SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
DIVISION OF ST CROIX
IN RE DECEASED PLAINTIFFS 1 )
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lOI-IN BARBELL ) CASE NO SX 06 CV 198
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Plaintiff ) COMPLEX LITIGATION DIVISION
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v ) a: a: a:
)
AMERADA HESS CORPORATION HESS OIL ) Coordinated Under In re Refinery
VIRGIN ISLANDS CORPORATION LITWIN ) Worker TOXIC Tort Litigation Master
CORPORATION and UNIVERSAL OIL ) Case No 8X 15 CV 198
PRODUCTS also known as U 0 P )
)
Defendants )
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THE LITWIN CORPORATION )
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Third Party )
Plaintiff )
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SHELL OIL COMPANY RIGGERS 8L ERECTORS )
INTERNATIONAL INC COMMUNICATION )
SYSTEMS 8r. MAINTENANCE CORPORATION )
VIRGIN ISLANDS INDUSTRIAL MAINTENANCE )
CORPORATION CHICAGO BRDIGE & IRON )
COMPANY, N V , individually and as successor )
in interest to CHICAGO BRIDGE 8: IRON and ]
A P GREEN SERVICES INC individually and as ]
successor in interest to BIGELOW LIPTAK )
CORPORATION )
)
Third Party )
Defendants ]
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1 Because several cases present the same issue death of a plaintiff the Court has grouped the cases together under a
generic caption to save judicial resources and issue one decision Accord In re Cases Removed to the Dist Ct of the VI
8X 98 CV 109 etseq 2016Vl LEXIS 154 *2 n 1(Vl Super Ct Sep 21 2016)
In re Deceased Plaintiffs 2020 VI Super 53
Case Nos SX 06 CV 198 221 SX 08 CV 056 227 229 273 295 3x 11 CV 244
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Page 2 of 33
JAMES HUGHES ) CASE NO SX 06 CV 221
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Plaintiff ] COMPLEX LITIGATION DIVISION
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V ) * * *
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AMERADA HESS CORPORATION HESS OIL ) Coordinated Under In re Refinery
VIRGIN ISLANDS CORPORATION LITWIN ) Worker Tox1c Tort Litigation Master
CORPORATION and UNIVERSAL OIL ) Case No SX 15 CV 198
PRODUCTS also known as U 0 P ]
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Defendants ]
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THE LITWIN CORPORATION ]
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Third Party )
Plaintiff )
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V I
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SHELL OIL COMPANY RIGGERS & ERECTORS )
INTERNATIONAL INC COMMUNICATION ]
SYSTEMS 8; MAINTENANCE CORPORATION )
VIRGIN ISLANDS INDUSTRIAL MAINTENANCE )
CORPORATION CHICAGO BRDIGE 8; IRON )
COMPANY, N V , individually and as successor )
in interest to CHICAGO BRIDGE & IRON and )
A P GREEN SERVICES INC individually and as ]
successor in interest to BIGELOW LIPTAK ]
CORPORATION )
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Third Party )
Defendants )
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ARNIM METIVIER ) CASE NO SX 08 CV 056
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Plaintiff ) COMPLEX LITIGATION DIVISION
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V ) * =8 *
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LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION ) Coordinated Under In re Alumina
individually and as successor in interest to ) Dust Claims, Master Case No SX 09
In re Deceased Plamtifis 2020 VI Super 53
Case Nos 5x 06 CV 198 221 5X 08 CV 056 227 229 273 295 3x 11 cv 244
MEMORANDUM OPINION
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MARTIN MARIETTA CORPORATION MARTIN ) MC 031
MARIETTA ALUMINUM INC & MARTIN )
MARIETTA ALUMINUM PROPERTIES INC )
MARTIN MARIETTA CORPORATION )
individually and as successor in interest to )
MARTIN MARIETTA ALUMINUM INC 8: )
MARTIN MARIETTA ALUMINUM PROPERTIES )
INC and GENERAL ENGINEERING )
CORPORATION ]
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Defendants )
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VISHNU SUBNAIK ) CASE NO SX 08 CV 227
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Plaintiff ) COMPLEX LITIGATION DIVISION
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V ) it * *
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HESS OIL VIRGIN ISLANDS CORPORATION ) Coordinated Under In re Refinery
AMERADA HESS CORPORATION UOP LLC ) Worker Toxic Tort Lttigation Master
SHELL OIL CORPORATION and JOHN CRANE ) Case No SX 15 CV 198
PACKING COMPANY )
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Defendants )
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HENRY HAZELL ) CASE NO 8X 2008 CV 229
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Plaintiff ) COMPLEX LITIGATION DIVISION
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V ) it * it
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HESS OIL VIRGIN ISLANDS CORPORATION ) Coordinated Under In re Refinery
AMERADA HESS CORPORATION UOP LLC ] Worker Tax": Tort Litigation Master
SHELL OIL CORPORATION and IOHN CRANE ) Case No 8X 15 CV 198
PACKING COMPANY )
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Defendants )
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FRANKIE MILLER ) CASE NO SX 08 CV 273
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Plaintiff ) COMPLEX LITIGATION DIVISION
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In re Deceased Plaintiffs 2020 VI Super 53
Case Nos 3x 06 CV 198 221 sx 08 CV 056 227 229 273 295 5x 11 cv 244
MEMORANDUM OPINION
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V J 3|: * *
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AMERADA HESS CORPORATION HESS OIL ) Coordinated Under In re Refinery
VIRGIN ISLANDS CORPORATION UNIVERSAL ) Worker Toxic Tort Litigation Master
OIL PRODUCTS also known as U 0 P and ) Case No SX 2015 CV 198
INGERSOL RAND CORPORATION )
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Defendants )
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SAMUEL PRIME ) CASE NO SX 08 CV 295
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Plaintiff ) COMPLEX LITIGATION DIVISION
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v 1 * * *
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LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION ] Coordinated Under In re Alumina
individually and as successor in interest to ] Dust Claims. Master Case No SX 09
MARTIN MARIETTA CORPORATION MARTIN ) MC 031
MARIETTA ALUMINUM INC & MARTIN )
MARIETTA ALUMINUM PROPERTIES INC )
MARTIN MARIETTA CORPORATION )
individually and as successor in interest to )
MARTIN MARIETTA ALUMINUM INC 8: ]
MARTIN MARIETTA ALUMINUM PROPERTIES )
INC and GENERAL ENGINEERING )
CORPORATION )
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Defendants )
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[OI-IN A WEEKES ) CASE NO 8X 11 CV 244
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Plaintiff J COMPLEX LITIGATION DIVISION
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V ) SI: * *
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LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION ) Coordinated Under In re Bauxzte
individually and as successor to MARTIN ) Containing Silica Halliday Litigation
MARIETTA CORPORATION MARTIN ) Series Master Case No SX 2015 CV
MARIETTA CORPORATION MARTIN ) 097
MARIETTA ALUMINUM INC now known as ]
ALERIS ROLLED PRODUCTS LLC or as )
LEWISPORT LLC ALERIS ROLLED PRODUCTS )
In re Deceased Plaintiffs 2020 VI Super 53
Case Nos sx 06 cv 198 221 5x 08 cv 056 227 229 273 295 5x 11 cv 244
MEMORANDUM OPINION
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LLC GENERAL ENGINEERING CORPORATION ]
GLENCORE LTD f/k/a CLARENDON LTD )
TANG HOW BROTHERS INC and ZENON )
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY ]
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Defendants )
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Cite as 2020 VI Super 53
Appearances
THOMAS ALKON ESQ
Law Offices of Thomas AIkon, P C
Christiansted VI 00820
For all Plamtlffs
JERRY HUDSON EVANS ESQ
Richardson Patrick Westbrook & Brickman LLC
Mt Pleasant SC 29465
For all Refinery Worker Plaintiffs
I RUSSELL B FATE ESQ
The Pate Law Firm
St Thomas VI 00804
For all PIamtszs
KOREYA NELSON ESQ
Burns Charest LLP
New Orleans LA 70130
For all Plamtlfl‘s
WARREN T BURNS ESQ
DANIEL H CHAREST ESQ
Burns Charest LLP
Dallas TX 75202
For all Plamtlfl‘s
CARL A BECKSTEDT III ESQ
Beckstedt 8: Associates
Christiansted VI 00820
For Hess 01] Virgm Islands Corporation and Amerada Hess Corporatzon
W MARK WILCZYNSKI ESQ
In re Deceased Plaintiffs
2020 VI Super 53
Case Nos SX 06 CV 198 221 8X 08 CV 056 227 229 273 295 3x 11 CV 244
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Page 6 of 33
Law Office of W Mark Wilczynkski, P C
St Thomas V100804
For thwm Corporation andjohn Crane Packing Company
IAMES L HYMES III
Law Office of James L Hymes, P C
St Thomas V100802
For Litwm Corporation
KEVIN A RAMES ESQ
SEMA] I JOHNSON ESQ
Law Office of Kevin A Rames P C
Christiansted VI 00822
For Lockheed Martin Corporation and Shell 011 Company
MICHAEL] SANFORD ESQ
RYAN] STUZMAN ESQ
Sanford Amerling 8: Associates
Christiansted V100820
For Riggers & Erectors International Inc and Virgin Islands Industrial Maintenance Corporation
RICHARD H HUNTER ESQ
Hunter 8: Cole
Christiansted V100820
For UOP LLC and Glencore Ltd
MARK D HODGE ESQ
Hodge & Hodge
St Thomas VI 00802
For Chicago Bridge & Iron, N V
EUGENIO W A GEIGEL SIMOUNET ESQ
GS Law Offices P C
Gallows Bay V1 00824
For General Engineering Corporation
MEMORANDUM OPINION
MOLLOY Judge
111 IN EACH CASE listed above in the caption the plaintiff [or first party plaintiff) passed away
while his lawsuit was pending In five cases Hughes Metzwer Prime, Subnazk, and Weekes
untimely motions were filed to substitute a personal representative and continue the lawsuit as a
In re Deceased Plaintiffs 2020 VI Super 53
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
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survival action The motions are opposed in all five cases The motion to substitute Hazell was filed
timely but remains unserved five years later In the remaining cases Barbell and Miller no
motion has been filed but the plaintiff’s death is a matter of record Because all eight cases raise
variations on the same legal issue, the Court has grouped them together under a common caption
to issue one Opinion For the reasons stated below the Court reaffirms that section 78 of title 5 of
the Virgin islands Code which governs substitution upon the death of a party, is akin to a statute of
limitations Martinez v Hess Oil VI Corp,
69 VI 519, 524 (Super Ct 2018) And because the
statute of limitations is an affirmative defense it must be asserted at the earliest opportunity Id
at 547 (citing Rennie v Hess Oil VI Corp 62 V I 529 536 (2015)) Failure to timely substitute was
raised at the earliest opportunity in Hughes, Metiwer, Prime, Subnazk and Weekes Although the
substitution was timely in Hazel! the motion was not served ln the remaining cases, Barbell and
Miller the Court will take judicial notice of the plaintiff’s death and dismiss both cases sua sponte
for failure to file a motion to substitute a personal representative
l FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
A Barbell v Amerada Hess Corporation, et a!
