SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS

DIVISION OF ST. CROIX

SHOW AYNE SIDNEY MODESTE,

PLAINTIFF, Civil No. SX-15-CV-021

VIRGIN ISLANDS POLICE CITE AS: 2023 VI SUPER 2]
DEPARTMENT,

DEFENDANT.

Appearances:

Showayne Sidney Modeste

New York, New York

For Plaintiff. Pro Se

Venetia H. Velazquez, Esq.

V.I. Department of Justice

St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands

For Defendant

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WILLOCKS, Senior Sitting Judge

,i 1 THIS MATTER is before the Court for review sua sponte.

BACKGROUND

2 On January 26, 2015, Plaintiff Showayne Sidney Modeste (hereinafter "Plaintiff')

commenced this lawsuit pro se against Defendant Virgin Islands Police Department (hereinafter

"Defendant") by filing a handwritten, single-page complaint:

On or about November 20, 2013, SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS

subpoened STX V.I. POLICE DEPARTMENT Rainbow building F'sted (custodian of

Records) for Maximum Information concerning "Simple Assault and Battery offense

reported by civilian I, SHOW AYWNE SIDNEY MODESTE [sic] 02/23/2013 but not

delivered I. Their recorded witness statements; recorded by V.1. POLICE

DEPARTMENT officers that arrived on scene A. Officer I. Navarro 3222, Officer C.

Jhero.

On or about July 7, 2 0 1 0 V.I. POLICE DEPARTMENT United States Virgin Islands

Police Officer Casanova wrote an report of I injury one year Five Months later I, went
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Memorandum Opinion 2023 VI SUPER 2\
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F'sted Police Station requesting Police Report with the fee and none was prepared or

delivered.

Wherefore the said Plaintiff claims this Honorable Court To A. Award I, damages In the

amount o f $ Ten Thousand Dollars. B. To award I, Attorney fees and costs. C. And any
1
further relief that this Court deems necessary.

(Compl.)

'1[ 3 Initially, Plaintiff only served Defendant with a summons and a copy of the complaint.

However, pursuant to Rule 4(i)(l) of the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff was

also required to serve the Attorney General of the Virgin Islands and the Governor of the Virgin

3
Islands in this matter but failed to do so. Thus, the Court entered multiple orders whereby the

Court denied Plaintiffs motions for entry of default and motions for judgment by default, both

filed in 2 0 1 5 and again in 2 0 1 9 , and ordered Plaintiff to serve the Attorney General of the Virgin

4
Islands and the Governor of the Virgin Islands.

1
The complaint is reproduced here with capitalization, punctuations, etc. as written by Plaintiff.

Rule 4 of the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

() Serving the Government of the United States Virgin Islands and Its Agencies, Public Corporations,

Officers, or Employees.

( I ) Government o
f the Virgin Islands. In all cases in which the Government of the Virgin Islands is a

named defendant, service shall be made by serving a summons and a copy of the complaint on the

Governor and upon the Attorney General of the Virgin Islands.

3
On November 6, 2019, the Coun entered an order whereby the Court noted that "it appears that the Plaintiff has

failed to serve the Attorney General of the Virgin Islands in compliance with [Rule 4(i)(l) of the Virgin Islands

Rules of Civil Procedure]" and ordered that: (i) Plaintiff's motion for entry of default is denied, (ii) Plaintiffs

motion for judgment by default is denied, and (iii) Plaintiff to serve the Attorney General of the Virgin Islands with

a summons and a copy of the complaint within thirty days from the entry of said order. (Nov. 6, 2 0 1 9 Order)

On September 1, 2021, Court entered an order whereby the Court noted that "Plaintiff has failed to serve the

Governor of the Virgin Islands as required under Rule 4(i)( I ) of the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure" and

ordered that: (i) Plaintiffs motion for entry of default is denied, (ii) Plaintiffs motion for judgment by default is

denied, (iii) Plaintiff shall serve the Governor of the Virgin Islands with a summons and a copy of the complain!

within thirty days from the entry of said order, and (iv) Plaintiff is notified that failure to comply with this order may

result in the dismissal of this case. (Sept. 1 , 2021 Order.)

