For Publication

             IN THE SUPREME                 COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
 3RC & COMPANY,          INC                                 ) S. Ct. Civ. No. 2024-0123


 .                                                           3
       Appellant/Plaintiff,                                  )   Re: ST-2014-CV-00624


 BOYNES TRUCKING SYSTEMS, INC                                )
 BOYNES GROUP; BREEZE SHIPPING,                    INC       )
 JAMES BOYNES; and JOANNA BOYNES;!                           )
      Appellees/Defendants                                   )
                                                             )

                      On Appeal from the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands
                                 Division of St. Thomas & St. John
                           Superior Court Judge: Hon. Kathleen Mackay

                                        Argued: July 8, 2025
                                        Filed: May 20, 2026
                                            Cite as: 2026 V1 8
BEFORE          MARIA M. CABRET,            Associate Justice; HAROLD W.L. WILLOCKS
                Associate Justice; and ERNEST E. MORRIS, JR., Designated Justice.”
APPEARANCES
Clive Rivers, Esq
Law Offices of Clive Rivers
St. Thomas, U.S.V.I
        Attorney for Appellant/Plaintiff,

Namosha Boykin, Esq
The Boykin Law Firm, PLLC
St. Thomas, U.S.V.I
        Attorney for Appellees/Defendants

                                 OPINION         OF THE COURT
WILLOCKS, Associate Justice


' Boynes Group and Breeze Shipping Inc. are not parties to this appeal, as 3RC does not challenge
the trial court’s rulings with respect to these defendants
* Pursuant to 4 V.I.C. § 24(a), the Honorable Ernest E. Morris, Jr. was appointed as a Designated
Justice in this matter due to the recusal of Chief Justice Rhys S. Hodge and Associate Justice Ive
A. Swan
3RC v, BTS, et al                                      

S. Ct. Civ. No. 2024-0123
Opinion of the Court
Page 2 of 25

qi        Appellant 3RC & Company,               Inc. (“3RC”) appeals from the August                     19, 2024 judgment

(“Judgment”)            and      accompanying       findings        of     facts        and          conclusions      of      law

(“Findings/Conclusions’”) of the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands (“Superior Court”), entered

following a bench trial resolving all of 3RC’s claims in the underlying action against Boynes

Trucking Systems, Inc. (“BTS”), Boynes Group, Breeze Shipping Inc., James Boynes, and                                      Joanna

Boynes.     On appeal, however, 3RC challenges the Superior Court’s rulings only as to Appellees

BTS,    James Boynes, and Joanna Boynes (collectively ““Appellees”)

                                                 I. BACKGROUND

42        In December 2014, 3RC initiated the underlying lawsuit by filing a complaint alleging that

BTS, Boynes Group, and Breeze Shipping Inc., James Boynes, and Joanna Boynes violated what

3RC characterized as a joint venture agreement among 3RC and all defendants, entered into in

February 2009 to operate a fuel distribution business.                   3RC alleged the following seven counts

Count     I-“Injunctive Relief’ (against all defendants);? Count                    II-“Self-Dealing” (against James

Boynes and Joanna Boynes only); Count III-“Breach of Fiduciary” (against James Boynes and

Joanna Boynes only); Count IV-Waste (against all defendants); Count V-“Breach of the Joint

Venture     Agreement”        (against   all defendants);        Count    VI-“Breach           of Contract”        (against    all

defendants);      and    Count     VII-“Unjust    Enrichment”       (against       all defendants).         3RC    sought     the

following      relief against      the defendants     “jointly     and    severally”:         “(a)    Declaratory judgment

declaring      the rights of the parties[;]        (b) Preliminary        and      permanent          injunction   against the

Defendants from further Self Dealing[;] (c) An accounting of all revenues and expenditures[;] (d)



3 The Superior Court had denied 3RC’s request for injunctive relief in a prior order which we
subsequently affirmed on appeal. See 3RC & Co. v. Boynes Trucking Sys., 63 V.1. 544, 548 (V.I
2015)
3RC v. BTS, et al                                 2026 V18
S. Ct. Civ. No. 2024-0123
Opinion of the Court
Page 3 of 25


Damages, both compensatory, and expectancy[;] (e) Attorney fees and cost[s]; (f) Such further

relief] ] as the court deems just.”

q3        In September 2019, the Superior Court held a three-day bench trial.             The court heard

testimony from six witnesses—Franklin Schjulterbrandt, Raymond Greene, and Roan Creque for

3RC; James Boynes, Joanna Boynes, and Lenore Edgecombe for the defendants—and admitted

various    exhibits    into evidence.   At the conclusion      of trial, the court took the matter      under

advisement

44        On August      19, 2024, the Superior Court entered its Findings/Conclusions based on an

examination of the parties’ exhibits and testimony presented at trial. Therein, the court identified

the five issues that had been tried in the proceeding, and resolved them as follows:               (i) as to

 whether a joint venture existed between the parties,” the court found that “the parties did not form

a joint venture or partnership”—and specifically, “3RC and [BTS] did not form a joint venture”

for the fuel operation; (11) as to “whether [the] {dJefendants breached the joint venture agreement

between the parties,” the court did not reach this issue given its finding that no joint venture existed

between the parties; (it) as to “whether [James Boynes and Joanna Boynes} breached a fiduciary

duty to 3RC,”    the court concluded that “{3RC] did not prove its claims for breach of fiduciary duty

against James Boynes and Joanna Boynes”;          (iv) as to    “whether 3RC is entitled to damages,”     the

court concluded        that 3RC is entitled to damages from BTS for breach of contract in the amount

of $494,098.47 and for breach of fiduciary duty in the amount of $25,000.00;                 and (v) as to

“whether [the] {d]efendants were unjustly enriched by retaining 3RC’s share of the joint venture

profits entitling 3RC to restitution,” the court concluded that       “{t]he existence of a contract and the

finding of a breach of contract bars 3RC’s claim for unjust enrichment
3RC v. BTS, et al                              2026 VI18
S. Ct. Civ. No. 2024-0123
Opinion of the Court
Page 4 of 25


q5       Consistent with its Findings/Conclusions, the Superior Court contemporaneously entered