1i2 On March 14 2006, John Barbell ( Barbell ) filed a complaint against Amerada Hess
Corporation ( Hess ), its wholly owned subsidiary Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corporation [ HOVIC )
(collectively Hess Defendants ) Litwin Corporation( Litwin') and Universal Oil Products( UOP )
for damages allegedly for exposing him to asbestos and asbestos containing products as well as
ethylene oxide and other industrial solvents (Compl Till 8, 9 ) Litwin appeared filed an answer
denying liability, crossclaimed against UOP, and filed a third party complaint, as amended, against
Shell Oil Company ( Shell ) Riggers & Erectors international, Inc [ Riggers ), Communication
Systems 8: Maintenance Corporation [ CSMC ), Virgin islands Industrial Maintenance Corporation
( [MC ) Chicago Bridge & Iron Company, N V [ CBI ),3 and AP Green Services Inc [ A P Green )
individually and as successor to Bigelow Liptak Corporation The Hess Defendants and UOP
answered the complaint and UOP crossclaimed against Litwin CBI, Shell, Riggers, and MC also
2 Although the cases are similar several being coordinated under the same master case, the factual and procedural
backgrounds relevant to this Opinion are different For this reason each case is summarized individually
3 CBI was also sued as successor in interest to Chicago Bridge 8: Iron
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answered the third party complaint and everyone except Shell counterclaimed against Litwin
CSMC and A P Green never appeared
fl?» Barbell later stipulated with UOP to dismiss his claims with prejudice, which the Court
approved on December 4, 2009 UOP s crossclaim against Litwin remained, however Barbell's case
was grouped with 59 other cases and eventually assigned to the same judge who coordinated all the
cases under a master case titled In re Refinery Worker TOXIC Tort Litigation See generally William v
Amerada Hess Corp, 66 V] 23, 34 35 (Super Ct 2017) (summarizing the same history] Several
months before the master case was opened Barbell’s counsel Thomas Alkon Esq (Attorney
Alkon ] filed a motion on February 19 2015, asking to be relieved as counsel Attorney Alkon
explained that he lost contact with Barbell [alfter Hovensa closed in 2012 [P] ’s Mot to be
Relieved as Counsel 1, filed Feb 19, 2015 ) Attorney Alkon sent letters by registered mail to Barbell 5
last known address which were returned tried Barbell s telephone number but found it
disconnected and hired an investigator all to no avail Attorney Alkon concluded that he could ' no
longer faithfully represent [Barbells] legal interest Id None of the Defendants or Third Party
Defendants responded
114 However several months after the Refinery Worker master case was opened, the Hess
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Barbell 5 case for failure to prosecute The only remaining first
party defendant, Litwin, did not join Attorney Alkon filed a joint response on behalf of Barbell and
other Refinery Worker plaintiffs who were the targets of identical failure to prosecute motions filed
by Hess and HOViC reiterating that he was no longer in contact with Barbell and therefore ’cannot
join in the motion to [d]ismiss (Pl 5 Rep to Def 5 Mot to Dismiss for Lack of Prosecution 4 filed
Dec 8 2015) "However as an officer of the court Attorney Alkon stated that he can t disagree that
there has been a lack of responses and again request[ed] that [he] be relieved as counsel 1d
TlS On November 6, 2016, Litwin filed a stipulation signed by counsel for the parties including
Attorney Alkon, to dismiss its crossclaim against UOP and its third party claims against CB! Riggers
and [MC And on December 20 2017 Litwin and Shell filed a stipulation, signed only by them, to
dismiss Litwin's third party claims against Shell which this Court approved on September 17 2019
in a separate order entered the same day the Court dismissed CSMC and A P Green for failure to
timely serve
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
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116 On June 5, 2018, Rhea Lawrence, Esq with Lee I Rohn and Associates LLC filed an
emergency petition with the Superior Court to have Maxima Barbell [ Maxima ) appointed as
personal representative of Barbell's estate in the petition, Maxima explained that her father was a
member of a putative class action pending in the Superior Court, Diane Cornwall et al v Virgin
Islands Industrial Maintenance Corporation et a] Case No SX 02 CV 641 which had been stayed
because one of the defendants HOVENSA LLC had filed for bankruptcy The bankruptcy court had
imposed certain deadlines on the claimants Because her father had passed away Maxima asked to
be appointed as personal representative to continue his Cornwall claim The petition was not served
on anyone and did not reference Barbells Refinery Worker case it did include a copy of a Florida
death certificate however, showing that Barbell had passed away on November 10 2010 A
Superior Court magistrate judge granted the petition on June 8 2018 To date probate proceedings
have not commenced for the Estate of lohn Barbell
117 During an October 16 2019 status conference in the Refinery Worker cases the Court advised
Barbell s attorney that the reason he could not locate Barbell was 'because he passed away in 2010
(Hr g Tr 42 9 (Oct 16 2019) In re Refinery Worker TOXIC Tort thlg SX 15 CV 198 [hereinafter
Refinery Worker Tr '} ) Counsel questioned whether Barbells death was in the record Id at
42 10 The Court referred him to the ex parte petition Maxima filed To date, no motion to substitute
Maxima or anyone else as personal representative for the Estate of John Barbell has been filed in
this case
B Hughes v Amerada Hess Corporation, et a!
TI8 The factual and procedural background of Hughes is identical to that of Barbell Hughes sued
the Hess Defendants, UOP as well as Litwin and Litwin then impleaded Shell Riggers, CSMC, IMC,
CB] and AP Green Shell Riggers and IMC counterclaimed against Litwin and Litwin and UOP
crossclaimed against each other Hughes stipulated with UOP to dismiss his claims with prejudice
which was approved on December 7, 2011, leaving the UOP Litwin crossclaims pending Hughes
differs from Barbell in one respect Hughes wife Lynette Hughes ( Lynette ), through Attorney
Alkon filed a petition on October 16 2013 to be appointed personal representative of her husband
Lynette attached to the petition a copy of New York death certificate for Hughes, which states that
he passed away on October 1, 2011 Counsel neglected to sign the October 16 2013 petition
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
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however 80 a signed version was filed on November 17, 2014, and granted by a Superior Court
magistrate judge shortly thereafter on November 24 2014
“9 Notwithstanding that neither the petition nor the order of appointment referenced Hughes
Refinery Worker case, the Hess Defendants, on April 24, 2015, filed a motion to dismiss for failure to
substitute The Hess Defendants attached to their motion copies of the complaint, the death
certificate Lynette s petition and the order of appointment Approximately three weeks later, on
May 14 2015, Lynette filed a motion for substitution and a response in opposition to the dismissal
motion Hughes was later grouped under Refinery Worker and Lynette filed a notice on December 2,
2016 to alert the Court to recent decisions rendered by other Superior Court judges, which she
thought were persuasive Lynette then filed a renewed motion to substitute on February 13 2018
after the Virgin Islands Rules ofCivil Procedure took effect on March 31 2017 By Order dated and
entered September 18 2019 the Court rejected several stipulated dismissals purportedly filed by
Attorney Alkon because Lynette had not at the time the stipulations were filed moved or been
granted leave to substitute The Court construed other stipulated dismissal Lynette joined as
motions and granted them The Court heard argument in Hughes on October 16, 2019, on
substitution and took her motion under advisement Litwin later filed a stipulation on january 24
2020, to dismiss with prejudice its third party claims against Shell
C Metivzer v Lockheed Martin Corporation, et aI
1110 Arnim Metivier ( Arnim') filed suit on january 24 2008 against Lockheed Martin
Corporation ( LMC ) and Martin Marietta Corporation ( MMC ), Martin Marietta Aluminum Inc
Martin Marietta Aluminum Properties, inc [collectively Martin Marietta Defendants ) as well as
General Engineering Corporation ("GEC ) 4 He sought damages for exposure to bauxite dust, silica,
and asbestos while he worked at the former alumina refinery on St Croix LMC appeared on its own
behalf and on behalf of the Martin Marietta Defendants and answered the complaint GEC also
appeared and answered the complaint Arnim 5 case was eventually grouped with several other
cases under a master case, In re Alumina Dust Claims for pretrial proceedings and reassigned to the
samejudge See generally In re Alumina Dust Claims 67 Vi 172 [Super Ct 2017)
4 LMC was sued individually and as successor in interest to the Martin Marietta Defendants and MMC was also sued
individually and as successor to the other Martin Marietta Defendants
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1111 On July 15, 2011, LMC moved for summary judgment, claiming that because Arnim had
worked for one or more of the Martin Marietta Defendants at the alumina refinery, LMC had
inherited their immunity from suit under the Virgin Islands Workers Compensation Act Arnim
opposed Approximately 3 year later, on April 13 2012, Arnim filed a stipulation with CBC to dismiss
his claims with prejudice which the Court (Willocks j ) approved on April 19 2012, entered April
23 2012
1112 Six years later, on March 2, 2018, Arnim 5 son, Frederick Metivier ( Frederick’) filed a
petition with the Probate Division to be appointed personal representative of his father s estate for
the purpose of filing a civil suit against all parties that may have been responsible for the wrongful
death of Arnim Metivier [and] to pursue a survival action in the Superior Court of the Virgin
Islands (Pet I filed Mar 2, 2018 In re Pet forAppt of Frederick Metlwer as Pars Rep ofEstate of
Armm Metiwer Case No 8X
18 MP 001 ] Frederick attached a copy of his father 5 death certificate,
which showed that Arnim passed away on April 7, 2013 in Winter Garden, Florida The petition was
not served on LMC or GEC nor was a copy filed in Arnim's civil case By order dated and entered
March 12 2018 the Court [Camacho M) granted the petition and appointed Frederick as personal
representative for the Estate of Arnim Metivier To date, no petition has been filed to open probate
proceedings for Arnim
1113 Three months later, on June 6 2018 Frederick through counsel filed a motion in Arnim 5
case for leave to substitute as personal representative Frederick acknowledged that his motion was
not filed within two years after his father 3 death as required by title 5, section 78 of the Virgin
Islands Code but argued that attorney inadvertence and neglect should excuse the delay LMC
opposed claiming the substitution statute is jurisdictional and the failure to substitute after a party
dies cannot be excused for good cause
D Subnaik v Hess 01! Virgin Islands Corporation, at a!
