IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
DIVISION OF ST. THOMAS AND ST. JOHN

PEOPLE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS, ) CASE NO. ST-2019-CR-00216

)
Plaintiff, ) 14 V.LC. §§ 921, 922(a)(1), 11(a)

Vs. } 14 V.LC. §§ 921, 922(b), 11(a)
JACQUES CAJUSTE,
Defendant.

PEOPLE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS, ) CASE NO. ST-2019-CR-00217

Plaintiff, ) 14 V.1.C. §§ 921, 922(a)(1), 11(a)
vs. ) 14 V.LC. §§ 921, 922(b), 11(a)
) 14 V.LC. § 551(1)
VIVIANE STUART a/k/a VIVIANE AIS, )
)
)
Defendant. _)

Cite as: 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court are:
1. Defendant Jacques Cajuste’s Motion to Dismiss Counts One and Seven of the Information

(“Motion to Dismiss”), which was filed on January 10, 2020;

2. Response to Defendant Cajuste’s Motion to Dismiss Counts One through Six and Eight of
the Information and Motion to Dismiss Counts One and Seven of the Information!
(“People’s Response”), which was filed on February 14, 2020; and

3. Defendant Jacques Cajuste’s Reply to the People’s Response to His Motion to Dismiss
Counts One and Seven of the Information (“Defendant’s Reply”), which was filed on April
17, 2020.

' Unfortunately, the People combined into a single pleading their response to two separate Motions filed by Cajuste.
While the title implies that Counts One through Six and Eight of the Information should be dismissed, the Court issued
a Memorandum Opinion and Order on December 30, 2020 that dismissed Counts Two through Six and Eight of the
Information with prejudice because they were barred by the statute of limitations. In addition to addressing
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Counts Two through Six and Eight of the Information, the People’s Response
addresses the Defendant’s instant Motion regarding Counts One and Seven of the Information.
Peopie of the Virgin Islands v. Jacques Cajuste 

Case No. ST-2019-CR-00216

People of the Virgin Islands v. Viviane Stuart a/k/a Viviane Ais

Case No. ST-2019-CR-00217

Memorandum Opinion and Order

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I. BACKGROUND

ql This case arises from the murder of Egbert Stuart (“Egbert”), which occurred sometime
during the night of June 21 and the early morning hours of June 22, 2005. At the time of his death,
Stuart was married to co-Defendant Viviane Stuart (“Stuart”).

G2 On March 4, 2015, the homicide of Egbert was assigned to the Cold Case Squad for follow-
up investigation. On April 2, 2019, Detective Sergeant Mario Stout, supervisor of the Major
Crimes Unit of the Virgin Islands Police Department (“VIPD”), was assigned as a case agent in
the investigation of Egbert’s murder. Previously, on June 30, 2005, co-Defendant Jacques Cajuste
(“Cajuste”) was interviewed and stated that he and Stuart were co-workers involved in a sexual
relationship. Sometime at the end of July or during August 2005, Cajuste moved to Pottstown,
Pennsylvania. In June and August of 2006, witnesses were interviewed about the murder of
Egbert. Almost ten years later, DNA analysis concluded that Cajuste was a “major contributor of
DNA found in the hallway and west bedroom of the home in which [Egbert] was killed.”?

3 On August 31, 2016, warrants were issued by this Court for the arrest of Viviane Stuart
and Jacques Cajuste. Subsequently, Cajuste was arrested in October of 2016. In connection with
Case Nos. ST-2016-CR-00328 and ST-2016-CR-296, respectively, before this Court, both Cajuste
and Stuart were charged with participating in the death of Egbert, who died from multiple stab
wounds. On the eve of trial, the People moved to dismiss both cases after their motion to continue
the trial was denied.

