IN THE SUPERIOR COURT THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
                                DIVISION OF ST. THOMAS AND ST. JOHN

ST. THOMAS CARGO                    & SHIP                         )
SERVICES, INC                                                      )
                                                                   )         CASE NO.       ST-2025-RV-00009
                               Appellant                           )
                                                                   )         APPEAL
         vy                                                        )
                                                                   )         RE:   Super. Ct. No. ST-2024-SM-00091
BONNIE        BRAGA                                                )
                                                                   )
                               Appellee                            )
ce
                                                   2025 VI Super 40

                                    MEMORANDUM             OPINION       AND       ORDER

ql       THIS MATTER                is before the Court upon Appellant, St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services

Inc’s (“STT Cargo”),' notice of appeal, filed September 9, 2025,” and the record from the

underlying Small Claims matter, Case No. ST-2024-SM-00091, before the Magistrate Division of

this Court.    After reviewing the notice of appeal and the record, the Court concludes that Appellant

received legal notice* of the suit and failed to act in a timely manner.                     Furthermore, Appellant




' Appellant's corporate name is written both with an ampersand as well as with the conjunction “and” throughout the
record. As Appellant does not dispute that the variations of spelling of Appellant’s name in the record are, in fact
Appellant, any such argument is waived. See /n re Bauxite Containing Silica Halliday Litig. Series, Master Case No
SX-2015-CV-097, 

, at *4 n.3 (V.I. Super. Ct. Mar. 26, 2024) (unpublished) (arguments raised for
the first time in reply waived); see generally World Fresh Markets, LLC v. Henry, 71 V.L. 1161, 1171-73 (V.1. 2019)
{arguments not timely raised are waived); Skepple v. Bank of N.S., 69 V.1. 700, 744-46 (V.I. 2018) (substantively
participating without presenting objection waives legal arguments); Ubiles v. People, 66 V.1. 572, 583-84 (V.L 2017)
(explaining “Fairly Presented” standard and the consequences of failing to Fairly Present an argument); Evans-Freke
v. Evans-Freke, 75 V.1. 407, 465-80 (V.1. 2021) 465-80 (Swan, J., concurring) (substantive participation can waive
even a previously preserved defense)
? As this matter is in the Appellate Division, the Virgin Islands E-filing rules apply. For Parties’ filings approved by
the Clerk of the Court, the operative date for purposes of complying with filing deadlines is the date a document is
submitted electronically.    V.I.   E-FILING R. 5(d) (“If the clerk accepts the document, the document shall be considered
filed with the court on the date the original submission to the electronic filing system was complete.”);     see also V.1
E-FILING R. 5(c)
3 See generally Skepple, 69 V.1. at 715 n.5 (defining “Legal Notice”     and analyzing Due Process notice requirements
for commencing a case)
St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services,         Inc. v. Braga
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                                                          2025 VI Super 40


failed to make out a case of Good Cause/Excusable Neglect;* and the Default Judgement obtained

by Appellee is valid 5 Therefore, the Court affirms the Order entered August 28, 2025,° denying

STT Cargo’s motion to vacate the June 26, 2025 Order’ of the Magistrate Division for the reasons

explained below




4-V.1. SM.   CL.   R. 6(b) (A motion for relief from a       “Default Judgment”       in a   “Smail Claims Proceeding”          “must state
good cause for granting such relief.”); see generally Montgomery v. Virgin Gr and Villas St. John Owners' Ass'n, 7|
V.1. 1119, 1127 (V.I. 2019) (quoting Beachside Assocs., LLC v. Fishman, 53 V.1. 700, 713 (V.I. 2010)): Beachside
Assocs., 53 V.1. at 713 (quoting MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Teleconcepts, Inc., 

, 1097 (3d Cir. 1995); and
citing Petrucelli v. Bohringer and Ratzinger, 

, 1312 (3d Cir.1995), Turner v. City of Taylor, 

, 650 (6th Cir.2005); McGuire v. Turnbo, 

, 324 (Sth Cir.1998),; Adams \ AlliedSignal General
Aviation Avionics, 

, 887 (8th Cir. 1996); Boudette v. Boudette, 

 (9th Cir. 1991))
5 Appellant does not challenge the Default Judgement as lacking any of the four essential requirements of a valid
judgment, and the record reflects STT Cargo had Legal Notice and does not reveal a facial deficiency in the Default
Judgment. Cf. Skepple., 69 V.I. at 731 (“[T]he facts in the record [do not] make a prima facie showing that service
was accomplished.” (citing Molloy v. Independence Blue Cross, 56 V.1. 155, 172 (V.I. 2012); Settlemier v. Sullivan,
97 USS. (7 Otto) 444, 447 (1879); Thomas v. Bonanno, Civ. No. 2013-06, 

, at *3 (D.V.I1. July 30
2013) (unpublished)))
6 V.], SUPER. CT. R. 322(b)(1) (deadline for appeal from Magistrate Division runs from “entry” of the Final Order
in a Small Claims Proceeding)
7 As discussed more fully below, the record establishes that STT Cargo was                   “properly served with process” and did
not appear on the return date.        Judgment having been entered after taking evidence on damages in STT Cargo’s
absence, the June 26, 2025 Order was a “Default Judgment,”             regardless of it being labeled an order.        V.I. SM. CL. R
4(b)(3)(A): Henry, 71 V.1. at 1170 (citing Penn v. Mosley, 

, 891 n.4 (V.L 2017) (discussing the distinctions
between a judgment, order, and decree); Miller v. Sorenson, 67 V.1. 861, 871 n.5 (V.1 2017) (discussing the
distinctions between a judgment and decree); Prosser v. Prosser, 33 V.1. 32, 40 (V.1. Super. Ct. 1995) (Noting that
 with the procedural merger of law and equity in the federal and most state [and territorial] courts under the Rules of
Civil Procedure, the term ‘judgment’ has generally replaced ‘decree.’” (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 410
(6th ed. 1990), and citing 16 V.I.C. §§ 108, 110, 111; 46 AM. JUR, 2D Judgments § 2 (1969)))); Davis v. People, 76
V1. 514, 526 n.4 (V.1. 2022) (Swan, J., concurring) (citing Balboni v. Ranger Am. of the V.1. 

, 0.4 (V.I
2019) (“It is well-established that it is the content and substance of an argument rather than its form or title, that is
controlling.” (citing Island Tile & Marble, LLC v. Bertrand, 57 V.1. 596, 611-12 (V.1. 2012) Hughley v. Gov't of the
VL, 

 (VI. 2014))); Hughley, 

 (noting that litigants need not use magic words”); see
Sorenson,    67 V.1. at 872 (acknowledging that it is the substance of a court's actions rather than the label the court
applies that controls (citing Brvan v. Fawkes,       

, 452 n.17 (V.I. 2014))); Penn, 67 V.1. at 898-99                 (“[C]ourts
 should examine, not just the nominal label (or, as here, the absence of a label), but the substance of what is requested
 (citing Jarbough    v. Atorney   Gen.,   

 (3d Cir.   2007))):    Toussaint \ Stewart,   67 V1.     931,    947 (V.I
 2017) (citing Brvan, 61 V.I. at 467 n.30; Anthony v. FirstBank VI, 58 V.1. 224, 228 n.5 (V.1. 2013): Bertrand, 57 V.1
 at 611-12; Joseph v. Gov't of the V.1, 54 V.1. 644, 648 n.2 (V.I. 2011); Penn, 67 V.L. at 898-99: Jarbough. 

)
St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services, Inc. v. Braga
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                                                        2025 VI Super 40

                                                       BACKGROUND

q2          Appellant does not challenge the judgment based on a lack of supporting evidence® but,

instead, argues that the judgment should be vacated to provide STT Cargo with the opportunity to

present opposing evidence on damages at a new trial.                           Because there is no challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence produced at trial, the following is a summary of the allegations (and

findings of fact) that are included only for the purpose of providing context,” followed by the

material procedural history determinative of this Appeal

     I.     Allegations and Findings of Fact

q3          It was alleged that Braga paid STT Cargo monthly fees for use of storage space #12 for

over 25 years.'°            Braga usually paid monthly storage fees several months in advance for the

duration of her occupancy of the storage space and was paid in full at the time of her August 9,

2024 visit.'!' On that day, Braga visited storage space #12 at STT Cargo and found that the padlock

had been removed and the contents emptied.!?                        She was the only person with a key.'?       Braga

immediately contacted a person she alleges to be a manager of STT Cargo and reported the missing

contents of her storage space.             This person could not offer an immediate explanation to Braga, and

it took STT Cargo three days to provide such




8 See generally, e.g., Penn, 

 (reviewing a Small Claims appeal for sufficient evidence)
 ” See generally 

 (“[R]ather than [blindly accept] the legal terminology used by [a party’s] lawyer when
seeking review in the Superior Court's Appellate Division [,]        the Appellate Division is cautioned to look at the
factual substance of the testimony of pro se Small Claims parties and consider legal theories that might be implicated
          (citing Cape Air Int'l v. Lindsey, 53 V.1.604, 619 (V.I. 2919)))
'° SC Compl.,     p.   1-2 and Ex.   2. p. 2 (Police Incident Report Narrative Page)
'' SC Compl.      p. 1
2 SC Compl..      p. |
'S SC Compl.,     p. 2
St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services, Inc. v. Braga
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                                                     2025 VI Super 40


q4         When Braga returned to STT Cargo, she alleges that the manager “Amy Gillotte” explained

that STT Cargo had hired a company to clean out storage spaces near Braga’s; during this process,

Braga’s storage space was also emptied '4 The manager explained that those employed by STT

Cargo who had made this mistake                 “had been let go     'S Braga filed a police report and retained

counsel, who wrote a letter to STT Cargo,                which was hand delivered on September 11,                 2024 6

STT Cargo failed to respond in any way.'’ While Braga’s counsel was awaiting a response, Braga

began receiving various credits to her credit card.              In response, Braga canceled her credit card and

contacted       Amy       Gillotte   at   STT    Cargo     to    explain   that    these    unilateral   actions     were

“unacceptable.”!®




'4 SC Compl.,   p. 2
'S SC Compl.,   p.1-2
‘9 SC Compl., p. 2 and Ex. 4
 ™SC Compl.,    p. 2
‘8 SC Compl.,   p. 3.   While litigants have an obligation to mitigate damages,   it is unclear if STT Cargo was refunding
these credits to declare their acceptance was in some way a settlement. Certainly, Braga could not be faulted for
accepting refunds of charges that were made after her storage space had been wrongly emptied, as these were invalid
See generally Gimenez v, De Leon, No. ST-15-RV-4, 

,                    at *4 (V.I. Super. Nov. 4 2016)
(unpublished) (Generally, courts should “promote the mitigation of damages,’           {and a] party ‘to a contract cannot
recover damages for loss that he could have avoided by reasonable efforts,”            and he is   “expected to take such
affirmative steps as are appropriate in the circumstances to avoid loss by making substitute arrangements’” (quoting
Raimer v. Stout, 14 V.1. 568, 591 (V.L. Super. Ct. 1978); A. E. Lockhart Mgmt. v. Hughes, 40 V.1. 123, 129-131 (V1
Super. Ct. 1999); and citing Germain v. Crown, 9 V.1. 501, 506 (D.V.1. 1973))); Julien 1 Matthew, 

, 960
(V.I. 2024) (“Material breaches excuse the non-breaching party's performance and allow for a myriad of remedies.”
(citation omitted)); In re Exide Techs., 

 (3d Cir. 2010), as amended (June 24, 2010) (“[A]
material breach, which ‘justifies the other party to suspend [their] own performance,” is ‘a breach which is so
substantial as to defeat the purpose of the entire transaction          The non-breaching party will be discharged from
the further performance of its obligations under the contract when the breach goes to the root of the contract *” (quoting
Lipsky v. Commonwealth United Corp., 

 (2d Cir.1976); and citing In re Lavigne 

(2d Cir.1997))). However, without any clear indication from STT Cargo that the refunds were not in full settlement
of any potential claim Braga had against them for the wrongful removal and destruction of her property in breach of
the contract for Braga to have a license to use STT Crago’s Unit 12 storage space, Braga was wise to end these
unilateral actions by the party whom she believed had breached their contract and wrongfully disposed of her personal
property
St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services, Inc. v. Braga
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
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                                                      2025 VI Super 40

q5       After a lack of response, Braga filed her Small Claims Complaint, which included an

itemized list of the contents of her storage unit and their estimated value '° Braga also attached

various invoices from STT Cargo and credit card receipts indicating she had paid her storage unit

fees under the license contract through August of 2024.”°

q6       These allegations appear to present a claim of breach of a contract for a license to use real

property (i.¢., the storage space (#12) at STT Cargo),”! as Braga alleges she paid to use a storage


19 SC Compl.,   Ex. 3, p. 1
 ° SC Compl.,   Ex. 5 p. 4
21 Although the Small Claims Complaint indicates this is an action for “DebUDamages,” the Court is stili obligated to
consider the factual substance of the allegations (and, later, evidence). Penn, 67 V.1. at 897; ¢.g., Serieux      Schneider
Clinic, 74 V.1. 429, 436  (V.L. Super. Ct. 2021) (“Although   [plaintiff] asserted an action for debt in Small Claims  Court
the allegations in [the] complaint read as negligence on the part of a medical provider. The Court could also liberally
construe [the] claims as a breach of contract between doctor and patient.”); Chaput \ Scafidi, 

 (V.I
Super. Ct. 2017) (“[Plaintiff’s] last claim was also couched as a debt claim: the value of the gun [Defendant] allegedly
stole from [plaintiff's] house. However, in truth, [plaintiff] asserted a claim for conversion     (citing Shmueli \
Corcoran Group, 

, 875 n.2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.      2005)))  Rahhal v . Clarke, 2022 V1 SUPER    67U, jf 2
16 (“This matter arises from Clarke’s purchase of a vehicle              Although never so presented, the nature of Clarke's
claim against Rahhal is for breach of the parties’ contract.”); see generally Toussaint, 67 V.L. at 947 (“Courts should
look beyond the nominal label given by a party to the substance of what is being asked.” (citing Bryan, 

n.30; Anthony., 58 V.I. at 228 n.5; Bertrand, 57 V.I. at 611-12; Joseph, 54 V1. at 648 n.2; Penn, 67 V.1. at 897;
Jarbough, 

)); Bradley v. International Voyager Media, Inc., 50 V.1. 51, 69 (V.L. Super. Ct. 2008) (“[A]
license is an agreement allowing a party to use the land of another for a specific purpose, subject to the control and
management of me owner. Unlike a lease, a license does not convey any interest in land, is usually not assignable,
and may be either created orally or by written contract.” (citation omitted)); ¢f Yacht Haven USVI, LLC v. Hubbly
Bubbly, LLC, Case No. ST-12-CV-327, 

, at *1 (V.I. Super July 30, 2012) (unpublished)
  Damages” is not a cause of action; it is the element of a civil action giving rise to a right to relief. Debt” has not
been adopted as a cause of action by the Virgin Islands Supreme Court. Notably, an action for “Debt” is an amorphous
concept of questionable utility as a cause of action.        “Breach of Contract”     covers nearly every factual situation in
which a non-tort debt can be created.       See generally Chaput, 66 V.1. at 190 (“‘Ordinarily, a promissory note is the
primary evidence of the indebtedness.’     A promissory note is “an unconditional contract to pay                       (emphasis
added) (quoting Fed. Farm Mortg. Corp. v. Bollinger, 

 (Kan.   1940)  Kothari     v . Patel,    585  $.E.2d
97, 103 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003))). Furthermore, Thomas      v . Carlos  Warehouse   recognized  that  a   majority    of  courts  have
held that “Debt” is indistinguishable from  causes of action   such  a Breach of Contract.  

   (V.I.  Super.
Ct. 2016) (“““{OJur cases have noted in dicta that debt claims sound in contract law.” (citing Ryans Rest 949 F. Supp
at 381-82: Schroeder v. Hackett, 

 (V.L. Super. Ct. 1977): Peppertree Terrance v. Williams, 52 V1
225, 237 (V.I. 2009) (Swan, J., concurring))); see also id. at 188 (collecting cases from other jurisdictions). In
situations not amounting to a Breach of Contract, there are quasi-contract and “Unjust Enrichment” theories of
recovery, Carlos Warehouse, 64 V.1. at 191 (collecting cases acknowledging that debt claims often factually lie as
claims of Unjust Enrichment and quasi contract); and the rules of civil procedure allow both pleading inconsistent
claims and claims in the altemative. It is also noteworthy that, while Carolos Warehouse, 

, stated that
some courts had identified factual situations in which causes of action such as Breach of Contract and Unjust
 Enrichment do not apply to facts clearly indicating a debt owed, the cases cited rely upon Unjust Enrichment and quasi
S1. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services,      Inc. v. Braga
ST-2025-RV-00009
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
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                                                        2025 VJ Super 40

space    in a storage facility that had regulated                   access.”       The    facts alleged also involve the

unauthorized destruction of personal property, therefore, a claim of conversion is colorable.”*

q7       At the Small Claims Default Judgement Hearing, Braga testified to the facts as alleged and

supported her testimony with exhibits.7*                Specifically finding Braga credible, the trial court noted



contract theories of recovery.    Furthermore, in Carlos Warehouse, 64 V.1. at 183, the court noted that, “[i]n its
December 31, 2013 [Smail Claims] Complaint, Carlos Warehouse alleged that [the defendant] purchased merchandise
from its store, failed to make payments, and still owes a balance. No claim, as such, was identified in the complaint.’
This was plainly a breach of contact alleged. The Court cannot identify a factual scenario in which a claim of “Debt
would be distinguishable, either substantively or procedurally, from a claim for Breach of Contract, Unjust
Enrichment. or a quasi-contract theory.    Moreover, Carlos Warehouse predated the Supreme Court’s              directive in Penn
67 V.1. at 897, that this Court is to consider the evidence presented in a Small Claims Proceeding and consider the
legal theories of recovery implicated by that evidence.       Recognizing a separate cause of action for “Debt”      independent
of existing theories of recovery appears to have about as much utility as treating a breach of a Jease as a claim different
from a claim for Breach of Contract.      In light of the binding command of the Virgin Islands Supreme Court in Penn
that “the Appellate Division is cautioned to look at the factual substance of the testimony of pro se Small Claims
parties and consider legal theories that might be implicated        

 at 897 (citing Cape Air Int'l, 53 V.1. at 619), this
Court believes the best rule of law for the Virgin Islands is far more likely to be developed when a pro se party’s
evidence does not fit within an existing cause of action, thus creating the need to determine the contours of a claim of
 Debt.” The facts giving rise to such a situation would be informative as to the best formulation of the elements of
the cause of action. Cf Carlos Warehouse, 64 V.1. at 185 (“No court in the Virgin Islands has ever discussed the
common law origins of the debt action, what law governs a debt claim, or how a claim for debt is proven in court
(emphasis added)). Because the facts of this Case plainly fall within several existing causes of action, there is no need
to consider a claim of “Debt
2 Alternatively, depending on the terms of access to the storage space. the Parties may have had a lease contract
Lastly, though the present facts do not seem to give rise to such a claim, the depositing of one’s personal property
with another for storage could establish a bailment agreement. See generally Cape Air Int'l, 53 V.1. at 620 (‘A bailor
makes out a prima facie case of negligence by a bailee by proof of three elements: a contract of bailment: delivery to
the bailee; and the failure of the bailee to redeliver the property at termination of the bailment.” (citations and internal
quotations omitted)); McKenzie Const., Inc. v. St. Croix Storage Corp., No. CIV. 1991-0141, 