1114 Vishnu Subnaik ( Vishnu ) filed suit on May 1, 2008 against HOVlC Hess UOP Shell and
john Crane Packing Company (’john Crane'} for asbestos related injuries from employment at the
St Croix oil refinery All the defendants appeared Vishnu later stipulated with Shell and UOP to
dismiss his claims with prejudice in 2009, leaving Hess, HOVlC, and john Crane as the remaining
defendants Once the case went dormant, the Court (Brady I) issued an order on September 23
In re Deceased Plaintiffs 2020 Vi Super 53
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
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2011, directing Vishnu to take steps to further his case Vishnu 5 wife Sandra Subnaik ( Sandra ),
filed a response on October 17, 2011 She attached a copy of an order the Court [Steele I ) issued on
May S, 2010, granting her November 5, 2009 ex parte petition for appointment as personal
representative And she explained that she and the defendants had been working out a case
management order to submit for the Court 5 approval However Sandra did not move to substitute
or include a certificate reflecting service of her response on the defendants
1115 On August 16, 2012, the Hess Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute
They noted that Vishnu had died in an unrelated automobile accident on October 9, 2008 No
substitution has been made nor was made within the time allowed by law ' (Hess Defs Mot to
Dismiss for Failure to Pros 1. filed Aug 16 2012 (citations omitted)) As support they attached a
print out from the Social Security Death Index Attorney Alkon filed a response and opposed
dismissal Unlike the October 17, 2011 response, the response did not refer to Sandra having been
appointed personal representative by the Family Court Instead Attorney Alkon opposed dismissal
because other plaintiffs that he represented had vigorously prosecuted their cases against the
Hess Defendants and other companies and everyone in the cases grouped under the In re Catalyst
Litigation master case had agreed to pursue these cases first (Pl 5 Opp n to Mot to Dismiss 1 2,
filed Aug 21, 2012 ] He concluded by asking that the Court hold a status conference to get the cases,
which he referred to as the Mixed Dust cases on track Hess and HOVlC opposed, claiming that
Vishnu had waived substitution because he failed to respond to their argument They also opposed
Vishnu s assertion that the parties to Subnaik had effectively agreed to a de facto stay But for
reasons not explained to the Court the Hess Defendants withdrew their dismissal motion on
September 25 2012
1116 Subnaik was later grouped under the Refinery Worker master case in a May 27 2015 Order
entered June 5, 2015 Sandra formally filed a motion for substitution on lune 10 2015 The Hess
Defendants opposed on June 16 2015 because seven years had passed since Vishnu 5 death John
Crane did not respond Subnaik was reassigned to the Family Court judge for a period of time cf
Willie v Amerada Hess Corp, 66 V i 23, 34 36 (Super Ct 2017), before being designated as complex
transferred to the newly established Complex Litigation Division and reassigned to the
undersigned judicial officer who held a hearing in the Refineiy Worker cases on October 16, 2019,
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Page 13 of33
and heard argument on Sandra 5 motion
E Hazel] v Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corporation, et a]
1H7 Henry Hazell { Henry J filed suit on May 1 2008 against HOVIC Hess UOP Shell and John
Crane for damages after he was diagnosed with mixed dust pneumoconiosis allegedly from his
employment at the oil refinery on St Croix All defendants appeared and answered Henry s
complaint On October 30 2009 Henry stipulated with Shell to dismiss his claims with prejudice
On December 2, 2009, he stipulated with UOP to do the same The Court (D’Eramo J ) approved both
stipulations on December 9 2009 However the orders were not entered until December 22, 2009
Nothing further occurred until the June 5 2015 Order was entered grouping Hazel] with other cases
filed in 2006 2008 and 2011 under the Refinery Worker master case and reassigning them to the
same judge
1J18 On June 24 2015 Altina Hanley [ Altina ) filed a petition with the Probate Division to be
appointed personal representative of her father Henry 5 estate to file a wrongful death lawsuit and
pursue a survival action She provided a copy of Henry 5 death certificate which showed that Henry
passed away on July 19 2013 on St Croix The petition was not served on anyone nor was a copy
filed in Hazel] it also did not reference Henry s pending lawsuit The Court (Gallivan M) granted
the petition a day later, on June 25, 2015, and appointed Altina as personal representative of the
Estate of Henry S Hazel! The Clerk’s Office entered the order on June 30 2015 and closed the
miscellaneous probate case To date, probate proceedings have not been initiated for Henry 5 estate
1J19 A week later on July 8, 2015, Altina, through counsel, filed a motion in Hazel] to substitute in
place of Henry and continue his lawsuit as personal representative The motion was not served on
the remaining defendants HOVIC Hess or John Crane and thus they did not file a response Based
on Altina s motion the case was reassigned to a time to the Family Court before the Presiding Judge
designated the case as complex on August 30, 2018, transferred it to the Complex Litigation
Division, and reassigned it to the undersigned judicial officer This Court scheduled Hazel] for a
status conference and oral argument on October 16 2019, with the Refinery Worker cases During
the hearing the Court informed plaintiff’s counsel, regarding Altina s substitution motion that "[i]t
does not appear there 5 a certificate of service, which may explain why there was no opposition'
(Refinery Worker Tr 40 5 7 ) John Crane and Hess and HOVlC through counsel confirmed that they
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
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had not been served with Altina s motion Only Hess and HOVIC voiced their oppose to substitution
on timeliness grounds John Crane did not give its position To date proof that the motion was
served on the defendants has not been filed
F Miller v Amerada Hess Corporatlon, et a!