Judgment ordering, inter alia, that 3RC be “awarded...        the sum of...$519,098.47 against [BTS]

with prejudgment interest accruing as of October           1, 2019, and that 3RC’s claims against the

remaining defendants—-Boynes       Group, and Breeze Shipping Inc., James Boynes, and Joanna

Boynes—dismissed with prejudice

46       On August 30, 2024, 3RC      filed a motion for reconsideration of the Superior Court’s

Judgment and Findings/Conclusions pursuant to Rule 6-4 of the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil

Procedure. Therein, 3RC argued that the     “court erred when it held that there was no joint venture

between the parties,” that the   “court erred in calculating the measure of damages owed to [3RC],”

and that the “court erred when it dismissed [BTS’] principals although the principals disregarded

the corporate entity in their day-to-day operations.“ 3RC          thus concluded that the Judgment

“require[d] correction.”

{7    | OnDecember 19, 2024, before the Superior Court ruled on that motion, 3RC filed a notice

of appeal from the Superior Court’s Judgment and Findings/Conclusions.* On February 18, 2025,



4 We take judicial notice of the underlying docket and papers. See Cianci v. Chaput, 64 V.1. 682,
690 n.2 (V.I. 2016) (recognizing that courts may take judicial notice of other courts' dockets and
papers); cf King v. Appleton, 61 V.1. 339, 348 (V.I. 2014) (“[T]he Superior Court may take judicial
notice of the existence of a document that has been filed with it in another proceeding.”) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)
   In its August 30, 2024 motion, 3RC identified three issues: (i) “Did the Trial Court err when it
entered a conclusion of law [regarding joint venture] that is contrary to the binding precedent of
the Supreme Court of the United States Virgin Islands?” (ii) “Did the Trial Court err when it
calculated the measure of damages at a sum that was less than the general and consequential
damages that are the proper remedy for a breach of in under the laws of the United States Virgin
Islands?” (iit) “Did the Trial Court err when it dismissed the principals of the Defendant company
from the suit although the testimony and evidence indicated that the principals disregarded the
corporate form of Boynes Trucking and used it for personal purposes?”
° On January 7, 2025, 3RC filed an amended notice of appeal to “cure deficiencies
3RC v. BTS, et al                                       2026 VI8
S. Ct. Civ. No. 2024-0123
Opinion of the Court
Page 5 of 25

3RC filed its appellant’s brief. In response, Appellees filed their brief in which they, inter alia,

argued that this Court “lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider this appeal because it was not

timely filed.”   (Appellee’s Br. 1). Thereafter, 3RC filed its reply brief.

q8         On July 8, 2025, 3RC, BTS, James Boynes, and               Joanna Boynes appeared before this Court

for oral argument

                                                   II. DISCUSSION

                                                    A. Jurisdiction

q9         “This Court, being an appellate court,            is a court of limited jurisdiction, and must be

satisfied of its own         appellate subject matter jurisdiction before it considers the merits of an

appeal.”    World Fresh Mkts.,         LLC v. Henry, 71 V.E. 1161,    1167 (V.L. 2019) (citations omitted). Thus

before reaching the merits of 3RC’s appeal, we must first address Appellees’ challenge to this

Court’s appellate jurisdiction

410        The Revised Organic Act of 1954 provides this Court with appellate jurisdiction over                “all

appeals from the decisions of the courts of the Virgin Islands established by local law                        48

U.S.C.     § 1613a(d).      Title 4,     section 32(a) of the Virgin       Islands Code   vests this Court with

jurisdiction over “all appeals arising from final judgments, final decrees or final orders of the

Superior Court [of the Virgin Islands], or as otherwise provided by law.”             4 V.LC. § 32(a). An “order

that disposes of all claims submitted to the Superior Court [of the Virgin Islands] is considered

final for the purposes of appeal.”           Jung v. Ruiz, 

 (V.I. 2013) (citing Matthew v.

Herman,      56 V.1. 674, 677 (V.I. 2012)); see also Beachside Assocs.,           LLC v. Fishman,    53 V.1. 700

706-07 (V.I.     2010) (“The general rule is that a decision is considered final when it ‘ends the

litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.””); Estate
3RC v. BTS, et al.                                 2026 VI8
S. Ct. Civ. No. 2024-0123
Opinion of the Court
Page 6 of 25

of George v. George,        

 (V.I. 2008) (quoting Berke v. Bloch,   

,     134 Gd

Cir. 2001))

411!     In this instance, it is undisputed that the Superior Court’s August 19, 2024 Judgment was

a final judgment—based on its Findings/Conclusions following a bench trial—that resolved all the

claims submitted for adjudication in the underlying matter. Nevertheless, Appellees argue that this

Court “lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider this appeal because it was not timely filed”

to wit, 3RC’s notice of appeal was not filed within the thirty-day deadline, which they contend was

not tolled by 3RC’s August 30, 2024 motion for reconsideration because that motion                  “[wa]s not

within the grounds specified in [Rule 5(a)(4) of the Virgin Islands Rules of Appellate Procedure].”

Relying on Khalil v. Guardian Insurance Co., 59 V.1. 892 (V.I. 2013), Appellees further contend

that this Court “has clearly stated that, unlike the motions specified in rule 5(a)(4),        a ‘motion for

reconsideration did not properly toll time to appeal.’”