, at
*5 (D.V.1. Feb. 3, 1997) (unpublished) (“‘In order to create a bailment, possession of the subject property must pass
from the bailor to the bailee. Generally, this takes the form of a delivery by the bailor and an acceptance by the
bailee.’” (quoting Ventura v. Pearson, 

 (V.1. Super. Ct. 1980)))
33 See generally Penn, 

 (Plaintiff “unequivocally argued that property, which was [theirs], had been
removed from [their] home by [defendant] and not retumed. This is the archetypical example of conversion.”)
*4 Unfortunately, the trial court did not note what the trial exhibits were or if they were the same as attached to the
Small Claims Complaint.      Because Appellant did not seek a new trial based on insufficient evidence and does not
challenge the evidence on appeal, it is unnecessary to further develop the evidentiary support for the judgment
However, it is useful for appellate purposes to note that, if the evidence presented in a Small Claims Default Judgment
Hearing (or Trial) is the same as any exhibit to the Small Claims Complaint and to at least note the nature of any
further evidence presented at trial. Although, it is arguably proper to infer that the exhibits were those attached to the
Small Claims Complaint, as a Small Claims plaintiff has an affirmative duty to attach any written documentation upon
which   a Small Claims Complaint     is based.   V.I.   SM.   CL.   R.   2(a)(2) (“If the claim   is based in part upon   a written
document. a copy of the document should be attached to the complaint            ), such an inference is not necessarily
supported by the present facts. The better practice would be for the Magistrate to note what the trial exhibits are when
entering judgment and note which exhibits were attached to the Small Claims Complaint
St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services, Inc. v. Braga
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                                                       2025 VI Super 40

as follows,       “Observing the Plaintiff's demeanor and testimony, and considering the complaint filed

by the Plaintiff, the Court found that the Plaintiff had met her burden of proof by a preponderance

of the evidence.”?°

 {I          Procedural History

q8           On May 21, 2025, Appellant, Braga, commenced”* a Small Claims Proceeding”’ (Case No

ST-2025-SM-00091) in the Magistrate Division”® of this Court by filing a Small Claims Complaint

against STT Cargo.”? On May 28, 2025, a Small Claims Summons was returned by the Superior

Court Marshal’s Office in which it was reported that the summons was served on Amy Weddle*”

on May 23, 2025.3!              The summons was addressed to St. Thomas Cargo and Shipping at 8197



5 Default Judgment, p. 1, June 26, 2025
 © VI. SM. CL. R. 2(a) (‘A Small Claims action is commenced by filing a complaint with the Clerk of the Court.”)
Parris v. Nurse, 76 V.L 492, 501 (V.I. 2022) (“[G]eneral provisions in title 5 state that the limitations subtitle ‘applies
to suits[.] which are brought in one form of action known as ‘civil action’            pursuant to [the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.]’ The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure — and identically in the present V.I. Rules of Civil Procedure
define commencement of an action. The applicable rule provides that a civil action is commenced by the filing of a
complaint.” (alterations in origina!) (quoting 5 V.LC. § 1; and citing FED. R. CIV. P. 3; V.I. R. CIV. P. 3; Kelley y
Gov't of the V. £., 

 (V.I. 2013)))
>? BLACK’S      L. DICT.,   at 1241 (defining   “proceeding”     as “the regular and orderly progression of a lawsuit, including
all acts and events between the time of commencement and the entry of judgment.”)
8 See generally V.1. SM. CL. R. 2(b) (“In accordance with Title 4, section 123(d) of the Virgin Islands Code, all
actions commenced in the Small Claims Division shall be concurrently assigned to the Magistrate Division.”’)
   Sm. Cl, Complaint, p. 1, May 21, 2025; V.I. SM. CL. R. 2(a)
* The Virgin Islands Small Claims Rules do not incorporate by reference Virgin Islands Rule of Civil Procedure 4
governing service of process—which expressly provides for service upon a “managing or general agent” of a juridical
person, V.I.R. CIV. P. 4(a)—and expressly reject the application of the Rules of Civil Procedure to Small Claims
Proceedings. Notably, Appellant does not argue that service of process was ineffective or otherwise deficient, thus
waiving such argument. Henry, 71 V.I. at 1171-73; Skepple, 69 V.L. at 744-46; Ubiles, 

. It is
therefore,    reasonable to conclude that Amy Weddle,          or however this person’s surname may be spelled (as it appears
in various spellings in the record), was, in fact, the manager of Appellant and a proper person to receive service on
behalf of a juridical entity.   See generally Defoe v. Phillip, 56 V.1. 109,     129 (V.1. 2012) (“[W]e recognize the principle
that [juridical persons] may only act through their agents                (citing Tavarez v. Klingensmith, 

, 191
92 (3d Cir. 2004))); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc..          

, 707 (V.I. 2014) (Juridical persons,    “separate
and apart from the human beings who own, run, and are employed by them, cannot do anything at all.”); City of St.
Louis v. Praprotnik, 

 (1988) (“[A] corporation is incapable of doing anything except through the
agency of human beings . . .” (citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 

 (1978))): Evans
Freke, 75 V.1. at 434 (Swan. J., concurring) (citing BLACK'S L. DICT., 1258 (defining “juridical person’”’))
3! Proof of Service of Process, p. 2 (handwritten note          “5/23/25 @ 12:45 pm @ St. Thomas Cargo and Shipping.         Ms
Amy Weddle was served as a manager of the business.”’)
St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services. Inc. v. Braga
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                                                       2025 VI Super 40

Subbase Suite 1, St. Thomas VI 00802 and directed that STT Cargo should appear at the Magistrate

Division in Barbel Plaza South in Courtroom 2 at 11:00 AM on June 24, 2025.”

q9        The Court held a Small Claims Default Judgment Hearing on the scheduled trial date, June

24, 2025, because neither Defendant nor its counsel appeared and neither STT Cargo nor its

counsel had taken any actions to otherwise defend this Small Claims Proceeding.                                The Court heard

testimony from Braga®’ and entered Default Judgment in her favor on June 26, 2025, (the “Default

Judgment”) in which the Court set a deadline of July 23, 2025,                         for STT Cargo to pay Braga the

total award.** Proof of service of the Default                  Judgment upon STT Cargo was docketed June 30

2025, and indicated that the judgement was served upon Samantha Williams on June 27, 2025, at

STT Thomas Cargo’s             office at 8197 Subbase Suite 1 St. Thomas VI at 1:53 PM

qi0       On August 25,         2025,   the sixtieth day after entry of the Default Judgment,                       STT Cargo

through its President, filed a motion to vacate the judgment and for a new trial.*> The motion was



*2 Proof of Service of Process, p. |
33 The Record of Proceeding entered June 24, 205, indicates that the witness for petitioner was Bonnie Braga; it does
not list any other witnesses
4 Default Judgement, June 26, 2025
*> On August 6, 2025, 41 days after entry of Default Judgment, STT Crago attempted to file a motion to set aside the
Small Claims judgment. However, while the motion had been docketed, by order entered August 13, 2025, the Court
disregarded the motion as a “legal nullity” because it was filed through counsel. (Order, August 13, 2025.) See 4
V.I.C. § L12(d) (“Neither party {to a Small Claims matter] may be represented by counsel and parties shall in all cases
appear in person except for corporate parties, [who must] appear by a personal representative.”); V.I. SM. CL. R. 2(c)
(declaring the circumstances under which parties to a Sma! Claims Proceeding waive their right to, inter alia, counsel}
(Comment:      “Rule 2(c) and (d) harmonize the small claims procedure with the constitutional rights to due process.
representation by counsel, and a jury trial        Rule 2(d) safeguards the rights of defendants by requiring transfer of
a case out of the Small Claims Division, as of right, if an attorney enters an appearance for the defendant, or the
defendant requests to be represented by an attomey, before the Small Claims triai            ); Lettsome v. VI Sea Trans,

 (V.L. Super. Ct. 2009) (“{I]n the Small Claims Division of this Court corporations must appear through
a representative who is nof an attorney.” (emphasis in original) (citing 4 V.I.C.        § 112(d); Thomas v. St. Croix, 41 V1
3 (V.1. Super. Ct. 1995))); Shroeder v. Hackett, No. 76/1977,        

,      at *1 (VJ. Super. Ct. Mar. 22, 1977)
(unpublished):   see also Ryans Restaurant,   Inc.   v. Lewis, 

 (D.V.L.   1996);   Magens Interval Resort,
Ine. v. Hart, 73 V.1. 342, 348-57 (V.L. Super. 2020) (analyzing the attributes of a “personal representative” of a juridical
person in a Small Claims Proceeding)
St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services, Inc. v. Braga
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                                                  2025 VI Super 40



Counsel filed the motion for relief from judgment after a Small Claims Default Judgment Hearing at which a
witness was sworn and testimony taken.    Consequently, Rule 2(d)(2)—requiring transfer of a Small Claims matter to
the general jurisdiction civil division upon the notice of appearance of counsel—was inapplicable;        and counsel's
motion for relief from a Small Claims Default Judgment could not be treated as a notice of appearance, as had been
done in prior Small Claims Cases. V.I. SM. CL. R. 2(d)(2) (Counset’s appearance must be entered “prior to any party
or witness being swor.”); ¢.g., Alexander v. Wilson, 73 V.1. 528, 532-33 (V.L 2020) (treating counsel's motion for
continuance of a Small Claims Trial as a notice of appearance requiring transfer to the general jurisdiction civil
division): see generally Balboni, 70 V.1. at n.4 (“It is well-established that it is the content and substance of an
argument, rather than its form or title, that is controlling.” (citing Bertrand, 57 V.1. at 611-12; Hughley, 61 V.1. at
333)). Rather, Rule 6(b) governed; and onlya “party” is authorized to file such    a motion. V.I. SM. CL. R 6(b) (The
rule’s language provides that. in a Smal! Claims Proceeding, a motion for relief from Default Judgement must be filed
by a “party.”); see Deliver It, Inc. v. Mitchell, No. 1293/1992, 

 (V.I. Super. Ct. Nov. 13
1992) (unpublished) (“While the Defendant, through Attorney Hilaire, did file an Answer on October 2, 1992 the
very day scheduled for the trial, it was illegally filed.”). Alexander v. Wilson provides a useful comparison to the
present procedural history

In that case, counsel for a small claims defendant filed a motion for a continuance of the Small Claims Trial: and that
motion was unhesitatingly treated as notice of appearance by counsel within the meaning of Rule 2(d)(2).         73 V.1
528, 533 (V.I. 2020) (Here, the record reflects that counsel filed a “Motion to Continue” on behalf of the defendants
on February 13, 2018, which both requested a postponement of the hearing date and made the substantive legal
argument that Alexander lacked the capacity to sue. Consequently, because the document had been filed before any
party or witness had been sworn to give evidence, pursuant to the plain language of Small Claims Rule 2(d)(2) the
matter should have been automatically transferred to the Civil Division at that point.”). Importantly, the motion in
Alexander was filed before the swearing of witnesses. In this matter, the motion filed by counsel was filed after a
witness was sworn at the Small Claims Default Judgment Hearing and pursuant to Virgin Islands Small Claims Rule
6(b), which only allows a “party” to file such motions. V.I. SM. CL. R. 6(b). Considering the law and present facts
the Cout does not believe that the trial court’s failure to treat a motion filed by counsel after a Small Claims Default
Judgment Hearing as a notice of appearance by counsel was error in any way, much less an error that might require
sua sponte reversal. Indeed, given the express language of the rule limiting who may file a motion for relief from
Default Judgement in a Small Claims Proceeding to a “party,” it would appear that, had the trial court treated the
counsel-filed motion as a notice of appearance, such action would have been a willful violation of the Court’s rules,
which is prohibited. Henry v. Dennery, No. S.CT.CIV, 2012-0130, 

, at *2 (V.I. Jan. 11, 2013)
(unpublished) (There is “simply no excuse for a single judge setting aside a mandatory court rule that was validly
adopted by the Superior Court pursuant to its rulemaking authority.”)

This Court recognizes that the Virgin Islands Supreme Court has decided Mill Harbour          Condo,   Owner's Ass'n \
Marshall, 53 V.1. 581, 584 n.3 (V.1. 2010) (“Although 4 V.LC. § 112(d) prohibits counsel from appearing on behalf
ofa party in the Small Claims Division, ‘there is nothing in the Virgin Islands small claims schemata that bars counsel
from filing documents in the Small Claims Division after trial or judgment.” (citing Carr v. Pena, 

 (D.V.I. 1977))). However, that case was decided before the effective date of the Virgin Islands Small Claims
Rules. V.I. SM. CL. R. 1(b) (“These rules shall take effect as provided in a promulgation order by the Supreme Court
of the Virgin Islands.”); Alexander, 73 V.I. at 532 (“The Virgin Islands Small Claims Rules        went into effect on
December 1, 2017          (citing V.I. SM. CL. R. 2 Reporter's Note)). Furthermore, Carr had been expressly overtuled
on this exact point of law.   Ryans Rest., 

 n.4 (“We also observe that appellant's motion was filed
in the Small Claims Division by counsel. *Neither party may be represented by counsel and parties shall in all cases
appear in person except for corporate parties, associations, and partnerships which may appear by a personal
representative.’ V.I. Code Ann. tit. 4, § 112. We do not interpret section 112 to mean that corporate parties may be
represented by counsel in the Small Claims Division          We reject any contrary interpretation of Carr v Pena, 

 (D.V.I. 1977) and Deliver It v. Mitchell [

 (V.I. Super. Ct. 1992),] because thle present
interpretation maintaining the prohibition on appearance of counsel in a Small Claims Proceeding] allows quick and
inexpensive resolution without interfering with any constitutional rights; legal counsel may be utilized should the case
St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services, Inc. v. Braga
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                                                       2025 VI Super 40



be transferred to the regular Civil Division or appealed.”); Thomas vy. St. Croix Marine, 41 V.1. 3, 5 (D.V.L 1995)
(“[T]o the extent that Mitchell suggests that corporations may be represented by counsel, this Court respectfully
disagrees with it. The (Small Claims] statute clearly ‘prohibits litigants from being represented by counsel
Associations, partnerships and corporations may appear by a ‘personal representative."”        (citations omitted))
Whatever the prior court rules may have allowed, Virgin Islands Small Claims Rule 6(b) limits who can file a motion
for relief from Default Judgment in a Small Claims Proceeding to only a “party.” V.I.SM. CL. R. 6(b). Any holdings
to the contrary, e.g., Mill Harbour,     53 V.1.   at 584 n.3; Carr,   

;   Deliver ft, 

,    were
implicitly overruled when the Virgin Islands Small Claims Rules containing this limiting language were adopted.                   See
Mills-Williams v. Mapp, 67 V1. 574, 584-85 (V.I. 2017) (Importantly, this Court has expressly held, in both its oldest
and newest decisions, that the Twombly standard does apply to proceedings in the Superior Court, at least until this
Court determines otherwise. We recognize, of course, that this Court has in fact determined otherwise, in that effective
March 31, 2017, this Court adopted the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure        ” (emphasis in original) (citations
omitted)). Indeed, Court’s (just like Legislature’s when passing laws) are presumed to know the law as it exists, see
Brooks v. Gov't of the Virgin Islands, 

 (V.I. 2013) (“{T]he courts should presume that[,] when the
Legislature creates a statute, it is aware of the long-standing procedures and practices of the courts.” (citations
omitted)), making it reasonable to presume that, when adopting the Virgin Islands Small Claims Rules. the Virgin
Islands Supreme Court was aware of any precedent that allowed counsel to file post-judgment motions in a Small
Claims Proceeding and affirmatively chose language that would prohibit such practice

The language of Rule 6(b)—limiting both when and under what circumstance the relief is available (only after
entry of a Default Judgment and no other Smal! Claims Judgment) and who may file a motion seeking post-trial relief
(only a party)—indicates a strong policy preference for challenges to Smal! Claims judgments to be argued on appeal
when counsel is available. The Virgin Islands Small Claims Rules prohibit counsel from making any post-trial filing
in a Small Claims Proceeding in the Magistrate Division; and given the policies underlying the prohibition on counsel
(keeping Small Claims Proceedings simple and inexpensive), it is a sound judicial rule to consider any filing in
violation of this prohibition to be a nullity and without any legal effect. E.g., St. Croix Marine, 41 V.Lat 5 (“Therefore
alt documents filed by counsel for [the Small Claims plaintiff], i.¢., its answer, motion to transfer, and proposed order.
are null and void. Such documents should be filed and argued by a personal representative (of a party that is a juridical
person].” (decided in 1995)); but see V.I. SM. CL. R. 2(d) (declaring that any filing by counsel prior to the swearing
of a witness to give testimony must be treated as a request to transfer to the general jurisdiction civil division (rules
effective in 2017))

It must be noted that the prohibition on counsel in Smali Claims Proceedings operates as an exception to the general
prohibition on the unauthorized practice of law. Ryans Rest., 

 n.4 (“[T]he usual rule that a
corporation[ or other juridical person] may not appear pro se may be relaxed in accordance with the purpose of [Small
Claims Proceedings] to allow a [juridical person] to be represented in the Small Claims Division by an officer or
shareholder, even if that officer or shareholder is an attorney.” (citing 4 V.I.C. § 112)); see generally 4 V.L.C. § 443(a)
(“[T]he unauthorized practice of law shall be deemed to mean the doing of any act by a person who is not a member
in good standing of the Virgin Islands Bar Association for another person usually done by attorneys-at-law in the
course of their profession, and shall include but not be limited to: the appearance, acting as the attorney-at-law, or
representative of another person,      firm or corporation,    before any court,   referee, department,     commission,        board
judicial person or body authorized or constituted by law to determine any question of law or fact or to exercise any
judicial power, or the preparation and/or filing of pleadings or other legal papers incident to any action or other
proceeding of any kind before or to be brought before the same.”): Murphy Rigging & Erecting, Inc. v. Virgin Islands
 WAPA, 76 V.L. 480. 486 (V.I. 2022) (“[T]he December 2, 2019 petition, ostensibly fited on behalf of [the juridical
person defendant], had been signed by[ the corporation’s CFO]—-a layman-——with the knowledge and assistance of
Grande. who mailed it to the Clerk of the Superior Court and whose law firm address appeared under [the CFO’]'s
signature on the petition.   The signing of a pleading on behalf of another person by an individual who is not a member
in good standing of the Virgin Islands Bar is a textbook example of conduct that constitutes the unauthorized practice
of law in the Virgin Islands     (citing In re Nevins, 60 V.L. 800, 803 (V.1. 2014))); Bart Enters., LLC v. Sapphire
Bay Condominiums W., 78 V.1. 582. 590-91 (V.1. 2023) (Here, [a project manager for the plaintiff LLC.) who is not
St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services, Inc. v. Braga
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                                                  2025 VI Super 40

one page and signed by Matthew Leondard, President of STT Cargo 36 For its argument, Appellant

stated that STT Cargo’s “failure to appear at the hearing on June 24, 2025, was a result of its

attorney’s clerical mistake,”      even though STT Cargo had been served with process that informed

it of the trial date.   Based on its reliance upon counsel, STT Cargo asserts it “did not mean to not

appear and feels it should [not] be punished for its attorney’s mistake                    and needs an opportunity

to ask plaintiff questions about [the] valuation of” Plaintiff's lost personal property and to cross

examine Braga regarding “other things testified to                  ” Ultimately, STT Cargo felt “it should be

allowed its day in court and should not be punished for its attorney’s clerical error.”

qi1         By Order entered August 28, 2025, (“August 28, 2025 Order”) the Court denied this motion

because STT Cargo’s manager received legal notice*’ of the trial date; and STT Cargo failed to


licensed to practice law in the Virgin Islands, initially signed and filed the February 13, 2020 complaint on behalf of
[the juridical person plaintiff], a Virgin Islands limited liability company. In [the] complaint, [the project manager]
sought to represent and affect the legal interest and rights of [a juridical person]       Because the cause of action in
this case was indubitably initiated by a complaint filed by an individual who is not a licensed attorney in good standing
as a member of the Virgin Islands Bar Association, the case is a nullity subject to dismissal. More succinctly, when
the Superior Court ‘recognized that the petition sought to vindicate the rights of a corporation but had not been filed
by a licensed Virgin Islands attorney, the Superior Court was obligated to treat the petition as a nullity, which would
require dismissing the case.”     (quoting Murphy Rigging, 76 V.1. at 486, 488-90; and citing Mitchell v. Mullgrav, S
Ct. Civ. No. 2015-0038. 

