For Publication
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
PEOPLE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS, ) S. Ct. Crim. No. 2024-0046
Appellant/Plaintiff, ) Re: SX-2021-CR-00214
)
v. )
)
SHARIF MATTHEW, )
Appellee/Defendant. )
On Appeal from the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands
Division of St. Croix
Superior Court Judge: Hon. Jomo Meade
Argued: October 14, 2025
Filed: May 28, 2026
Cite as: 2026 VI 9
BEFORE: RHYS S. HODGE, Chief Justice; IVE ARLINGTON SWAN, Associate Justice; and
MARIA M. CABRET, Associate Justice.
APPEARANCES:
Sean P. Bailey, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
St. Croix, U.S.V.I.
Attorney for Appellant,
Anthony R. Kiture, Esq.
Kiture Law Firm
St. Croix, U.S.V.I
Attorney for Appellee.
OPINION OF THE COURT
HODGE, Chief Justice.
¶1 Appellant, The People of the Virgin Islands, appeals from the Superior Court’s August 26,
2024 order granting Appellee, Sharif Matthew’s motion to suppress all cell phone evidence
obtained pursuant to a telephonic search warrant. For the reasons that follow, consistent with our
People v. Matthew 2026 VI 9
S. Ct. Crim. No. 2024-0046
Opinion of the Court
Page 2 of 16
recent holding in People v. Cumberbatch, 2026 VI 7, we affirm the Superior Court’s August 26,
2024 order.
I. BACKGROUND
¶2 This appeal arises from Matthew’s motion filed on May 23, 2024, to suppress all evidence
obtained pursuant to a March 2, 2021 telephonic search warrant. This matter is one of two
companion cases arising out of the same events, People v. Cumberbatch, SX-2021-CR-00073 and
People v. Matthew, SX-2021-CR-00214 consolidated in the Superior Court. The facts in both
cases are identical, but some issues are distinguishable.1 Cumberbatch’s case was resolved in
People v. Cumberbatch, 2026 VI 7. This appeal solely addresses Matthew’s suppression motion.
¶3 On July 12, 2024, the Superior Court held a hearing on the motion to suppress to determine
(1) whether the telephonic warrant comported with the Fourth Amendment’s requirements and was
not overbroad or lacking in particularity and (2) whether the good faith exception applied to the
search. Testimony from the hearing, along with numerous affidavits and exhibits, produced the
following facts and evidence relevant to this motion.2
¶4 On Tuesday, March 2, 2021, at approximately 11:17 a.m., the Virgin Islands Police
Department (VIPD) responded to a report that there was a shooting victim at #151 Estate Carlton,
St. Croix. Upon arrival, Sergeant Aisha Jules, a VIPD detective, observed the victim, Ian
Benjamin, Sr., who had suffered multiple gunshot wounds to the face, neck, right elbow, and
another lodged near his heart. Later that day at approximately 3:08 p.m., Benjamin Sr. succumbed
to his injuries shortly after his arrival at Juan F. Luis Hospital.
1
People v. Cumberbatch raises the issue of standing while this case does not and this case raises the issue of the
plain view doctrine while Cumberbatch does not.
2
A more detailed recitation of the facts and procedural history of these cases is set out in Cumberbatch ¶¶ 2-12.
People v. Matthew 2026 VI 9
S. Ct. Crim. No. 2024-0046
Opinion of the Court
Page 3 of 16
¶5 Sergeant Jules later reviewed surveillance footage from neighborhood cameras depicting a
white Acura TL vehicle with chrome rims and a white/silver sticker on the rear passenger glass
drive past Benjamin Sr.’s residence and turn around. The vehicle parked in an area that could not
be seen by the surveillance video. From the video, Sergeant Jules observed a woman with a small
frame appear from the area where the vehicle was parked and walk toward Benjamin Sr.’s
residence. Subsequently, an African American male dressed in a black shirt and three-quarter
length khaki pants also appeared from where the Acura TL was parked, walked to Benjamin Sr.’s
gate, and then pointed and discharged several shots at Benjamin Sr.’s residence before returning to
his vehicle.