On October 20, 2 0 2 1, after the 30-day period passed and Plaintiff has not filed proof of service for the Governor of

the Virgin Islands as ordered, the Court entered an order whereby the Court ordered that: (i) within fifteen ( 1 5 ) days

from the date Plaintiff is served with the order, Plaintiff shall file proof of service for the Governor of the Virgin

Islands, or show good cause as to why the Court should extend the time for service for Governor of the Virgin

Islands, and (ii) Plaintiff is notified that failure to comply with this order will result in the dismissal of this case

without prejudice. (Oct. 20, 2021 Order.)

4
Upon review of the docket, it appears that the Attorney General of the Virgin Islands and the Governor of the

Virgin Islands were served with some of the orders entered in this matter by the Superior Court Marshal. However,
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Memorandum Opinion 2023 I SUPER 2 \

Page 3 of 10

4 On November 30, 2 0 2 1 , after 15-day period passed and Plaintiff has not complied with

the October 20, 2021 order, the Court entered an order whereby the Court ordered, inter alia,

that: (i) on January 27, 2022, Plaintiff shall appear for a show cause hearing to show cause why

she should not be held in contempt and sanctioned for failing to comply with the Court's

September I, 2021 order and October 20, 2021 order, and (ii) Attorney General Denise N.

George, Esq. of the Virgin Islands Department of Justice shall make a limited appearance at the

aforementioned show cause hearing to advise the Court why no appearances have been made on

behalf of Defendant VIPD in this matter. (Nov. 30, 2021 Order.)

5 At the January 27, 2022 show cause hearing, Venetia H. Velazquez, Esq. of the V.I.

Department of Justice appeared on behalf of Defendant and Plaintiff did not appear. The Court

continued the status conference to March 10, 2022.

6 On February 3, 2022, Defendant filed a motion for more definite statement pursuant to

Rule 12(e) of the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff did not file an opposition in

response.

,r 7 On March 15, 2022, the Court entered an order whereby the Court found that the

complaint failed to sufficiently put Defendant on notice of the claim that is brought against it to

defend and ordered, inter alia, that: (i) the March 10, 2022 status conference is vacated, (ii)

Defendant's February 3, 2022 motion for more definite statement is granted, (iii) within fifteen

(15) days from the date of entry of the order, Plaintiff shall serve and file a more definite

statement that provides factual allegations of the transaction or occurrence on which Plaintiff's

"[ijn general, actual notice of a law suit is not a substitute for proper service and absent proper service, a case must

be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant." Ross v. Hodge, 58 V.I. 3 IO (V.I. 2013) (citation

omitted). Nevertheless, the issue of service and personal jurisdiction over Defendant was mooted by Defendant's

subsequent voluntary appearance in this matter-to wit, Defendant filed a motion for more definite statement on

February 3, 2022, the Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant. See Title 5 V.I.C. § 115 ("A

voluntary appearance of the defendant shall be equivalent to personal service of the summons upon him.").
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Memorandum Opinion 202 vIsvFER 2\
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claim is based upon-including but not limited to ( I ) Defendant's conduct that allegedly caused

Plaintiff harm, (2) the harm Plaintiff allegedly sustained, and (3) the timeframe thereof-and

identify Plaintiffs claim, and (iv) Plaintiff is notified that failure to comply with this Order may

5
result in the dismissal of this matter for failure to prosecute. (March 1 5 , 2022 Order.)

' I n the March 15, 2022 order, the Court explained:

In its motion, Defendant moved the Court to order Plaintiff to file a more definite statement of her

complaint. Defendant made the following assertions in support of its motion: (i) " It is difficult to discern

when Plaintiff is claiming the incident/event that forms the basis of his Complaint occurred"to wit, The

complaint references three periods: July 7, 2010 (date a report was allegedly written); one year five months

later (presumably late 2 0 1 1 ) , when Plaintiff was not provided a report when requested; and February 23,

2013 (date a report was allegedly subpoenaed but not delivered)." (Motion, p . 2 , n.D); and (ii) "Plaintiffs

bare bones complaint fails to put the defendant on notice of the conduct of the Defendant that is being

challenged, the alleged harm that was purportedly proximately caused by that conduct, and the alleged legal

claim(s) that m ay subject it to liability." (I d., at p. 3); (ii) From the
" fa cts pied, it is difficult to decipher

wh at conduct or harm is even being alleged, what, if any, violation of right(s) is claimed and the causes of

action asserted." (Id.); (iv) " These ilures deprive the
fa D efendant of the opportunity to mount appropriate

defenses, pursuant to rule 1 2 , and to file a responsive pleading." (Id.)