, at *3 (V.I. Nov. 4, 2015) (unpublished); Nevins, 60 V.I. at 805; Kelly)
St. Francis Med Ctr.,   

 (Neb. 2017); Jn re IFC Credit Corp.,         

 (7th Cir
2011); in re Neil’s Mazel, Inc., 

 (Bankr. E.D. N. Y 2013); Frayler v. New York Stock Exch., Inc
  

, 449 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Jn re Dreviow, 

 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1998))); see Gore
v. Tilden, 50 V.1. 233, 238-39(V.1. 2008) (a non-lawyer “representative” of a real person who is party to a Small
Claims Proceeding engages in unauthorized practice of law)
3¢ Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, August 25, 2025
37 See generally V.I. SM. CL. R. 4(b)(3)(A) (“If the defendant fails to appear on the retum date, after having been
properly served, judgment may be entered by default where the claim is for a liquidated amount, or the judgment
may be entered upon ex parte proof where the claim is unliquidated.” (emphasis added)); Appleton v. Harrigan, 

 (V.1. 2014) (“‘Here, the affidavit [of plaintiff] submitted in support of default judgment merely repeated
the unsupported assertion that [defendants} owed him $44,950 in unpaid rent. This claim for unpaid rent in [plaintiff]'s
affidavit did not qualify as a sum certain because ‘[tJhe term ‘sum certain’ in this context contemplates a situation in
which, once liability has been established, there can be no dispute as to the amount due, as in actions on money
judgments and negotiable instruments.”  In other words, damages are a ‘sum certain’ only in ‘actions where the
damages sought can be determined without resort to extrinsic proof.” Because the damages claimed here could not be
‘determined without resort to extrinsic proof,’ as in ‘actions on money judgments and negotiable instruments,” they
were not a sum certain        (quoting KPS & Assocs., Inc. v, Designs By FMC, Inc., 

, 19 (Ist Cir. 2003)
Interstate Food Processing Corp. v. Pellerito Foods, Inc.,   

 (Me.   1993); and citing Reynolds Sec
St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services. Inc. v. Braga
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                                                        2025 VI Super 40

appear;*® failed to have its attorney enter an appearance (or appear at the trial date), file a motion

seeking transfer, or defend;*’ and, further,                 failed to seek relief from judgment until after the

deadline to pay the judgment passed.”

q12        STT Cargo filed a notice of appeal on September 9, 2025;*' and this matter is before this

Court on that notice and the record in ST-2024-SM-00091

                                       SUBJECT        MATTER         JURISDICTION

q13        This Court is obligated to ensure that it has subject matter jurisdiction,                      as the parties to a

case cannot stipulate to the law;*? and every Court has the obligation to ensure it is only acting

within its granted authority.

414        When the Legislature uses legal terminology,                   it is presumed the Legislature understood

and intended to incorporate any existing meaning and presumptions because Legislatures are




Inc. v. Underwriters Bank & Trust, Co., 

 (N.Y. 1978)); Brockton Sav. Bank v. Peat, Marwick
Mitchell & Co., 

 (1st Cir. 1985))); Skepple, 69 V.I. at 715 n.5 and 717-21; Chaput, 66 V.1. at 188
8 STT Cargo offers no explanation for its own failure to appear at the date and time specified in the summons.               Even
if a party is relying on counsel, this does not excuse a party’s failure to comply with an order directing when to be in
court. This fact weighs heavily against STT Cargo’s protestations that it should have the opportunity to cross-examine
Braga
39 See generally V.I. SM. CL. R. 2(c)(2); Alexander, 73 V.I. at 532 (“[BJecause the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution safeguards the right to appear through retained counsel in a
Judicial proceeding, it has long been the practice in the courts of the Virgin Islands to provide for a transfer to the Civil
Division as of right whenever a defendant desires to be represented by counsel. The Virgin Islands Small Claims
Rules, which went into effect on December |, 2017, codify this long-standing practice              (citing V.I.SM.CL.R
2 Reporter's Note (collecting cases); Carr, 

)
” Order, August 28, 2025
“VI. E-FILING R. 5(d); see afso V.1. E-FILING R. 5(c)
® Davis v. People, 78 V.1. 624, 638 (V.I. 2023) (“This Court has repeatedly cautioned that parties may not. through
explicit agreement or implicitly by omission, stipulate to the law; and thus, the Superior Court possesses an obligation
to apply the law correctly and not blindly follow the erroneous interpretations proffered by the parties.”               (internal
quotations and alterations omitted) (citing Simmonds v. People. 59 V1. 480, 493 (V.I. 2013); Heywood, 63 V.I. at 855
Dennery,   

, at *2))
% Brunn v, Dowdye,    59 V.1.   899,   904 (2013) (“Prior to considering the merits of a matter before it, a court is obligated
to examine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute.        [If] the pertinent [statutory] provisions . . . are
jurisdictional, the Superior Court correctly questioned whether the statute's requirements were satisfied.”           (citing Vf
Gov't Hosp. & Health Facilities Corp. v. Gov't of the V.1., 

. 279 (V.I. 2008}))
St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services, Inc. v. Braga
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                                                          2025 VI Super 40


presumed to know the law as it exists and legislate with that knowledge in mind 44 Section 76 of

title 4 of the Virgin Islands Code provides that the Superior Court is a court of “general

jurisdiction.”*> Courts of general jurisdiction are presumed to have subject matter jurisdiction over

any matter before them.*® However, section 111                       of title 4 of the Virgin Islands Code*’ creates a

Small Claims Division of the Superior Court that may only consider uncomplicated civil cases

with an amount in controversy of $10,000 or less.*®                          This grant of subject matter jurisdiction

contrasts with section 76 and is specific and limited.                     Courts of limited, ie., specific, jurisdiction




4 Eg., Alexander, 73 V.1. at 535 (Plaintiff          “was not required to preemptively plead in [the] initial complaint any facts
in anticipation of the defendants asserting non-compliance with the VITCA                  [I]t is well-established that a court of
general jurisdiction is presumed to possess subject-matter jurisdiction                 (citation omitted)); see Greer v. People,

, 583 (2021) (“[A] codification of a common law crime is presumed to incorporate the substance of the
common law.” (citing Wallace v. People, 71 V.1. 704, 763 (V.1. 2019) (Swan, J., concurring); United States v. Wells

 (1997); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S, 422, 436 (1978); Morisette \ United
States, 

 (1952); Baumann v. Pub. Emps. Relations Bd., 68 V.L. 304, 339 (V1. Super. 2018); State
v. Pike, 

 (N.H. 1870); Mayo v. Wilson, 

 (N.H. 1817) Thurber v. Blackbourne, | N.H
242, 245 (N.H 1818))); Richards v. Pub. Emps. Rels. Bd,            2024 V1 37, {23      (“When enacting a statute the Legislature
is presumed to know the existing state of the law.” (alterations and internal quotations omitted) (citing People 1
Looby, 

, 696 (V.E 2018); Cascen \ People, 60 V.1. 392, 404 (V.1. 2014))) Brooks, 58 V.L. at 428
Henderson v. Shinseki, 

 (2011))); Cascen, 60 V.E. at 404-05 (observing that the Legislature “is
presumed to know the common law [in existence] before ... [a] statute was enacted” and that because it is also
presumed that “statutes are consistent with the common law,” courts will “not presume that the Legislature intends to
abrogate or modify a common law rule except to the extent expressly declared or clearly indicated”                     in a statute
(alterations in original) (citations omitted)); Davis   \ People, S. Ct. Crim. No. 2015-0061, 

, at *3
(V.I. Dec.  16, 2015)  (unpublished)  (legislatures are presumed  to know long standing procedures and practices); Evans
Freke, 75 V.1.at 445 (“Lastly, regarding consideration of context, legislatures are presumed to know the common law
of the United States and to have incorporated it in all its relevant aspects into any statutory codification of the common
 law.”   (citing Greer,   74 V.I. at 582 nn.26-27;    United States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S    (6 Pet.) 691, 743 (1832))); Baumann
68 V1. at 339 (observing that it is “presumed that the Legislature enacts statutes with knowledge of the common law
and court decisions”      addressing a subject (citations omitted))
45 Evans-Freke, 75 V.1. at 450-51 (Swan,J., concurring) (“[W]hen the Legislature chose to divest the District Court
of subject matter jurisdiction over matters arising under Virgin Islands law, the Superior Court became the only trial
court of record with general civil jurisdiction (including Divorce Jurisdiction), and all the common law presumptions
 and burdens became applicable.”);        see 4 V.I.C.   $$ 76(a): 2(a)
 © Alexander, 73 V.1. at 535
 VAVIC.§ 111
 48 4 V.LC. § 311 (Small Claims Proceedings are              “informal and summary as is consistent with justice.”);     4 V.LC.      §
 112(a) (“The small claims division of the Superior Court has jurisdiction of all civil actions, concurrently with the
 civil division of the said court,      wherein the amount in controversy does not exceed the sum or value of $10,000
 exclusive of interest and costs.’’)
 St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services, Inc. v. Braga
 ST-2025-R      V-00009
 MEMORANDUM               OPINION AND ORDER
 PAGE 14

                                                      2025 VI Super 40

 are presumptively without jurisdiction;*? and the facts establishing jurisdiction must be found in

 accordance with the applicable evidentiary standard.™

qiS          Because the Small Claims             Division operates under a grant of limited subject matter

jurisdiction, all Small Claims Cases must have an amount in controversy of $10,000 or less (which

can be met by affirmatively waiving damages more than $10,000)*! and be a matter of simple

factual resolution not requiring the usual civil pretrial discovery.”

q16     = It is legally significant that “[t]he Clerk of Court may issue a form and instructions that, if

completed, will satisfy the requirements of [V.I. SM.                  CL. 2(a)].”         Rule 2(a) requires a Small

Claims Complaint to be signed by a                    plaintiff,   state the case simply, contain a statement

affirmatively electing to file in the “Small Claims Division,”                and also contain either a certification

that the amount of damages are below the monetary limit on the Small Claim’s Court’s subject

matter jurisdiction or an affirmative statement waiving any damages in excess of the Small Claim’s

Court’s monetary limit on its subject matter jurisdiction.** By using the Small Claims Complaint

provided by the Court, a plaintiff enjoys a presumption of compliance with Rule 2(a)(1).°


” Willis v. People, 71 V.1. 789, 819 (V.1. 2019) (Swan, J., concurring) (“Courts of limited or specific jurisdiction do
not benefit from a presumption of jurisdiction, and proof of jurisdiction of both the subject matter and the person must
appear in the record. In fact, absent record evidence establishing such, these courts are presumed to lack both subject
matter and personal jurisdiction.” (citing and quoting parenthetically Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 

 (1994) (“It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of
establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” (citing Turner v. Bank of N.A., 4 U.S (4 Dall.) 8,
11 (1799); McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 

 (1936)))
°° In civil matters, this is generally a preponderance of the evidence; but other standards may apply.      5 V.I.C. § 740(5);
cf, Wilkinson v. Wilkinson,    70 V.1. 901 (V.L   2019) (Holding that the   “‘on all proper occasions”   in 5 V.I.C.   § 740(3)
leaves some discretion for courts to decide which cases are properly considered under the preponderance of evidence
standard.)
4 VLC. § 112(a)
24V.LC. S$ 111
33-V.1.SM. CL. R. 2(a)(3)
54V.1.SM. CL. R. 2(a)(1)
8 V.I. SM. CL. R. 2(a)(3); see generally Inniss v. Inniss, 

. 278 n.5 (V1 2016) (“[A] presumption, is ‘a
legal inference or assumption that a fact exists, based on the known or proven existence of some other fact or group
St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services, Inc. v. Braga
ST-2025-RV-00009
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                                                          2025 VI Super 40

Appellant has not raised a lack of compliance with this rule.                          While Braga has also not challenged

subject matter jurisdiction on appeal, the Parties cannot stipulate to the law                                     which includes a

prohibition on stipulating to subject matter jurisdiction.°° Therefore, the                                Court considers whether

the Magistrate Division possessed Small Claims Subject Matter Jurisdiction over this matter 5

417         Notably, Braga used the Small Claims Complaint form and is entitled to the presumption

that comes from that choice.              Nothing about the Small Claims Complaint filed by Braga is facially

deficient.      Therefore, without either an obvious facial deficiency or a challenge from Appellee,**



of facts.    A presumption shifts the burden of production or persuasion to the opposing party who can then attempt to
overcome the presumption.’”   (quoiting BLACK'SL. DICT.,                at 1304); Bertrand, 57 V.1. 596, 625 (V.1. 2012) (holding
that “prima facie evidence” creates a presumption)
% Davis, 78 V.1. at 638 (citing Simmonds, 

; Heywood, 63 V.1. at 855; Dennery, 

, at *2)
57 fd. at 639 (“[T]his Court has repeatedly held that the Superior Court not only possesses the discretion, but is required
to consider the issue of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, even if not raised by either party.” (citing, Brunn, 59
 V.1. at 905)); Willis, 71 V.1. at 809 (“[A]Jn appellate court . . . must be satisfied of . . . the trial court's             subject matter
jurisdiction before it considers the merits of an appeal.” (citing       People   v .   Rios, S. Ct.     Crim.  No.  2007-0112,    

, at *1 (V.I. Nov. 14, 2008) (unpublished);       Gov't  of  the   VL. ex     rel. Larsen    v ,  Ruiz,  145  F. Supp   2d  681, 689
(D.V.I. App. Div. 2000)))
‘8 Cf Willis, 71 V.L. at 818 (“[T]here are certain presumptions that apply with regards to challenges to the trial court's
jurisdiction. Courts of general jurisdiction are presumed to have jurisdiction over both the cause of action and the
parties, which by extension includes a presumption that process was served correctly.            This presumption is
dispositive absent contradiction in the record or contradiction by extrinsic evidence.” (emphasis added) (citing
Milliken v. Meyer, 

 (1940): Hanley v. Donoghue, 

 (1885); Cooper v. Reynolds. 77 U.S
(10 Wall.) 308, 316 (1870))). While the presumption discussed in the cases cited in Willis relate to the presumption
that process was properly served, the Court can discern no coherent rationale that would dictate that the presumption
contained in Virgin Islands Small Claims Rule 2(a)(3) should operate differently. See Bryan, 61 V.1. at 442
(*Presumptions are precisely that—presumptions, i.e. procedural devices to force the party against whom the
presumption operates to come forward with rebuttal evidence.”       (quoting Rivera—Moreno \ Gov't of the V.1., 

 (V.I. 2014) (internal quotations and alterations omitted)). Nothing in the Revisor’s notes to this rule indicate
the Supreme Court intended Rule 2(a)(3)’s presumption to operate any differently than presumptions generally
operate. See generally Greer, 74 V.1. at 580 and n.22 (discussing how to determine the Plain Meaning of a statute and
defining the Dictionary Definition Rule of statutory construction (citing Ubiles, 

; Wallace, 71 V.1. at
763)); Inniss, 

 n.5 (defining and explaining how a presumption operates), Littor al Woodland, LLC \
Henry, 2025 VI SUPER 13, 62-66 and n.167 (discussing principals of statutory construction and interpretation and
the Dictionary Definition Rule); Newrez LLC v. Estate of Green, 2025 VI SUPER 30U, 416-19 (rules of statutory
construction generally applicable, but the interpretation of court rules is controlled by the purpose and history of
adoption); Captain's Command at Bluebeurd's Beach Club Interval Ownership Condo. Assoc., Inc. v. D'Andrade
2025 VI SUPER 31U. 4913-15 (same); Caribbean Off the Grid Plaza, Inc. v. Hoolink, LLC, 2025 V1 SUPER 28U
410 (same); Captain's Command at Bluebeard's Beach Club Interval Ownership Condo. Assoc, v. Bonner 2025 VI
SUPER 19U, 4913-15 (same); ¢.g., Alexander, 73 V.1. at 532 (interpreting Small Claims Rule 2 according to history
and purpose (citing V.I. SM. CL. R. 2 Reporter's Note (collecting cases):                Carr, 

))
  St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services. Inc. v. Braga
  ST-2025-RV-00009
  MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
  PAGE 16

                                                    2025 VI Super 40

 the presumption is not rebutted.’ This Court possesses (and the Magistrate Division had) subject

 matter jurisdiction to hear this Small Claims Appeal

                                                    TIMELINESS

 q18     | The Appellate Division must also consider whether an appeal from the Magistrate Division

 is timely under Superior Court Rule 322.               “Although [the Court] recognize[s] that Rule [322] is

 a claims-processing rule—and that [the Court] could exercise our discretion to hear [an] untimely

 appeal—relaxing the requirements of Rule [322] under normal circumstances would ‘severely

 undermine and weaken’ the rule's purpose and diminish ‘society's legitimate interest in the finality

 of a judgment that has been perfected by the expiration of the time allowed for direct review.’                      For

these reasons, appellate courts will relax the time to appeal only in rare cases, such as where a trial

court erroneously informs a party that a post judgment motion will toll the time to appeal, or where

deciding the late appeal on the merits will promote judicial economy.”®'                     Furthermore, the Court

commits error if it fails to follow duly promulgated rules;” and the Parties cannot stipulate to the




» The judgment does not exceed the jurisdictional limit, and Braga waived any excess damages. 4 V.I.C. § 1t2(a)
V.I. SM. CL. R. 2(a)(1)(C). Therefore, even if Appellant had challenged the presumption, the facts in the record
establish Small Claims Subject Matter Jurisdiction
“° Because Rule 322 does not require an opposing brief and the Court has not issued a briefing schedule, Braga could
not have waived this argument by a failure to timely assert it. V.I. SUPER. CT. R. 322(b)(5) ( party to the Magistrate
Division proceeding may, but is not required, to file a response”); see Ryans Rest.. 