1120 Frankie Miller ( Frankie ) filed suit on May 30, 2008 against Hess, HOVIC, UOP, and lngersoll
Rand Corporation [ lngersoll Rand ) for asbestos related injuries from his employment at the St
Croix oil refinery Hess and HOVIC appeared and answered the complaint Frankie voluntarily
dismissed his claims against lngersoll Rand in 2008, and UOP in 2009 On October 22 2010 the
Court noted that the case had gone dormant and directed Frankie to take steps to move his case
Frankie responded by filing a notice of service of initial disclosures Two years later on August 16,
2012, the Hess Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to prosecute Frankie filed the same
response as Vishnu that his case had been stayed effectively by agreement of the parties while the
Catalyst cases went forward The Hess Defendants rejected his arguments But as in Subnalk, the
Hess Defendants withdrew their motion on September 25, 2012 without explaining why
1i21 Three years later, on April 24, 2015, the Hess Defendants filed another motion to dismiss
for failure to substitute Hess and HOVIC explained that Frankie had died on May 23, 2011 (See Hess
Defs Mot to Dismiss 1 filed Apr 24 2015 ( On May 23 2011 Plaintiff Frankie Miller died at the
age of 76 ) ) They attached a copy of Frankie s obituary, published in the St Crozx AVIS on May 27
2011, in support As four years had passed and no one substituted Hess and HOVlC argued that this
case must be dismissed Six weeks later on lune 5 2015 Frankie and the Hess Defendants, through
counsel filed a stipulation for dismissal with prejudice and a proposed order On August 5, 2015,
the Administrative Judge reassigned Miller to the Family Court judge for all further proceedings
1122 On November 20, 2015 the Court (Hinds Roach J ) issued an order to alert the parties to the
following concerns
The first concern the Court has is the scope of authority an attorney has to make
decisions after his client has died Although at present there is no binding authority
in the Virgin Islands addressing this question cf Banks v Int 1 Rental & Leasmg Corp,
55 V 1 967 [2011), the general rule ‘under well established principles ofagency law
is that an agent 5 authority terminates upon the death of the principal The lawyer
client relationship is not excepted from this rule Brantley v Fallston Gen Hops , 636
A2d 444 446 (Md 1994) (internal citation omitted) Accord [ones v Montgomery
Ward& Co 725 P 2d 836 838 [Ariz Ct App 1985) ( The general rule is that the death
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
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of a party terminates the power of his attorney to act in his favor ) [collecting cases)
But see Brantley, 636 A 2d at 446 (noting an exception where an attorney can show
that he or she was specifically retained by the client to continue the representation
even beyond death (citing Vincent v Vincent 554 P2d 374 378 {Wash Ct App
1976)) Accepting, for the purposes of this order only, that Mr Miller died on May 23
2011 as the Hess Defendants represented in their April 24, 2015 Motion, then the
question becomes whether Mr Miller 5 attorney could enter into the June 5, 2015
Stipulation with the Hess Defendants' attorney If not, then the June 5, 2015
stipulation is not properly before the Court
The second concern is the effect of section 78 of title 5 of the Virgin Islands
Code on this action Section 78 directs in part that "[n]o action shall abate by the death
of a party if the cause of action survives or continues In case of the death of
a party, the court may at any time within two years thereafter, on motion allow the
action to be continued by or against his personal representatives or successor in
interest The Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands reaffirmed in Sweeney v 0mbres
60 V I 438 443 [2014) that the two year limitations period in section 78 governs
substitution of deceased parties in Superior Court proceedings Sweeney was based
on an earlier decision Hodge v McGowan 50 Vi 296 (2008) which had held that
section 78, and not Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25 through Superior Court 7,
governs substitution after death Here, the Hess Defendants initially moved to dismiss
this action because a personal representative was not substituted for Mr Miller
within two years of his death But the Hess Defendants did not file a suggestion of Mr
Miller's death They also did not serve a copy oftheir April 24, 2015 Motion on any of
Mr Miller s survivors which they were aware of since they attached to their Motion
a print out of an online newspaper s obituary notice for Mr Miller instead, in their
Motion, the Hess Defendants argue that "Plaintiff failed to amend the complaint to
allow the action to be continued by his personal representative or successor in
interest (Hess Defs Mot to Dismiss 1, filed Apr 24, 2015 ) But the Hess Defendants
fail to appreciate the illogic of their argument the Plaintiff, Mr Miller, could not move
to amend his own complaint because he died And, assuming for purposes of this
order that the Virgin islands would join the other jurisdictions in holding that death
terminates the attorney client agency relationship then Mr Millers attorney also
was powerless to move to amend his complaint
No court in the Virgin Islands has yet addressed how [procedurally speaking]
substitution after death occurs under section 78 of title 5 In Brantley for example
the Court of Appeals of Maryland explained that, under the former Maryland
substitution statute
if a successor in interest did not appear and request substitution at the
term of court at which the suggestion of death was made the defendant
would issue a summons for the proper person to prosecute the action
if that person failed to appear in obedience to the summons, the court
issued an attachment of contempt, and if no appearance was made
within a stated time after service of the attachment judgment of non
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suit was entered[]
636 A 2d at 447 Thus, Maryland courts put the initial burden on the deceased party 5
survivors to appear and if they did not, then the opposing party would have to
attempt to substitute one or more survivors into the deceased party's case In
contrast, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held in construing its substitution statute
[which was modeled after the federal rule of civil procedure) that the suggestion of
death should be served on the deceased party’s attorney Schwzster v Schoenecker,
654 NW2d 852 862 63 (Wis 2002} But the court qualified that service on the
former attorney alone was not sufficient to start the clock on the Wisconsin statutory
substitution period because the attorney 5 agency to act on behalf of a client ends
with the death of the client and therefore the attorney is no longer ' a person with a
right to decide or an interest in deciding whether a motion for substitution should be
filed ' Id at 863 instead the party filing the suggestion of another party 3 death must
in addition to serving the deceased party 3 attorney also identify and serve
appropriate persons with the suggestion of death such as any heirs, beneficiaries
successors, and representatives of the deceased party Id at 863 64 The Virgin
islands substitution statute requires substitution on motion but who has the duty to
make the motion, and who should be served with that motion and further when the
two year substitution period begins to run, is unclear
(Order2 3 entered Nov 20 2015)
1123 The Court set a briefing schedule, directed that the parties address whether certifying the
question pursuant to title 4, section 33(c) of the Virgin Islands Code would be appropriate and
provided that if the Court concluded that Frankie 5 death terminated his attorney 5 authority to act
on his behalf Attorney Alkon would be deemed appointed as an amicus curiae See id at 3 [citing
State ex rel Comm rofTransp v Eagle 63 S W 3d 734 758 (Tenn Ct App 2001) Ryan v Commodity
Futures Trading Comm n 125 F 3d 1062 1063 (7th Cir 1997)) The Hess Defendants filed their brief
on December 9, 2015 Frankie (or Attorney Aiken as amlcus) filed his response on December 16
2015 And after an extension of time, the Hess Defendants filed their reply on January 8 2016
1R4 The Presiding judge later designated Miller complex in August 2018, transferred it to the
Compiex Litigation Division and reassigned it to the undersigned judge The Court added Miller to
the Refinery Worker master case and heard argument on October 16, 2019
G Prime v Lockheed Martin Corporation, et a!
1125 On June 9, 2008, Samuel Prime ("Samuel") filed a complaint against LMC, MMC, and the
Martin Marietta Defendants, as well as GEC for damages from exposure to bauxite and silica dusts
and asbestos while working at the former alumina refinery on St Croix LMC appeared and
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answered the complaint on its own behalf and on behalf of the Martin Marietta defendants CBC also
appeared and answered the complaint Prime was later grouped with other cases under the In re
Alumina Dust Claims master case Like Metlwer LMC moved for summary Judgment against Samuel
in July 2011, claiming Samuel had worked for one or more ofthe Martin Marietta defendants and,
therefore LMC inherited their immunity from suit Samuel later stipulated to dismiss his claims
against GEC in April 2012, leaving only LMC and the Martin Marietta Defendants in January 2019
the Presiding Judge designated the Alumina Dust cases complex transferred them to the Complex
Litigation Division and reassigned them to the undersigned judicial officer
$26 On August 5 2019 Samuel 5 son, Hollis Prime ( Hollis ), filed a motion to substitute himself
as personal representative for Samuel to continue Samuel s lawsuit as a survival action Hollis did
not state when his father passed away however LMC opposed for that reason because Hollis’s
motion omitted a key fact Samuel died on January 9, 2010 (Def Lockheed Martin Corp 5 Opp n
to Mot to Substitute Hollis Prime as Pers Rep for P1 1 field Aug 30 2019] In his reply Hollis
detailed the steps he and his father’s attorney took regarding substitution and asked the Court to
find good cause to excuse counsels neglect in not filing the substitution motion sooner
H Weekes v Lockheed Martin Corporation, at a!