¶6 Sergeant Jules’ partner, Detective Raheem Benjamin, informed her that the vehicle belongs
to a female known as “Tae” with a very small build who was later identified as Ta’jhanique
Cumberbatch and that she is known to operate the vehicle. (J.A. 38.) Upon receiving additional
information that Cumberbatch resides at No. 2 Betsy Jewel, the officers traveled to the residence
where they observed a vehicle matching the description of the vehicle observed in the surveillance
video. Sergeant Jules then contacted the fee simple owner of the residence and was informed that
Cumberbatch resided in Apartment A—described as yellow in color—to the rear of the premises
and sometimes has a male visitor.
¶7 Relying on this information, Sergeant Jules applied to Superior Court Judge Gallivan for a
telephonic warrant that was granted on March 2, 2021 at approximately 8:00 p.m. and was
executed shortly thereafter. Judge Gallivan placed Sergeant Jules under oath, received her sworn
oral testimony, and verbally authorized the search. The search warrant authorized a search of
apartment A of No. 2 Betsy Jewel, its curtilage, and the Acura TL vehicle. Judge Gallivan
People v. Matthew 2026 VI 9
S. Ct. Crim. No. 2024-0046
Opinion of the Court
Page 4 of 16
memorialized the interaction in handwritten notes titled “Application for Search Warrant,”
summarizing the facts provided and describing the places to be searched. (J.A. 293.)
¶8 Upon execution of the warrant Sergeant Jules and other VIPD officers encountered
Cumberbatch and Benjamin Sr., at Cumberbatch’s apartment. Amongst the items seized during
the search were: an iPhone with a brown cover found on a bed, a red iPhone found on top of a
printer in the living room, and a damaged pink-gold iPhone inside a box in the living room. Three
days later on March 5, 2021, Sergeant Jules filed a formal written affidavit setting forth her
probable cause facts for the warrant and identifying the items sought in the search. On March 15,
2021, Sergeant Jules applied for warrants to search the contents of the electronic devices seized
for evidence related to the crime and the following day the warrants were issued. On May 23,
2024, Cumberbatch filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained pursuant to the March 2, 2021
telephonic warrant.
¶9 On July 7, 2024, Cumberbatch filed a second motion to suppress the evidence seized
pursuant to the initial telephonic warrant and subsequent warrants permitting the search of the
contents of the electronic devices. On July 10, 2024, Matthew joined in this motion to suppress.
On July 11, 2024, the People filed a response opposing both the May 23 and July 7 motions and
“address[ing] all [of] the issues” pertinent to them. (J.A. 97-117, 208-290.)
¶ 10 On July 12, 2024, the Superior Court conducted a hearing on the issues raised in the
foregoing motions. At the conclusion of the hearing the Superior Court rendered its decision from
the bench which granted the July 7, 2024 motion to suppress, finding there was a conspicuous
absence of any specific information of items to be seized, and concluding that the good faith
exception to warrant requirements did not apply. The Court later reduced its ruling to a written
People v. Matthew 2026 VI 9
S. Ct. Crim. No. 2024-0046
Opinion of the Court
Page 5 of 16
order entered on August 26, 2024. The People timely filed a notice of appeal with this Court on
August 9, 2024. See V.I. R. APP. P. 5(b)(1)-(2).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
¶ 11 This Court has jurisdiction over “all appeals arising from the decisions of the courts of the
Virgin Islands established by local law[.]” 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(d); see also 4 V.I.C. § 32(a) (granting
this Court jurisdiction over “all appeals arising from final judgments, final decrees or final orders
of the Superior Court”). While not a final judgment, because the Superior Court’s July 12, 2024
decision suppressed evidence in a criminal proceeding, this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal.
4 V.I.C. § 33(d)(2) (“An appeal by the Government of the Virgin Islands shall lie to the Supreme
Court from a decision or order of the Superior Court suppressing or excluding evidence.”).
¶ 12 Our review of the Superior Court's application of law is plenary, while findings of fact are
reviewed only for clear error. St. Thomas–St. John Bd. of Elections v. Daniel, 49 V.I. 322, 329
(V.I. 2007). “In reviewing the trial court's decision on [a] motion to suppress, ‘we review its factual
findings for clear error and exercise plenary review over its legal determinations.’” People v.