 (“Since there
is no requirement in the Small Claims Division under Terr. Ct. R. 62 to submit an answer or other responsive filing
that may indicate the existence of a meritorious defense. the preference for resolving controversies on the merits rather
than by default is even stronger.)
*! Peters v. People. 60 V.1. 479, 484-85 (V.I. 2014) (quoting Chavez v.       U-Haul Co. of N.M., Inc., 

(N.M.1997); United States v. Frady, 

 (1982); and citing Gov't of the V.L. v. Crooke, 54 V1. 237. 254
(V.1.2010); United States v. Mitchell, 

 (10th Cir.2008); Long v. Atlantic City Police Dep't, 

, 445 n.18 (3d Cir.2012); Gutierres   v. Johnson & Johnson, 

 (3d Cir.2008): Ramos v. Comm'r of
Corr,   

 (Conn.1999))
© Dennery, 

, at *2
St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services, Inc. v. Braga
ST-2025-RV-00009
MEMORANDUM              OPINION AND ORDER
PAGE 17

                                                                2025 VI Super 40

law.     Therefore, the best practice for the Appellate Division is to consider whether an appellant

has timely commenced their appeal

q19       An appeal from the Magistrate Division is commenced “by filing a notice of appeal with

the Clerk of the Superior Court within fourteen (14) days of entry of the judgment or order form

which appeal is sought.”**               On August 28, 2025, the Court denied STT Cargo’s motion; and STT

Cargo filed a notice of appeal on September 9, 2025.                                   Timeliness of this notice of appeal is

governed by Virgin Islands Rule of Civil Procedure 6.                                 Excluding the day the August 28, 2025

Order was entered,°° September 9, 2025, was the fourteenth day; and the appeal was timely

                                       ISSUES AND STANDARDS                          OF REVIEW

420       “(T]he Appellate Division is cautioned to look at the factual substance of the testimony of

Small Claims parties, who are legally required to appear pro se,°’ and consider legal theories that

might be implicated in determining [what] issue [is] presented                                  »68 “ When deciding an appeal

of a Small Claims matter, this Court must remain mindful that the trial court ‘is directed to do

substantial justice by the parties in a Small Claims [P]roceeding.””® ‘“‘[T]he rational behind [this]

less stringent standards is to keep the Small Claims Court accessible to unsophisticated litigants

seeking expeditious and inexpensive justice.’””” In general, “[t]he standard of review for this



63 Davis, 78 V.I. at 638 (citing Simmonds, 

; Hevwood, 63 V.I. at 855; Dennery,                

,    at *2)
VI,     SUPER. CT. R. 322(b)(b)
6 VI. SM. CL.R. I{f)
6 VER. CIV. P. 6(a)(1)(A)
4 V.LC. § 112(d)
6 Penn, 67 V1. at 897 (citation omitted)
  Id. at 892 (citing Cape Air. int'l, 53 V.l.at 612)
 ° Irizarry vy. Carpenter,     

 (D.V.I. App. Div. 2003) (quoting Ryans Rest.,           

)
Cannonier    v.   Gilbert.   72 V.1.   1155.   1161   (D.V.1.    App.   Div.   2020) (“Small claims actions are summary proceedings
with relaxed procedural and evidentiary rules that are designed to move cases efficiently to conclusion.” (citing
Fuertes v. Martin, 

, 

 (D.V.I. App. Div. Sept. 4, 2002)
(unpublished)))); St. Croix Marine, 41 V.Lat, 5 (“The purpose behind the enactment of the Small Claims Statute was
 St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services, Inc. v. Braga
 ST-2025-RV-00009
 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
 PAGE    18

                                                               2025 VI Super 40

 Court's examination of the trial court's application of the law is plenary, and its findings of fact are

 reviewed for clear error.””!

{21           For the first issue,’” STT Cargo argues that the trial court committed error when it found

 that the August 25, 2026 motion was untimely because, pursuant to Virgin Islands Small Claims

 Rule 6(b), the motion was filed on the sixtieth day after entry of Default Judgment.                                    As there is no

challenge to the procedural facts that determine this issue, this is purely an issue of law subject to

plenary, i.e., de novo, review.”

922          STT Cargo presents three other issues that make more sense (and present a more effective

argument) when read and analyzed as a single issue rather than as three standalone arguments




to permit individuals with small claims access to the courts in a simple inexpensive manner and without the need to
retain counsel.” (citing 4 V.LC. 111; Schroeder, 13 V.L. at 248))
™ Penn, 67 V.1. at 892 (citing Rodriguez v. Bureau of Corr., 58 V.1. 367, 371 (VI 2013), overruled in part on other
grounds by Mosby v. Mullgrav, 65 V.1. 261, 268 (V.I. 2016); Blyden v. People, 53 V.1. 637, 646 (V.1. 2010)). It should
be noted that Virgin Islands Superior Court Rule 322 does not prescribe standards of review, unlike Virgin Islands
Rule of Civil Procedure 91, which governs writs of review. Compare V.1. SUPER CT. R. 322. with V.LR. CIV. P
91(i); ¢.g., Littoral Woodland, 2025 VI SUPER 13, € 53. The Court must apply the common law standards of review
to this matter, while standards of review for writs of review are governed by statute or rule. Compare Penn, 67 V.1
at 892 (applying common law standards of review to a Small Claims appeal), with Littoral Woodland, 2025 V1 SUPER
 13, | 53(“No provision of the CZM Act or the writ of review provisions in Title 5 of the Virgin Islands Code prescribe
a standard of review. Therefore, Virgin Islands Rule of Civil Procedure 91(i) governs.”)
  The Court considers the issues out of the order presented, as the issue of whether the motion was timely under the
Virgin Islands Small Claims Rules, if decided against Appellant, would eliminate the need for consideration of the
other issues. See generally, e.g.. Bertrand, 57 V.1. at 608 (“Notwithstanding the Superior Court's numbering, we
proceed by first addressing Questions # 4, # 1, and # 3, since it would be inappropriate for this Court to resolve
Question # 2 if the Superior Court lacked authority to set aside its April 6, 2010 Order or applied the incorrect legal
standard."’)
” Peters, 60 V1. at 482 (“This Court . . . reviews the Superior Court's interpretation of a court rule de novo.” (citing
Mustafa v, Camacho, S. Ct. Civ. No.2013-0049, 

 (V.1. Sept. 4, 2013) (unpublished))); Fuller
v. Browne, 59 V.I, 948, 953 (V.I. 2013) (“This Court exercises plenary review over questions of law, including whether
the Superior Court has properly applied or interpreted Superior Court Rule 322 and other court rules.” (citing Denner

,   at *2));   Browne   v.   Gore,   57   V.1.   445,   449-50   (VI.   2012)   (reviewing   the interpretation   and
application Superior Court rule de novo); White y. Spenceley Realty, LLC, 53 V.1. 666. 678-79 (VI. 2010)
(“[N]otwithstanding a latent ambiguity, ‘if the court finds that a contract is ambiguous and that the extrinsic evidence
is undisputed, then the interpretation of the contract remains a question of law for the court to decide’                at the summary
judgment stage.” (emphasis added) (citing /n re Columbia Gas System, Inc., 

, 241 (3d Cir.1995))): Pedro
v. Ranger Am. of the VI, Inc.. 63 V.1. 511, $25 (V.I. 2015) (Gomez, D.J., concurring in part) (“The certified docket
and the parties’ motions contained therein are not, and cannot reasonably be, controverted.”’)
St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services, Inc. y. Braga
ST-2025-RV-00009
MEMORANDUM              OPINION AND ORDER
PAGE 19

                                                           2025 VI Super 40

STT Cargo argues that there is a strong preference for the determination of litigation on the merits

in this Territory; that STT Cargo has a meritorious defense, arguing that Braga’s valuation of her

personal property was not properly supported by documentary evidence; and that its failure to act

was due to its counsel’s error.               These three points stand for the argument that, in the interests of

justice,” there is Good Cause/Excusable Neglect’® for the Default                                   Judgment to be set aside and a

new Small Claims Trial ordered on damages.                              The Court now must consider whether the trial court

abused its discretion” when it failed to grant the motion for a new trial.”


 4 See generally,     compare 4 V.LC.       § U1; V.I.     SM.     CL.    R.     1(d) (“These rules shall be construed to implement the
simple, speedy, and inexpensive trial of actions in the Small Claims Division, in in such manner as to do substantial
justice between the parties       ); V.L SM. CL. R. 2(f) (“All pleadings shall be construed to do substantial justice.”);
V.L SM. CL. R. 4(b)(5)     (“The court  shall conduct the trial in such manner as to do substantial justice between the
parties           ”): with Montgomery, 71 V.L. at 1127 (“The determination [of Good Cause/Excusable Neglect] ‘is at
bottom an equitable one where the court should take into account all relevant circumstances surrounding [the]
omission         (emphasis added) (quoting Brown v. People, 49 V.1. 378, 383 (V.I. 2008)))
75 See generally Hodge v. Allenbaugh, 

, #4] 11-12 (equating Good Cause Excusable Neglect/Due Diligence
when determining whether to allow an untimely pro se motion for attorney’s fees); Metivier 1 Lockheed Martin Corp.,
77 V.1. 602, 612 (V.I. 2023) (citing V.I. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1); Fudler, 59 V.1. 948; Beachside Assocs., 53 V.1 700: Brown
49 V1. 378); Ranger Am. of the Virgin Islands, Inc. v. Pedro, 2025 V1 20 (quoting Montgomery,                         71 V.Lat 1127 and
citing Beachside Assocs.,      53 V.I.    at 713; Brown,    49 V.I1. at 383; Fuller,       59 V.L at 954), Montgomery      71 V1. at 1127
(quoting Brown, 49 V.1. at 383); Fuller,          59 V.1. at 954 (citing Beachside Assocs.,              53 V.1. at 713, Brown, 49 VI. at
383)
 6 Spencer v. Navarro,       No. 2007-69, 

,       at *2 (V.I. Apr. 8, 2009) (per curiam) (unpublished)         (“We
review a trial court's decision denying relief from the default judgment [in a Smal! Claims Proceeding] for an abuse
of discretion.”     (citing Harad v. Aetna Cas. and Sur.         Co.,    

 (3d Cir.1988); United States v. $55,518.05
in U.S. Currency,      

 (3d Cir.1984); Ryans Rest, 

)); Ryans Rest.,                   

 (In a Small Claims Appeal considering former Superior Court Rule 64, the Appellate Division held that, “[iJn
reviewing whether the [Superior] Court erred in failing to vacate the default judgment against [appellant], we utilize
an abuse of discretion standard.” (citing Skinner v. Guess, 27 V.1. 193, 197 (D.V.I. App. Div. 1992))); see Skepple, 69
V.L at 715 (“We review the Superior Court's ruling on a motion to grant relief from a judgment for an abuse of
discretion.”      (quoting Appleton,     61 V.1. at 268; and citing Gould v. Salem,             59 V.1. 813, 817 (V.1. 2013); Ernest \
Morris, 64 V.1. 627,       636 (V.1. 2016); Beachside Assocs.,                 53 V.I. at 711; Martinez + Colombian Emeralds,      Inc., 51
VI. 174, 188 (V.L. 2009); Spencer,          

, at *2))
77 In the absence of argument addressing the validity of a judgment and facts supporting such argument (or such facts
appearing facially in the record), the Default Judgement is not subject to the void judgment analysis established in
Skepple and its progeny. See generally Skepple., 69 V.L.at 732 (“If the trial court never obtained personal jurisdiction
over Skepple, any default judgment is void and must be set aside as a matter of law; said differently, the trial court
 lacks discretion to decline to set aside a judgment that is void.” (citing Ernest, 

); Gore, 50 V1. at
 239 (“Unquestionably, ‘a judgment may be set aside on voidness grounds . . . for a violation of the due process clause
 of the Fifth Amendment.”         (quoting in re Center Wholesale, Inc.,                

 (9th Cir.1985):   and citing
 Winhoven y. United States, 

 (9th Cir.1952))). Rather, it is subject to appellate review of the trial
 court’s Good Cause/Excusable Neglect analysis pursuant to Virgin Islands Small Claims Rule 6(b)
 St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services, Inc. v. Braga
 ST-2025-RV-00009
 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
 PAGE 20

                                                        2025 VI Super 40

                                                         ANALYSIS

 {723        Issues in a Small Claims Appeal from the Magistrate Division are reviewed subject to the

 consideration that the Small Claim’s Division is directed to do substantial justice.”?                         To that end,

 the rules of evidence are relaxed;’? and attorneys are prohibited from appearing in Small Claims

 Proceedings.®”        Therefore, the goal of Small Claims Proceedings must infuse consideration of all

 issues in Small Claims Appeals, including issues of law, such as the proper interpretation of a court

rule.*! The Court keeps this command in mind as it considers Appellant’s arguments

    1.       The Motion for a New Small Claims Trial was Timely Filed on the Sixtieth Day After
             Entry of Default Judgment Pursuant te Virgin Islands Small Claims Rule 6(b)

4724         A party to a Small Claims Proceeding may move to set aside a Default Judgment within

60 days of entry of the judgment.*? The motion (signed by the President of STT Cargo) was filed®


® 4 V.LC. § 111; V.L SM. CL. R. 1(d); VL.             SUPER CT. R. | (The Superior Court Rules including Rule 322
goveming, inter alia, Small Claims Appeals,           “shal! be liberally construed to secure simplicity and uniformity in
procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.”); Penn, 67 V.1. at 897
n.5
” 4 VLC. § 111; V.1. SM. CL. R. 4(b)(5) (‘The court        shall not be bound by statutes or rules governing practice
procedure, pleadings, or evidence, except those statues and rules relating to privileged communicating and the
swearing of parties and witnesses.”)
8° 4 V.LC. § 112(d) (“Neither party may be represented by counsel            ); BLACK’S      L. DICT., at 1328 (defining
“representation” as “The act or instance of standing for or acting on behalf of another, esp. by a lawyer on behalf of a
client.”),   The Legislature's choice to use of a variation of “representation”      without restricting its use with limiting
phrases (¢.g.,    “at trial” or “during trial”) plainly extends the prohibition on representation by counsel to all stages of a
 Small Claims Proceeding.      See generally Greer, 74 V.1. at 580 and n.22 (discussing how to determine the plain
meaning of a statute and defining the Dictionary Definition Rule of statutory construction (citing Ubiles, 

; Wallace, 71 V.L. at 763)); Littoral Woodland, 2025 VI SUPER 13, 9962-66 and n.167 (discussing principles of
statutory construction and interpretation and the Dictionary Definition Rule)
*! See generally Newrez, 2025 VI SUPER 30U, 9916-19; D’Andrade, 2025 VI SUPER 31U 4113-15 (same)
Caribbean Off the Grid Plaza, Inc., 2025 VI SUPER 28U., {10 (same): Bonner, 2025 VISUPER 19U 4913-15 (same)
¢.g., Metivier, 77 V.L. at 609-10 (citing In re V.I. Bar Ass'n, 75 V.1. 393, 399-400 (V.1. 2021); Adills-Williams, 67 V.I
at 585; Corraspe v. People, 53 V.1. 470, 482 (V.1. 2010): Hansen \ Bryan, 68 V.1. 603, 609 n.3 (V.L 2018))
8 VI. SM. CL. R. 6(b)
“ The Court notes that Virgin Islands Small Claims Rules leave a gap that, while not material to this appeal, will be
an issue in need of resolution when different facts are before the Court.       “(T]he statutes or rules governing practice
procedure,    pleadings.   or evidence” (“except those statutes and rules related to privileged communications and the
swearing of parties and witnesses”) do not apply in Small Claims Proceedings. V.I. SM. CL R. (4)(b)(5). The Supreme
Court's choice to expressly incorporate only certain rules of procedure while rejecting other rules of procedure in the
practice and procedure in the Smail Claims Division means that only those rules expressly made applicable by the
St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services, Inc. v. Braga
ST-2025-RV-00009
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
PAGE 21