1J27 On May 9, 2011, John A Weekes ( John ) filed a complaint primarily against LMC and the
Martin Marietta Defendants Over several amendment John dropped Alleris Rolled Products inc
and GEC added Glencore Ltd ( Glencore ), and added and dropped Tang How Brothers Inc and
Zenon Construction Company Presently, LMC, as successor to the Martin Marietta Defendants and
Glencore are the only defendants John filed suit to recover damages from his exposure to silica dust
released from the bauxite used at the former alumina refinery on St Croix where he worked from
1976 to 1983 and from 1990 to 1995 LMC appeared and on July 7 2011 moved to dismiss for
failure to state a claim for relief As in Metiwer and Prime LMC argued that John 3 lawsuit was barred
because he used to work for companies that through successive mergers and acquisitions, LMC
became the successor to Glencore also appeared and on August 15, 2011, moved to dismiss for
failure to state a claim for relief Glencore argued first, that the Martin Marietta Defendants were
sophisticated purchasers and thus Glencore could rely on them to pass on any warnings to the end
user, the workers And second, Glencore argued that bauxite was a mineral, a naturally occurring
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product, and thus, could not be supplied defectively when supplied in its raw form The Court
[Willocks J) later grouped John 5 case with several others filed around the same time initially
under one of the individual plaintiff’s cases but then under a master case, In re Bauxzte Containing
Silica Halliday Litigation Series, Case No SX 15 CV 097 The Presiding Judge later designated all the
cases, including the master case as complex transferred them to the Complex Litigation Division
and reassigned them to the undersigned judicial officer This Court held a status conference and
heard argument on December 17, 2018 denying LMC's and Glencore s motions from the bench
because they raised grounds not appropriate to a pre answer motion
1J28 Efforts to streamline the litigation saw John amend his complaint to drop the Martin Marietta
Defendants as direct defendants, name LMC in its successor capacity only and remove the other
defendants who were no longer parties to his case Glencore answered the third amended
complaint LMC moved to dismiss reasserting the same argument [the workers compensation bar]
the Court rejected John s attorneys filed an opposition to LMC’s second motion to dismiss and a
proposed fourth amended complaint titled john Doe as the Personal Representative of the Estate of
john Weekes v Lockheed Martin Corporation and Glencore, PLC LMC objected to the improper
attempt to make a motion within a response in opposition Glencore did not respond
1J29 Approximately a month after LMC s second motion was fully briefed, and two months after
John s attorneys filed the proposed fourth amended complaint, Johns daughter, Tamyka Khan
( Tamyka ) filed a motion on May 21 2019, for leave to substitute as John 3 personal representative
and continue the lawsuit on behalf of the Estate of John Weekes Tamyka attached a copy of her
father 5 death certificate, which showed that John died approximately two and a half years earlier,
on October 17 2016 on St Croix Tamyka did not explain the delay or move the Court to excuse it
She did represent, however that she had conferred with LMC (but not Glencore) and that LMC may
oppose LMC did oppose and disputed Tamyka 3 meet and confer representation On August 12,
2019, the Court struck Tamyka s motion failure to follow Standing Orders the Court issued to govern
complex litigation cases struck LMC 3 response for not serving all counsel, and struck the fourth
amended complaint as improper5 Tamyka refiled her motion on August 26 2019 Her second
5 As the August 12 2019 Order explained
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motion argued that the substitution statute, title 5, section 78 of the Virgin Islands Code was not
jurisdictional and further that any delay should be excused LMC and Glencore opposed Tamyka's
motion The Court heard argument on October 16, 2019 and took it under advisement
Standing Order No 4 provides that counsel must meet and confer before filing any motion or request,
including dispositive motions and discovery motions, so that the issues are crystalized and ancillary
matters are reduced And Standing Order No 2 directs that electronic service is adopted for all papers
served in Complex Litigation Division cases unless a person declines electronic service in writing
These requirements were adopted to reduce ancillary matters and ensure that all parties receive
timely notice of issues raised in each case
The meet and confer requirement was broadened to include dispositive motions as well as
discovery motions because oftentimes counsel learn each others positions through their motion
papers, which is inefficient particularly in complex litigation Rather than file a motion for leave to
amend the complaint in response to a motion to dismiss or fora more definite statement counsel might
be able to reduce additional cost and further delay if they met and conferred first Even if counsel
cannot agree by meeting and conferring first the Court is given notice ofwhich parties will oppose in
this instance counsel for Tamyka Khan certified that a meet and confer was held [and] that an
opposition may be forthcoming Counsel for Defendant Lockheed Martin successfully rebutted that
certification countering that the parties did not, in fact, meet and Khan's counsel's representation may
have been based on prior conversations about other cases Unless counsel enter into a [global]
stipulation of non opposition to each other's motions, discussions about prior motions cannot be
grafted onto subsequent motions filed in the same case or in different cases, including master cases
To be clear the meet and confer requirement is case as well as motion specific Because Standing
Order No 4 was not complied with Tamyka Khan 5 motion must be stricken
Lockheed Martin's June 17 2019 response must also be stricken because a copy was served
by first class mail not electronically and only on one attorney, Thomas Alkon, Esq, not all attorneys in
contravention of Standing Order No 2 Attorney Alkon did not file written notice objecting to electronic
service Thus Lockheed Martin should have served its response electronically But more importantly,
J Russell B Pate Esq KoreyA Nelson, Esq,WarrenT Burns,Esq,and Daniel H Charest Esq also filed
the motion on behalf of Khan along with Attorney Alkon, Esq Yet Lockheed Martin failed to serve them
as well Likewise, Glencore was not also served and would not know of the deadline to join Lockheed
Martin's opposition by filing a paper titled 'Ioinder " Such selective service will not be tolerated To
be clear all papers must be served on all parties or their counsel including co counsel, unless counsel
otherwise agree among themselves and designate a lead attorney or move the Court for similar relief
Because Lockheed Martin only served one of Khan's attorneys and failed to serve all other attorneys
who appeared in this case its response must be stricken
Lastly the Court notes that two months before Khan filed her substitution motion, Attorneys
Burns, Charest, Nelson and Pate filed a document on March 11 2019 entitled Fourth Amended
Complaint purportedly brought by john Doe as personal representative of the Estate of John Weekes
This pleading must be stricken for several reasons First, it was filed without leave Second, it was filed
by a fictitious party With few exceptions not relevant here such as qut tam actions, a case cannot be
commenced or continued by a John Doe plaintiff Third, according to the affidavit Khan executed and
attached to her substitution motion, she did not agree to substitute as plaintiffuntil March 19,2019 at
week after the Fourth Amended Complaint had been filed Finally since Khan has not been granted
permission to substitute yet, and did not seek leave for another two months and since death
terminates the attorney client relationship, the March 11 2019 Fourth Amended Complaint is
improper and must be stricken
(Order I 3 entered Aug 12 2019 (ellipses brackets, and citations omitted))
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[l DISCUSSION
1i30 The broad question raised here is whether title 5 section 78 of the Virgin Islands Code is
jurisdictional or a claims processing rule This Court and another Superior Court judge concluded
that it is not jurisdictional See Mortmezv Hess Oil VI Corp, 69 VI 519, 541 (Super Ct 2018) jones
v Lockheed Martin Corp, 68 Vi 158, 180 (Super Ct 2017) Instead like a statute of limitation
Section 78 is simply a rule for processing a party 3 claims [Flailure to raise the timeliness of a
substitution motion means the untimeliness defense is either waived or forfeited Martinez 69 V i
at 541 (quoting jones, 68 V] at 180]) But decisions of trial level courts are not binding on any
other court, including that same trial court' Der Weerv Hess 011V! Corp 60 Vi 91, 101 (Super Ct
2014] And these cases present more nuanced issues because the defendants did not oppose
substitution in lanes, see 68 V] at 165, 186, 8: 188. or in Martinez See 69 V1 at 524 Here by
contrast, substitution is opposed in Hughes Metzvzer Subnaik Hughes Prime and Weekes And,
while no motion to substitute has been filed in Barbell or Miller all parties are on notice that the
plaintiffs in those cases passed away But, before addressing specifics some background is
necessary for context
1j31 At common law all personal injury or tort claims ended, or abated, when the person who
was injured died or when the person who caused the injury, the tortfeasor, died Der Weer v Hess
011 Virgin Island Corp 61 Vi 87 98 (Super Ct 2014) This common law rule was abrogated by
statute in many jurisdictions In the Virgin islands it was abrogated by title 5, section 77 of the
Virgin Islands Code See 5 VIC § 77 ( A thing in action arising out of a wrong which results in
physical injury to the person or out of a statute imposing liability for such injury shall not abate by
reason of the death of the wrongdoer or any other person liable for damages for such injury nor by
reason of the death of the person injured or of any other person who owns any such thing in
action ) Thus whether the person who caused an injury dies, or the person who was injured dies
an action may be filed by or against that individuals personal representative See Id § 37(a)
(personal representative as plaintiff), Id § 37(b] (personal representative as defendant)
Additionally, if someone dies after an action has been filed in court the action does not abate
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Instead, if the cause of action survives or continues, 5 V l C § 78,6 then the court may at any time
within two years thereafter, on motion, allow the action to be continued by or against his personal
representatives or successor in interest Id But when must the motion be filed by whom, must
death he suggested on the record first when does the two year clock begin, can it be tolled or the
delay excused and can a court take notice of death sua spante? These are the questions raised in the
cases grouped under this Opinion
1132 To be clear "[s]ubstitution of parties and revivor of actions are different names for the same
thing' megston v 3105,
640 P 2d 362 364 65 (Kan Ct App 1982) ’The revivor of an action is in
fact the substitution of new parties who have the right under the substantive law, to go ahead with
the prosecution or defense of the claim Id at 365 Once an action has been commenced and a
necessary party to the action dies, a procedure is required to bring into court the persons who have
become, by right of succession under the substantive law the real parties in interest Id in most
jurisdictions, including the Virgin islands that procedure requires a motion See 5 V l C § 78 See
also eg Fed R Civ P 25[a) Nev R Civ P 25(a) Kan Stat Ann § 60 255(a)(1) And in some
jurisdictions, a personal representative, ie an executor or an administrator must be appointed
first, before a case can be commenced or revived Cfi Drumm v ngberg, 7 Phila 333, 337 (1982)
( [Tjhe personal representative must be appointed within the statutory time period before an
action is commenced against the decedent s estate ), accord Estate of Paulk v Lott 217 So 3d 747
751 n 6 (Miss Ct App 2017) ( Ordinarily, if’litigants wish to pursue a claim on behalfof the estate
6 Not all claims continue after death At common law, property and contract claims do not abate upon a person's death
Augustin v Hess Oil VI Corp , 67 V I 488 505 (Super Ct 2017) Whether statutory claims survive or tort claims without
physical injury, depends on each jurisdiction 5 survival statute See, e g, Guarantee Tr Life Ins Co v Estate of Casper
418 P 3d 1163 1168 (Colo 2018) ( We note that the survival statute provides that all actions survwe the death ofeither
party except actions for slander or libel " (emphasis added)) Cf. Memphis Dev Found v Factors Etc, Inc,
616 F 2d 956,
959 [6th Cir 1980) [ There is no right of action for defamation after death [citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 560