The Co urt notes at the outset that Defendant filed its motion prior to filing any responsive

pleading and pointed out the defects complained of and the details desired in compliance with Rule 12(e) of

the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure.

Plaintiffs complaint did not set forth counts with separate designation of the specific names of

each count in the pleadings. N evertheless, this error is not fat al if Plaintiffs complaint sufficiently put

D efendant on notice of the cl aims brought against them. See V.I. R. Civ. P. (a)(2) ("[The
8 Virgin Islands]

is a notice pleading jurisdiction");' Mills-Williams ,•. Mapp, 6 7 V.I. 574 , 585 (2017) ("Virgin Islands R ule

of Civil Pro cedure 8 expressly states that the Virgin Islands "is a notice pleading jurisdiction," V.I. R. CJV.

P. 8 (a), an d the Reporter's N ote eliminates any doubt that this language is calculated to "apply[] an

approach that declines to enter dismissals of cases based on fa ilure to allege specific fa cts which, if

established, plausibly entitle the pleader to relief." (citing V.I. R. CIV. P. 8 Reporter's Note (emphasis

added)); see Williams v. Galiber, 70 V.I. 226, 2 30 (V.I Super. Ct. March 8, 2019) (Notice pleading means

that a Complaint is sufficient when it 'adequately alleges fa cts that put an accused on notice of aims
cl

brought against it."'). Upon review of the complaint, given the lack of clarity regarding D efendant's

conduct that allegedly caused Plaintiff harm, the harm Plaintiff allegedly sustained, and the timeframe

thereof, the Court finds the complaint has failed to sufficiently put Defendant on notice of the claim that is

brought against it to defend. See Oxley • Sugar Bay Club & Resort Corp., 2 0 1 8 .
V I. LEXIS 8 1 , at * 1 0

(V.1. Super. Ct. May 14, 2018) ("Based upon the differences among notice pleading, fa ct pleading, and the

plausibility standard, this Court determines that a complaint need not plead facts to support each element of

a claim in order to adequately allege facts that put an accused party on notice or to "show[] the pleader is

entitled to relief under V.I. R. CIV . P. 8( a)(2). But, a complaint should provide factual allegations sufficient

to advise the responding party o f the transaction or occurrence on which the claim is based and identify

the claim, reciting its elements, so as to enable the defendant to respond intelligently and to enable the

Court to determine on a motion to dismiss under V.I. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) whether the claim is adequately

pied."). While Plaintiff, as a p ro s e litigant, is "entitled to additional leniency, that leniency is not a license

[excusing non-compliance] with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." Montgomery v. Virgin

Grand Villas St. John Owners' Association, 7 1 V .I. 1 1 1 9 , 112 7 -2 8 (V.I. 2019) (internal quotation omitted);

see also, Phillip v. Marsh-Monsanto, 66 V.I. 6 1 2 , 622 (V.I 2017) (noting that the leniency toward p ro s e

litigants has limits). As such, the Court will grant Defendant's motion for more definite statement and order
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Memorandum Opinion 2023 VI SUPER 2-\
Page 5 of IO

8 As of the date of this order, Plaintiff has not filed anything in response to the March 1 5 ,

2022 order.