                                                   2025 VI Super 40


on the sixtieth day* “after entry of a default judgment.”** As such, STT Cargo’s motion for relief

from the Default Judgment was timely.              To the extent the language of the August 28, 2025 Order

denying STT Cargo’s motion could be understood as denying it based on the motion being

untimely, the trial court erred as a matter of law.®°




Small Claims Rules apply.    Metivier, 77 V.1. at 609-10.   This means the Virgin Islands E-filing Rules, being rules of
procedure, do not apply. However, the Virgin Islands Small Claims Rule only state when a judgment is entered. V.I
SM. CL. R. 5(a) (Magistrate Division may order “entry” of judgment); V.I. SM. CL. R 6(b) (party may move to set
aside default judgment within 60 days of “entry” of the judgment); Henry, 71 VI. at 1177        (“Entry is ‘the placement
of something on the record.”  BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY             574 (8th ed. 2004); id. at 572  (defining “enter” as “to
put formally before the court or on the record <the defendant entered a plea of no contest>.”)”), Greer, 74 V.1. at 580
and n.22 (Dictionary Definition Rule requiring the application of any specific accumulated legal meaning);         Littoral
Woodland, 2025 VI SUPER 13, {62-66 and n.167.            By contrast, the Supreme Court has also declared that a Small
Claims Case is “commenced” when the Small Claims Complaint is “filed” with the Clerk of the Court. V.I. SM. CL
R. 2(a); BLACK’S L. DICT., at 660 (defining “file” as a verb meaning “To deliver a legal document to the court clerk,
or record custodian for placement into the official record <Tuesday is the deadline for filing a reply brief>         Also
termed      lodge.”).   This rule makes clear that a Small Claims Proceeding begins upon a plaintiff formally handing
the Small Claims Complaint to the Clerk for entry on the docket. For comparison, the Virgin Islands Electronic Filing
Rules, expressly made inapplicable to all proceeding in the Small Claims Division, provide that, upon the Clerk’s
approval of a filing, “the document shall be considered filed with the court on the date of the original submission to
the electronic filing system was complete.” V.I. E-FILE R. 5(d). Yet, no rule states when a motion ina Small Claims
Proceeding is formally “entered” upon the docket. In this matter, the physical date stamp on STT Cargo’s motion was
the same day the motion was electronically docketed, obviating any need for the Court to resolve this issue of law
However, it is perfectly foreseeable that a future appellant will file their motion at one minute to 5:00 p.m. on the 60th
day, a situation in which it would be reasonable to have a physical date stamp on the last day for filing but a formal
entry on the electronic docket on the 61" day.    Cf, e.g., Henry, 71 V.Lat 1177 n. 1 (quoting parenthetically Kansas
Packing Co. v. Lavilla, 39 V.1. 71, 74 (V.L   Super. Ct. 1998)    (“In the matter sub judice, the Court Order, while signed
on Monday, December 8, 1997, was not entered by the Clerk of the Court until Tuesday December 9, 1997. Therefore,
the 14-days time period prescribed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B) began to run the following day, Wednesday
December 10, 1997.”)). Certainly, the addition of language to Rule 6(b) to the effect, “the motion shall be considered
entered on the docket on the date of the original submission to Clerk,” would prevent any future need for judicial
resolution of any argument that such a motion was untimely—an argument that will unquestionably be made by a
savvy (or even not so savvy) lawyer. Thankfully, the present facts do not fall within this gap; and the Court need not
address this issue
84 This Court both counted on a physical calendar and verified at https://www.timeanddate.com/date/ duration html
85 VI, SM. CL. R. 6(b). This rule makes clear that the time for filing runs from the “entry” of the Default Judgment
on the docket, not the oral announcement of the Default Judgment
8 There are statements that could be understood as finding the motion to be untimely under the Virgin Islands Small
 Claims Rules, particularly because the trial court did not cite any of the Virgin Islands Small Claims Rules in its order
 Of note, the trial court admonished that “more than a month after the June 24, 2025, Judgment was entered; Judgment
 which was duly served on the Defendant June 26, 2025           still nothing was filed by Defendant       It was only
 after Plaintiff filed a Writ of Execution on July 25, 2025, that the Defendant made any filing whatsoever.”     The Court
 further admonished that it would not “unfairly prejudice the Plaintiff in this matter
 St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services, Inc. v. Braga
 ST-2025-RV-00009
 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
 PAGE 22

                                                    2025 VI Super 40

(25        However, the trial court further concluded that, “[o]n May 23, the Manager of St. Thomas

 Shipping and Cargo was duly served.            Said service put the Defendant on alert that a Court Hearing

was to be held June 24, 2025.          The Defendant did not enter a single filing before the date of trial

 [This Court was never put on notice that the Defendant had retained counsel to begin with

Attorney Eckard did not enter his appearance until August 6, 2025                                 “On June 24, 2025

Plaintiff was sworn to testify.        As a result, the Defendant waived their right to Counsel and their

right to Transfer by filing nothing before this point.”                  These statements present an alternative

rationale for the denial of the motion for relief from Default               Judgment much more akin to a finding

that the interests of justice do not warrant vacating the Default Judgment due to a failure to

establish “Good       Cause.”®’      Although the Magistrate Division arguably erred based upon an




*’ Notably, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court has declared that “Good Cause” and “Excusable Neglect” are essentially
synonyms.    Montgomery, 71 V.I. at 1127 (quoting Beachside Assocs., 53 V.1. at 713). This is functionally true;
although, conceptually, they are different approaches. Excusable Neglect is an analysis focusing on excusing a failure
to act in a timely manner after the deadline has expired.   E.g.,   Greene v. Virgin Islands WAPA,   67 V.1. 727, 736-37
(V.I. 2017) (“Under that rule, when an act must be done by a specified deadline and a party moves for an extension
of that deadline after the deadline passes, the party must demonstrate that their failure to request such an extension
before the expiration of that deadline was the product of excusable neglect.” (citation omitted) (emphasis added))
Good Cause is an analysis that focuses on whether the reasons offered before a deadline expiring (or before some
other action) justify granting the relief requested. £.g., /rizarry, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 729-30, 731 ( [A]ppellant. . . did
not receive notice of the underlying action until May 7, 2002, when [they were} informed that the matter had been set
for trial on May 14, 2002.     Due to [their] employment obligations, [movant] was scheduled to be off island on a
business trip from May 9 through May 14. Thus, upon receiving notice of the impending trial date appellant promptly
filed on May 9 a motion for a continuance of the trial wherein [they} informed the trial court of [the] situation.    The
trial court, however, never ruled on this motion and proceeded with the trial on May 14.      When [defendant] failed to
appear for [the Small Claims] trial, the trial court entered a default judgment in favor of appellee in the amount of
$5,000.00 plus $40 in court costs. Upon learning of the default judgment on [their] return to St. Thomas, [defendant]
moved the trial court to reconsider its decision. As it did with appellant's motion for a continuance, the trial court
never ruled on appellant's motion for reconsideration. We now vacate the trial court's default judgment
Here,   [defendant] had informed the trial court of [the] situation before the trial date and properly requested a
continuance.”); Divine Destinations, LLC v. Shortz, No. ST-13-SM-207, 

, at *1 (V.I Super. Apr
16, 2013) (unpublished), While there is very significant conceptual overlap with these two legal principles, the two
analyses are not always universally interchangeable due to the fact differences that give rise to the application of each
standard. Virgin Islands Small Claims Rule 6(b) is stated in terms of Good Cause, but the factual basis for STT
Cargo’s motion is Excusable Neglect—explaining its failure to timely answer or otherwise defend this Case after the
trial date passed
St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services, Inc. v. Braga
ST-2025-RV-00009
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
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                                                              2025 VI Super 40

incorrect calculation of the deadline for filing, as an alternative basis of affirmance, the Court will

consider the remaining issue presented by STT Cargo

 II.         Appellant has failed to Demonstrate “Good Cause” for its Failure to Appear on the
             Small Claims Trial Date or Otherwise Defend Against that Action, and the Trial
            Court did Not Abuse its Discretion When it Denied the Motion to Vacate the Default
             Small Claims Judgment

426          Appellant is correct that the Virgin Islands has established an extremely strong preference

for cases to be decided on the merits.88                        However,      ““‘[t]he power of the court to prevent undue

delays and to achieve the orderly disposition of cases must be weighed against the policy of law

which favors disposition of litigation on its merits.””*?                         Similarly, absent issues of Due Process



88 See generally Powell v. FAM Protective Servs., Inc., 72 V.1. 1029, 1043 (V.1 2020) (“[P]arties should be afforded
liberal freedom to amend, to satisfy this Court's ‘strong preference for trial courts to decide doubtful cases on their
merits rather than dismiss them for a failure to strictly follow purely procedural rules.’”*(emphasis added) (quoting
Joseph, 54 V.1. at 650; Daves y. Payless Cashways, Inc., 

 (Sth Cir. 1981))); Virgin Islands Taxi
Ass'n v. Virgin Islands Port Auth., 67 V.1. 643, 693 (V.1. 2017) (‘consistent with ‘our longstanding instruction ‘that
the preference is to decide cases on their merits”   (quoting Sarauw v. Fawkes, 66 V.I 253, at 265(V.1. 2017); Fuller,
59 V.I.  at 956)); Matter of Maynard, 68  V.1. 632, 644   and n.11 (V.I. 2018) (“in keeping with our stated preference for
resolving cases on the merits” (citing Virgin Islands Taxi Ass'n, 67 V.1. at 693 n.30)); Skepple., 69 VI. at 711
(“[S]everal cases from the courts of this Territory . . . confirm a strong public policy for determining civil cases on the
merits.” (citing Spencer, 

, at *2; Ryans Rest, 

; Toussaint, 

 48
n.13)); Toussaint, 67 V.1. at 948 n.13 (citing Arvidson v. Buchar, Case No. ST-16-CV-410, 

, at *4
(V.I. Super. Ct. Jan 11, 2017) (unpublished); St. Thomas & St. John Police Benevolent Ass'n v. VI.P.D., Case No ST
15-CV-115, 

, at *3 (V.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 31, 2016) (unpublished); Clarke v. Pan Am. Invs., Inc.
Case No. ST-15-CV-645, 

, at *2 (V.I. Super. Ct. Jul. 5, 2016) (unpublished); Adams v. N.W. Co.
(int'l),   Inc.,   63 V.1.   427,   446 (V.I.   Super.   Ct. 2015));   of Rivera~Moreno,   61 V.I,   at 298   Joseph,   54 V.1.    at 650
Spencer,       

, at *2; Deal Furniture & Appliance v. Four Winds Plaza P'ship, 

(D.V.1. App Div. 1997)
8 Gore, 50 V.1. at 238 (quoting Marshall v. Sielaff, 

 (3d Cir.1974) (emphasis added)); see also
Powell, 72 V.1, at 1043 (“‘[L]iberality in pleading does not bestow on a litigant the privilege of neglecting (their] case
for a long period of time.’”          (quoting Joseph, 54 V.I. at 650; Daves, 

)); In re Asbestos Prods. Liab
Litig. (No. VI), 

 (3d Cir. 2013) (“However, a district court's ability under Rule 41(b) ‘to prevent
undue delays and to achieve the orderly disposition of cases must be weighed against the policy of law which favors
disposition of litigation on its merits.’” (quoting Sielaff, 

)); Virgin Islands WAPA v. Virgin Islands Tel.
Corp., 18 V.1. 451, 452-53 (D.V.I. App. Div. 1981) (‘A trial court has the inherent power to dismiss a case for want
of prosecution. That power has been codified, in part, by Rule 41(b) Fed. R Civ. P., applicable in the Territorial Court
pursuant to Title 5 Appendix IV V.1.C. Rule 7.                   The power    ‘is necessary in order to prevent undue delays in the
disposition of pending cases and to avoid congestion in the calendars of the (Territorial) Courts.’ the trial court here
had the power to dismiss for lack of prosecution        ” (quoting Link v. Wabash, 

 (1962)))
Lenhardt v. Barnett, 79 V.1. 353, 356 (V.1. Super. Ct. 2025) (“[T]he power to dismiss for failure to prosecute is
 necessary to prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases and to avoid Court congestion                       (citing Link
St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services, Inc. v. Braga
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                                                      2025 VI Super 40

rendering a judgment void,” and unlike a motion to vacate entry of default, vacating a default

judgment implicates concerns about finality of judgments, which weigh strongly against unsettling

disputes     finally adjudicated.?'         The    Virgin    Islands    Supreme      Court has made          clear that the

)); Remy v. Ford Motor Co., 48 V.1. 144, 154 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2006) (‘‘A trial court has the inherent
power to dismiss a case for want of prosecution in order to prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases
and to avoid congestions in the calendars of the courts.” (citing Virgin Islands WAPA, 18 V.1. 451))
© Void judgments are a nullity and of no legal effect from their inception, as if they never existed.        Skepple, 69 V.Lat
733 n.28 (“From its inception, a void judgment is a legal nullity and without legal effect, and any defect cannot be
cured.” (citing, inter alia, Rubin v. Johns, 

 (D.V.I. App. Div. 1986); Raymark Indus., Inc. v. Lai,

 (3d Cir. 1992))); Gore, 

 (quoting Center Wholesale, 

; and citing
 Winhoven, 

). Therefore, in Skepp/e, the Court found an abuse of discretion in the Superior Court’s
denial of the motion to vacate—concerns about finality of judgments do not override the Constitution's guarantee of
Due Process. But see 5 V.LC. § 31(a)(1)(B) (‘Civil actions shall only be commenced within the periods prescribed
below after the cause of action shall have accrued, except when, in special cases, a different limitation is prescribed
by statute: (1) Twenty years[—JAn action upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States, or of any State,
Commonwealth, or Territory within the United States.”), As an action collaterally attacking a judgment to have it
declared void is a civil action founded upon a judgment, the 20-year limitations period appears to apply. See generally
Skepple., 69 V.I. at 710 (“[A] civil action, [is] ‘an action to enforce, redress or protect a private or civil right.’” (quoting
In re Najawicz, 52 V.1. 311, 335 (V.I. 2009); and citing BLACK'S L.DICT., at 32)); Magens Point Resort Hotel \
Benjamin, 58 V.1. 191, 197 n.3 (V.1. 2009) (“The Supreme Court of the United States has described litigation initiated
to enforce a judgment as an ‘action.’”     (quoting McKnett v. St. Louis & SF. Ry. Co., 

 (1934); and
citing BLACK’S L. DICT., at 31 (defining ‘action’ as ‘a civil or criminal judicial proceeding.’)); In re Moorhead, 27
V.1. 74, 85 (V.L Super. Ct. 1992) (stating that civil actions include all actions brought to enforce, redress, or protect
private rights, other than criminal proceedings)
°! The interest in finality of judgments is very strong. See Peters, 60 V.1. at 484 (“*[S]ociety [ has a] legitimate interest
in the finality of a judgment that has been perfected by the expiration of the time allowed for direct review.” (quoting
Frady, 

; and citing Long, 

 n.18; Mitchell,        

 (“Finality      serves societal
interests and the interests of judicial administration by minimizing uncertainty and waste of judicial resources caused
by undue delay.”)); Pelle v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 66 V.1. 315, 320-21 (V.1. 2017) (“{T]he
societal interests in upholding final judgments demands such...        .” (citing Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 

 (1981); Simpson v. Board of Dirs. of Sapphire Bay Condos. West, 62 V.1. 728, 732 (V.I. 2015)
Peters, 60 V.1. at 484)); Tip Top Constr. Corp, v, Austin, 71 V.1. 549, 563 (V.I. 2019) (quoting Peters, 60 V.I. at 484
and citing Simpson, 62 V.I. at 731-32); Companion Assurance Co. y. Smith, 66 V.1. 562, 571 (V.I. 2017) (quoting
Peters, 60 V1. at 484; and citing Paxton Resources, L.L.C. v, Brannaman, 

 (Wy. 2004)
Bombardier Capital, Inc. v. Williams, 

 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002); Commonwealth v. Santone, 

 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000); Freiberg v. City of Mission Viejo, 

, 805-06 (Cal. Ct. App
1994); Baker Phillips, Inc. v. Caviness, 

 (Mo, Ct. App. 1980); Minor v. Leisure Lodge, Inc., 

 (Or. Ct. App. 1998)); Pedro, 63 V.I.at 525 (“[Gl]iven the posture of this case, the Court should give
due consideration to the interest in finality of judgments.”) (citing and quoting parenthetically Bldg. & Const. Trades
Council of Philadelphia & Vicinity, AFL-CIO v. N.L.R.B., 

 (3d Cir.1995) (“[T]he interest in finality
of judgments may assume greater or lesser prominence according to the nature of the case and the private and public
interests implicated, but should not be either deprecated or ignored.’’)}). Even in instances involving a potentially void
judgment, “[t]he concept of a void judgment is narrowly construed in order to promote finality of judgments, and only
a demonstration of a clear usurpation of power will render a judgment void.” Skepple, 69 V.I. at 733 n.28 (citing
inter alia, Rubin,   

; Raymark Indus., 

))
St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services, Inc. v. Braga
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                                                     2025 VI Super 40


preference for determination of cases on the merits, however strong, does not establish a rule of

law that eliminates the requirements in the Virgin Islands Small Claims Rules” or the requirement

to show Good Cause/Excusable Neglect when seeking relief from a Default Judgment in a Small

Claims Proceeding for failure to answer or otherwise defend.”

427       Importantly,     the Virgin      Islands    Small     Claims     Rules    have established        that,    “{i]f the

defendant fails to appear on the return date, after having been properly served, judgment may be

entered by default . . . upon ex parte proof where the claim is unliquidated                       °4 STT Cargo having

been timely served and having utterly failed to avail itself of the means of having this matter

transferred to the general jurisdiction civil division of this Court,” the trial court was not just




  See generally Dennery, 

, at *2
%3 V1, SM. CL. R. 6(b); see generally Greene, 67 V.1. at 738-39 and n.6     (“‘The determination of excusable neglect is
at bottom an equitable one, where the court should take     into account all   relevant circumstances surrounding the
                                                                                                                      on
omission including the danger of prejudice to the opposing party, the length of the delay and its potential impact
judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was   within the reasonable control of the movant,
and whether the movant acted in good faith.’ Prejudice to the nonmoving party encompasses, among other things, the
 loss of opportunity to present some material aspect of a case,’     ‘the expenditure of money or similar detrimental
changes in position by one side in reliance on the action or inaction of the other,’ and the imposition of ‘additional
trial preparation, and added expense.’  Any delay that affects the Superior Court's ability to manage its docket as a
whole weighs against a finding of excusable neglect. And delay entirely within the movant's contro!—-such as when
the movant makes a conscious decision to pursue one litigation strategy at the expense of another—does not support
                                                                                                                  Risk
a finding of excusable neglect.” (quoting Fuller, 59 V.I. at 954 State ex rel. Sizemore v. United Physicians Ins,
Retention Grp., 

 (Tenn. 2001); citing Brown, 49 V.I. at 383 Raymond v. Ameritech Corp., 

 (7th Cir. 2006); Baptiste v. Rohn, Civil No. 2013-0104, 

, at *5 (D.V.1. Dec. 23
                                                                                                                       

) (unpublished); Eskridge v. Cook Cnty., 

 (7th Cir. 2009); Slaughter v. S. Tale Co.,
                                                                                                       LLC,    

, 307 (5th Cir. 1990))) (collecting cases at note 6); Suppertime, LLC v. Frankfield Mgmt.,
                                              ‘[tjactical decisions and dilatory motives  may   lead  to  a   finding  of undue
 466, 473 (D.V.I. 2025) (Additionally,
 delay.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Synthes, Inc. v. Marotta, 

  (E.D.  PA.    2012)))
 4 VI. SM. CL. R. 4(b)(3)(A); see also V.1. SM. CL. R. 2(c)(2) (“[I]f the defendant fails to request a transfer as
 provided in subpart (d) of this Rule, defendant shall be deemed to have waived both the right to a jury trial and the
 right to be represented by counsel at trial, if the matter remans in the Smal! Claims Division.”)
                                                                                                     2(d) has been
 %S The Court’s wishes to emphasize that the relief provided for in Virgin Islands Small Claims Rule
 subjected to the substance over labels analysis dictated by the Virgin Islands Supreme Court.        E.g., Alexander, 73 V.1
 at 532-33 (treating counsel’s motion for continuance of a Small Claims Trial as a notice of appearance requiring
                                                                                                                   before the
 transfer to the general jurisdiction civil division). As such, had STT Cargo’s counsel filed anything
                                                 have been obligated to transfer this Case out of the Small Claims  Division
 swearing of a witness, the trial court would
 V1. SM. CL. R. 2(d); Alexander,      73 V.1. at  532-33
St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services, Inc. v. Braga
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                                                        2025 VI Super 40

entitled, but obligated,”® to take evidence on Braga’s unliquidated claim and render judgment

according to the facts found to be credible

28         The trial court found the facts warranted entry of Default Judgment in favor of Braga.                              In

the absence of facts rendering the judgment void,”’ STT Cargo was obligated to comply with