(1977)) Butsee MacDonald v Time Inc
554 F Supp 1053 1054 (D N j 1983) [ Why should a claim fora damaged leg
survive one's death, where a claim for a damaged name does not After death the leg cannot be healed, but the
reputation can (footnote omitted)) See also 39 Lindsay by & Through Lindsay v S San Antonio Indep Sch Dist
983
S W 2d 778, 780 (Tex Ct App 1998) ( [A] statutory claim for disability benefits was sufficiently analogous to common
law breach of contract to permit the claim to survive the death of the claimant ’) Lincoln Natl Life Ins Co v Silver, Civ
No 86 7175 1990 U S Dist LEXIS 13669 *11 (N D Ill Oct 4- 1990) [observing that several federal courts have found
that antitrust claims survive the death ofa party ) But see eg , Flores v MUFG Union Bank NA , No 11 cv 0022 2017
U S Dist LEXIS 54038 *2 (D N Mar 1 Apr 6, 2017) [territorial consumer protection act claim did not survive death),
Sperber v Schwartz 527 N Y 5 2d 279 281 (App Div 1988) ( It is well settled that where one party to a divorce action
dies prior to the rendering of a judicial determination which dissolves or terminates the marriage, the action abates
inasmuch as the marital relationship between the parties no longer exists ' (citations omitted))
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of the deceased, such estate must, of course be opened and administered through the Chancery
court" [quoting Delta Health Grp Inc v Estate of Pope ex rel Payne. 995 So 2d 123 125 (Miss
2008)) But not in the Virgin Islands In promulgating rules of procedure for the Territory the
Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands "expressly and unambiguously eliminated the requirement to
open an estate as a prerequisite for bringing or maintaining a survival [action] Augustin v Hess
Oil VI Corp
67 VI 488 519 (Super Ct 2017) The Virgin Islands Supreme Court also promulgated
a rule regarding substitution Rule 25 of the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
'{a] motion for substitution may be made by any party or by the decedent s successor or
representative [and] may be granted at any time within two years after the death V i R Civ P
25(a)(1)
1[33 In jones another Superior Court judge questioned whether title 5, section 78 of the Virgin
Islands Code was superseded by Rule 25 of the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure Seejones 67
V l at 169 71 & 184 n 9 The question arose because the motions to substitute a personal
representative were filed more than two years after death if section 78 was jurisdictional then the
statutory two year deadline controlled If section 78 was not jurisdictional, then the statute may
have been implicitly repealed when the rule was promulgated because both governed procedure
See id at 181 82 (discussing concurrent authority of judicial and legislative branches to promulgate
rules of procedure for courts) Ultimately the Court concluded that the conflict [if any) between
Section 78 and Rule 25 need not be resolved, id at 183 because section 78's two year deadline was
akin to a statute of limitations Id at 196 The defendants waived any objection to timeliness
by not opposing the motions to substitute And the motions at issue in ]ones were filed before Rule
25 took effect Cf id at 194 n 9 Unlike/ones, this Court must consider the impact if any Rule 25 had
on the procedure for substituting a personal representative after a party dies because the motions
in Subnaik, Hazel], and Hughes were filed before Rule 25 took effect while the motions in Weekes,
Prime, and Metiwer were filed after Rule 25 took effect N o motion was filed in Miller or Barbell And
the motions in Hughes and Hazel! were supplemented or renewed after Rule 25 took effect The
problem is that, Rule 25 governs to the exclusion of section 78, no one followed it here
1134 Virgin Islands Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a) appears to be modeled largely after Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a) though the two rules differ in one important aspect Id at 184 n 9
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Rule 25 retained the two year time limit in section 78 But it adopted nearly every other aspect of
the federal rule For example, both rules require that ' [t]he death should be noted on the record
V] R Civ P 25(a)(2) accord Fed R Civ P 25(a){2) { The death should be noted on the record )
Both rules also require that the substitution motion together with a notice of hearing, must be
served on the parties as provided in Rule 5 and on nonparties as provided in Rule 4 V I R Civ P
25[a)(3), accord Fed R Civ P 25(a)(3) ( A motion to substitute together with a notice of hearing,
must be served on the parties as provided in Rule 5 and on nonparties as provided in Rule 4 )
Statements noting death also must be served in the same manner Vi R Civ P 25(a)(3) accord
Fed R Civ P 25(a)[3) ( A statement noting death must be served in the same manner ) There are
only three differences between the two rules the length of time for substitution, the scope of
service and the requirement to dismiss the case if substitution is not effected The Virgin islands
rule does not provide that [s]ervice may be made in any judicial district' Fed R Civ P 25(3) (3]
or that the action by or against the decedent must be dismissed Fed R Civ P 25[a)[1) (emphasis
added] [i]fthe motion is not made within 90 days after service ofa statement noting the death '
Id The Virgin Islands rule provides that a motion to substitute ‘may be granted at any time within
two years after the death V] R Civ P 25(a)(1) [emphasis added) It does not mandate dismissal,
not explicitly that is
1135 To understand the similarities and differences between the two rules and the potential
impact on Virgin islands practice and procedure given the adoption of several aspects of the federal
rule, the Court must address how substitution proceeds in federal court and how the federal rule
came about Initially Rule 25 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was similar to title 5 section
78 of the Virgin Islands Code The federal rule, when first promulgated provided that [i]f a party
dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished the court within 2 years after the death may order
substitution of the proper parties if substitution is not so made, the action shall be dismissed as to
the deceased party Anderson v Yungkau 329 U S 482 484 [1947) [quoting Fed R Civ P 25(a)
(1947 ed )) superseded by Amends to Rules OfClV Proc for the US Dist Cts 374 U S 861 [1963)
Anderson had sued to recover stock assessments from shareholders of the Banco Kentucky Co
329 US at 483 Seven cases were filed six were stayed while one went forward See 1d The
shareholders died during the course of litigation So Anderson, as receiver of the National Bank of
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Kentucky, moved in the district court to revive against the respective executors of seven defendants
named in civil actions brought against them, while alive Anderson v Yungkau,
153 F 2d 685,
686 (6th Cir 1946) aff’d 392 U S 482 [1947) The district court denied the motions to revive the
cases and substitute the executors of the shareholders estates and instead granted the executors
motions to dismiss See id Anderson appealed and lost See 1d at 688 He petitioned the Supreme
Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari But he lost there too He argued in the trial court
and on appeal that the delay should be excused See
153 F 2d at 687 ( The appellant urges that Rule
6(b) 'permits enlargement in all cases when by the civil procedure rules an act is required to be
done within a specified time, with the two exceptions stated in the rule, namely, the period for taking
any action under Rule 59 concerning new trials, and the period for taking an appeal ) The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit and the Supreme Court of the United States all disagreed See Anderson v Brady, 1
FRD 589 590 91(E D Ken 1941) Anderson 153 F2d at 687 88 Anderson 392 U S at 485 86 But
it was not unanimous Cf. Anderson
153 F 2d at 688 (Simon J dissenting] Anderson 392 U S at 486
(Rutledge,l dissenting)
1B6 Essentially, the Anderson courts concluded that two years was enough time to substitute and
that the limitation period could not be extended The rule was based on a statute See
153 F 2d at
687 ( Prior to the adoption of Rule 25(a)(1] the period oflimitation for reviving an action against
the estate of a defendant was fixed by section 778 of 28 U S C A , Judicial Code, at two years after his
death ) And when the rule was promulgated, the same time limit two years, was 'written into the
rule Id Thus ‘ [i]f within two years after death substitution of the proper parties has not been
made the rule commands the court to dismiss the action against the deceased party Id The
Supreme Court agreed The Court reasoned that the statute, on which the rule was based, was a
statute of repose It was designed to keep short the time within which actions might be revived so
that the closing and distribution of estates might not be interminably delayed ” 392 U S at 485
Even within the two year period substitution is not a matter of right, the Court observed Id [T]he
court may order substitution but it is under no duty to do so Id [T]he settlement and distribution
of the estate might be so far advanced as to warrant a denial of the motion for substitution within
the two year period’ Id The Court acknowledged that there might be more force to Anderson s
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argument if Rule 25 did not mandate dismissal See id at 485 86 But dismissal was mandated The
federal law embodied in Rule 25(a) has a direct impact on the probate of estates in the state courts ’
Id at 486 It should not be construed to be more disruptive, the Court reasoned, ’of prompt and
orderly probate administration in those courts than its language makes necessary Id
Ti 37 Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was later amended in furtherance of Anderson
to expressly reference Rule 25 among the time limitations that cannot be extended for excusable
neglect Cf Iovmo v Waterson,
274 F 2d 41, 49 (2d Cir 1959) (referencing the amendment of F R
6(b] on December 27, 1946 adding Rule 25 as a rule specifically excepted from its operation )
Attempts were made to undo Anderson Cf 1d at 50 (noting the Supreme Court's failure to adopt
the recommendation ofthe Advisory Committee in its report ofOctober 1955 for the deletion of the
two year provision of Rule 25(a)(1] in favor of a rule that the action might be dismissed as to a
deceased party if substitution were not made within a reasonable time ) But they were not
successful until 1963 The 1963 amendment of Rule 25(a)(1) was designed to eliminate the
hardships and inequities of the unyielding requirement of the former rule that an action was to be
dismissed as to a deceased party if substitution was not effected within a fixed period measured
from the time of death Farrmgton v Benjamin 20 Vi 470 472 (D VI 1984) The two year time
limit was removed from Rule 25(a] See 31 F R D at 638 And the following language was added
Unless the motion for substitution is made not later than 90 days after the death is suggested upon
the record by service of a statement of the fact of the death as provided herein for the service of the
motion, the action shall be dismissed as to the deceased party Id [italics omitted) Rule 6(b) was
also amended to remove the reference to Rule 25 See 1d at 633 see also Id ( The prohibition against
extending the time for taking action under Rule 25 [Substitution of parties) is eliminated The only
limitation of time provided for in amended Rule 25 is the 90 day period following a suggestion upon
the record of the death of a party within which to make a motion to substitute the proper parties
for the deceased party It is intended that the court shall have discretion to enlarge that period )
1138 'Prior to its amendment in 1963 Rule 25(a)(1) required the court to dismiss a case if no
motion for substitution was filed within two years after date of death, and no extensions of this
period were allowed under Rule 6(b) Rende v Kay
415 F 2d 983 984 (D C Cir 1969) The rule
was rigorously applied, often with harsh results and was called easily the poorest rule of all the
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Federal Rules Id (footnote and citation omitted)
Under the amended Rule either a party or the successors or representatives of the
deceased party may avoid delay in effecting substitution for the deceased party
either by filing a motion for substitution or by suggesting death on the record and
thus triggering the 90 day period which begins with suggestion of death
Id Following the amendments to Rule 25 it is now clear that the suggestion of death on the record
commences the time to substitute See Unicorn Tales v BanerJee, 138 F 3d 467 469 (2d Cir 1998)
( The present version of the rule establishes a time limit starting from the time information of
the death is provided by means of a suggestion of death upon the record (quoting Fed R Civ P