John, 52 V.I. 247, 255 (V.I. 2009) (quoting United States v. Shields, 458 F.3d 269, 276 (3d Cir.
2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.
Corriette v. Morales, 50 V.I. 202, 205 (V.I. 2008).
B. Motion to Suppress
¶ 13 On appeal, the People ask this Court to determine that the Superior Court abused its
discretion by suppressing evidence obtained from a white iPhone cell phone in a brown gel case
[serial number 354875091984028], belonging to Matthew and seized during a search of
Cumberbatch’s apartment on March 2, 2021 pursuant to the telephonic warrant. The People argue
People v. Matthew 2026 VI 9
S. Ct. Crim. No. 2024-0046
Opinion of the Court
Page 6 of 16
that the telephonic search warrant was reasonable and supported by probable cause insofar as it
authorized the VIPD to search for and seize cell phones. Further, the People assert that the good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule is applicable to this search. Lastly, the People argue the
seizure of Matthew’s cell phone was lawful as the VIPD was executing a valid search warrant for
firearms and ammunition and the incriminating character of the cell phone was immediately
apparent pursuant to the plain view doctrine.
1. The telephonic warrant.
¶ 14 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that search warrants
must be supported by probable cause and must particularly describe “the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; People v. Armstrong, 64 V.I. 528, 530
(V.I. 2016). The primary consideration in a Fourth Amendment search or seizure analysis is
“whether a police officer acted reasonably.” People v. Lobby, 68 V.I. 683, 699 (V.I. 2018)
(emphasis added). Reasonableness generally requires law enforcement personnel conducting a
search to discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing prior to obtaining a warrant. See Brigham
City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006); Veronia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653
(1995) (“[W]hether a particular search meets the reasonableness standard is judged by balancing
its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
¶ 15 In determining whether probable cause exists, a judge must make a practical common-
sense decision that there is a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found
in a particular place.” John, 52 V.I. at 256 (citing Shields, 458 F.3d at 277) (quoting Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983)). Moreover, the circumstances establishing probable cause
must appear in the affidavit supporting the warrant. Id. The duty of a reviewing court is simply
People v. Matthew 2026 VI 9
S. Ct. Crim. No. 2024-0046
Opinion of the Court
Page 7 of 16
to ensure that the magistrate had a “substantial basis” for concluding that probable clause existed,
id., and that the warrant authorizing that search “be supported by probable cause particularized
with respect to that person.” Shields, 458 F.3d at 276.
¶ 16 First, we address the question of whether Sergeant Jules supplied the judicial officer with
the necessary information to support a reasonable inference that evidence of the alleged crimes
would be found on a phone in Matthew’s possession. The Superior Court concluded that neither
the information provided to the judicial officer, nor the affidavit established probable cause that
the cellphones were evidence of the crimes alleged. The Superior Court noted the telephonic
warrant displayed a “conspicuous absence” of the persons or things to be seized despite describing
the place to be searched, and was impermissibly general. Id. We agree.
¶ 17 Before turning to our analysis, it is important to clarify the requirements for a valid
telephonic search warrant. For a telephonic search warrant to be valid under our laws and rules,
the testimony in support of the warrant must be “recorded verbatim by an electronic recording
device, by a court reporter, or in writing.” V.I. R. CRIM. P. 4-1(b)(2)(B). Here, there was no
verbatim recording of the testimony by any of these means or any means at all.3 Additionally,
Sergeant Jules stated during her testimony that this is a normal procedure that she has followed in
obtaining telephonic search warrants which have been granted “between five and seven” times in
the past. (J.A. 229-231.) Sergeant Jules claims that she has never been challenged on any of those
warrants. This purported practice, however, clearly contravenes Rule 4-1. Moreover, the fact that
improper practices have gone unchallenged in the past is no excuse for ignoring the requirements
3
Sergeant Jules later related all the facts she allegedly presented to Judge Gallivan in her written
affidavit. Judge Gallivan’s handwritten notes of her colloquy with Sergeant Jules were presented
at the hearing and considered by the judge in ruling on the issues raised by the parties.