Virgin Islands Small Claim Rule 6(b) and make a showing of Good Cause/Excusable Neglect

within 60 days of entry of Default Judgment if it wanted to obtain the relief it requested.”®

      A.   Legal Standard for Showing Good Cause/Excusable Neglect

qz9        “This jurisdiction acknowledges the doctrine of [Good Cause/Excusable Neglect”, and a

determination thereof is equitable in nature.”’°° The Virgin Islands Supreme Court has directed

that “[t]he Superior Court must consider ‘all relevant circumstances’                      when making an [E]xcusable

[NJeglect determination.”'®'          “The determination ‘is at bottom an equitable one’ where the court

should take into account ‘all relevant circumstances surrounding the omission including the danger

of prejudice to the opposing party, the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial

proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of


 © VI. SM. CL. R. 2(c)(2); 4(b)(3): see generally Dennery, 

, at *2
” See generally Skepple, 69 V.1. at 733(‘A ‘failure to vacate a void judgment is per se an abuse of discretion
(quoting Oldfield v, Pueblo De Bahia Lora, S.A., 

 (11th Cir. 2009); and citing Hart v. Sansom
 

 (1884))); Gore, 

 (quoting Center Wholesale, 

; and citing Winhoven

)
8 V1. SM. CL. R. 6(b)
” The Virgin Islands Supreme Court “tha[s]       ‘equated [FRCP 4(m)'s] ‘good cause’ with the concept of ‘excusable
neglect’ of [FRCP] 6(b)(2), which requires       ‘a demonstration of good faith on the part of the party seeking an
enlargement and some reasonable basis for noncompliance within the time specified in the rules.” Beachside Assocs

 (quoting MC/ Telecomms,, 7\ F.3d at 1097; and citing Petrucelli, 46 F.3dat 1312; Turner, 

McGuire,   137 F.3d at 324; Adams,   74 F.3d at 887: Boudette, 

):        Fuller,   59 V.I. at 954 (‘““Excusable
neglect’ and ‘good cause’ are essentially synonyms...      . .” (quoting Beachside Assocs.,   53 V.1. at 713)); see also Pedro,

 (same (quoting Montgomery, 71 V.I. at 1127; and citing Beachside Assocs., 53 V.1. at 713))
Montgomery, 71 V.1. 1127 (same (quoting Beachside Assocs., 53 V.L. at 713)); ¢.g., Bazzar v. Salem, No. ST-14-CV
370, 

, at *2 (V.I. Super. Oct. 8, 2015) (unpublished) (same (quoting Fidler, 59 V.I. at 954))
19 Allenbaugh, 2025 V1 21.4 13 (citing Fuller, 59 V.L at 954; Brown, 49 VL. at 383)
'! Id. 4 13 (alterations omitted) (quoting Fuller. 59 V.I. at 954; and citing Brown, 49 V_I. at 383)
St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services, Inc. v. Braga
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                                                     2025 VI Super 40

the movant,{!°2] and whether the movant acted in good faith.’’'°?                      The Virgin Islands Supreme

Court has explained that

          Virgin Islands Rule 6(b)(1) enumerates several factors that the Superior Court may
          consider in deciding whether to grant a request to extend the date for doing an act,
          including ‘whether the request to extend time is made before or after the required
          date; the reason for the movant's delay; whether the reason for delay was within
          the reasonable control of the movant; the danger of prejudice to the parties; the
          length of the delay; the potential impact of the delay on judicial proceedings;
          whether the party seeking the extension has acted in good faith, and all other
          relevant circumstances          surrounding the party's failure to meet the originally
          prescribed deadline.’        V.I. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1).       Significantly, this portion of Virgin
          Islands Rule 6(b)(1) has no counterpart in the analogous federal rule.                  Rather, the
          Reporter's Note accompanying Virgin Islands Rule 6 reflects that this enumerated
          list of factors was codified in Rule 6(b)(1) to incorporate existing case law, and
          specifically cites to this Court's decisions in Fuller v. Browne, 59 V.I1. 948 (VI
          2013), Beachside Assocs. v. Fishman, 53 V.1. 700 (V.I. 2010), and Brown v.
          People, 49 V.1. 378 (V.1. 2008), which collectively identified these factors as ones
          that the Superior Court should consider when making a determination on a request
          to extend time.       [I]t goes without saying that not every one of these factors will
          necessarily be relevant in every single case                  [04

Because these factors were developed in case law and then subsequently adopted in a rule, the lack

of incorporation of Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(1) into the Virgin Islands Small Claims Rules




 102 See generally BLACK’S L. DICT.,      at 1040 (defining “movant” as “one who makes a motion to a core                 Also
termed moving party, mover.        —Formerly also spelled movent.”)
 193 Pedro, 

 (quoting Montgomery,,      71 V.I. at 1127; and citing Brown, 49 V1. at 383, Fuller.       59 V.1
at 954); see also Montgomery,      71 V.I. at 1127(same (quoting Brown, 49 V.I. at 383)); Greene, 67 V.1. at 738 (same
 (quoting Fuller,   59 V.1. at 954; and citing Brown, 49 V.I. at 383)); Fuller,   59 V.I. at 954 (same (quoting Brown, 49
 V.I. at 383)); Brown, 49 V.L. at 383 (same (quoting Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Bi unswick Assoc., 

 (1993))); compare Allenbaugh, 

 (Superior Court must consider relevant factors, “including ‘whether
 the request to extend time is made before or after the required date; the reason for the movant's delay; whether the
 reason for delay was within the reasonable control of the movant; the danger of prejudice to the parties; the length of
 the delay; the potential impact of the delay on judicial proceedings; [and] whether the party seeking the extension has
acted in good faith.”  (quoting V.I. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1))); with Skinner, 27 VL. at 196 (“The decision to vacate a default
judgment is left to the sound discretion of the trial court which must consider whether vacating the default judgment
will ‘visit prejudice on the plaintiffs, whether the defendant has a prima facie meritorious defense and whether the
 default was   a result of the defendant's culpable or inexcusable conduct.””      (quoting Zawadski   De Bueno     \   Bueno
                                                                                                                  1987)
 Castro, 

. 420 (3d Cir.1987); and citing Emcasco Ins. Co. v. Sambrick, 

 (3d Cir.
 Zawadski.   

-420:   Gold Kist, Inc. v . Laurinburg Oil Co., Inc., 

 (3d Cir.1985)))
 10 Verivier, 77 V.I. at 612(alterations in original)
St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services, Inc. v. Braga
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                                                       2025 VI Super 40

does not foreclose the application of these factors,'°> and any other relevant circumstance, to the

present analysis.'"¢

{30      ~=—- Failure to provide an explanation and/or a strategic choice not to provide an explanation

can never be Good Cause/Excusable Neglect.'"’                            Similarly, pro se status, without further


105 See also Daisley v. Daisley, No. CIV.APP. 2005-0140, 

,               at *3 (D.V.I. App. Div. Feb. 29, 2012)
(unpublished) (“[T]Jrial courts must weigh whether vacating default would, ’visit prejudice on the [non-movant]
whether the {movant]t has a prima facie meritorious defense and whether the default was a result of the [movant]'s
culpable or inexcusable conduct.’”       (quoting Emcasco Ins.,   

; and citing Miles vy. Aramark Corr. Sern
Inc., 

 (3d Cir.2009); Zawadski, 

)); Ryans Rest., 

n.5 (same (citing Zawadski, 

--20)); Deliver it, 28 V.1. at 29 (“A Default Judgment having been entered,
the proper motion is one to set aside the default [judgment]. Such a motion will usually be granted if (a) the non
{moving] party will not be prejudiced by the reopening; (b) the default was not the result of inexcusable neglect or
willful act [of the moving party]; and (c) the [moving] party has a meritorious defense.” (citing Bonhomme v. Terry
Frederick Associates, 25 V1. 385 (D.V.1. App. Div. 1990))); Davis v. Boehm, No. CV 607/1996, 

at *1 (V.1. SuperCt. Apr. 24, 1997) (unpublished) (same (citing Skinner, 27 V.1. 193; Zawadski, 

; Scatliffe
v, George, 17 V.1. 91, 94 (V.L Super. Ct. 1980); Restatement (Second) of Judgments     $ 67 (1982))); Bazzar, 

, at *2 (citing Cohen v. Gabriel Enterprises, Inc., Civ. No. 2011-0059, 

, at *1 (D.V.L. Mar.
21, 2013) (unpublished); $55,518.05 in U.S. Currency, 

; Caesar v. Firstbank P.R., 49 V.1. 1041, 1048
(D.V.1. 2008))). In fact, the Supreme Court is presumed to know the law that existed at the time of adopted the Virgin
Islands Small Claims Rules; and the choice to use a legal term that had a set of factors established in prior precedent
(and did not cross-refence the Virgin Islands Rule of Civil Procedure codifying those factors) is strong evidence they
intended for the common law set of factors to apply to motions made pursuant to the rule
106 Simply, the incorporation of principles or rules of law announced in court decisions into a new rule of procedure
does not abolish or alter the extant precedent, which remains binding. Using precedent as a basis for creating a new
rule does not exhibit an intent to abolish the precedent relied upon
107 Allenbaugh, 2025 V1 21,4 13 (‘“[T]he reason for the delay’ is ‘the most important factor’ in an excusable neglect
analysis, and the Superior Court made no findings on this factor, nor could it, because [the movant] failed to provide
any reason for filing [their] motion late. [Movant]'s failure to provide an explanation for filing [their] motion late
is fatal because clear or plain neglect is not commensurate to excusable neglect pursuant to Rule 6(b)(1)(B) of the
Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, the fact that [the movant] appears pro se also means that the delay
in filing [the] motion is entirely attributable to [them] and the time to file a motion for attorney's fees, as is clearly
set forth in Rule 54 of the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure, does not require any legal training to comprehend
or calculate.” (emphasis added) (quoting Montgomery, 71 V.I. at 1128; and citing Bowman v Korte, 

 (7th Cir. 2020); Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 

 (2d Cir. 1976): Grant v. Revera Inc.,

 (3d Cir. 2016); Martin v. Matthews, 

 (10th Cir. 2012))); Greene, 67
V.L.   727,   737,   740 (V.I. 2017) (“{[Movant] did not address the     ‘excusable neglect’    standard in [their] opposition to
WAPA's summary judgment motion. Instead, (movant] explained that [they] made a conscious decision not ‘to
expend time and money responding to WAPA's improperly filed Statement of Facts’ because [they] ‘shouid not have
to expend time and resources on a matter that [h]as been litigated exhaustively for seven years.’             The Superior Court
denied [movant]'s request for an extension of time, reasoning that ‘nothing prevented Greene from presenting
altemative arguments and addressing the merits of WAPA’s motion in its opposition,’ and because ‘granting
[movant]'s request would do nothing more than encourage                piecemeal   litigation resulting   in a waste of judicial
resources.’”); Beachside Assocs., 53 V.L at 713 (“[I]t is the [movant]'s burden to show good cause. Therefore, because
{movant] failed to provide the trial court with some reasonable basis for its failure to serve [process] within the time
specified by FRCP 4(m),         we hold that the triat court did not abuse its discretion in finding in its October 14. 2008
St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services, Inc. v. Braga
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                                                     2025 VI Super 40

explanation, does not excuse failure to comply with Court Rules, even in the absence of prejudice

to the opposing party.'°*          In fact, “‘the reason for the delay’         is ‘the most important factor’ in an

excusable neglect analysis                  109   “Importantly,        the ‘absence of prejudice alone can never

constitute good cause to excuse late [action];”              ‘while the prejudice may tip the ‘good cause’ scale,




Order that [movant] had not established good cause for an extension under FRCP 4(m).”);          ¢.g., Crt. stobal v. Merchants
Mkt.,   LLC, No. S.CT.CIV. 2017-0052, 

, at *4-*5 (VI. June 22, 2018) (per curiam) (unpublished)
(No excusable neglect where “the Government only states that it ‘inadvertently failed to file the notice of appeal
without stating why this shows good cause or excusable neglect to accept this appeal out of time.”); Hamdallah \
Warlick, 

 (D.V.I. App. Div. 1995) (failure to offer any explanation does not establish excusable
neglect)
108 “4 Henbaugh, 

, ] 13 (“[T]he Superior Court took none of these relevant factors into consideration.        Rather
than determining whether [movant] had met her burden of showing good cause or excusable neglect, the Superior
Court placed tremendous weight on the fact that [movant] was a pro se litigant and essentially shifted the burden to
[the non-moving party], suggesting that because [they] also failed to respond timely that there was no prejudice to
[them].  While pro se pleadings are ‘interpreted with considerable lenience because the authors lack formal legal
training,’   and as a policy matter, the Court ‘gives pro se litigants greater leeway in dealing with matters of procedure
and pleading,” that lenience and leeway are not unlimited. The policy of solicitude does not extend so far as to ‘allow
a party to ignore or defy the rules of procedural and substantive law.” (quoting Construction Technicians v. Zurich
American Ins. Co., 61 V.1. 153, 157 n.3 (V.L. 2014); Clarke v. Lopez,    73 V.1. 512, 516 (2020); and citing Marsh
Monsanto v. Clarenhach, 66 V.1. 366, 376 (V.I. 2017); Simpson v. Golden, 56 V.1. 272, 280 (V.I. 2012))); see also
e.g., Skinner, 27 V.1. at 196 (No Good Cause/Excusable Neglect to vacate a default judgment against a pro se party
where, “[t]he trial in this case was scheduled for June 12, 1991. On March 25, 1991, [the movants were] effectively
served with the complaint          During all this time, [movants] were residing together in California. On June 7, 1991,
[movants] mailed    a  letter requesting  a continuance until August 1991 due to [one of the movant s] schedule as a
medical doctor. The      [movants]   mistakenly   addressed a new Express Mail envelope to the Territorial Court of the
Virgin Islands,” and the motion to continue was received on June 14, 1991, two days after the Small Claims Default
Judgment Hearing.); Dais/ey, 

, at *4 (“The trial court issued the divorce decree on January 23, 2004
The Appellant's 60(b) motion to set aside the divorce decree was filed on February 3, 2005 Therein, the Appellant
justified [their] delay by averring that he did not recall being served and that [they] failed to sufficiently scrutinize the
documents [they] were served with. The Appellant further conceded that [they] had no defense to the clear indication
on the record that [they] had, indeed, been personally served. The Appellant further claims that [they] lacked the
sophistication to understand the documents [they] were served with.     However, neither ignorance, nor lack of
sophistication nor failure to scrutinize documents are sufficient to overcome Rule 60(b)(1)'s one year time-bar or
otherwise serve as a viable basis for substantive relief.”    (citing Miranda Hermanos Co. v. Asad, 13 V.1, 271, 277 (V.I
 Super. Ct. 1977); Berry v. St. Thomas Gas Co.,     36 V.1. 64, 73 (V.I. Super. Ct. 1997))) Scatliffe,   17 V1. at 97
 1 Allenbaugh,     

, 4 13 (quoting Montgomery , 71 V.L. at 1128); Pedro, 

 (same (quoting
 Montgomery,     7\ V.1, at 1127)); Montgomery,    71 V.1.   1119 (same (quoting /n re Sheedy,    

 (1st Cir.
 2017))); Greene, 67 V.1. at 738-39 (In fact. a “delay entirely within the movant's control-—such as when the movant
 makes a conscious decision to pursue one litigation strategy at the expense of another—does not support a finding of
 excusable neglect.”   (citing Eskridge. 

; Slaughter,    919 F.2d at 307 (collecting cases at footnote 6))
  St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services. Inc. v. Braga
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                                                         2025 VI Super 40

  the primary focus is on the [movant]'s reasons for not complying with the time limit in the first

  place,’”?!!