25(a)(1)) see also Antome v Hess Oil VI Corp Case No SX 05 CV 508 2017 VI LEXIS 44 at *12
(VI Super Ct Mar 10, 2017) ( Some courts have held that the time to file a motion to substitute
does not begin to run until a suggestion of death or at least a motion to substitute, has been served
on the deceased party 3 representative or successor because courts only have power or jurisdiction
over the parties to a case The personal representative or successor must be made a party first
before the court acquires jurisdiction over a nonparty' (footnotes omitted) (collecting cases))
11 39 To be clear in federal court the 90 day clock does not begin to run at the party 5 death
rather it begins to run after a valid suggestion of death is made Cuoco v Palisades Collection LLC
Civ No 13 6592 (lLL) 2014 U S Dist LEXIS 31660 *25 (D N J Mar 11 2014) And even more
importantly the time to substitute also does not begin until a statement noting the death’
(commonly referred to as a suggestion of death based on the prior wording of Rule 25) IS served
Mandarmo v Mandarmo 257 FRD 394 395 (S D N Y 2009) (emphasis added]) Service of the
suggestion of death, if it is to be served on a nonparty must be effected like summons via Rule 4
And the suggestion of death may also have to identify the representative or successor of an estate
who may be substituted as a party for the deceased before Rule 25(a](1) may be invoked Rende
415 F 2d at 986 if not, the suggestion must at least ‘be served on the involved parties Unicorn
Tales 138 F 3d at 470 (disagreeing with Rende) And [w]hile it is clear that the 1963 amendments
were designed to liberalize substitution after death, it is equally clear that Rules 6(b] and 25(a](1)
do not invite courts to enlarge arbitrarily the period within which motions for substitution will be
considered Farrmgton, 20 V I at 473
“40 Like the federal rule the Virgin islands rule requires that [a] statement noting death must
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be served in the same manner[,] V l R Civ P 25(a) [3), meaning in the same manner as “ [a] motion
to substitute on the parties as provided in Rule 5 and on nonparties as provided in Rule 4 Id
And any party or the decedent s successor or representative may file [a] motion for
substitution‘ VI R Civ P 25(a)(1) None of the successors and representative of the deceased
plaintiffs filed a suggestion of death in these cases. not even after Rule 25 was promulgated And, of
course, section 78 does not require a suggestion of death it requires only a motion made within two
years from the date of death So, if the promulgation of Rule 25 of the Virgin islands Rules of Civil
Procedure implicitly repealed title 5, section 78 of the Virgin Islands Code then all motions before
the Court may be timely as ‘the two year deadline for substitution may not have begun to run yet
[if] the suggestion of death is the formal event under federal law that starts the running of the clock '
lanes 68 V I at 184 n 9
TIM But two differences between Federal Rule 25(a) and Virgin islands Rule 25(a) remain crucial
First, the Virgin Islands rule retained the two year deadline for substitution, which the federal rule
discarded in favor of a 90 day deadline that begins after death is first suggested on the record
Second, while the federal rule mandates dismissal ifmore than 90 days have passed after death was
suggested on the record and the decedent’s successor or representative has not come forward, the
Virgin Islands rule does not mandate dismissal not explicitly instead, mirroring section 78 the rule
provides that [t]he motion may be granted at any time within two years after the death V l R Civ
P 25[a)(1] Thus the date of death is still controlling under the Virgin Islands rule And here, all
motions to substitute were filed more than two years after the death of the plaintiffs
1142 Counsel argue in favor of applying Rule 6(b) to find excusable neglect in Hughes Metwter
Weekes, and Prime Rule 6(b) of the Virgin islands Rules of Civil Procedure, like Rule 6(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not reference Rule 25 as one of the rules under which {a}
court may not extend the time to act V l R Civ P 6(b] But the Court cannot necessarily read
its omission to also mean its inclusion It is clear that Virgin Islands Rule 25(a] was modeled after
Federal Rule 25(a) and the body of case law construing that rule may properly be considered in
construing [the Virgin islands rule] Slack v Slack 69 VI 567 573 (2018) it is not clear
however that the body of federal case law can be used to rewrite Virgin Islands precedent Accord
Ventura v People 64 V] 589 616 (2016) ( [B]orrowed rules are generally not construed the same
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as borrowed statutes and courts are not required to incorporate the construction given them by
the highest court of the jurisdiction from which they were borrowed (citation omitted)) Instead,
it merely informs the interpretation of the Virgin Islands rule And here the Court cannot find that
the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands when it borrowed the suggestion of death on the record
requirement it meant to delay the requirement of granting the motion within two years after the
death Vi R Civ P 25(a)[1) When interpreting a rule courts first look to the words of the rule
and if the words are plain the rule's plain meaning controls In re Asbestos, Catalyst & Silica TOXIC
Dust Exposure thlg 68 V l 494 501 [Super Ct 2018) (citing Bryan v Fawkes
61 VI 416 457
(2014)) To construe two years after the death to mean two years after the [suggestion of] death
would be to rewrite the rule Just as "’courts are not authorized to rewrite revise, modify, or amend
statutory language in the guise of interpreting it[,] Rohn & Assocs LLC v Marshall A Bell &
Assocs, PC 2019 V] Super 132, 1] 26 (brackets and citation omitted) courts also cannot rewrite,
revise, modify, or amend rules under the guise of interpretation The Supreme Court of the Virgin
Islands can amend rules if as in Anderson, a revision is required But the Superior Court of the Virgin
Islands cannot
1143 Moreover, assuming, arguendo, that Rule 6[b) of the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure
could apply to excuse the failure to comply with the two year deadline in title, 5 section 78 of the
Virgin Islands Code or Rule 25(a) of the Virgin islands Rules of Civil Procedure the Court cannot
find good cause here Regarding two of the Refinery Worker cases Vishnu passed away on October
9, 2008, three months after his complaint was filed Sandra filed an ex parte petition to be appointed
personal representative of Vishnu s estate a year later on November 5, 2009, which the Court
(Steele I) granted on May S, 2010 Yet Sandra did not file a motion in Subnaik to substitute until
June 10, 2015 three years after Hess and HOVlC had moved on August 16 2012, to dismiss
because Vishnu had died Thus Vishnu's death had been suggested on the record in Subnaik
approximately three years before Sandra filed her motion Similarly, James died on October 1 2011
His wife, Lynette filed an unsigned, ex parte petition with the Probate Division on October 15, 2013,
to be appointed personal representative The petition was refiled on November 17 2014 because it
lacked a signature The Court [Camacho M) granted the petition on November 24, 2014 Yet,
Lynette did not file her motion in Hughes to substitute until approximately six months later on May
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14, 2015, but nearly four years after James had died
1144 The analysis is the same for the Alumina Dust Claims cases Arnim passed away on April 12
2013 Frederick filed an ex parte petition with the Probate Division approximately five years later
on March 2, 2018 Counsel represents that his "office lost contact with his meaning Arnim s, aged
Widow ’ (F Metivier’s Mot to Extend Time for Filing Substitution per 6(b)(1) of Vi R Civ P at 1,
filed June 6 2018 [emphasis added) ) Counsel eventually located Frederick and petitioned the court
for his appointment But counsels own motion reveals that he knew that Arnim had died because
he lost contact with Arnim’s widow meaning he had been in contact with her and knew that Arnim
had passed No excuse is proffered to explain why five years passed other than counsel’s failure to
keep in touch with his clients But counsel no longer had a client once the plaintiff died Cases
belong to the parties not the attorneys Arno v Hess Corp
2019 VI Super 140 1[ 20 (ellipsis and
citation omitted) The Court likewise cannot find good cause in Prime First, Hollis failed to disclose
the date of Samuel 5 death in her August 5, 2019 motion which is troubling because LMC
represented that Samuel died on January 9 2010 Thus it appears Hollis was attempting to conceal
the nine year delay Because she did not disclose the delay, she also did not argue good cause it was
in her reply, filed by a different attorney, where she argued good cause But arguments raised for
the first time in a reply are deemed waived See Der Weer v Hess 011V] Corp 64 V l 107 121 (Super
Ct 2016) [’ Ordinarily, when a party raises a new argument in its reply the argument is deemed
waived because the opposing party typically does not have the opportunity to respond (quoting
Perez v Ritz Carlton (V1) Inc
59 VI 522 528 n 4 (2013))
$45 Lastly, the Court also cannot find good cause in the Bauxrte / Halliday case In her initial
motion which the Court struck for failure to follow the Standing Orders governing the Complex
Litigation Division, Tamyka did not argue good cause She simply moved for permission to
substitute on John s behalf Only after LMC filed its opposition, which was also struck did Tamyka
raise good cause in her renewed motion In support she submitted an affidavit stating the steps she
took after her father 5 death on October 17 2016, to learn if he had a lawsuit She did not know that
he did, she stated, but she was told John had an attorney Rather than come to the Superior Court of
the Virgin Islands or the District Court of the Virgin Islands the two trial courts of record in the
Territory Tamyka instead went to Attorney Lee Rohn’s office because her office handles
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hundreds of lawsuits for men that worked at the refinery [T Khan Affirm, filed Aug 26 2019)
Attorney Rohn 5 office had no case for John But Tamyka did not give a timeframe for when she
reached out to Attorney Rohn 5 office It was not until early 2019 that she learned from a friend of
her father's that ‘an Attorney on St Thomas was looking for [her] father or his family to discuss
[her] late father 5 case Id at 2 If good cause were a factor, Tamyka may have shown it Immediately
after someone one passes, substituting into pending lawsuits may not necessarily be at the
forefront But unlike the federal rule which allows for consideration of good cause because the time
for substitution is short, a mere 90 days from the date death is suggested the Virgin Islands rule
and statute both provide two years Two years is sufficient time for heirs and attorneys to substitute
Tort claims, which would have abated at common law, must be filed within the same time This
Court holds that because the two year deadline in section 78 was incorporated into Rule 25, good
cause and excusable neglect are not factors for consideration in a motion to substitute
1J46 Again, the Court reaffirms ’that section 78 of title 5 of the Virgin Islands Code is akin to a
statute of limitations Martinez 69 V I at 524 And the defense of failure to timely revive a lawsuit
that abates upon the death of the plaintiff must be raised at the earliest opportunity or else it is
waived Here, LMC timely challenged substitution in Metiwer and Prime, LMC and Glencore timely
challenged substitution in Weekes Arnim died on April 7 2013 The motion to substitute was filed
on June 6 2018 nearly five year later Samuel died on January 9, 2011 The motion to substitute
was filed on August 6, 2019, more than eight years later And John died June 10, 2015 The motion
to substitute was filed August 26 2019 over four years later Each motion was filed more than two
years after the plaintiff’s death Accordingly the Court will deny the motion to substitute and
dismiss all three cases entirely All remaining defendants timely opposed substitution
1M7 Hess and HOVIC timely challenged substitution in Hughes and Subnaik Litwin did not in
Hughes nor did John Crane in Subnalk James died on October 1, 2011 Lynette filed her motion to
substitute on May 14 2015 after Hess and HOVIC moved to dismiss for failure to substitute Litwin
did not join Hess and HOVIC s motion or oppose Lynette s motion Instead Litwin served discovery
demands Vishnu died on October 9 2008, three months after his case was commenced Sandra filed
her motion to substitute on June 10 2015 approximately seven years later Hess and HOViC timely
challenged substitution John Crane did not Accordingly, the Court will grant Lynette’s motion and
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Sandra 5 motion, but dismiss Hess and HOVIC from both cases