People v. Matthew 2026 VI 9
S. Ct. Crim. No. 2024-0046
Opinion of the Court
Page 8 of 16
of the court rules. See People v. Warrell, No. ST-2019-CR-00134, 2022 WL 2666745, at *3 (V.I.
Super. Ct. June 22, 2022) (noting the officer’s previous involvements in cases where warrantless
searches resulted in suppression); Thomas v. People, 63 V.I. 595, 600-01 (V.I. 2015). Rule 4-1 was
adopted to ensure that an accurate record of the facts related to the judge in support of a telephonic
warrant is preserved, and to avoid the kinds of conflicting factual issues that are present in this
case. To the extent that Judge Gallivan’s making of contemporaneous handwritten notes was an
attempt to comply with Rule 4-1, the trial judge correctly gave greater weight to those notes than
to the prepared affidavit of Sergeant Jules, which was filed three days after the telephonic warrant
had been authorized and executed.
¶ 18 Matthew argues that the facts as communicated by Sergeant Jules in support of the warrant
lack the specificity that would lead a magistrate to believe the cell phone at issue contained
evidence related to the murder in question. (Appellee’s Br. 9.) While an affidavit is not required
to use specific language, the circumstances establishing probable cause must appear in the affidavit
supporting the warrant. John, 52 V.I. at 257 (citing United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 122 (2d
Cir. 2008)). Here, this information is absent from the affidavit. Neither the judge’s documented
notes entitled “Application for Search Warrant,” the actual search warrant, or Sergeant Jules’
March 5, 2021, affidavit include facts to support a reasonable inference that a cell phone was used
in furtherance of the crime. (J.A. 293.)
¶ 19 The People argue that there is a common-sense inference establishing a nexus between a
conspiracy to commit murder and the use of a cell phone. (Appellant’s Br. 14.) However, despite
People v. Matthew 2026 VI 9
S. Ct. Crim. No. 2024-0046
Opinion of the Court
Page 9 of 16
the rapidly developing case law regarding the ubiquity of cell phones and “geofence” warrants,4
there is no evidence linking the use of a cell phone to this particular crime.5 The Fourth
Amendment requires a “nexus between the place to be searched and the evidence sought” and
4
“Geofencing” is an electronic system that allows law enforcement to establish a virtual perimeter
(i.e. a fence) around a specific geographical location. Brian L. Owsley, The Best Offense is a Good
Defense: Fourth Amendment Implications of Geofence Warrants, 50 HOFSTRA L. REV. 829, 832-
34 (2022). The first geofence warrant was issued in 2016, and this technology allows law
enforcement officers to track individuals or vehicles that have entered or exited a specific limited
area based on cell phone location information. Id. Only a few federal and state courts have
rendered decisions considering “geofence” warrants and circuits are split on their constitutionality.
United States v. Smith, 110 F.4th 817 (5th Cir. 2024) (finding geofence warrants unconstitutional);
United States v. Chatrie, 136 F.4th 100 (4th Cir. 2025) (upholding denial of a motion to suppress
evidence obtained from Google via a geofence warrant, but not addressing the constitutionality of
geofence warrants), cert. granted, No. 25-112, ___ U.S. ___, 2026 WL 120676, (Jan. 16, 2026);
see also State v. Contreras-Sanchez, No. A22-1579, 2026 WL 1015919, at *5 (Minn. Apr. 15,
2026) (finding geofence warrants are constitutional under the Minnesota Constitution on a “case-
by-case” basis).
5
The U.S. Supreme Court has observed that in contemporary society most people carry a cell
phone with them at all times. See Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 311 (2018) (finding
people “compulsively carry cell phones with them at all times”); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373,
385 (2014) (noting that cell phones “are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that
the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human
anatomy”). But those opinions contain no indication that the Supreme Court took judicial notice
of any of these facts, as opposed to relying on the evidence in the extensive records in the cases
before it. Importantly, the Supreme Court made such findings to justify increasing Fourth
Amendment protections in the cell phone context by eliminating two judicially-created exceptions
to the warrant requirement. In Carpenter, the Court rejected applying the third-party doctrine to
permit the government to obtain cell phone location records without a warrant because such
evidence constituted “near perfect surveillance, as if it had attached an ankle monitor to the phone’s
user.” 585 U.S. at 312. And in Riley, the Court declined to extend the search-incident-to-arrest
exception to cell phones given that “neither of its rationales has much force with respect to digital
content on cell phones.” 573 U.S. at 386.