412     Appellees’ argument is unpersuasive. First, the timeliness of the appeal does not affect this

Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Rule 5(a)(1) of the Virgin Islands Rules of Appellate Procedure

(“Appellate Rule 5(a)(1)”)—which sets forth the thirty-day time limit for filing a notice of appeal

in a civil case, see V.I. R. App.      P. 5(a)(1}—is merely a claims-processing rule, as opposed to a

jurisdictional requirement.      See Peters v. People, 60 V.1. 479, 481 n.1 (V.I. 2014) (observing that

“despite our previous case law describing a timely appeal as a jurisdictional requirement, we have

long since    ‘reconsidered this approach and now treat the time limits established by [Appellate]

Rule 5 as claims processing rules’” (quoting Brvan v. Gov't of the VI,              

 (VI

2012))); see also Gov't      of the VI. v. Crooke, 

 (V.I. 2010) (“It is well established

that time limits set exclusively by court rules are mere claims-processing rules which do not affect
3RC v. BTS, et al                                         

S. Ct. Civ. No. 2024-0123
Opinion of the Court
Page 7 of 25

a court's subject-matter jurisdiction even if they may result in dismissal if violated.” (citing Bowles

v. Russell, 

 (2007)));                Vazquez v. Vazquez,    

 (V.I. 2010)

(“Consequently, because no statute requires that a civil litigant file a notice of appeal to this Court

within thirty days or prohibits this Court from considering moot appeals,                       neither requirement

relates to this Court's subject matter jurisdiction, and thus [the appellee] has waived her right to

challenge either issue.”); V.I.            R. APP. P. 1{i) (“These rules shall not be considered to extend or limit

the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands as established by law.”); cf’ People v.

Freeman,     57 V.1. 336, 340 (V.I. 2012) (recognizing that the thirty-day statutory appeal deadline set

forth in in 4 V.LC.     § 33(d)(5) is jurisdictional (citing First American Development Group/Carib

LLC v. WestLB AG, 55 V.1. 594, 601 (V.I. 2011)))

413      Second,    the filing of 3RC’s August 30,               2024 motion extended the thirty-day deadline

pursuant to Rule 5(a)(4) of the Virgin Islands Rules of Appellate Procedure (“Appellate Rule

5(a)(4)”).   Although       styled     as a motion       for reconsideration    under   Rule    6-4,   3RC’s   motion

substantively      challenged        the    Superior   Court’s   Findings/Conclusions     and     sought   alteration

amendment, or relief from the August 19, 2024 Judgment based on alleged legal error. See supra

note 4. Rule 6-4 expressly provides that, “[e]xcept as provided in Rules 59 and 60 relating to final

orders or judgments, a party may file a motion asking the court to reconsider its order or decision

within 14 days after the entry of the ruling, unless the time is extended by the court.” V.I. R. Civ

P. 6-4(a). Because the August 19, 2024 Judgment was final and terminated the litigation, any post

judgment relief therefore lay under Rules 59 or 60—and not Rule 6-4—of the Virgin Islands Rules

of Civil Procedure. See V.I. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (setting forth the time limit for filing a motion to alter
3RC v. BTS, et al                                   

S. Ct. Civ. No. 2024-0123
Opinion of the Court
Page 8 of 25


or amend a judgment); see also, V.I. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (setting forth grounds for relief from a final

judgment)

414           This Court has repeatedly held “that the substance of a motion, and not its caption, shall

determine under which rule that motion is construed.” Island Tile & Marble, LLC v. Bertrand, 57

VI.    596,     612 (V.I.   2012) (quoting Joseph v. Bureau of Corrections,   

,   648 n.2 (VI

2011)).       Accordingly, because the substance of a motion—not its caption—determines the rule

under which the motion is construed, 3RC’s August 30, 2024 motion is properly construed as a

motion under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b), thereby bringing it within the ambit of Appellate Rule

5(a)(4), which extended the time to file a notice of appeal. See V.I. R. App. P. 5(a)(4) (“If any party

timely files in the Superior Court a motion for judgment as a matter of law; to amend findings or

make additional findings; for a new trial; to alter or amend the judgment or order; or (if filed within

28 days) for relief from the judgment or order, the time for filing the notice of appeal for all parties

is extended until 30 days after entry of an order disposing of the last such motion; provided,

however, that the failure to dispose of any motion by order entered upon the record within 120

days after the date the motion was filed shall constitute a denial of the motion for purposes of

appeal.”)

q 15      Finally, Appellees’ reliance on Khalil is misplaced.     Khalil did not consider whether the

filing of a motion for reconsideration tolls the thirty-day deadline for filing a notice of appeal;

rather, in that case, this Court addressed—and rejected—the appellant’s attempt to use an appeal

from later orders awarding attorney’s fees and prejudgment interest to revive appellate review of

an earlier summary judgment decision for which the appeal period had expired

416       Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal
3RC v: BTS, et al.                               2026 VI8
S. Ct. Civ. No. 2024-0123
Opinion of the Court
Page 9 of 25

                                         B. Overview of Issues

{17      On appeal,° 3RC argues that the Superior Court erred: (i)     “when it entered a conclusion of

law regarding joint ventures that is contrary to [our] binding precedent;” (11)     “when it calculated

the measure of damages at a sum that was less than the general and consequential damages that

are the proper remedy for a breach of contract under the laws of the United Staes Virgin Islands;

and (iii) “when it dismissed the principals [Appellees James Boynes and Joanna Boynes] of the

Appellee[] company [BTS] from the suit although the testimony and evidence indicated that the

principals acted as their company’s alter ego when they disregarded the corporate form of and

diverted company funds for personal used and consumption.”          As such, 3RC concludes that this

Court should “reverse the lower court, vacate the Judgment, and enter a damages award consistent

with the facts presented at trial.”