"4 On September 25, 2019, the People filed an Information charging Cajuste with: (1) First
Degree Murder in violation of 14 V.ILC. §§ 921, 922(a)(1) and 14 V.LC. § 1i(a); (2) Using a
Dangerous Weapon During the Commission of a First Degree Murder in violation of 14 V.I.C.
2251(a)(2)(B) and 14 V.I.C. § 11(a); (3) First Degree Assault in violation of 14 V.LC. § 295(1)
and 14 V.L.C. § 11(a); (4) Using a Dangerous Weapon During the Commission of a First Degree
Assault in violation of 14 V.I.C. §§2251(a)(2)(B) and 14 V.LC. § 11(a); (5) Third Degree Assault-
Aiding and Abetting in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 297(a)(2) and 14 V.LC. § 11(a); (6) Using a
Dangerous Weapon During the Commission of a Third Degree Assault-Aiding and Abetting in
violation of 14 V.I.C. 2251(a)(2)(B) and 14 V.LC. § 11{a); (7) Second Degree Murder-Aiding and
Abetting in violation of 14 V.I.C. §§ 921, 922(b) and 14 V.LC. § 11(a); and (8) Using a Dangerous
Weapon During the Commission of a Second Degree Murder — Aiding and Abetting in violation
of 14 V.I.C. 2251(a)(2)(B) and 14 V.LC. § 11(a).

95 On December 30, 2019, Cajuste filed a Motion to Dismiss the Information as to Counts
Two through Six and Eight pursuant to Virgin Islands Rules of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3). On
December 30, 2020, the Court found that Counts Two Through Six and Eight of the Information
were barred by the statute of limitations and accordingly dismissed them with prejudice.

? Stout Aff. J 64.
People of the Virgin Islands v. Jacques Cajuste 

Case No. ST-2019-CR-00216

People of the Virgin Islands v. Viviane Stuart a/k/a Viviane Ais

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46 On January 10, 2020, Cajuste filed the instant Motion to Dismiss Counts One and Seven
of the Information pursuant to Virgin Islands Rules of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3). The Motion
alleges that a “fourteen-year delay in bringing these charges violate Mr. Cajuste’s due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 3 of the
Revised Organic Act of the Virgin Islands of 1954."

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

47 Cajuste submits his Motion to Dismiss arguments pursuant to V.I. R. Crim. P.
12(b)(3)(A)(ii), Section 3 of the Revised Organic Act, and the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.

"8 V.I.R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3) provides, in pertinent part, that the following must be raised before
trial:

(A) a motion alleging a defect in instituting the prosecution, including:
(ii) pre-information delay

(B) a motion alleging a defect in the information, such as:
(i) joining two or more offenses in the same count (duplicity);
(ii) charging the same offense in more than one count (multiplicity).

A. Rights to Procedural Due Process

79 The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution prohibit the government
from depriving an inmate of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.* A defendant’s
rights to procedural due process are applicable to the Virgin Islands through Section 3 of the
Revised Organic Act: “No law shall be enacted in the Virgin Islands which shall deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or deny to any person therein ue
protection of the laws.’* Due process rights consist of procedural and substantive components. “A
violation of procedural due process requires (1) that the state has interfered with the inmate’s
protected liberty or property interest, and (2) that procedural safeguards were constitutionally
insufficient to protect against unjustified deprivation.”* Courts will afford due process protections
to state-created interests and then use a three factor balancing test to determine what procedural
safeguard is required by said interest:

3 Def. Jacques Cajuste’s Mot. to Dismiss Counts One and Seven of the Info. 1.

4U.S. CONST., amend. V, XIV.

> Carty v. People of the Virgin Islands, 56 V.1. 345, 364 (V.L. 2012),

° 42 Geo. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. at [075 (2013) (referencing Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 222-23; and Ky. Dep't of
Corr. V. Thompson, 

 (1989).
People of the Virgin Islands v. Jacques Cajuste 

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People of the Virgin Islands v. Viviane Stuart a/i/a Viviane Ais

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(1) the importance of the private interest affected, (2) the importance of the
governmental interests affected (including the fiscal and administrative costs of the
additional procedural requirements), and (3) the potential value of the additional
procedural requirements (including any reduction in the risk of erroneous
deprivations under current procedures).’

10 Procedural due process “is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands.”* Generally, “[t]he primary components of procedural due process
are notice and the right to be heard.” Courts have found it to be self-evident “that the degree of
procedural protection required by the Due Process Clause is proportional to the extent of the
deprivation.”!”