In this case, no evidence of the use or involvement of a cell phone in connection with the
commission of the crime was claimed in any of the warrant applications. Because cell phone
technology—which is constantly evolving—and the use of cell phones by alleged criminals are
not “generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction” or “can be accurately and
readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned,” V.I. R. EVID.
201, we decline the People’s invitation to effectively infer that all warrants implicitly permit
searches of a cell phone.
People v. Matthew 2026 VI 9
S. Ct. Crim. No. 2024-0046
Opinion of the Court
Page 10 of 16
evidence to satisfy this requirement is lacking here. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. The surveillance
video depicts a substantial portion of the events on the day of the murder, but the use of a cell
phone is not among them. There is no cell phone seen in the video or anything to point to the
conclusion that a cell phone was used in the furtherance of the crime. The speculative and
unsupported reasoning that a phone may be seized as evidence of a crime despite the absence of
any evidence that a phone was used in connection therewith is an impermissibly broad conclusion
and not in the interest of justice. See United States v. Griffith, 867 F.3d 1265, 1270 (D.C. Cir.
2017) (“[T]he affidavit supporting the warrant application provided virtually no reason to suspect
that Griffith in fact owned a cell phone . . . at the same time, the warrant authorized the wholesale
seizure of all electronic devices discovered in the apartment . . . In those circumstances, we
conclude that the warrant was unsupported by probable cause and unduly broad in its reach.”).
¶ 20 Applying the People’s interpretation would lead to seemingly unfettered freedom to seize
the cell phones of suspects even in the absence of a substantial basis for law enforcement to
reasonably believe that any evidence exists on them. Cell phones contain a “broad array of private
information never found in a home in any form —unless the phone [itself] is [present].” Riley v.
California, 573 U.S. 373, 396 (2014). As such, their seizure pursuant to a merely general search
warrant cannot be condoned. The mere fact that most people in contemporary society may own a
cell phone, standing alone, is not enough to justify an unrestricted warrant to search a person’s
home and seize any cell phones that may be present there without specific and particularized
evidence in a search warrant application connecting the use of the cell phone to a crime. Thus, as
we did in Cumberbatch, we reject the People’s argument that the search warrant was supported by
sufficient probable cause and that there was a nexus between the cell phone seized and the crime
in this case. Cumberbatch, at ¶ 21.
People v. Matthew 2026 VI 9
S. Ct. Crim. No. 2024-0046
Opinion of the Court
Page 11 of 16
2. The good faith exception.
¶ 21 As this Court has established, “when police act under a warrant that is invalid for lack of
probable clause, the exclusionary rule does not apply if the police acted ‘in objectively reasonable
reliance’ on the subsequently invalidated search warrant.” John, 52 V.I. at 261 (quoting Herring
v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 142 (2009)). This principle has been coined the “good faith”
exception to the warrant requirement.
¶ 22 The People argue that even if there was no probable cause to justify seizure of the cell
phones, the good faith exception applies to this case so as to validate their seizure and the use of
information contained on them as admissible evidence. (Appellant’s Br. 16.) They contend there
are reasonable inferences apparent to both ordinary people and an officer of Sergeant Jules’
experience and training that Matthew both owned a cell phone and that evidence of the crimes
would likely be found on his cell phone. Upon applying the principles of the good faith exception,
we reject the argument that the exception applies here, just as we recently did in Cumberbatch.
See Cumberbatch, at ¶ 22.
¶ 23 Typically, the existence of a warrant is sufficient to prove that an officer conducted a search
in good faith and justifies the application of the good faith exception. United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 922 (1984). However, the United States Supreme Court has identified three situations
in which this exception does not apply: (1) evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant issued in
reliance on an affidavit secured by an affiant making knowingly false statements or with reckless
disregard for their truth, (2) evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant issued by a magistrate judge
who has abandoned their neutral and detached role, and (3) evidence obtained pursuant to a “bare
bones” affidavit or warrant that is so facially deficient that the executing officers cannot reasonably
presume it to be valid. Id. at 923. The lattermost exception is germane here. Id. at 924-25.