ST AND ARD OF REVIEW

9 Rule 41(b) of the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[i]f the plaintiff

fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to

dismiss the action or any claim against it" and that "[u]nless the dismissal order states otherwise,

a dismissal under this subpart (b) and any dismissal not under this rule -- except one for lack of

jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure to join a party under Rule 19 -- operates as an

adjudication on the merits." V.I. R. CIV. P. 41(b). In Halliday v. Footlocker Specialty, Inc., the

Virgin Islands Supreme Court adopted the six Poulis factors and held that "the Superior Court

may not dismiss an action for failure to prosecute unless these six [Poulis] factors strongly weigh

in favor of dismissal as a sanction." 53 V.I. 505, 5 1 1 (V.I. 2010). See V.I. Taxi Ass'n v. V.I. Port

Auth., 67 V.I. 643, 693 n.30 (2017) (This itself constitutes error, as the Superior Court must

conclude that, when weighed against one another, the six Halliday factors "strongly weigh in

Plaintiff to file a more definite statement.' In light of the Court's ruling, the Court will also vacate the

March I 0, 2022 status conference.

' Defendant referenced: V.L.R. CI. P. 8(a)(2).

4
As noted above, where an action was pending on the effective date of the effective date of the Virgin

Islands Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1 - 1 of the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the

Court make "an express finding that applying them in a particular previously-pending action would be

infeasible or would work an injustice." V.I. R. CI. P. l-l(c)(2). Here, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court

has not directed that prior rules or practices to be applicable. Furthermore, given that Rule 8(a)(2) of the

Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure both

require "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief' and that the

local rule "eliminates the plausibility standard and instead will permit a complaint so long as it

"adequately alleges facts that put an accused party on notice of claims brought against it," the Court does

not find that applying the new rules to be infeasible or work an injustice. Brathwaite • H.D. V.I. Holding

Co., 2017 V.l. LEXIS 76, 3 , ( V. I Super. Ct. May 24, 2017). Thus, the Court finds that Rule 8(a)(2) of the

Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure applies here.

' Rule 6-1 provides that "[n ]othing herein shall prohibit the court from ruling without a response or reply

when deemed appropriate." V.l. R. CIV. P. 6(1)(6).

(March 1 5 , 2022 Order 2-4.)
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favor of dismissal as a sanction" for failure to prosecute.") (citing Halliday, 53 V.I. at 5 1 1 ). The

six Pou/is factors are:

( I ) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary

caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of

dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad

faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of

alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense.

Molloy v. Independent Blue Cross, 56 V.I. 1 5 5 , 185-86 (V.I. 2 0 1 2 ) (quoting Pou/is, 747

F.2d at 868).

In Molloy, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court instructed that "[a ]lthough a trial court is not

required to find that all the factors weigh in favor of dismissal to warrant dismissal of the claim,

the court must explicitly consider all six factors, balance them, and make express findings." 56

V.I. 1 5 5 , 1 8 6 (V.I. 2 0 1 2 ) (citations omitted). In other words, "the 'extreme' sanction of dismissal

is reserved for instances in which 'a trial court makes appropriate findings to all six factors"" and

"[w]ithout them, the drastic sanction of dismissal 'cannot be warranted."' Id. (citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

10 As noted above, Plaintiff failed to comply with the March 1 5 , 202 2 Order, which advised

Plaintiff that failure to comply may result in the dismissal of this matter for failure to prosecute.

(March 1 5 , 2022 Order.) This matter has been pending since 2 0 1 5 and still remains in the initial

pleading stage of the litigation. At this juncture, the Court will consider the six Poulis factors and

determine whether dismissal for failure to prosecute is warranted in this instance.

1. Plaintiffs Personal Responsibility

'I[ I I Here, Plaintiff commenced and proceeded in this matter as a pro se litigant. Initially,

Plaintiff prosecuted this matter with gusto. However, since November 2 0 1 9 , Plaintiff has not

done anything in response to the Court's orders or moved this matter along. While Plaintiff, as a
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Memorandum Opinion 2023 VI SUPER 4
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pro se litigant, is "entitled to additional leniency, that leniency is not a license [ excusing non

compliance] with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." Montgomery v. Virgin

Grand Villas St. John Owners· Association, 71 V.I. 1119, 1127-28 (V.I. 2019) (internal

quotation omitted); see also, Phillip v. Marsh-Monsanto, 66 V.l. 6 1 2 , 6 2 2 (V.I. 2 0 1 7 ) (noting

that the leniency toward pro se litigants has limits). The leniency is also not a license excusing

non-compliance with the Court's orders. Thus, the Court finds Plaintiff personally responsible

for the delay in the prosecution of this matter. As such, this factor weighs strongly in favor of

dismissal.