B. Safeguards Against Preaccusation Delay

§11 Both the Fifth and Sixth Amendment strive to protect an individual’s ability to defend
himself against charges brought by the state, whether pre- or post- information. In addition to
prohibiting the deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, the Virgin
Islands Bill of Rights contains parallel provisions that afford defendants the right to a speedy trial
through Section 3 of the Revised Organic Act.'' Although the federal statutes of limitations is the
primary form of protection from intentional and prejudicial preaccusation delay, it “does not fully
define [defendants’] rights with respect to the events occurring prior to indictment...and that the
Due Process Clause has a limited role to play in protecting against oppressive delay.”'* Among
the federal courts of appeals, there is a circuit split regarding the proper standard for evaluating a
pre-indictment due process claim.'?

ql2 In United States v. Marion, the United States Supreme Court first held that the Fifth
Amendment Due Process clause may be violated when the government delays too long in bringing
charges against a defendant.'* Whereas, the Sixth Amendment protects “the rights of the defendant
which may be hampered by undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial ... and the possibility
that a long delay wil! impair the ability of an accused to present a defense.”'° The right to a speedy

1 Id. (referencing Wash, V. Harper, 

 (1990)).

8 Mathews v. Eldridge, 

, 96 S, Ct. 893, 

 (1976)(quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U

, 

 (1972)).

° Gumbs v. Schneider Reg'l Med. Ctr., 73 V.1. 358, 386 (Super. Ct, 2020) (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 

,
92S. Ct. 1983, 

 (1972)).

"Browne v. Gore, No. SX-10-CV-155, 2011 V.I, LEXIS 73, at *19 (Super, Ct. Feb. 18, 2011) (citing Cinea v. Certo,

 (3d Cir. 1996).

''U.S. CONST., amend. V-VI; and See Carty v. People of the Virgin Islands, 56 V.1. 345, 364 (V.L. 2012).

"? Lovasco, 

 (1977) (quoting United States v. Marion, 404 U.S, 307, 324 (1971)).

'3 Michael J. Cleary, Pre-Indictment Delay: Establishing A Fairer Approach Based on United States v.
Marion and United States v. Lovasco, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1049, 1059 (2005).

“ United States v. Marion, 

 (1971).

'5 Francis, 63 V.I. at 743-744.
People of the Virgin Islands v. Jacques Cajuste 

Case No. ST-2019-CR-00216

People of the Virgin Islands v. Viviane Stuart a/k/a Viviane Ais

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trial attaches at the time of an arrest or formal charge.'* Importantly noted by the Supreme Court,
prejudice due to a pre-indictment delay does not factor into a Sixth Amendment speedy trial
analysis, and vice versa.!?

{13 In Marion, “[t]he Supreme Court established that the dismissal of an indictment may be
required ‘if it were shown at trial that the pre-indictment delay in [the] case caused substantial
prejudice to [a defendant's] rights to a fair trial and that the delay was an intentional device to gain
tactical advantage over the accused.’”!® In that case, the Supreme Court found that there was
insufficient evidence to support a constitutional due process claim based on a thirty-eight month
pre-charging delay because the defendant failed to show actual prejudice to their defense, nor
presented any evidence that the government intentionally delayed its actions to gain a tactical
advantage.'? The Court established that a “defendant must prove something more than general
prejudice, such as a risk of lost evidence or faded memories.”2°

414 The Supreme Court revisited the issue in United States v. Lovasco. The Court held that
“pre-indictment delay rises to the level of a constitutional violation when the defendant can show
substantial prejudice caused either by the government's intentional delay in bringing the case to
gain a tactical advantage or by its ‘reckless disregard of circumstances, known to the
prosecution.””?! In that case, Respondent testified that he had lost the testimony of two material
witnesses due to a delay to establish prejudice to the defense.?? The Court found that because the
delay was caused by the “government’s efforts to identify persons in addition to respondent who
may have participated in the offences”, it would not be fundamentally unfair to compel the
respondent to stand trial.?? However, the Court conceded that it “could not determine in the abstract
the circumstances in which preaccusation delay would require dismissing prosecutions.”24

{15 | Lovasco also clarified the role that the due process clause plays in establishing safeguards
against preaccusation delays. In part, the Supreme Court noted that the statute of limitations is “the
primary guarantee against bringing overly stale criminal charges,”*> but “does not fully define
[defendants’] rights with respect to the events occurring prior to indictment...and that the Due
Process Clause has a limited role to play in protecting against oppressive delay.”° The Court
further explained that “as far as the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment is concerned,

16 Rivera v. People of the V.L, 64 V.1. 540, 582 (2016)

'7 Rivera, 64 VI. 540, 575 (2016) (referencing United States v. Jones, 

 (11th Cir.
2015) (holding the death ofa witness that occurred before defendant's indictment is not implicated in a post-indictment
speedy trial analysis but should only be considered when discussing pre-indictment delay.)