 431           The near total absence of facts explaining counsel’s failure to act and STT Cargo’s failure

 to follow up with counsel or read the publicly available court rules could, potentially, justify a

 ruling that Appellant simply failed to offer an explanation, thus justifying the trial court’s denial

 of its motion.        However, STT Cargo does proffer what could be considered arguments based upon

 the lack of culpable conduct.             Though brief, STT Cargo makes other arguments that are founded

 upon the Good Cause/Excusable Neglect standard, such as that it has a meritorious defense

 requiring further consideration.'''              Additionally, the Appellate Division of the District Court of

 the Virgin Islands has established a framework for evaluating failures of counsel when evaluating

 Good Cause/Excusable Neglect.''? Because decisions of the Appellate Division remain binding

on this Court in the absence of precedent from the Virgin Islands Supreme Court overturning them

and the Court has been unable to find any contrary precedent,''3 the Court will consider this as a

factor in its analysis



''® Beachside Assocs., 53 V.1. at 713 (quoting MCI Telecomms., 71 F.3d at 1097}
  ' Rivera v. People, 77 V1. 514, 548 (V.L. 2023) (“Furthermore, a court cannot ‘exercise its discretion            by choosing
to ignore a claim or issue that was properly before it.      ‘It is axiomatic that, when a court with discretion fails to balance
the pertinent factors required for it to properly exercise that discretion, such failure constitutes an abuse of discretion.’
(quoting Bryan, 

; Rivera-Mercado v. Gen. Motors Corp., 

 (V.I. 2009) (Swan, J.,
concurring); and citing Garcia v. Garcia, 59 V.1. 758, 771 (V.I. 2013); Beachside Assocs , 

))
'2 Archer v. Caribbean Auto Mart, Inc., 67 V.1. 1024, 1030-31 (D.V.I App. Div. 2017)
"3 Wallace, 71 V.1. at 739 (“[P]rior decisions of the Appellate Division remain binding upon the Superior Court unless
overtumed by this Court.” (citing Defoe, 56 V.L. at 119)). The Court recognizes that the Virgin Islands Supreme Court
has adopted a standard for Good Cause/Excusable Neglect e.g., V.I.R. CIV. P. 6(b)(t).           However, the mules of
procedure are expressly made inapplicable to Small Claims Proceedings. V.I. SM. CL. R (6)(b)(5), except in those
instances where the Small Claims Rules themselves expressly declare such rules applicable, ¢ g.. V.ILSM. CL. R. Ife)
(making V.LR, Civ. P. 1-2 applicable), (f) (making V.I.R. Civ. P. 6 applicable); V.I. SM. CL. R 4(b)(5) (making
 rules relating to privileged communications and the swearing of parties and witnesses” applicable); see Metivier, 77
V.L.   at 609-10 (“[A] deliberate choice to borrow some—yet not all—of the substantive language of another
jurisdiction's court rule constitutes impressive evidence that it was not the intent to implicitly adopt the omitted
provisions.”     (emphasis in original) (citing V1. Bar Ass'n,   75 V.1. at 399-400; Mills-Williams.   67 V1. at 585 Corraspe
St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services, Inc. v. Braga
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                                                        2025 VI Super 40

432        Considering the Small Claims prohibition on counsel and the directive to do substantial

justice, the Court will analyze these arguments.''* Because the primary focus is on the conduct

and motives of the party making the Good Cause/Excusable neglect argument, i.e., the movant,

the Court will first analyze that factor

      B.   Reason for Delay/Movant’s Conduct

433        Regrettably, Appellant does not make an extensive argument on this point and relies almost

exclusively on the fact that it handed the summons and complaint to its attorney.                           While such lack

of factual support and substantive briefing could constitute waiver,''> the little argument that is


53 V.1. at 482; Hansen,      68 V.1, at 609 n.3)).   Therefore,   the present Good Cause’ Excusable Neglect determination is
not in any way limited by Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(1).         Additionally,   “all other relevant circumstances surrounding
the party's failure to meet the originally prescribed deadline” are to be considered under V.I. R. Civ. P 6(b)(1)
Allenbaugh, 

, 4 13 (“The Superior Court must consider ‘all relevant circumstances’ when making an
excusable neglect determination.”   (alterations omitted) (quoting Fuller, 59 V.1. at 954; and citing Brown, 49 V.I. at
383).   The fact that it was counsel’s action or inaction would appear to be a relevant circumstance warranting
application of the standard adopted by the Appellate Division. Cf Halliday v. Footlocker Specialty, Inc., 53 V.1. 505
510 (2010) (factor when considering whether to dismiss for failure to prosecute is “whether the conduct of the party
or the attorney was willful or in bad faith” (emphasis in original) (citation omitted))
'14 The Court cautions that the primary reason it is considering these arguments is the absence of precedent interpreting
the Small Claims Rules. However, as this opinion will be published, future litigants will have the benefit of its
guidance. Thus, there will be no justification excusing more substantial presentation of material facts supporting an
appellant's argument.     But for this unique situation, the Court would consider such inadequately presented arguments
to be waived for lack of briefing
 \S See Beachside Assocs.,      53 V.1. at 713 (“{I}t is the [movant]'s burden to show good cause.      Therefore, because [the
movant, acting through its attorney, failed to provide the trial court with some reasonable basis for its failure to
serve [the defendant] within the time specified by [the applicable rule], we hold that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in finding in its October 14, 2008 Order that [movant] had not established good cause for an extension under
FRCP 4(m).”     (emphasis added)); cf Greene, 67 V.1. at 736-37 (“Under that rule, when an act must be done by a
specified deadline and a party moves for an extension of that deadline after the deadline passes, the party must
demonstrate that their failure to request such an extension before the expiration of that deadline was the product of
excusable neglect. [The defendant sought] summary judgment on August 4, 2014. [Movant] filed [their] response in
opposition on September 26, 2014, 50 days after [defendant]'s motion, which is well past the 20-day deadline imposed
by the Superior Court under Local Rule of Civil Procedure 56.1 for responding to such motions             Even though [movant]
filed two notices for extension of time pursuant to Local Rule of Civil Procedure 56.1 and a motion for a further two
day extension of time, [movant] still failed to file [any] response in opposition by September 25, 2015—the deadline
that would have existed if the Superior Court had granted [the] motion for a two-day extension of time.        Since
[movant]'s response in opposition—and consequently, [the] request for an extension of time to file an additional
opposition   --was untimely, Superior Court Rule 10 obligated [movant] to demonstrate excusable neglect in order to
receive the requested extension of time. [Movant] did not address the ‘excusable neglect’ standard in [their] opposition
to [the] summary judgment motion. Instead, [movant] explained that [they] made a conscious decision not ‘to expend
time and money responding to [an] improperly filed Statement of Facts’              because (they]   “should not have to expend
St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services, Inc. v. Braga
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                                                    2025 VI Super 40

provided relating to the reason for delay and STT Cargo’s conduct does not support a finding of

Good Cause/Excusable Neglect, as explained as follows

      1.   When a Defendant is Served With a Small Claims Complaint, Reliance Upon Counsel
           is, as a Matter of Law, not a Factor that is Considered in Evaluating Good Cause
           When Considering Whether to Vacate a Default Judgment and Excuse a Defendant’s
           Failure to Appear or Otherwise Defend

q34        To reiterate, when making         a Good Cause/Excusable Neglect determination, “‘the reason

for the delay is the most important of these factors,’ and ‘even where there is no prejudice, impact

on judicial proceedings, or trace of bad faith, the favorable juxtaposition of these factors does not

excuse     the delay    where    the proffered      reason    is insufficient.’”''®       “Conduct      is culpable       or

inexcusable if it evinces an attitude of willfulness or bad faith.”!'’              There is no explanation offered

for its failure to answer or otherwise defend other than, after having received legal notice informing

its manager of the date of the Small Claims Trial, STT Cargo handed the summons and complaint

to its lawyer and never followed up again.''®

q35        However, subsection 112(d) of title 4 of the Virgin Islands Code has included a prohibition

on counsel appearing in Small Claims Proceedings since its creation.''?                         Likewise, the Virgin



time and resources on a matter that [h]as been litigated exhaustively for seven years... The Superior Court denied
[movant]'s request for an extension of time, reasoning that ‘nothing prevented [movant] from presenting alternative
arguments and addressing the merits of [the summary judgment arguments] in its opposition,’ and because ‘granting
[movant]'s request would do nothing more than encourage piecemeal litigation resulting in a waste of judicial
resources.’” (citing V.I. SUPER. CT. R. 10(a)(2); Der Weer v. Hess Oil Vi, Corp.. 64 V.1. 107, 125 (V.1. Super. Ct
2016); McGary v. JS. Carambola, L.L.P.,      Case No. SX-13-CV~289,        

, at *2 n.4 (VI. Super. Ct
Oct. 7, 2016) (unpublished)))
6 Montgomery, 71 V.1. at 1127 (quoting Sheedy, 

)
"7 Skinner, 27 V.1. at 197 (citing Zawadski, 

)
'\8 Considering the absence of facts in the record, this is the only conclusion the record supports.   Cf Skinner.   27 V.1
at 197-98 (“A [movant]'s conduct is culpable or inexcusable if it evinces an attitude of willfulness or bad faith
(Movants] were made aware of the trial date in this case in late March. They waited two and a half months before
seeking a continuance.  No information was given as to the specifics of the fmovants’] medical schedule or any
emergencies which required a continuance.” (emphasis added) (citing Zawadski, 

))
'8 See generally Shroeder, 

, at *1 (“The history of the Small Claims Division of the Territorial Court
is not complex. The division was created in 1957 in the Municipal Court of St. Croix and the Municipal Court of St
St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services, Inc, v. Braga
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                                                             2025 VI Super 40

Islands Small Claims Rules provide that, before the swearing of any witness at a Small Claims

Trial,      the   Defendant      must    be   informed          that “counsel        are not    permitted    in Small       Claims

proceedings.””!?°

436         The rules of procedure governing all proceedings in this Court, including the Virgin Islands

Small Claims Rules, are available to the public on the website for the Judiciary of the Virgin

Islands (www.vicourts.org).!?! To the extent STT Cargo either failed to read the rules or believed

reliance upon counsel, without more, excused compliance with the Virgin Islands Small Claims




Thomas and St. John,         and in 1965 became a division of the Municipal Court of the Virgin Islands upon the
consolidation of the Courts,       Its jurisdiction at that time was limited to $100 and its purpose was ‘to provide a simple
and inexpensive procedure for the handling of small claims.”               (quoting Revision Note following 4 V.LC. § 111))
10 V1, SM. CL. R. 4(b)(1)(a)
2) Eg. Allenbaugh, 

, € 13 (“While pro se pleadings are ‘interpreted with considerable lenience because
the author{’]s lack formal legal training,’ and as a policy matter, the Court ‘gives pro se litigants greater leeway in
dealing with matters of procedure and pleading,’ that lenience and leeway are not unlimited The policy of solicitude
does not extend so far as to ‘allow a party to ignore or defy the rules of procedural and substantive law.’ Additionally.
 the reason for the delay’ is ‘the most important factor’ in an excusable neglect analysis, and the Superior Court made
no findings on this factor, nor could it, because [movant] failed to provide any reason for filing {the] motion late
[Movant)'s failure to provide an explanation for filing (the] motion late is fatal because clear or plain neglect is not
commensurate to excusable neglect            Moreover, the fact that [movant] appears pro se also means that the delay in
filing [the] motion is entirely attributable to [the movant] and the time to file a motion for attorney's fees, as is clearly
set forth in Rule 54 of the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure, does not require any legal training to comprehend
or calculate.” (quoting Clarke, 73 V.1. at 516; Construction Technicians., 61 V.1. at 157 0.3; Montgomery, 71 V.I. at
1128; and citing Simpson, 56 V.I. at 280; citing Marsh-Monsanto, 66 V.1. at 376; Bowman, 

, Pittston
Stevedoring, 

; Grant, 

; Martin, 

)); Montgomery, 71 VI. at
1127-28 (“We conclude that (movant] failed to act reasonably when she attempted to file a notice of appeal with the
Bureau of Motor Vehicles. While [movant] is a pro se litigant entitled to additional leniency, ‘that leniency is not a
license excusing non-compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.’                 That is particularly true in
this case, where even the most cursory reading of the Virgin Islands Rules of Appellate Procedure—which are freely
available on this Court's website—would reveal the proper place to file a notice of appeal, and, of course, an appeal
from any judgment entered by the Superior Court must be filed with this Court, the only appellate court in the Virgin
Islands.”     (citing Cornelius v. Bank of N.S.,   67 V.1.    806   823 (V.I.   2017) (which had quoted Simpson,   56 V.E   at 280)))
cf Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 

 (1982) (“The first question raised is simply how a legislature must go
about advising its citizens of actions that must be taken to avoid a valid rule of law                  The answer to this question
is no different from that posed for any legislative enactment affecting substantial rights.            Generally, a legislature need
do nothing more than enact and publish the law, and afford the citizenry a reasonable opportunity to familiarize itself
 with its terms and to comply.”); Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 

, 265 (2020) (“Every citizen is
 presumed to know the law,” and ‘it needs no argument to show that all should have free access’ to its contents
 (alterations omitted) (quoting Nash v. Lathrop, 

, 560 (Mass.               1886)))
  St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services, Inc. v. Braga
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                                                     2025 VI Super 40

  Rules, “such a construction was untenable and any reliance upon it was unreasonable.”'22. While

  it is reasonable for a Small Claims defendant to seek advice of counsel before a Small Claims

  Trial,'** nothing in the text of any of the Small Claims Rules could be understood to excuse a

 defendant from appearing on the return date stated in the Smal! Claims Summons

 137        Indeed,   the Small Claims Rules make clear that only a party may participate in a Small

 Claims Proceeding;         and the prohibition on counsel “is clearly set forth in Rule [4(b)(1)(A)] of the

 Virgin Islands [Small Claims} Rules . . ., [and] does not require any legal training to comprehend

         "!24 Because counsel are prohibited in Small Claims Proceedings and the Small Claims Rules

 provide multiple methods of preserving the right to counsel (and having the case removed from

 Small Claims jurisdiction), reliance upon counsel is not a factor in the Good Cause/Excusable

Neglect analysis and can never, as a matter of law, excuse a failure to appear and defend a Small

Claims Case

38         Although the Court finds upon this basis that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial

court to deny Appellant’s motion; the Virgin Islands Supreme Court has not held that such conduct

is not a factor when analyzing Good Cause/Excusable Neglect.                     Therefore, alternatively, the Court

will consider the applicable factors




'? See Tip Top Constr.,    71 V.1. at 563 (“To the extent [movant] construed the Superior Court's terse statements and
conclusion concerning the trial court's jurisdiction as an assurance that the denial of its renewed motion was properly
before this Court on appeal, such a construction was untenable and any reliance upon it was unreasonable.”’)
'*. Indeed, assuming counsel live up to their ethical obligation to know the law and objectively apply it to the facts
presented (and to not become emotionally involved such that they “become” the client), given the efforts made to
settle small claims matters before trial, a defendant’s consultation with counsel before the return date on a Smal!
Ciaims Summons has the very real possibility of facilitating prompt and low-cost resolution on the return date. In
fact.   a Small Claims plaintiff's pre-suit consultation with counsel would also be likely to facilitate prompt and low
cost resolution, as an objective evaluation of the application of law to fact by counsel should help a party assess their
actual and/or potential success or liability, thus enabling the party to determine when to “cut their losses,” so to speak
"3 Allenbaugh, 

, $ 13; see V.L SM. CL. R 4(b)(1)(a): Tip Top Constr, 71 V1. at 563
St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services, Inc. v. Braga
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                                                                 2025 VI Super 40

      2.     Ina Small Claims Proceeding, a Defendant’s Failure to Appear or Otherwise Defend
             is Not Excused by Reliance Upon Counsel; and Reliance Upon Counsel Does Not
             Establish Good Faith on the Part of the Movant

439          To reiterate,      “{cJonduct is culpable or inexcusable if it evinces an attitude of willfulness or

bad faith.”!25 STT Cargo, after having been served with process that stated the date of the Small

Claims Trial,         gave those documents to counsel and failed to take any subsequent actions.                                      This

does not show good faith or reasonable conduct;                                     and   “Defendant [STT Cargo], like all other

defendants, must, in the absence of a showing of incapacity,                                         be held responsible for reading

properly served legal process and taking appropriate action.                                         In this case, such action would

certainly have been no less than contacting the attorney with whom defendant left the original

complaint.”!?6

940        = Scatliffe ex rel.      Frazer v. George provides a remarkably compelling analogy to the present

facts.       In that case, this Court provided the following analysis

             Defendant . . . also contends that [their'?”] neglect should be excused because [they]
             mistakenly left the original complaint with an attorney without leaving a retainer,
             and assumed that the attorney would take care of the case. In addition, [defendant]
             says that due to [their] physical and mental condition [they] requested [their]
             partner to follow through with the case.                       [Defendant] does not state, however, that
             [their] partner agreed to follow through. Consequently, absent some showing that
             the attorney led the defendant to believe the case would be taken without a retainer,
             or a credible explanation for failing for two and a half months to communicate with
             either the attorney or defendant's partner regarding the progress of the case, the
             court cannot conclude that these explanations show excusable neglect. Indeed, the

125 Skinner,     27 V.1. at 197 (citing Zawadski, 

)
1% Scatliffe, 17 VA. at 97
127 See generally Newrez, 2025 VI SUPER 30U, n.61 (citing and quoting parenthetically Evans-Freke v. Evans-Freke
75     VA.     407,   462   (V.I.   2021)   (Swan,        J.,    concurring)        (“7hev,     merriam-webster.com,   http://www.meriam
webster.com/dictionary/they          (last visited Oct.         25, 2021)   (updating     the usage of they to    ‘[be] used with a singular
antecedent to refer to an unknown or unspecified person’                       or    ‘to refer to a single person whose gender identity is
nonbinary’).”)); Bonner, 2025 VI SUPER 19U, n75 (same):                        Hoolink,       2025 VI SUPER 28U, n.32 (same)    D'Andrade
2025 VI SUPER 31U, n.70 (same)
St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services, Inc. v. Braga
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                                                    2025 VI Super 40

          court cannot accept as excusable a defendant, when faced with a $[10},000 claim,
          simply leaving a complaint with an attorney who has not been retained and
          requesting a partner to follow through, without further inquiry.[!?°]

“The ... Courts of the Virgin Islands have held that motions to vacate default judgments should

be denied where defendants or their counsel act with ignorance, carelessness, mere forgetfulness,

outright disregard, or a cavalier indifference to the service process.”!”°                 Upon these facts, STT

Cargo’s reliance upon counsel does not support a finding of Good Cause/Excusable Neglect.'*°


 ® Scatliffe, 17 V.1. at 96-97 (emphasis added) (citing Residential Reroofing Union Local 30-B v. Mezicco, 55 F.R.D
516 (E.D.Pa.1972))
9 Boehm, 

, at *2 (citing Government of the Virgin Islands y. Virgin Islands Pleasure Boat Inc
14 V.L. 123 (V.I. Super. Ct. 1977); Scatliffe, 17 V.1. 91: Miranda Hermanos Co., 13 V.1. 271)); ¢.g., Skinner, 27 V.1
at 197-98 (citing Zawadski, 

); Daisley, 

, at *4 (“The trial court issued the divorce
decree on January 23, 2004. The Appellant's 60(b) motion to set aside the divorce decree was filed on February 3
2005. Therein, the Appellant justified [their] delay by averring that he did not recatl being served and that [their]
failed to sufficiently scrutinize the documents he was served with.       The Appellant further conceded that he had no
defense to the clear indication on the record that he had, indeed, been personally served. The Appellant further claims
that [they] lacked the sophistication to understand the documents they] was served with. However, neither ignorance,
nor lack of sophistication nor failure to scrutinize documents are sufficient to overcome Rule 60(b)(1)'s one year time
bar or otherwise serve as a viable basis for substantive relief.” (citing Miranda Hermanos Co., 13 V.1. at 277; Berry,
36 V1. at 73)); Boehm, 

, at *2 (“The Court cannot accept [movant’s] claims that [they] was so
distracted for a period of five to six weeks that [they] could not remember to inform [their] counsel. By [movant]'s
own admission, [they were] in repeated contact with [their] lawyer during this time, [they] had been served with
plaintiffs complaint, and plaintiff's motion for default. Additionally, after this Court entered a default judgment in
the amount of $9,437.00 against [movant] on November 30, 1996, it took [movant] nearly seven weeks to file a motion
to set aside the default judgment. Such conduct on the part of the [movant], who appears to have a good deal of
experience in matters concerning litigation, cannot be deemed excusable, but instead reveals either an outright
disregard or a cavalier indifference by the [movant] to the service of process upon [them].”); Donastorg v. Willis, No
ST-2010-CV-272, 

, at *4 (V.I. Super. Jan. 27, 2015) (unpublished) (“The default was the result of
[movant]'s culpable or inexcusable conduct. Aside from filing [the] initial Answer, it does not appear that [movant]
took any action in this case until [they] retained Attorney Clive Rivers, who entered an appearance for the [movant]
on December 9, 2014. As the Plaintiffs indicate in their Opposition, [movant] waited over two years after the Court
entered default before [they] retained an attorney in this matter.   Further, [movant] waited almost two months to retain
counsel once the Court scheduled a hearing on the issue of damages.        [Movant] provides no reason for waiting over
two years to finally respond to the First Amended Complaint.”)
139 Appleton, 61 V.1. at 268-69 (Movant, proceeding pro se, “was served with [the pleading] on July8, 2010, informing
{them] of the claims against [them] and that a ‘judgment by default will be taken against you as demanded in the
complaint” upon a “failure to appear or answer.’ [Movant] had until July 28, 2010, to respond to Harrigan's claims
and after [they] failed to do so for several months, the Superior Court entered default on December 2, 2010. Despite
the *greater leeway’ granted to pro se parties, this does not excuse [movant]'s failure to appear or respond to the
allegations      when [they were] properly served and informed of the consequences of such a failure.          Therefore,
because [movant] was properly served and informed of the consequences of failing to respond, the Superior Court did
not abuse its discretion in denying [the] motion to set aside the entry of default judgment           (citing Simpson,   56
V.I. at 280))
St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services, Inc. v. Braga
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                                                     2025 VI Super 40

      C.   Meritorious Defense

441        “While a defendant need not prove that [they] would prevail on the merits of [their]

defense, [they] must do more than make an unsupported allegation of a defense.                            At a minimum,

[they] must allege a credible factual basis of such a meritorious defense and must accompany such

a motion with supporting evidence that tends to show that the asserted defense is potentially

meritorious.”!3! General denials of the allegations in the complaint are not enough; there must be

specific factual matter proffered that, if proved, establish either a negative or affirmative

defense.'*?