                                         C. Standard of Review

418     Our standard of review in examining the Superior Court's application and construction of

law is plenary, while findings of fact are reviewed only for clear error. St. Thomas-St. John Bd. of

Elections v. Daniel, 49 V.1. 322, 329 (V.I. 2007); In re L.O.F:, 

 (V.I. 2015) (citing

In re Reynolds, 60 V.1.     330, 333 (V.I.   2013)).   “Clear error is a very deferential standard; an

appellate court should only reverse a factual determination as being clearly erroneous if it is

completely devoid of minimum          evidentiary support or ... bears no rational relationship to the

supportive evidentiary data.”   Jn re Estate of Small, 57 V.1. 416, 430 (V.I. 2012) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted)




® In its appellate brief, 3RC identified the same three issues enumerated in its August 30, 2024
motion. See supra note 4
3RC v. BTS, et al                                        

S. Ct. Civ. No. 2024-0123
Opinion of the Court
Page 10 of 25


                                D. Whether the Superior Court Erred in Concluding
                                           that no Joint Venture Existed

419        In its brief, 3RC argues that the Superior Court erred in concluding that no joint venture

existed between the parties as to the fuel operation, asserting that all elements of a joint venture

were established and that, “(uJnder the U[niform] P[artnership] A[ct] as codified in Title 26, there

was a joint venture between Roan Creque, Ornette Creque, 3RC, Joanna Boynes, James Boynes,

and [BTS]

420        Inresponse, Appellees argue that “[t]he trial court correctly found that there was no joint

venture between the parties, either by written agreement, by operation, or otherwise.”

           1.    Joint Venture

q21        In 3RC        &     Co.   v. Boynes   Trucking Sys., we    recognized     that “even   though   a joint

venture agreement can exist without a writing, ‘the Virgin Islands Code incorporates the Uniform

Partnership Act of 1997’ to govern partnerships and joint ventures in the Virgin Islands.”                  63 V.I

544, 560 (V.I. 2015) (quoting Yusuf v. Hamed, 59 V.1. 841, 849-50 (V.I. 2013) (citing 26 V.LC. §§

1-274)).        “Under       the Uniform    Partnership Act, ‘in the absence of a written           agreement,” a

partnership or joint venture can be shown by evidence of ‘the express or implied intent of the

parties,’ ‘joint control and management of the business,’ the sharing of the profits and losses, and

‘a combination of property, skill or knowledge.’”             Jd. at 560 (quoting Yusuf, 59 VI. at 850 (internal

quotation marks and alterations omitted)).               “‘A person who receives a share of the profits of a

business is presumed to be a partner in the business’ unless those profits were received as payment

of a debt, for services of an independent contractor, employee compensation, rent, ‘an annuity or

other retirement or health benefit,’ loan interest, or ‘for the sale of the goodwill of a business.’”

Yusuf,     59 VI.        at 850      (citing 26 V.I-C.   § 22(c)(3)(i)-(vi); UNIF.    PARTNERSHIP ACT 1997           §
3RC vy. BTS, etal                                  

S. Ct. Civ, No. 2024-0123
Opinion of the Court
Page 11 of 25


202(c)(3)(i)-(vi)).    But   “‘no single factor is determinative” — instead, “it is necessary to examine the

      relationship as a whole.”    Yusuf, 59 V.1. at 850 (quoting Griffith Energy,      Inc.   v. Evans, 

 (App.   Div. 2011) (citation omitted) and citing Tedeton v. Tedeton,       

 (La. App.       Ct. 2012) (“There are no hard and fast rules in making the determination of

whether a partnership exists and each case must be considered on its own facts.”); Wood v. Phillips,

 (Ala.      2001) (‘There is no settled test for determining the existence of a

partnership. That determination is made by reviewing all the attendant circumstances.”’))

422       Asapreliminary matter, the record reflects ambiguity regarding the identity of the parties

to the alleged joint venture agreement governing the fuel operation.         In its complaint, 3RC alleged

that it entered into a joint venture with BTS, Boynes Group, Breeze Shipping Inc.,             James Boynes,

and Joanna Boynes. However, notwithstanding its general conclusion that “the parties did not form

a joint venture,”     a review of the Findings/Conclusions demonstrates that the Superior Court treated

3RC and BTS as the relevant joint venture participants. In doing so, the court attributed the actions

of the respective principals to the entities—attributing the actions of Roan Creque and Ornette

Creque to 3RC, and the actions of James Boynes and Joanna Boynes to BTS—-rather than treating

the principals as individual joint venturers.      Consistent with that approach, the Superior Court’s

joint venture analysis focused exclusively on 3RC and BTS and expressly concluded that “[u}Jnder

Virgin Islands law, 3RC and [BTS] did not form a joint venture.”

423       Onappeal, notwithstanding 3RC’s general assertion that “there was a joint venture between

Roan Creque, Ornette Creque, 3RC, Joanna Boynes,               James Boynes, and [BTS],” 3RC’s arguments

likewise treat 3RC and BTS as the relevant joint venture participants, consistent with the Superior

Court’s approach.       Accordingly, our review is confined to whether the Superior Court erred in
3RCv. BTS, et al                                 2026 VI8
S. Ct. Civ. No, 2024-0123
Opinion of the Court
Page 12 of 25


concluding that no joint venture existed between 3RC and BTS and, for purposes of our review,

we Similarly attribute the actions of the respective principals to the entities

         2.   The Superior Court’s Findings/Conclusions’

424      In its Findings/Conclusions, the Superior Court found that “[t]he parties never executed a

joint venture agreement” and therefore addressed each of the joint venture elements, ultimately

concluding that “under Virgin Islands law, 3RC and [BTS] did not form a joint venture.”

425      As to the “combination of property, skill, or knowledge”    factor, the court found that “[t]he

parties did combine their properties, skills, and knowledge of the industries.’

426      With respect to the “joint control and management          of the business” factor, the court

similarly determined that the parties “did not have joint control and management            of the fuel

operation,” reasoning that (i) “[BTS] and its principals controlled the gross income and paid

expenses,” (ii) the parties “did not have equal rights in the management and conduct of the fuel

operation,” and (iii) neither entity possessed authority over the other—specifically, “3RC had no

authority over [BTS]”       and “[BTS] had no authority over 3RC

427      Regarding the “sharing of the profits and losses”      factor, the court determined that the

parties did not share profits and losses, finding that (i)   “Creque, 3RC, and the Boynes parties had

no agreement to share” them; (ii)        “Creque and 3RC did not receive any profits from the fuel

operation,” and (iii) the court “did not receive sufficient evidence to determine if the fuel operation

was profitable or suffered losses, and if so, how much.”