'8 fd, at 571 (2016) (quoting Marion, 

).

'9 Marion, 

.

2 

2! Rivera, 64 V.1. 540, 571 (2016) (quoting United States. v. Lovasco, 

 n. 17).

22 

.

33 fd. at 796.

24 

,

5 fd. at 789 (quoting Marion, 

 (1971)).

6 Lovasco, 

 (1977) (quoting Marion, 

 (1971).
People of the Virgin Istands v. Jacques Cajuste 

Case No. ST-2019-CR-00216

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Case No. ST-2019-CR-00217

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such delay is wholly irrelevant, since [the] analysis of the language, history, and purposes of the
Clause persuaded us that only ‘a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints
imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge... engage the particular protections’
of that provision.””’

"16 Marion and Lovasco created varying standards for evaluating whether a pre-indictment
delay violated a defendant’s Fifth Amendment due process rights.

The majority of the circuits place the burden on the defendant to satisfy a two-
pronged test by proving: (1) actual prejudice as a result of the delay, and (2)
intentional delay by the government in an attempt to win tactical advantage in the
defendant's prosecution. The minority approach uses a balancing test, where once
the defendant proves actual and substantial prejudice, the burden shifts to the
government to provide a reason for the delay.”*

{17 “Few Virgin Islands cases — and only those in the federal system — have ever addressed
whether a defendant's due process rights have been violated by pre-indictment delay.”?? In United
States v. Gross, the District Court of the Virgin Islands required “the government to justify the
delay once the defendant ...present[ed] some evidence of actual prejudice.”>° Likewise, in Pereira
v. Gov't of the V.L., the District Court held that “if the defendant suffers actual prejudice, the court
must consider the Government's reasons for the delay and whether the length of the delay, when
balanced against the reasons for the delay, violates those fundamental conceptions of justice which
lie at the base of our civil and political institutions.”3!

q18 Most recently in Rivera v. People, the Virgin Islands recognized the Territory’s right to
investigate and prosecute cases in accordance with its own ability and agenda — considering that
“it has limited resources and must prioritize the cases it pursues” so long as a criminal defendant’s

774d. at 788-89 (quoting Marion, 

 (1971)).

*® Rivera, 64 V.1. 540, 572 (2016) (citations omitted) (quoting Michael J. Cleary, Pre—Indictment Delay: Establishing
A Fairer Approach Based on United States v. Marion and United States v. Lovasco, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1049, 1059
(2005)).

9 Id. at 573. (“See United States v. Gross, 41 V.1. 463, 472, [WL], at *5 (D.V.I. 1999) (unpublished) (holding that
“[n}o real, substantial prejudice to the defendant is apparent, so the Court wil! not ask the government to justify the
delay”); Gov't of V.E v. Moncayo, 31 V.1. 135, 141 (D.V.1. 1993) (unpublished) (questioning whether “the delay in
returning format charges [was] intentional, demonstrating a total lack of diligence or for some other improper reason”
and concluding no due process violation where delay was largely attributed to the defendant's evasion of process by
the courts).”).

© United States v. Gross, 41 V.1. 463, 472, [WL], at *5 (D.V.I. 1999) (unpublished) {holding that “[nJo real,
substantial prejudice to the defendant is apparent, so the Court will not ask the government to justify the delay”); See
also Gov't of V.f. v. Moncayo, 31 V1. 135, 141 (D.V.I. 1993) (unpublished) (questioning whether “the delay in
returning formal charges [was] intentional, demonstrating a total lack of diligence or for some other improper reason”
and concluding no due process violation where delay was largely attributed to the defendant's evasion of process by
the courts).