‘31 Boehm, 

, at *2 (citing Scatliffe, 

). For example,          “[a] meritorious defense is
established ‘when ‘allegations of defendant's answer, if established on trial, would constitute a complete defense to
the action.” [Movant]'s proffer of facts in its motion, accompanied by a copy of the $1,000 check and an affidavit
from a party who participated in settlement negotiations, presented sufficient information for the court to be able to
evaluate the merits of the defense.”   Deal Furniture, 

 (quoting $55,518.05 in U.S. Currency, 

; and citing Tozer v. Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 

 (3d Cir. 1951))
132 Skinner, 27 V.1. at 197 (“The [movants] have not come forward with a prima facie meritorious defense or any
defense at all. They have not responded to the allegations presented in plaintiffs' complaint nor have they filed a brief
regarding the appeal with this court. A [movant] seeking to set aside a default judgment is required to set forth with
some specificity the grounds for [their] defense and the trial court must then evaluate that defense to determine whether
it is meritorious.” (citing Harad, 

)); compare Donastorg, 

, at *4 (“[T]he general
denials in both Defendant's original Answer and in Defendant's Answer to Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint do not
establish a meritorious defense. In cases where a meritorious defense has been found, a moving party has relied on
specifically-pled facts to persuade the court that an entry of default should be set aside. [T]he defendant's answer [did
not contain] specific factual allegations as to why defendant was not bound to the alleged terms of a contract. [I]n
addition to ‘simple denials or conclusory statements,’       the defendant's answer   ‘also alleged specific facts beyond the
general denial’ that would constitute a complete defense.”     (quoting Tozer, 

; $55,518.05 in U.S. Currency

; and citing Gross v. Stereo Component Systems. Inc., 

 (3d Cir. 1983); Feliciano \
Reliant Tooling Co. Ltd., 

 (3d Cir. 1982); Farnese v. Bagnasco. 

 (3d Cir. 1982)))
with Scatliffe, 17 V.1. at 94-95 (Movant    “claims that defendants George and Sprauve breached the Purchase and Sales
Agreement out of which their cross-claim arose ‘by failing to deliver mover functional and operational car wash as
warranted.’ The Purchase and Sales Agreement attached to George's and Sprauve's response to [movant]'s motion
however, shows that no such warranty was ever made. In fact, the agreement states, ‘the Buyers have examined the
premises and are willing to accept the premises as they are with all the equipment and other assets presently located
and situated on the premises.”  [Movant] has not challenged the attached agreement, nor [have they] asserted that the
agreement was modified. Thus, the court does not believe [movant] has shown this to be a meritorious defense.”); see
generally, e.g., Bazzar, 

, at *4 (“The Court finds, without taking into account the arguments raised
in the motion to dismiss, that [movant] has asserted sufficient facts to support a finding that there exists a basis for a
meritorious defense to Plaintiff's negligence and premises liability claim.”): Deal Furniture. 

(“[T]hough many terms of the agreement were not provided. the court may find that the negotiated settlement
eliminated a substantial portion of the original debt.   A defense that reduces the actual judgment award could constitute
St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services, Inc. v. Braga
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                                                    2025 VI Super 40

42         STT Cargo has not proffered a Meritorious Defense.                       While it asserts that the valuation

provided by Braga is questionable, it provides no comparisons from which such a conclusion could

be drawn.      Likewise, the desire to cross-examine is not a proffer of facts that would defeat, even

in part, the damages determination.          The absence of a Meritorious Defense weighs against a finding

of Good Cause/Excusable Neglect

      D.   Non-Movant Braga’s Conduct

43         Bad faith and other conduct on the part of the non-movant can weigh in favor of a finding

of Good Cause/Excusable Neglect.'*? Nothing in the record indicates Braga took any actions or

communicated anything that would have led STT Cargo to fail to appear or otherwise defend this

Case, and this factor does not weigh in favor of finding Good Cause/Excusable Neglect

      E.   Prejudice to the Opposing Party

§44        “Prejudice to the nonmoving             party encompasses,             among      other things, the ‘loss of

opportunity to present some material aspect of a case,’                     ‘the expenditure of money or similar

detrimental changes in position by one side in reliance on the action or inaction of the other,’                             and




a meritorious defense for this purpose.”   (citing Howard Fischer Assoc.,        Inc.   v. CDA Investment Technologies,      

,     *3, n. 4 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (unpublished);   Grubb v. Evangelisti,      

 (E.D. Pa.      1989)))
'33 E.g., Deal Furniture, 

 and n.6 (The court must consider a movant’s           “culpability in the litigation
process.    The record does not imply willful misconduct by appellants.           It appears that they acted in good faith by
entering negotiations and making partial payment toward complete settlement.            Appellants assert, and [the non-moving
party] vaguely denies, that the agreement contemplated dismissal of the lawsuit as a term of settlement.              Under this
set of facts, [movants’] actions constituted excusable behavior based on the reasonableness of their belief that [the
non-movant] would dismiss the debt action          Even if it turns out that [the non-movant] had not agreed to dismiss
the litigation, the misunderstanding between the parties constituted sufficient reason on its own for vacating the default
judgment.” (citing INVST Fin. Group, Inc. v. Chem—Nuclear Systems, Inc., 

 (6th Cir. 1987))); Deal
Furniture, 

 (The non-movant’s     “action in obtaining a default judgment for the full amount, without
deducting the $1,000 payment,     casts serious doubt on its good faith.   The trial court could use this failure to disclose
that a payment had been received in judging the credibility of [the non-movant’s] denial that there was an agreement
to dismiss the case.   Furthermore, though many terms of the agreement were not provided. the court may find that the
negotiated settlement eliminated a substantial portion of the original debt.”)
St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services, Inc. v. Braga
ST-2025-RV-00009
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the imposition of ‘additional trial preparation, and added expense.””'**                              “Importantly, the ‘absence

of prejudice alone can never constitute good cause to excuse late service.’”!7°

945        Under the present facts,               “[vJacating the default judgment prejudices the plaintiff[.} They

had prepared for and appeared at trial ... and complied with all of the trial court's orders.                               Although

the delay ‘in realizing satisfaction on a claim rarely serves to establish the degree of prejudice

sufficient to prevent the opening of a default judgment entered at an early stage of the proceeding,

this case represents a delay of what is now approximately [fourteen] months since the plaintiffs

[discovered          the destruction of her personal                property]      and approximately          [six] months        since

plaintiffs filed their complaint.”'3® While such a delay in a general civil matter may not warrant a

finding of prejudice,'?’ given the focus on prompt and inexpensive resolution focusing on doing

substantial justice in the Small Claims Division, a finding of prejudice to Braga is warranted.                                   This

factor does not support a finding of Good Cause/Excusable Neglect



'

 V.1. at 738 (quoting Sizemore,              

); see also Deal Furniture,       

 (“The
prejudice referred to            is that which is experienced after default judgment has been entered and which would not
otherwise be visited upon the judgment creditor. [The non-movant] has not shown that vacating the default judgment
would have subjected it to greater prejudice than that ordinarily experienced in the processing of a normal court docket
since mere delay in final resolution was never contemplated as a factor to be considered in determining prejudice.”
(citing Skinner, 27 V.1. at 196; James Wm. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice | 55.10, at 55-75, n.25, 80, 86 (2d
ed.1996)))
135 Beachside Assocs., 53 V.1. at 713 (quoting MCI Telecomms., 71 F.3d at 1097)
136 Skinner, 27 V.I1. at 197 (quoting Enicasco Ins., 

)
137 Cf Bazzar, 

,            at *3 (“While the Court recognizes that [non-movant] expended time preparing and
filing the motion for entry of default, the motion for default judgment, and a notice of waiver of jury trial, the case
itself is still in the early stages, and the Court is unable to find prejudice to [non-movant] based on the mere delay in
the proceedings and final resolution of the case.”           (citing Deal Furniture, 

)); Donastorg,       

, at *3 (“[Non-movants} contend that they will suffer great prejudice because it has been over two years since
the default entered against [movant]                 This argument is not persuasive.      Although the passage of time may have
obscured the memories of those involved, [non-movants] would still be able to propound interrogatories, request
documents, depose witnesses, and, if necessary, retain expert opinions. [Movant] would also have the opportunity to
do    the same.      Further,   aside   from   providing   voluntary disclosures    pursuant   to Federal   Rule   26, amending    their
Complaint,        seeking an entry of default, and defending [the present] Motion,             [non-movants] have taken little other
action in this case. Although the parties would be getting a very late start, it is unlikely that setting aside the entry of
default and allowing the parties to proceed to discovery will prejudice the [non-movants].”’)
St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services, Inc. v. Braga
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                                                             2025 VI Super 40

      F.     Undue Delay           Affecting    Docket Management

946          Any delay that affects the Superior Court's ability to manage its docket as a whole weighs

against a finding of excusable neglect.”!3® The docket of the Magistrate Division is overwhelming

and vacating the Default Judgment would require a new trial.                              This most certainly impacts the

ability of the Court to manage its docket.                      However, given that this sort of prejudice will arise in

every Small Claims Case in which a Default Judgment is sought to be vacated, it is unclear how

significant this factor is.            Certainly, to give it significant weight would completely undermine the

purpose of Virgin Islands Small Claims Rule 6(b) providing for relief from a Small Claims Default

Judgment.         Beyond this, the Court is not aware of any docket management issues vacating the

Default Judgment would cause.                     This factor only weighs minimally against the finding of Good

Cause/Excusable Neglect

      G. Mistake of Counsel!*”

447         ‘Although inadvertence, ignorance of the rules, or mistakes construing the rules do not

usually constitute excusable neglect,['*°] it is clear that excusable neglect is a somewhat elastic

concept and is not limited strictly to omissions caused by circumstances beyond the control of the




38 Greene.     67 V.L. at 738 (citing Ameritech Corp.,          

; Baptiste, 

, at *5)
'39 While the Court has already rejected mistake of counsel as a relevant factor, the absence of binding precedent
directly stating this point justifies reasoning in the alternative. See Virgin Islands Taxi Ass'n, 67 V.1. at 684 (“[W]hen
the Superior Court predicates its ruling on one basis without addressing alternate arguments, we will decline to address
those alternate arguments in the first instance on appeal.” (citing Rennie v. Hess Oil VJ. Corp., 

 (VI
2015) (“Ordinarily, when the Superior Court enters judgment on one basis, but fails to consider altemate arguments
that were raised by the parties, this Court will decline to address those alternate issues in the first instance, and instead
direct the Superior Court to do so on remand.” (citations omitted)); Fawkes v. Sarai, 66 VI. 237, 251 1.8 (V.I
2017))); Metivier. 77 V.1. at 611 (“Because the Superior Court provided an alternate reason for denying the substitution
motions and dismissing the claims, we may not reverse the April 26, 2020 opinion and order unless we are to also
hold that the Superior Court erred with respect to this determination.”)
40 Boehm, 

, at *2 (citing Government of the Virgin Islands v. Virgin Islands Pleasure Boat Inc.

 (V1.   Super. Ct.    1977): Scatliffe,   17 V.1. 91:   Miranda Hermanos,   13 V.1. 271)
St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services, Inc. v. Braga
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                                                   2025 VI Super 40

movant.’          [Courts have] identified five non-exclusive factors to guide courts in determining

whether an attorney's inadvertence is inexcusable:                      ‘({1) whether the inadvertence reflects

professional incompetence such as ignorance of the rules of procedure; (2) whether the asserted

inadvertence reflects an easily manufactured excuse incapable of verification by the court; (3)

whether       the   tardiness   results   from   counsel's    failure   to provide      for a readily          foreseeable

consequence; (4) whether the inadvertence reflects a complete lack of diligence; or (5) whether

the court is satisfied that the inadvertence resulted despite counsel's substantial good faith efforts

toward compliance.””'*!

448        STT Cargo makes the following argument

           The client should not be punished for the mistakes of the attorney. Fla. Physician's
           Ins. v. Ehlers, 

, 783 (11th Cir. 1993) (technical error by a party’s attorney
           should not deprive the party of an opportunity to present the merits of its claim)
           The Motion makes clear that Defendant’s failure to appear at trial was the result of
           its attorney’s clerical error. Defendant should be allowed to defend and present its
           case

STT Cargo does not even attempt to apply any of the factors governing when mistake of counsel

will allow a finding of Good Cause/Excusable Neglect.                   Absent some argument, there can be no

finding of Good Cause/Excusable Neglect.'*”



4! Archer, 67 V.L at 1030-31 (quoting Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del. v. Larson, 

 (3d Cir. 1987)
Ragguette v. Premier     Wine & Spirits, 

(3d Cir. 2012);   and citing Pioneer,   

)):   cf
Bazzar,    

, at *3 (“Despite the fact that there appeared to be a miscommunication between counsel
regarding whether default had been entered by the Clerk, and while it was [movant]'s counsel's responsibility to
independently review the Court's Docket, the Court is unable to determine that [movant}'s counsel was attempting “to
circumvent the rules and procedures of the Court’ to justify a finding of inexcusable neglect on the part of [movant]
zon Ds
"? Cristobal, 

, at *4-*5 (No excusable neglect where “the Government only states that it
 inadvertently failed to file the notice of appeal’ without stating why this shows good cause or excusable neglect to
accept this appeal out of time."); see Peters, 60 V.I. at 481, 483-84 (Appellant “filed an affidavit in which [their] trial
counsel stated that ‘[they] overlooked filing the Notice of Appeal’ in [this] case. and that [they were} unable to
determine when the Superior Court's Judgment and Commitment reached [their] office, or ‘when and if [movant]
requested’ that a notice of appeal be filed      No statute or court rule allows the Superior Court to grant...  105 days
St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services, Inc. v. Braga
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                                                         2025 VI Super 40

       H.   Preference for Decision on the Merits

449         The Virgin Islands Courts’ preference for decisions on the merits has at least two apparent

applications.         The first involves instances where technical application of rules would defeat a

meritorious argument or claim raising doubt as to whether the rule should be strictly applied; or,

said slightly differently, in those instances where proof of Good Cause/Excusable Neglect is a

close call, doubt should be resolved in favor of allowing for a merits determination.'*? The Court

does not question the continued viability of this application, but the present facts are not a close

call under the Good Cause/Excusable Neglect standard discussed above

450         The second application of the preference for a determination on the merits appears to be

founded on the former Superior Court Rules governing Sma!l Claims Proceedings, which allowed

the      vacating     of a default judgment             for mistake        and   other   reasons      in addition      to   Good

Cause/Excusable Neglect.'**                  It is axiomatic that this standard was replaced by the standard set

forth in Virgin Islands Small Claims Rule 6(b), which limits the consideration of whether to vacate



to file an appeal with this Court after the entry of a final judgment,           and accordingly, the Superior Court erred in
granting [the] motion for an extension of time.”)
'8See, e.g., Powell, 72 V.I. at 1043 (“{P]arties should be afforded liberal freedom to amend, to satisfy this Court's
 strong preference for trial courts to decide doubtful cases on their merits rather than dismiss them for a failure to
strictly follow purely procedural rules.’’*(emphasis added) (quoting Joseph, 54 V.1. at 650; Daves, 661 F.2d at
t025))
'4 Ryans Rest., 

 (“Since there is no requirement in the Small Claims Division under Terr. Ct. R
62 to submit an answer or other responsive filing that may             indicate the existence of a meritorious defense,        the
preference for resolving controversies on the merits rather than by default is even stronger.”); Deal Furniture, 

 (“Territorial Court Rule 50 entitles the trial judge to set aside the default judgment ‘for good cause
shown’ and as guided by Fed. R. Civ. P. 59-61. In general, courts disfavor default judgments, preferring instead to
decide cases on the merits. Determining whether to grant a motion to set aside default is based on liberal as opposed
to strict interpretation, and ‘any doubt should be resolved in favor of the petition to set aside the [default] so that cases
may be decided on their merits.’”       (emphasis added) (quoting Medunic v. Lederer, 

 (3d Cir.1976)
citing Skinner,     27 V.I. at 196;   $55,518.05 in U.S. Currency,   

;    Tozer,   

:   $55,518.05 in
U.S.   Currency,    

.-95));    Daisley, 

,   at *3 (“[T]he court may relieve a party or a party's
legal representative from a final judgment order or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake , inadvertence,
surprise or excusable neglect [or] ... (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment
(emphasis added) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), (6); and citing Skinner,         27 V.I. at 196))
 St. Thomas Cargo & Ship Services, Inc. v. Braga
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                                                     2025 VI Super 40

 a Default Judgment in a Small Claims Proceeding to Good Cause/Excusable Neglect.'45 To the

 extent STT       Cargo relies upon a standard contained only in a repealed rule, that reliance is

 misplaced as a matter of law

                                                    CONCLUSION

 {51      Because the Default Judgment is valid and STT Cargo has failed to make a showing of

 Good Cause/Excusable Neglect, the order of the Magistrate Division denying STT Cargo’s motion

 for relief from a Small Claims Default Judgment is affirmed

        Accordingly,        it is hereby

        ORDERED that Order of the Magistrate Division denying the motion to vacate the Default

Judgment is AFFIRMED,                and it is further

        ORDERED that a copy of this Order shall be directed to counsel                   of record



DATED:         December 1, 2025
                                                         HONO                  E SIGRID M. TEJO
                                                         Judge     ofthe   Superior Court of the Virgin Islands

  ATTEST                                                                   /

  TAMARA CHARLES
  Clerk of      the Court

  BY:      \
           PAULA CLAXTON
           Court Clerk I {p}-/|                 /PODFA




"45 Mills-Williams, 

 (When a court rule adopts a standard different from a prior rule, the new standard
replaces the old.)