2. Prejudice to the Adversary

,i 1 2 In Molloy, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court stated that "[p ]rejudice to the opposing

party is generally demonstrated by either increased expense to the opposing party arising from

the extra costs associated with filings responding to dilatory behavior or increased difficulty in

the opposing parties' ability to present or defend their claim(s) due to the improper behavior." 56

V.l. at 1 8 9 (citing Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868). As mentioned above, since November 2019, Plaintiff

has not done anything in response to the Court's orders or moved this matter along. Notably,

Plaintiff failed to file a more definite statement as ordered, and thus, to date, Plaintiff has failed

to put Defendant on notice of the claim that is brought against it to defend. With the passage of

time, evidence could be lost, memories could fade, and witnesses could disappear or become

unavailable. As with any case, a lengthy delay will certainly make it more difficult for

Defendants to defend against Plaintiff's claims. As such, this factor weighs strongly in favor of

dismissal.
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Memorandum Opinion 2023 vIsvFE 2Z [

Page 8 of 10

3. A History of Dilatoriness

,r 1 3 A history of dilatoriness is characterized by a consistent delay in the prosecution of this

matter. See Gilbert v. Gilbert, 2 0 1 7 V.I. LEXIS 143, 8 (Super. Ct. Sep. 1 1 , 2 0 1 7 ) (citing Poulis,

747 F.2d at 868); see also, Encarnacion v. Gov't o
f the V.I., 2 0 1 8 V.I. LEXIS 73, 6-7 (V.I

Super. Ct. July 3 1 , 2 0 1 8 ) ("Plaintiff has engaged in a history of dilatoriness such that "litigation

has been characterized by a consistent delay.") (quoting Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868). As mentioned

above, this 20 I 5 matter remains in the initial pleading stage of the litigation-to wit, Plaintiff has

not done anything in response to the Court's orders or moved this matter along since November

20 I 9. As such, the Court finds a history of dilatoriness in the prosecution of this matter, and this

factor weighs strongly in favor of dismissal.

4. Offending Party/Attorney's Conduct Willful or in Bad Faith

14 In Molloy, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court stated that "the trial court must point to

specific evidence to justify its determination of willfulness or bad faith." 56 V.I. at 192. Thus, if

there is no evidence of willfulness or bad faith on the record, the Court must presume the

party/attorney's conduct was not willful or in bad faith. Id. In Virgin Islands Taxi Association,

the Virgin Islands Supreme Court clarified that "[willful' conduct that justifies dismissal is

conduct 'that is deliberate and contuma cious,'and that 'involves intentional or self-serving

behavior."" 67 V.I. 643, 698 (V.I. 2 0 1 7 ) (quoting Watts v. Two Plus Two, Inc., 54 V.I. 286, 308

( V.I. 2 0 1 0 ) (citations omitted). "Willful conduct, without a finding of bad faith, may still support

a conclusion that dismissal for failure to prosecute is warranted, but the absence of a good-faith

effort to prosecute a case does not." V.I. Taxi Ass'n, 67 V.I. at 699 (citations omitted). Here,

although there is no specific evidence to justify a determination that Plaintiffs conduct was in

bad faith, there is specific evidence to justify a determination that Plaintiff's conduct was
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Memorandum Opinion 023 v1scree 2Zl
Page 9 of IO

willful-to wit, Plaintiffs failure to attend status conference(s), Plaintiff's failure to comply with

the Court's orders, and Plaintiffs failure to take any initiative to move this matter forward. As

such, this factor weighs in favor of dismissal.

5. Effectiveness of Alternate Sanctions

'I[ 1 5 Courts must look to other appropriate methods of sanctioning before dismissal for failure

to prosecute because "[d]ismissal must be a sanction of last, not first, resort." Gilbert, 2 0 1 7 V.I.

LEXIS 143 at 10 (citing Pou/is, 747 F.2d at 869). Here, some alternate sanctions include

excluding evidence, precluding witnesses, striking portions of the pleadings, or imposing

monetary sanctions. See Gilbert, 2017 V .I . LEXIS 143 at *10. However, none of these

alternatives are appropriate here because in taking everything into consideration-such as the

fact that this case has been pending since 2 0 1 5 and still remains in the initial pleading stage of

the litigation and Plaintiff's dilatory and lackadaisical approach to this matter since November

2 0 1 9 the Court finds that there lacks a clear interest on Plaintiffs part to pursue her case

against Defendant. As such, this factor weighs strongly in favor of dismissal.