*! Pereira v. Gov't of V.L, Crim, No. 2003/035, 

, at *4 (D.V.L. Feb. 27, 2008), aff'd, 

 (3d Cir.2008).
Peopie of the Virgin Islands v. Jacques Cajuste 

Case No. ST-2019-CR-002 16

Peopie of the Virgin Islands v, Viviane Stuart a/k/a Viviane Ais

Case No. ST-2019-CR-00217

Memorandum Opinion and Order

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Constitutional right to due process is not violated.** The court in Rivera established that “once a
defendant has proved substantial prejudice to his defense, the government must justify its delay,
and this explanation will be balanced against the prejudice the defendant suffered due to the delay
to determine whether a violation of justice has occurred.”7? The Court examined whether the
government intentionally delayed bringing the case to gain tactical advantage or recklessly
disregarded circumstances known to the prosecution that suggested “an appreciable risk that delay
would impair the ability to mount an effective defense.’24

I. ANALYSIS

q19 Cajuste argues that “fourteen years after the alleged underlying criminal activity, and
eleven years after the limitations period for most of the charges expired, the People commenced
this criminal case” and the “totally unexcused, delay between the incident and the commencement
of this case” violates Cajuste’s Due Process rights.** Cajuste does not raise a Sixth Amendment
speedy trial argument, but exclusively focuses on Fifth Amendment due process concerns.

A. The Court finds that the Defendant has not met his burden to establish a due process
violation based on preaccusation delay.

{20 Given that Virgin Islands courts have seemingly endorsed the minority balancing test to
establish the standard for a due process violation claim based on preaccusation delay, this Court
finds that once a defendant has proven substantial prejudice to his defense, the government must
Justify its delay, and the explanation will be balanced against the prejudice the defendant suffered
due to the delay to determine whether a violation of justice has occurred.*¢

{21 According to Cajuste, the People’s delay in the filing of charges has caused substantial
prejudice in his case and that the fourteen-year delay begs explanation. In support, Cajuste claims
that “witnesses’ recollections most likely have dimmed...[and] neighbors who resided in the
community where this incident occurred, may have relocated, died, or otherwise become
unavailable for [his] investigatory efforts.”2”

{22 The People respond by asserting that “[t]he Defendant has made no definitive statement
regarding any efforts by the Defendant to investigate and speak with witnesses and any failures
experienced as a result.”** Further, the People argue that “[t]he Defendant’s claims of due process

® Rivera, 64 V.1. 540, 573 (2016).

B 

4 fd. at 571 (quoting Lovasco, 

 n.17).

** Def. Jacques Cajuste’s Mot. to Dismiss Counts One and Seven of the Info. 2.
36 Rivera, 

 (2016).

3? Def. Jacques Cajuste’s Mot. to Dismiss Counts One and Seven of the Info. 3.
38 People’s Response to Mot. to Dismiss. 10.
People of the Virgin Islands v. Jacques Cajuste 

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violations based on delay is objective and does not provide any substance for the People to rebut
or by which the court can base a dismissal of these counts.’9

{23 A delay that causes a witness’s or defendant’s memories to diminish is insufficient to
establish the requisite degree of actual and substantial prejudice needed for a due process
violation.” For example, in U.S. v. Benson, the Third Circuit found it insufficient to establish
prejudice when a witness's memory faded due to a thirty-four month delay because the defendant
had access to other information in discovery.*' Additionally, delays that cause the preclusion of
discovering witnesses, losing evidence, the death of witnesses, or causes witnesses to refuse to
testify is generally insufficient to establish prejudicial preaccusation delay that would result in a
due process violation.”

24 The Court finds that Cajuste failed to demonstrate a concrete instance where the People’s
pre-charging delay actually and substantially prejudiced him to the extent that would warrant
dismissal of the Counts of the Information. Cajuste has not presented any evidence to this Court
that the People delayed prosecution in bad faith to gain a tactical advantage. Although Cajuste
argues that “the discovery shows an entirely unexplained gap from March 2007 to March 2015 in
the investigation of this case,” “without proof of actual prejudice, a due process claim is not ripe
for adjudication.”*? The Court cannot presume prejudice absent proof established by the
Defendant. The role of the Court is circumscribed to determine the action complained of here, not
impose its own notions of due process.

[T]he Due Process Clause does not permit courts to abort criminal prosecutions
simply because they disagree with a prosecutor's judgment as to when to seek an
indictment. Judges are not free, in defining "due process,” to impose on law
enforcement officials our "personal and private notions" of fairness and to
"disregard the limits that bind judges in their judicial function. "Our task is more
circumscribed. We are to determine only whether the action complained of - here,
compelling respondent to stand trial after the Government delayed indictment to
investigate further - violates those "fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at

Fd,

See e.g., US. v Benson, 

 (3d Cir. £973).

