of §
prosecute is necessary to prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases and to avoid
Court congestion. See Link v. Wabash R. Co.,
370 U.S. 626, 629 (1962)
DISCUSSION
I THE PLAINTIFFS ARE PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR FAILURE
TO PROSECUTE
[7] The Plaintiffs have not been represented since their counsel withdrew in 2012. Since then,
they have not secured substitute counsel. They have not appeared at duly scheduled court hearings,
although they were notified of some of the hearings. They have not complied with any order of
the Court or contacted the Court regarding the status of their case in over ten years. These facts
compel the Court to conclude that they have abandoned their case. Considering the Poulis factors,
adopted in Halliday v. Footlocker Specialty, Inc., supra, the weight of circumstances favors
dismissal
A. The Plaintiff's failure te prosecute has prejudiced Defendants
[8] Delays that hinder an adversary’s ability to levy a proper defense against the plaintiff's
complaint are prejudicial. See Sanchez v. Hughes, No. ST-04-CV-393, 2011 WL 3855477, at *3
(V.L Super. Mar. 21, 2011). In Sanchez, the Plaintiff failed to move a dog bite claim forward for
six years. Jd, The Court found that such a delay resulted in witnesses relocating and memories
fading, thus prejudicing the Defendants’ ability to launch a full-throated defense against the
claims. /d. The instant case deals with a property dispute from 2006. Like Sanchez, in the almost
twenty (20) years since the Complaint was filed, the Defendants and potential witnesses may have
changed jobs, retired, moved away, or simply forgot relevant information to the case. Moreover,
during the twenty years, the property condition may have changed, prejudicing the Defendants’
defense against the Plaintiffs’ waste claims. If a six-year delay was prejudicial to the Defendants
in Sanchez, then the over 10-year lapse since Plaintiffs counsel was permitted to withdraw is
certainly prejudicial to the instant Defendants
B. Plaintiffs have a history of dilatoriness because they have repeatedly failed to
comply with Court orders
[9] In addressing this Poulis factor, the Third Circuit found that repeated failure to comply
with time limits imposed by the Court demonstrated a pattern of dilatoriness that was “intolerable.”
BIZVI, LLC v. Olive, No. ST-15-CV-89, 2015 WL 13858467, at *7 (V.L. Super. Nov. 23, 2015)
The Third Circuit explained that “[t]ime limits imposed by the rules and the court serve an
important purpose for the expeditious processing of litigation ... [i]f compliance is not feasible, a
timely request for an extension should be made to the court.” /d. In this case, the Plaintiffs have
repeatedly failed to comply with the time limits imposed by the Court. Most notably, the Court
Memorandum Opinion 2025 V.1. Super 2 P
Lenhardt, et. al. v. Barnett, et. al.,
SX-06-CV-511
Page 4 of §
ordered the Plaintiffs to move the case forward, which they ignored. Plaintiffs also failed to show
up at nine (9) hearings. A party's failure to attend status hearings, comply with the court’s orders,
and take the initiative to move their case forward are all evidence of dilatory conduct. Hassan v.
Brian/Bryan Bishop, 77 V.1. 269, 275, 2023 V1 SUPER 20, 4 16 (Super. Ct. 2023). Here, the
repeated failures to follow Court orders and total inaction are intolerable and justify dismissal for
failure to prosecute
C. The conduct of Plaintiffs is willful and in bad faith because it is repeated
[10] In evaluating whether to dismiss an action for failure to prosecute, the Court must examine
whether the Plaintiffs or their counsel engaged in willful or flagrantly bad faith behavior. BIZVI.