’ Although the Superior Court placed certain determinations regarding the elements in the
“Conclusions of Law” section of its Findings/Conclusions, they constitute findings of fact
grounded in the evidentiary record, not conclusions of law derived from the application of legal
principles. We therefore look to the substance of the determinations, not their labels
3RC v. BTS, et al                                2026 V1 8
S. Ct. Civ. No. 2024-0123
Opinion of the Court
Page 13 of 25


428       Finally, with respect to the “express or implied intent” factor, the court found that “3RC

and [BTS] did not intend to form a partnership.”      The court noted that although “Creque and 3RC

intended to share in the profits and losses,” the intent of BTS,       James Boynes, and Joanna Boynes

when they started doing business with Creque was             “unknown” but they “acknowledged that the

monies that Creque contributed to the fuel operation were not loans.”

429       We now examine the record bearing on the joint venture factors to determine whether the

Superior Court erred in concluding that no joint venture existed between 3RC and BTS.            At the

outset, 3RC asserts in its appellant’s brief that there ts “copious evidence that the parties combined

their property, business contacts, equipment, and other assets to create and operate a viable fuel

delivery business for their mutual benefit,” and thus does not dispute the Superior Court’s finding

on that factor. We therefore limit our review to the remaining three joint venture factors

          3.   Joint Venture Factors

                      a.    Express or implied intent of the parties

4/30      The record supports an inference that the parties intended to operate the fuel enterprise

jointly

431        14-1 Lindbergh Bay. The record reflects the Lindbergh Bay property was leased in 3RC’s

name, with 3RC providing the security deposit as well as the first and last month’s rent, yet BTS

set up its office and operated a fuel business from that location. The lease remained in 3RC’s name

throughout the relevant period,      from 2009 through at least 2014.     The record further shows that

3RC initially paid to have the property prepared for the fuel operation (i.e., cleared bushes and

debris; installed concrete slab for gas pumps and storage tanks; connected sewage line) while BTS

later paid for additional construction so that retail] fuel sales could commence.        These actions
3RC v. BTS, et al                                  

S. Ct. Civ, No. 2024-0123
Opinion of the Court
Page 14 of 25


demonstrate that 3RC contributed the physical site necessary for the fuel enterprise while BTS

carried out the day-to-day fuel operations. Such coordinated investment in and use of the property

supports an inference that 3RC and BTS intended to undertake the fuel operation together.

432          3RC’s Truck and Tanks. The record shows that 3RC purchased several trucks and tanks in

furtherance of the fuel operation, and these vehicles were insured under BTS’      policy as part of

BTS’ fleet. BTS then used these vehicles as part of the fuel operation. This integration of assets

and operations likewise supports an inference that 3RC and BTS intended to undertake the fuel

operation together.

433         Banco Popular Collateral Authorization Agreement. The record further reflects that BTS

assisted 3RC in obtaining the $900,000 loan with Banco Popular by conveying certain equipment

as collateral, agreeing to procure insurance for said equipment, and undertaking to maintain it in

good condition. By assuming these obligations in connection with financing obtained by 3RC for

the fuel operation, BTS participated in securing the capital necessary to establish the enterprise

Such conduct supports an inference that 3RC and BTS intended to undertake the fuel operation

together.

434         BTS’ Financial Statements. The record also shows that BTS was aware that its 2009-2014

financial statements prepared by BTS’ own accountant all indicated

            As of July 2009,   the company operated from 14-1 Lindbergh Bay. The company
            operates from these premises under an operating lease agreement in the name of
            one of its venture partners of the oil and diesel operations
The absence of a correction of this statement by BTS regarding 3RC’s       description as a “venture

partner[ ] of the oil and diesel operations” supports an inference that 3RC and BTS intended to

undertake the fuel operation together.
3RC v. BTS, et al.                                  2026 V1 8
S. Ct. Civ. No. 2024-0123
Opinion of the Court
Page 15 of 25


435      Logos on the Fuel Operation Vehicles. The record further demonstrates that the trucks and

trailers used for the fuel operation displayed marks identifying both BTS                 and 3RC.     Such

identifying marks were required by the Department of Transportation and Hovensa.* The presence

of both companies’         names on the vehicles reflects that the parties publicly associated themselves

with the fuel operation and presented the enterprise to regulators               and customers    as a joint

undertaking. This representation to third parties likewise supports an inference that 3RC and BTS

intended to undertake the fuel operation together,

{36     Viewed     collectively, the record supports the inference that 3RC and BTS              intended to

undertake the fuel operation as a joint enterprise

                      b.     Sharing of the profits and losses

437     The record likewise suggests that the parties shared in the financial benefits and burdens

of the fuel operation, bearing on the       “sharing of profits and losses” factor.”

438     3RC’s 2008 Loans.          The record reflects that 3RC obtained loans from Banco Popular

($900,000), the Government Development Bank ($50,000), and the Small Business Administration

($100,000) to finance the fuel operation. The record further shows that BTS made payments for

several years toward those loans using funds from its operating accounts, which included revenues

generated from the fuel operation conducted at Lindbergh Bay. By making payments toward loans




§ The petroleum sold through the fuel operation was purchased from Hovensa and transported from
Hovensa’s premises
° The record reflects that BTS commingled revenues from the fuel operation with revenues from
its other business activities and did not separately account for the fuel operation’s financial
performance. As a result, the record does not establish whether the operation generated profits or
operated at a loss. Nevertheless, the use of those revenues to service enterprise debt remains
relevant to the analysis of the “sharing of profits and losses” factor.
3RC v. BTS, et al                               2026 VI8
S. Ct. Civ. No. 2024-0123
Opinion of the Court
Page 16 of 25


incurred     to finance the fuel operation using revenues     generated   by that operation—and    by

providing equipment as collateral for the Banco Popular loan—BTS participated in servicing debt

incurred to establish the enterprise. This conduct suggests that revenues generated by the operation

were treated as funds of the fuel enterprise rather than as revenues belonging solely to BTS

supporting an inference that the parties contemplated sharing in the benefits of the venture and in