*° 42 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. at 412 (2013) Seen. 1305-09 (referencing U.S. v. Stokes, 

 (Ist
Cir.1997) (claim that 5-year delay prevented defendant from locating witness insufficient to show actual prejudice
because defendant was unable to tocate witness before state trial on related charges 3 years prior to federal indictment);
US. v. Munoz-Franco, 

, 29 (1st Cir. 2007) (claim that delay caused actual prejudice insufficient because
defendant was unable to show that lost witnesses could provide exculpatory evidence on his financial activities); LS.
v. Mmahat, 

 (Sth Cir. 1997) (claim that death of witness during 9-year delay prejudiced defendant
insufficient because witness’s testimony preserved in transcripts of prior civil action for same conduct), overruled in
part on other grounds by LS. v. Estate of Parsons, 

 (5th Cir. 2004); and U.S. v. Duncan, 

 (6th Cir. 1985) (claim that delay resulted in former girlfriend’ s refusal to testify not sufficiently prejudicial
to justify dismissal because no indication former girlfriend would aid defense).

8 Lovasco, 

 (1977).
People of the Virgin Islands v. Jacques Cajuste 

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the base of our civil and political institutions," and which define "the community's
sense of fair play and decency."**

{25 It is probable that Cajuste has suffered some prejudice to his defense given the lengthy
amount of time from when the crime was committed to the time when he was charged with the
Counts of Information.” In Francis v. People, the Court recently held that “a post-information
delay of one year is sufficient to raise a presumption of prejudice, requiring further evaluation of
the reasons and consequences behind the post-charging delay.” Further, in Doggett, the Supreme
Court found that “even where the prosecution’s delay is due to mere negligence, it is not
‘automatically tolerable simply because the accused cannot demonstrate exactly how it has
prejudiced him.’*’ However, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court in Ventura did not recognize “the
legal parallel between the presumed prejudice [...] suffered from pre-information delay and a
defendant’s presumed prejudice resulting from a post-information delay.”4* Doggett dealt with the
presumption of prejudice in post- accusation delay that triggered a Sixth Amendment speedy trial
right analysis, whereas the case at hand deals with safeguards against pre-accusation delay and
Cajuste’s Fifth Amendment due process rights.

"26 Accordingly, Cajuste has the burden of demonstrating substantial prejudice caused by the
delay. This burden is heavy; it requires “that he was meaningfully impaired in his ability to defend
against the state’s charges to such an extent that the disposition of the criminal proceedings was
likely affected.”*? The burden to prove actual and substantial prejudice may be met through
showing loss attributed to the delay “of specific witnesses or documents that would have provided
information unavailable through other sources.”*° In the instant Motion, Cajuste does not allege
any specific person or document that is now unavailable. Instead, he argues through a series of
rhetorical questions concerning the People’s discovery: “Is there sufficient samples from the crime
scene for Mr. Cajuste to have an expert conduct her or his own analysis? Or have samples
deteriorated or otherwise been lost? What about the persons who purportedly identified Mr.
Cajuste?”°! “An allegation of a denial of due process ‘cannot rely on the real possibilities inherent
in the delay, such as dimmed memories, inaccessible witnesses, and lost evidence. The defendant

4 fd, at 791. (quoting Rochin v. California, 

 (1952); then quoting Mooney v. Holohan, 294 US.
103, 112 (1935); then quoting Rochin v. 

. See also Ham v. South Carolina, 

(1973); Lisenba v, California, 314. U.S. 219, 236 (1941); Hebert v. Louisiana, 272, U.S. 312, 316
(1926); Hurtado v. California, 

 (1884) (all citations omitted).

* See e.g., Commonwealth v. Scher, 

, 1217 (Pa.2002) (holding “prejudice alone is not sufficient to
show a violation of due process where the delay was due to the government's continuing investigation of the crime”).
“© Francis v. People, VI. ——, 

, at #36, 

 (V1, Oct. 23, 2015).

* Ventura v. People, 64 V.1. 589, 609 (2016) (quoting Doggett v. United States, 

 (1992)),

8 fd. at 610.

° Jones v. Angelone, 

 (4th Cir.1996).

Ventura, 64 V.I, 589, 612 (2016) (referencing Carty, 56 V.1. at 367-68 (finding no actual prejudice where defendant
offered no evidence that a favorable witness actually existed).