LLC v. Olive, 2015 WL 13858467, at *8 (“Willfulness involves intentional or self. serving
behavior.”) If there is no specific evidence of willfulness, it is assumed that the delay is
unintentional, and this factor will not weigh in favor of dismissal. Ferguson v. Francis, 2024 VI
SUPER 30U, 4 14. However, delay is sufficient for a finding of willfulness or bad faith when there
is “evidence on the record that Plaintiff has repeatedly ignored the Court's orders or flouted the
Court's authority.” BIZVI, LLC v. Olive,
2015 WL 13858467, at *8
{l11] The Court allowed the Plaintiffs’ attorney to withdraw in 2012. Since then, the Plaintiffs
have repeatedly ignored the Court’s orders and failed to appear at multiple hearings without
excuse. Considering the age of the case, it is reasonable to expect that within ten years, a litigant,
particularly a plaintiff, would contact the Court to follow up on the status of their case. The
Plaintiffs have not done so. These facts alone show that the delay is willful
D. The effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal would be futile because
Plaintiffs do not wish to prosecute their case
[12] Dismissal for failure to prosecute is an extreme sanction of last resort. Halliday v.
Footlocker Specialty, Inc., 53 V.1. at 510. However, in the case at hand, the inaction of the
Plaintiffs shows that they are not interested in prosecuting the case further. Any lesser sanction,
such as imposition of fines against an absent party, will not further the case. Rather, dismissal for
failure to prosecute is warranted given the circumstances while simultaneously reducing the
congestion on the Court’s docket and preventing undue delay in the progression of cases
E. The Defendants raise a meritorious defense that, if true, would completely bar
recovery
[13] In considering whether a claim or defense is meritorious for the final Poulis factor, Courts
do not apply summary judgment standards. BIZVI, LLC v. Olive, 2015 WL 13858467, at *9
Rather, a claim or defense will be deemed meritorious when the allegations in the pleadings, if
established at trial, would support the Plaintiff's recovery or constitute a complete defense. Jd. In
Memorandum Opinion 2025 V.I. Super 2 P
Lenhardt, et. al. v. Barnett, et. al
SX-06-CV-511
Page 5 of §
the case at hand, the Defendants submitted a July 9, 2007, Opposition to the Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Summary Judgement that states that Naomi Lenhardt, Denise Lenhardt, and Tanyah Barnett all
have an interest in the subject property, and they jointly appointed third-party property managers
Moreover, an attached affidavit from Denise Lenhardt alleges that the property managers were
still collecting reduced rent, at their discretion, and, at the time of filing, were taking one tenant to
court for nonpayment. If established at trial, this defense would constitute a complete defense
CONCLUSION
[14] All six Poulis factors used by Virgin Islands Courts in evaluating Motions to Dismiss for
Failure to Prosecute weigh in favor of dismissal. The Plaintiffs have displayed a history of willful
and dilatory conduct by failing to appear at court hearings and otherwise disobeying the orders of
this Court. The repeated nature of the Plaintiffs’ conduct rises to bad faith, particularly when they
ignore duly served orders of the court to appear before it. The Defendants waited almost twenty
years to have their case heard. The Plaintiffs’ silence prejudiced the Defendants because witnesses
and evidence were likely lost, and memories faded. It also caused unacceptable congestion on the
Court’s docket. As such, the Court will grant the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure to
Prosecute. An appropriate Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will follow
Pal ff MZ, ef
Dated: January 24, 2025 Beamws e g PO,
at YV OSS EDWARDS
Judge of the Superior Court
ATTEST
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By, SS >
~Gourt Clerk
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
District of St. Croix
Naomi Lenhardt et al, Case Number: SX-2006-CV-00511
Plaintiff Action: Partition And Quiet Title
v.
Tanyah Barnett et al,
Defendant.
NOTICE of ENTRY
of
MEMORANDUM OPINION
To: Naomi Lenhardt Tanyah Barnett
Claudia Lenhardt Denuise Lenhardt
Floyd Lenhardt
Please take notice that on January 31, 2025
a(n) MEMORANDUM OPINION
dated February 02, 2025 was/were entered
by the Clerk in the above-titled matter.
Dated: January 31, 2025 Tamara Charles
Clerk of the Court
By:
Sioned Hernandez
Court Clerk II