6. Meritoriousness of the Claim

16 "In considering whether a claim or defense appears to be meritorious for this inquiry, we

do not purport to use summary judgment standards. A claim, or defense, will be deemed

meritorious when the allegations of the pleadings, if established at trial, would support recovery

by plaintiff or would constitute a complete defense." See Gilbert, 2 0 1 7 V.l. LEXIS 143 at 1 0

(quoting Poulis, 747 F.2d at 869-70). In her complaint, Plaintiff did not set forth any counts

designating specific causes of action. As noted above, the Court found that the complaint has

failed to sufficiently put Defendant on notice of the claim that is brought against it to defend and
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Plaintiff failed to file a more definite statement as ordered. As such, the Court does not find

Plaintiff's claim meritorious, and this factor weighs strongly in favor of dismissal.

"JI 17 Having examined the six Poulis factors regarding the dismissal of this matter for failure

to prosecute, the Court finds that all six factors weigh in favor of dismissal (with five factors

weighing strongly in favor). Accordingly, the Court finds the extreme sanction of dismissal is

warranted in this instance. See Molloy, 56 V.I. at 1 8 6 ("Although a trial court is not required to

find that all the factors weigh in favor of dismissal to warrant dismissal of the claim, the court

must explicitly consider all six factors, balance them, and make express findings."); see also,

Halliday, 53 V.1. at 511 ("{T]he Superior Court may not dismiss an action for failure to

prosecute unless these six [Poulis] factors strongly weigh in favor of dismissal as a sanction.");

V.I. Taxi Ass'n, 67 V.I. at 693 n.30 (quoting Halliday, 53 V.I. at 5 1 1. ) .

CONCLUSION

18 Based on the foregoing, the Court will dismiss this matter for failure to prosecute and

close this matter. An order and judgment consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be

entered contemporaneously herewith.

DoNE • 6a %ray 2o23.

ATTEST:

Tamara Charles
·A4weal HAROLD W.L. WILLOCKS

Clerk of the Court Senior Sitting Judge of the Superior Court

By: Sharisse A. Bascombe
Court Clerk Supervisor

Dated:
MAY 16, 2023
-------------
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS

DIVISION OF ST. CROIX

SHOWAYNE SIDNEY MODESTE, Civil No. SX-2015-CV-021

PLAINTIFF,

v.
CITE AS: 2023 VI SUPER 7- \
VIRGIN ISLANDS POLICE

DEPARTMENT,

DEFENDANT.

Appearances:

Showayne Sidney Modeste

New York, New York

For Plaintiff. Pro Se

Venetia H. Velazquez, Esq.

V.I. Department of Justice

St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands

For Defendant

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

WILLOCKS, Senior Sitting Judge

In accordance with the Memorandum Opinion entered contemporaneously herewith, it is hereby:

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Plaintiff Showayne Sidney Modeste's

(hereinafter "Plaintiff') complaint against Defendant Virgin Islands Police Department is DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE for failure to prosecute. It is further:

ORDERED that this matter is CLOSED. And t i s further:

ORDERED that a copy of this Order and Judgment and the Memorandum Opinion entered

contemporaneously herewith shall be served upon:

I. Venetia H. Velazquez, Esq. electronically.

2. Plaintiff via: (i) certified mail and regular First-Class mail to 14 Thayer Street, Apt.

2G, New York, NY 10040; (ii) email to [email protected]; (iii)

personally to Plaintiffs grandmother Agatha Medeste at 192 Estate St. Georges,

Frederiksted, VI 00840L

DONE and so ORDERED this D day of May 2023.

ATTEST: ·444.d is«oLp wt w.64,(4y
Tamara Charles

Clerk of the Court Senior Sitting Judge of the Superior Court

By: Sharisse A. Bascombe
Court Clerk Supervisor

Dated: MAY 16, 2023
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