*' Def. Jacques Cajuste’s Mot. to Dismiss Counts One and Seven of the Info. 4.
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must show actual prejudice.””** The Court finds that speculation about possible lost evidence is
insufficient to support a Fifth Amendment due process violation.*?

"27 Relying upon Balboni, Cajuste argues that the Revised Organic Act guarantee of due
process that “[n]o person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process prior
to being charged” implicates a more stringent view than the federal due process analysis, but he
does not articulate what this stricter view should be. Such an argument is an insufficient basis for
this Court to depart from the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands holding in Ventura:

Because we believe that requiring the defendant to prove the reason behind the
government's decision to delay charging him with a crime would be nearly
impossible, rendering the rule defunct, see Howell v. Barker, 

(4th Cir. 1990), we join the minority of jurisdictions and hold that once a defendant
has proved substantial prejudice from the delay, the burden shifts to the People to
explain the delay.**

As explained above, Cajuste has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating substantial prejudice
caused by the delay. Of further importance is the fact that there is no statute of limitations for
murder in recognition of the value of human life and the view that taking the life of another person
is one of the most serious and heinous crimes that a person can commit. If there were a statute of
limitations for murder, the passage of time would inure to the benefit of the guilty.

£28 In addition to moving this Court to dismiss Counts One and Seven of the Information,
Cajuste requests this Court to set an evidentiary hearing and direct the People to “provide the
appropriate addresses of the investigating officers who are no longer with the Virgin Islands Police
Department.”** However, Cajuste failed to file an appropriate motion to compel the production of
this information.

29 Accordingly, this Court finds that Cajuste has not met his burden to establish that he has
suffered substantial prejudice in violation of his due process rights and, thus, the Court need not
examine why the government delayed in bringing charges to determine whether a violation of
justice has occurred. Further delay was caused by the suspension of jury trials and in-person
proceedings from March 2020 to September 2021 and then in December 2021 to January 2022.

IV. CONCLUSION

*? 

 (quoting State v. Glazebrook, 

, 778 (Neb.2011)).

™ Id.; See e.g., Jackson, 446 F.3d at 851 (“Alleged prejudice is insufficient to establish a due process violation if it is
insubstantial, speculative, or premature.”)

4 64 V.L. 589, 609 (V.I. 2016).

** Def. Jacques Cajuste’s Mot. to Dismiss Counts One and Seven of the Info, 4.
People of the Virgin Islands v. Jacques Cajuste 

Case No. ST-2019-CR-00216

People of the Virgin Isiands v. Viviane Stuart a/k/a Viviane Ais

Case No. ST-2019-CR-00217

Memorandum Opinion and Order

Page 11

930 This Court will deny Defendant Jacques Cajuste’s Motion to Dismiss Counts One and
Seven of the Information based on pre-indictment delay because he failed to show that he was
substantially prejudiced by the length of time that elapsed between the murder of Egbert Stuart
and Cajuste’s arrest. The primary safeguard against bringing overly stale criminal charges is
generally the statute of limitations. Because the statute of limitations does not apply to Counts
One and Seven of the Information in this case, the Court recognizes that the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments play a role in protecting against oppressive delay. Although Cajuste failed to assert
his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial in the instant Motion, his Fifth Amendment right
safeguards against pre-accusation delay are at issue. The Court considered the minority approach
balancing test to establish the standard for Cajuste’s due process violation claim and found that he
has not met his burden of proving substantial prejudice. Cajuste’s examples of prejudice caused
by the delay are insufficient to establish the requisite degree of substantial prejudice needed for a
due process violation and the Court cannot presume prejudice absent proof established by the
Defendant. Although the Court acknowledges that Cajuste has suffered some prejudice to his
defense given the lengthy amount of time from when the crime was committed to the time he was
charged with the Counts of the Information, the allegations of prejudice set forth in the Motion are
insufficient to grant his Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that Defendant Jacques Cajuste’s Motion to Dismiss Counts One and Seven
of the Information, filed on January 10, 2020, is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order shall be directed to
Attorney Adam G. Christian; Assistant Attorney General Kimberly M. Riley; and Attorney Julie
Smith Todman, Office of the Territorial Public Defender.

DATED: 6|30]2022 Pan hanna

DENISE M. FRANCOIS
Judge of the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands

ATTEST:

TAMARA CHARLES
Clerk of the Court

CAMACHO
Court €ferk Supervisor 0/ (S0/ QO02D-