the financial burdens of the enterprise

739        Electricity and Rent at the 14-1 Lindbergh Bay. The record also shows that the electricity

account with the Virgin Islands Water and Power Authority (““WAPA”) for the Lindbergh Bay

property was maintained in 3RC’s name; however, BTS paid the WAPA bills. Similarly, although

the lease for the Lindbergh Bay property remained in 3RC’s name, BTS paid the rent. The record

further shows that BTS made these payments using funds from its operating accounts, which

included revenues generated by the fuel operation conducted at Lindbergh Bay. By paying these

operating expenses for the property where the fuel operation was conducted using revenues

generated by that operation further suggests that revenues generated by the operation were treated

as funds of the fuel enterprise rather than as revenues belonging solely to BTS.    This supports an

inference that the parties contemplated sharing in the benefits of the venture and in the financial

burdens of the enterprise

440        Taken together, the record supports an inference that 3RC and BTS shared in the financial

benefits and burdens of the fuel operation. Although actual profits or losses are unclear because

BTS did not separately account for the fuel operation’s financial performance apart from its other

business activities,'” the parties’ financial arrangements treated the operation’s revenues and



'° See supra note 9
3RC v. BTS, et al                                    

S. Ct. Civ. No. 2024-0123
Opinion of the Court
Page 17 of 25


obligations as shared—circumstances supporting an inference regarding the sharing of profits and

losses

                       c.   Joint control and management of the business

441      Finally, the record indicates that 3RC and BTS jointly participated in the control and

management of the fuel operation

442      Fuel Pricing for the Operation.     The record shows that the price of fuel sold through the

Lindbergh Bay operation was determined by reference to several factors, including prevailing fuel

prices and the operation’s overhead expenses. Those expenses included, among other things, the

loans obtained by 3RC to finance the operation, as well as electricity and rent associated with the

Lindbergh Bay property. The inclusion of these enterprise expenses in determining the retail fuel

price reflects that the parties treated those obligations as operating costs of the business itself. Such

arrangement bears on the joint control factor because it demonstrates that the financial structure of

the fuel operation—including        how    costs were      recovered    through   fuel pricing—was    tied to

expenses incurred by both parties in furtherance of the enterprise

443      Initial Fuel Purchase from       Hovensa.     The record      shows   that 3RC   paid approximately

$290,000 for the initial fuel purchase from Hovensa on October 2, 2008. Roan Creque testified to

this payment, and Joanna Boynes similarly acknowledged that BTS had not previously purchased

fuel from Hovensa before October 2008, although she recalled that BTS began issuing its own

checks for fuel purchases later that month or in November and that one or two hauling trips had

already occurred.      This testimony reflects that 3RC          initially financed the acquisition of fuel

necessary to begin the enterprise, while BTS simultaneously carried out the transportation and

operational activities associated with distributing that fuel. Such coordinated contributions to the
3RC v. BTS, et al                                 2026 VI8
S. Ct. Civ. No. 2024-0123
Opinion of the Court
Page 18 of 25


establishment and operation of the fuel business support an inference that the parties jointly

participated in managing and operating the enterprise

444        Training and Certification for Hovensa Access. The record also reflects that, before the first

fuel purchase or transport from Hovensa, 3RC paid for the initial training and certification required

for drivers to access the Hovensa premises. These expenses included airfare, ground transportation,

and meals associated with the required training, and the drivers who attended included James

Boynes and Joanna Boynes.         The record further shows that 3RC also paid for the fire-retardant

garments required by Hovensa for personnel entering its facilities to pump fuel. The certification

required to access Hovensa’s premises had to be renewed periodically, and the record reflects that

BTS subsequently paid for later training and certification of its drivers.          By funding the initial

training and equipment necessary for BTS’         drivers to access Hovensa and transport fuel—while

BTS    later paid    for subsequent     certifications—the   parties jointly   facilitated   the operational

capability of the fuel enterprise. After this training and certification was completed, BTS drivers

were able to access Hovensa’s facilities and transport the first fuel order from Hovensa on October

2, 2008.    Such coordinated efforts to enable and maintain the drivers’       access to Hovensa further

indicate that the parties jointly participated in the management and operation of the fuel enterprise

445        Titling and Insurance of the Fuel Operation Vehicles. The record further reflects that some

of the trucks and trailers used to transport fuel for the operation were purchased and paid for by

3RC in furtherance of the fuel operation but titled in BTS’ name and insured under BTS’ insurance

policy. The record further shows that 3RC initially paid for insurance covering the fleet in 2008

when the additional vehicles were first added to BTS’ policy, while BTS paid for the insurance

coverage in subsequent years.         These vehicles constituted the core operational assets used to
3RC v. BTS, et al                                2026 VI8
S. Ct. Civ. No. 2024-0123
Opinion of the Court
Page 19 of 25


transport fuel for the enterprise. By allocating responsibility for the purchase, titling, and insurance

of the fleet between the two entities, the parties’ conduct supports an inference that 3RC and BTS

jointly managed and maintained the equipment necessary to conduct the fuel operation.                  This

coordinated management of essential operational assets supports an inference that 3RC and BTS

jointly controlled the enterprise

446       Taken together and considered in the aggregate, all of the foregoing circumstances support

the inference that 3RC and BTS jointly participated in the management and control of the fuel

operation

                      d.    Summation of the Joint Venture Factors

4447      An examination of 3RC and BTS’ relationship as a whole favors the conclusion that they

entered into a joint venture for the fuel operation. See Yusuf, 

 (noting that “no single

factor is determinative”     of whether a joint venture exists and that     “it is necessary to examine the

      relationship as a whole’). The record shows that 3RC and BTS combined resources to launch

the fuel operation, treated revenues as funds of the business, jointly managed the enterprise, and

intended to operate it together—circumstances supporting this conclusion

448       Accordingly, the Superior Court erred in concluding that no joint venture existed between

3RC and BTS and, as a result, further erred by terminating its analysis at that point and failing to

address the remaining elements of 3RC’s claim for breach of the parties’ agreement concerning

their joint venture. See Phillip v. Marsh-Monsanto,      66 V.1. 612, 619-20 (V.I. 2017) (conducting a