1148 The Court will also grant Altina s motion in Hazel] but dismiss Hess and HOVIC Only in Hazel!
could the motion be considered timely Henry died on July 19 2013 The motion to substitute was
filed on July 8, 2015, with eleven days remaining on the two year deadline But the motion does not
have a certificate of service A certificate of service is prima fame evidence of the fact of service
Ayala v Lockheed Martin Corp
67 VI 290 297 (Super Ct 2017) (citation omitted) Indeed the
purpose of a certificate of service is to inform the court that the paper has been served on other
parties Id (citation omitted) But when the Court questioned counsel for Hess and HOVIC and
counsel for John Crane if they were served with Altina s motion both stated that they were not
Motions filed but not served are not properly before the court Accord Rivera v M/T Fossarma
840
F 2d 152, 154 (ist Cir 1988) ( The timeliness of a motion to alter or amend a judgment is
determined by the date it is served not by the date it is filed J (collecting cases) Neuendorfv St
josepthosp No CV 12 2724 PHX RCB (DKD) 2014 U S Dist LEXIS 61900 at*10 (D Ariz May2
2014) ( Defendant United States of America has not been served Accordingly Plaintiff’s Motion is
not properly before the Court and will be denied ), Cabrera v Tronolone 500 A 23d 755 756 57
(N J App Div 1985) (affirming denial of motion for new trial filed but not served within required
time set by rule) Phillips v Patterson Ins Co 734 So 2d 1285 1288 (La Ct App 1999) (vacating
summary judgment because motion and accompanying affidavits were filed but affidavits not
served on plaintiff) Nearly five years has passed, and Altina s motion remains unserved Section 78
and Rule 25 both require a motion to substitution and motions must be served on all parties Cf.
Ayala, 67 Vi at 299 ( Since the Superior Court's rules and Virgin islands statutes [we]re silent
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 would apply through the Superior Court Rule 7 Federal Rule 5
requires that every written motion be served on all of the parties’ (citing Fed R Civ P 5(a)(1)(D)
(E)) Rule 6(b) might have excused Altina s neglect in failing to serve her motion if good cause were
shown But, after learning at the October 16 2019 hearing that the motion was not served Altina
has not attempt to Show good cause Clearly a motion not served after five years is not properly
before the Court Yet even though Hess and HOVIC were not served they both timely challenged
substitution at the earliest opportunity (Cf. Refinery WorkerTr 41 14 15 ( Attorney Alkon and I got
together and we met and conferred at least two times last week and we put this list together and
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it's not on the list I even put a footnote I think in our June filing that said or in one of my motions
recently that said Footnote, I believe that Mr Hazell died and we anticipate a motion for
substitution coming in and we re going to oppose it J J John Crane did not For this reason the Court
finds that John Crane waived the defense Accord jones, 68 VI at 180 ( [FJailure to raise the
timeliness of a substitution motion means the untimeliness defense is either waived or forfeited )
Thus, the Court will grant Altina s but dismiss Hess and HOVIC from Hazel]
1M9 That leaves only Miller and Barbell Frankie died on May 23 2011 Nine years have passed,
and no motion has been filed But Frankie 3 death was suggested on the record on April 24, 2015
when Hess and HOVIC moved to dismiss for failure to timely substitute Barbell died on November
10 2010 Barbell’s death was not suggested on the record of his case But his death is a matter of
public record because Maxima filed a petition for appointment as personal representative to
continue his claims in the Cornwall class action lawsuit specifically against HOVENSA in the
bankruptcy proceedings Maxima did not file a motion to substitute in Barbell however and nearly
ten years have passed and Barbells case remains pending So does Attorney Alkon s motion for
leave to withdraw, though technically that motion is moot since death terminates the attorney
client relationship Martinez 69 V] at 531 (quoting lanes, 68 VI at 189)
1150 Courts can take judicial notice of the death ofa party Cf. People ex rel 16
59 VI 347 365
n 16 (2013) [courts can take judicial notice of death certificates) accordjohnson v Morgenthau, 160
F 3d 897, 898 (2d Cir 1998) ( 'In this case no party has suggested Johnson 3 death on the record
But because Johnson's sister in law has provided the Court with a copy of Johnsons death
certificate we may take judicial notice of the fact that Johnson is dead ') Kudaszk v Nicholson No
05 3526 2007 U S App Vet Claims LEXIS 1438 *1 (Vet Ct App Sep 14 2007) [ The Court takes
judicial notice of the fact that the Social Security Death Index reports that Mr Kudasik died on
February 10 2007 ) Wilson v Gordon 84 Wang Law Grp PC No 2 13 CV 00609 MCE KJN 2013
U S Dist LEXIS 180366 *11 (E D Cal Dec 23 2013) [ Other district courts have taken judicial
notice that a person is deceased based on an obituary published in a newspaper (citing United
Statesv Beeman 1 10 CV 237 SJM 2011 U S Dist LEXIS 80057 [WD Pa July 22 2011)) Bernard
v E Strondsburg Umv N0 3 09 CV 00525 2016 U S Dist LEXIS 22573 at *56 n 15 (M D Pa Feb
24 2016) ( [TJhe mandatory language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(3), requiring that the
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action by or against the decedent must be dismissed' if no motion for substitution is made by any
party or the decedent s successor or representative allows the Court to sua sponte dismiss the
decedent, even in the absence of a motion to dismiss (citing Fossyl v Milligan, 317 F App x 467
(6th Cir 2009]) But see Bluth v Islamic Republic oflran 203 F Supp 3d 1 22 n 17 [D D C 2016)
( Our Court of Appeals has ruled that the Court may, sua sponte, substitute an appropriate person,
such as a close relative, as a representative of her estate J In johnson, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded after learning that the appellant had passed away but
no one moved to substitute in his place that
the best course under these circumstances is to dismiss Johnson 5 appeal without
prejudice to the right of Johnson 3 personal representative to seek reinstatement of
the appeal on Johnson 5 behalf a disposition that we base on the inherent power of
this Court to manage and control its docket In so holding, we note that this
disposition is consistent with decisions of other courts that have addressed similar
issues
lohnson. 160 F 3d at 898 99 (footnote omitted) The Court agrees with johnson and will dismiss
Miller and Barbell without prejudice and sever UOP s crossclaim against Litwin in Barbell Ten years
have passed since Barbell died and nine years since Frankie died No one has come forward to
continue either case and their attorney 5 authority to represent them terminated upon their deaths
Courts cannot keep cases pending indefinitely The only course under such circumstances is to
dismiss both cases without prejudice and sever U0? 5 crossclaim against Litwin
ill CONCLUSION
1J51 For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes the motions to substitute must be denied
in Metiver Prime and Weekes More than two years passed since the plaintiffs died LMC and
Glencore timely opposed substitution The motions to substitute will be granted in part in Hughes,
Hazel], and Subnalk but Hess and HOVlC will be dismissed from all three cases as they timely
opposed substitution Lastly, the Court will take judicial notice of the death of the laintiffs in Miller
and Barbell Both cases will be dismissed without prqadice p
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