People v. Matthew 2026 VI 9
S. Ct. Crim. No. 2024-0046
Opinion of the Court
Page 12 of 16
Under this exception, the executing officer must have had no reasonable grounds
for believing that the warrant was properly issued. Moreover, the objective
reasonableness determination does not examine the subjective states of mind of [the
particular] law enforcement officers [conducting this particular search], rather it
inquires whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search
was illegal despite the magistrate's decision.
United States v. Hodson, 543 F.3d 286, 293 (6th Cir. 2008) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
¶ 24 Here, the telephonic warrant was lacking in both particularity and nexus, making any
reliance upon it objectively unreasonable. See Cumberbatch, at ¶ 22. The memorialized search
warrant filed on March 5, 2021—after the search had been conducted—and especially the
contemporaneous notes the judge made relating to the facts on which she authorized the telephonic
warrant, are an accurate reflection of the factual basis for issuing the telephonic warrant. There is
no suggestion in the affidavit or the search warrant that indicates that the defendants owned a cell
phone or that a cell phone was used in any way during the crime. Therefore, it was not objectively
reasonable for an officer to have believed they had the authority to seize any cell phones while
executing that search warrant. See Griffith, 867 F.3d at 1273 (finding that since there was “no
observation” or evidence of the suspect using a cell phone there was no proof to support this
conclusion in an affidavit).
¶ 25 Because the warrant was facially deficient and lacking in particularity, the officers could
not have considered it to be valid. Thus, the good faith exception does not apply to the seized cell
phones.
3. The seizure of cell phones under the plain view doctrine.
¶ 26 The People argue that VIPD lawfully seized Matthew’s cell phone pursuant to the plain
view doctrine, citing Horton v. California, 469 U.S. 128, 141 (1990). This issue was not brought
People v. Matthew 2026 VI 9
S. Ct. Crim. No. 2024-0046
Opinion of the Court
Page 13 of 16
before the Superior Court, and consequently, it never had the opportunity to address this issue.
Therefore, this issue is likely waived -- and even if it was not waived it is not applicable in this
case.6 As we have previously held, the plain view exception allows an officer to make a
“‘warrantless seizure of items that he or she viewed from a place or position in which he or she
was lawfully entitled to be, provided it is immediately apparent that the item observed is evidence
of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.’” Heath v. People, 78 V.I. 990, 1008 (V.I.
2024) (quoting Gumbs v. People, 64 V.I. 491, 508-09 (V.I. 2016)). Here, the officers were lawfully
present in Cumberbatch’s apartment as they were executing the telephonic warrant for evidence of
firearms. The question is whether the incriminating nature of the cell phones was “immediately
apparent” at that time, given the information that they may reasonably be deemed to have known
under the circumstances. Heath, 78 V.I. at 1008.
¶ 27 The People are correct in stating that this standard does not require the officers to have
“near certainty” that the items found in plain view were contraband or evidence of a crime and
officers only need “probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity” to seize
evidence. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741 (1983); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980)
6
Under our rules, “[o]nly issues and arguments fairly presented to the Superior Court may be
presented for review on appeal….” V.I. R. APP. P. 4(h). The plain view doctrine argument was not
“raised or objected to before the Superior Court” in the suppression hearing by the People, and as
the appellant, it bears the burden of preserving issues to be raised on appeal. See V.I. R. App. P.
22(m). Consistent with our rules, the People failed to preserve its plain view doctrine argument.
However, this Court has discretion under Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure 4(h) to
reach issues waived on appeal “‘when the interests of justice so require.’” Rodriguez v. People,
71 V.I. 577, 633 (V.I. 2019) (citing Phillip v. People, 58 V.I. 569, 585-87 & n.19 (V.I. 2013)
(reviewing waived argument under V.I. R. App. P. 22(m)); see Babij v. Cuffy, 79 V.I. 1080, 1098
n. 11 (reviewing waived argument under V.I. R. App. P. 4(h)). In this case, the Court chooses to
address this plain view issue, in the interest of justice to provide clarification on the limits of the
plain view doctrine.