Banks analysis and adopting the “historically recognized elements underlying a claim for breach

of contract:   (1) an agreement; (2) a duty created by that agreement; (3) a breach of that duty; and

(4) damages” as the “soundest path forward”       for the Virgin Islands)
3RC v. BTS, et al.                                    2026 VI8
S. Ct. Civ. No. 2024-0123
Opinion of the Court
Page 20 of 25


                 E. Whether the Superior Court Erred in Calculating the Measure of
                       Damages for 3RC’s Breach of Contract Claim Against TBS

449      Having concluded that no joint venture existed, the Superior Court proceeded directly to

analyze 3RC’s breach of contract claim, found BTS liable, and entered judgment in favor of 3RC

in the amount of $494,098.47.          Specifically, the court found that the parties “agreed that the income

derived from fuel sales would pay the operating costs of the business, including rent, utilities,

salaries, maintenance of the grounds, maintenance of the equipment, freight costs, and repayment

of the loans 3RC and Creque procured to fund the fuel operation”; “[BTS] had a duty to pay the

aforesaid expenses from the income derived from the fuel operation”;                “[BTS] breached its duty to

[3RC]     when       [BTS]   stopped     making    payments      on   the   Banco   Popular,   Small   Business

Administration, and Government Development Bank loans and otherwise did not tender equivalent

funds to 3RC”;        and “[BTS’] breach of its duty entitles 3RC to an award of damages[, 1.e.,] the

sums [3RC] paid to satisfy and pay off its loans after [BTS] stopped making payments.”

450      However, because the breach of contract claim and the breach of joint venture agreement

claim arise from the same operative terms governing the fuel operation, the characterization of the

parties’ relationship necessarily precedes any determination of breach or damages.               Where a joint

venture exists, the terms of that joint venture agreement define the parties’ respective rights and

duties, which in turn determine whether a breach occurred and the appropriate measure of recovery

The joint venture determination is therefore dispositive of the governing legal framework and must

be resolved before undertaking any separate breach of contract analysis

45!      As noted above, the Superior Court erred in concluding that no joint venture existed

between 3RC and BTS, and the record supports the existence of a joint venture governing the Fuel

Operation. Accordingly, we vacate (i) the denial of 3RC’s August 30, 2024 post-judgment motion
3RC v. BTS, et al                                    2026 V18
S. Ct. Civ. No. 2024-0123
Opinion of the Court
Page 21 of 25

for reconsideration insofar as it pertains to 3RC’s claims for breach of joint venture agreement and

breach of contract; (11) those portions of the Superior Court’s Findings/Conclusions that pertain to

3RC’s   claims for breach of joint venture agreement and breach of contract; and (iii) that portion of

the Superior Court’s Judgment awarding 3RC damages in the amount of $494,098.47 for breach

of contract against BTS, and remand with instructions that the Superior Court first determine

whether 3RC established a breach of joint venture agreement before proceeding to any breach of

contract analysis

452      In light of this remand, review of the damages calculation on the breach of contract claim

would be moot. We therefore decline to undertake such review and express no opinion on the

proper measure of damages for 3RC’s breach of contract claim

                 F, Whether the Superior Court Erred in Dismissing 3RC’s Claims
                            against James Boynes and Joanna Boynes

453      Onappeal,    3RC argues that the Superior Court erred in dismissing with prejudice its claims

against James Boynes and Joanna Boynes on the grounds that they are personally liable to 3RC

under an alter ego/corporate veil piercing theory. However, the record reflects that 3RC did not

allege alter ego liability or seek veil-piercing relief in its complaint.    Instead, 3RC asserted distinct

causes of action against James Boynes and Joanna Boynes, including claims for self-dealing,

breach of fiduciary duty, waste, breach of joint venture agreement, breach of contract, and unjust

enrichment.     Likewise, the trial transcript reflects that 3RC did not set out to prove the elements

necessary to establish alter ego liability or corporate veil piercing relief at trial

454      Nonetheless, the alter ego issue is not raised for the first time on appeal. As noted above,

in its August 30, 2024 post-judgment motion, 3RC advanced the same alter ego/corporate veil

piercing arguments          it now   raises on appeal.   That motion,   however,   was deemed    denied   by
3RC v. BTS, et al                                  

S. Ct. Civ. No. 2024-0123
Opinion of the Court
Page 22 of 25


operation of Appellate Rule 5(a)(4), and the Superior Court did not substantively consider or rule

on those arguments

455      As the United       States Supreme    Court has succinctly stated, exercising our appellate

jurisdiction under 4 V.I.C. § 32(a) means that ‘we are a court of review, not of first view.” Lewis

vy, Rogers, 73 V.1. 592, 599 (V.I. 2020) (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 

, 718 n.7 (2005))

Accordingly, and particularly in light of our decision to remand this matter on other grounds, we

vacate (i) the denial of 3RC’s August 30, 2024 post-judgment motion for reconsideration insofar

as it pertains to 3RC’s     alter ego/corporate veil piercing theory and (ii) that portion of the Superior

Court’s Judgment dismissing with prejudice 3RC’s claims against James Boynes                   and Joanna

Boynes, and remand for the Superior Court to consider 3RC’s alter ego/corporate veil piercing

theory in the first instance, including whether it was raised for the first time in the August 30, 2024

post-judgment motion for reconsideration

"56      In doing    so, we     take this opportunity    to reaffirm   that a post-judgment    motion   for

reconsideration—-seeking alteration,        amendment,    or relief from a judgment—is        not a proper

vehicle to advance a theory that could have been, but was not, previously raised before judgment

As this Court observed in one of its earliest opinions, “[a] motion for reconsideration            is not a

vehicle for registering disagreement with the court's initial decision, for rearguing matters already

addressed by the court, or for raising arguments that could have been raised before but were not.”

In re Infant Sherman,       49 V.1. 452, 457-58 (V.I. 2008). See also Edionwe v. Bailey, 

 (5th Cir. 2017) (observing that a post-judgment motion for reconsideration brought under Fed

R. Civ. P. 59 “is not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal theories, or arguments that

could have been offered or raised before the entry of judgment’);            United States v. Jasin, 292
3RC v. BTS, et al                                       2026 VI8
S. Ct. Civ. No. 2024-0123
Opinion of the Court
Page 23 of 

 (E.D.          Pa. 2003) (same).       Rather, it    “serves [a] narrow purpose,” Zemplet v

HydroChem Inc., 

 (Sth Cir. 2004), and “is an extraordinary remedy.”                 /n re Infant

Sherman, 49 V.I. at 458. Accordingly, such a motion “should be used sparingly,” 7emplet, 

, and it is      “not to be sought reflexively,” Jn re Infant Sherman, 49 V.I. at 458

457       Because 3RC styled its post-judgment motion as one for reconsideration under Rule 6-4—

rather than under Rule 59 or Rule 60''—it is unclear under which rule the motion was brought or

what grounds for relief 3RC intended to invoke.              Under Rule 59(e), a motion to alter or amend a

judgment must rest on one of four recognized grounds:                  an intervening change in controlling law,

newly available evidence, or the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice. See

Beachside Assocs.,        LLC v. Fishman,      53 V.1. 700, 715 (V.I. 2010) (quoting Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 

 (3d Cir. 2010)).         Likewise,   Rule 60(b) permits relief only on specified grounds

including mistake, newly discovered evidence, fraud, or other exceptional circumstances.                  V.I. R

Civ.    P. 60(b). Thus,     while a post-judgment motion for reconsideration may be prompted by the

need “to correct manifest errors of law or fact,” Edionwe, 

, or to address newly

arising circumstances, Beachside Assocs., 53 V.I. at 715; V.I. R. Civ. P. 60(b), it nevertheless does

not enable a party to advance an argument that it was able, but neglected, to make before judgment

Edionwe,     

; see also Jasin, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 677 (citing Reich v. Compton,            

 (E.D.      Pa. 1993)).    Indeed, a motion for reconsideration “must [be] base[d]            on

arguments that were previously raised but were overlooked by the [cJourt.”                 Jasin, 292 F.Supp.2d

at 677. To be sure, a court cannot           “discuss or take up a matter again,” 1.e., reconsider'? via a post




1! See supra note 5
2 Black’s Law Dictionary 1528 (12th ed. 2024)
3RC v. BTS, et al                                2026 VI8
S. Ct. Civ. No. 2024-0123
Opinion of the Court
Page 24 of 25


judgment motion, an argument that was not presented to it in some form prior to judgment.              See

Pittston Co, Ultramar Am. Ltd. v. Allianz Ins. Co.,       

, 519 n. 12 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting

that “‘{cJourts often take a dim view of issues raised for the first time in post-judgment motions’”

(citation omitted)); see also Gov't of the VI. y. Innovative Commc'ns Corp., 

 (D.V.I. 2002) (explaining, in the context of a post-judgment motion for reconsideration,           that

such motions are “not the proper forum for raising new legal arguments or theories which could

have been addressed initially, and the court need not address such arguments”         (citation omitted));

Banister v. Davis,      

   (2020)     (observing   that with respect to a motion     for

reconsideration    brought   pursuant to Federal       Rule 59(e), “[i]n keeping   with th[e] corrective

function” of that rule, “courts will not address new arguments or evidence that the moving party

could have raised before the decision issued”). In such circumstances, the court would be granting

the movant a prohibited “second bite at the apple,” to the extent that a litigant’s initial failure to

raise an argument usually is considered a waiver thereof. /n re Infant Sherman, 49 V.I. at 457

Thus, on remand, the Superior Court must first determine whether 3RC’s alter ego/corporate veil

piercing theory was raised for the first time in its post-judgment motion for reconsideration, in

which case it falls outside the permissible scope of such a motion, before determining the

governing rule and applicable grounds for relief, if any

                                         III. CONCLUSION

458     For the foregoing reasons, we vacate (i) the denial of 3RC’s August 30, 2024 post-judgment

motion for reconsideration insofar as it pertains to 3RC’s claims for breach of joint venture

agreement and breach of contract; (11) those portions of the Superior Court’s Findings/Conclusions

that pertain to 3RC’s claims for breach of joint venture agreement and breach of contract; and (iii)
3RC v. BTS, et al                                             2026 VI8
S. Ct. Civ. No. 2024-0123
Opinion of the Court
Page 25 of 25

that portion       of the      Superior        Court’s    Judgment   awarding         3RC     damages        in the amount       of

$494,098.47 for breach of contract against BTS, and remand with instructions that the Superior

Court first determine whether 3RC                        established a breach of joint venture agreement before

proceeding to any breach of contract analysis

459      We       also vacate     (i) the denial          of 3RC’s August       30,    2024    post-judgment         motion     for

reconsideration insofar as it pertains to 3RC’s alter ego/corporate veil piercing theory and (ii) that

portion of the Superior Court’s Judgment dismissing with prejudice 3RC’s claims against James

Boynes      and Joanna Boynes,                 and remand      for the Superior Court            to consider 3RC’s            alter

ego/corporate veil piercing theory in the first instance, including whether it was raised for the first

time in the August 30, 2024 post-judgment motion for reconsideration.                            Given that this action has

been pending since 2014, we are certain that the Superior Court will address the issues on remand

promptly.     Cf     Christianson         v.   Colt Indus.     Operating     Corp.,     

,     816   n.5 (1988)

(“Perpetual litigation of any issue -- jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional -- delays, and therefore

threatens to deny, justice.”)

Dated this 20‘ day of May, 2026

                                                                         BY THE       COURT:




                                                                         nabkows W.L. WILLOCKS
                                                                         Associate Justice
ATTEST
DALILA E               T         ESQ
Clerk of t                 t
By:           “
      Deputy Clerk II
Dated:        ‘SY:             QNo |