People v. Matthew 2026 VI 9
S. Ct. Crim. No. 2024-0046
Opinion of the Court
Page 14 of 16
(holding officers only need “probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity” to
seize evidence). Even so, this standard is not met in this instance.
¶ 28 There was insufficient evidence here to link the cell phone in question to the alleged crime
of murder. See United States v. Davis, 94 F.4th 310, 320-21 (4th Cir. 2024) (noting that a phone is
an everyday object and that there must be significant additional evidence or indicators of
criminality to establish probable cause). There was no evidence that Matthew had a cell phone on
the day of the murder and nothing about the physical condition of the phone that the officers saw
linked it to the murder. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Wright, 99 A.3d 565, 569 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014)
(citing Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649,652 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010)) (“[P]olice properly seized
a cell phone because police knew the victim had a cell phone with him on the night of his murder
and because police observed a blood-stained cell phone in plain view during their search of the
defendant's dorm.”). Further, there was no evidence of a specific phone call having been made by
the defendants during the relevant timeframe. Id. at 570. (citing Commonwealth v. McEnany, 667
A.2d 1147,1148 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)) (“[P]olice were aware that the accused made a phone call
to the victim's residence on the day of the murder.”). Specific facts tying the cell phone to the
crime are absent, and as a result, there was a lack of probable cause.
¶ 29 Cell phones are not illegal or dangerous in and of themselves and Matthew was not
previously under investigation for conspiracy to commit murder. United States v. Bishop, 338 F.3d
623, 626 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The Supreme Court also has indicated that the plain view exception
permits the warrantless seizure of ‘objects dangerous in themselves.’”); see United States v.
Babilonia, 854 F.3d 163, 180 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding that officers were justified in seizing cell
phones pursuant to plain view as the result of the culmination of a months-long police investigation
yielding evidence of cell phone use in murder-for-hire conspiracies). To seize a cell phone under
People v. Matthew 2026 VI 9
S. Ct. Crim. No. 2024-0046
Opinion of the Court
Page 15 of 16
the facts of this case runs afoul of the plain view doctrine and the People’s additional
unsubstantiated arguments are unpersuasive.7
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 30 For the foregoing reasons and consistent with our recent decision in Cumberbatch, 2026
VI 7, this Court concludes that the telephonic warrant was constitutionally defective. The warrant
failed to meet the Fourth Amendment’s requirements requiring particularity and failed to establish
the requisite nexus between the seized cell phones and the alleged criminal conduct. Additionally,
the officer’s reliance on the deficient warrant was not objectively reasonable and the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule is therefore not applicable. Lastly, because the incriminating
nature of the cell phones was not apparent, the cell phones were not justifiably seized under the
plain view doctrine. Consequently, any evidence obtained directly or indirectly from the cell
phones must be suppressed. This Court therefore affirms the Superior Court’s August 26, 2024
order granting Matthew’s motion to suppress all cell phone evidence and evidence acquired from
the cell phones obtained pursuant to a telephonic search warrant.
Dated this 28th day of May, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Rhys S. Hodge____
RHYS S. HODGE
Chief Justice
7
Additionally, the People argue that since Matthew’s phone was found in plain view near
marijuana packaged in plastics bags, VIPD also had probable cause to seize the cell phone as
potential evidence of drug related crimes. (Appellant’s Br. at 29.) This issue was not raised in the
Superior Court as a basis for upholding the seizure of the cell phones and was only raised in a brief
footnote with no citations to legal authority. Consequently, we deem this issue to have been
waived. See V.I. R. App. P. 4(h) and 22(m).
People v. Matthew 2026 VI 9
S. Ct. Crim. No. 2024-0046
Opinion of the Court
Page 16 of 16
ATTEST:
DALILA PATTON, ESQ.
Clerk of the Court
By: /s/ Reisha Corneiro
Deputy Clerk II
Dated: May 28, 2026