IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
DIVISION OF ST. THOMAS AND ST. JOHN

RRKEKRKREKEERERE

GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS,
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,

CASE NO. SX - 2013-CV-00491

ACTION FOR DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT AND TO VACATE
ARBITRATOR’S DECISION &
AWARD

Plaintiff,

V.

Nee Nee ee eee ee Se”

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS |)
LOCAL 1826 on behalf of SOCIAL WORKERS )
And PSYCHOLOGISTS,

Defendant.

ST. CROIX FEDERATION OF TEACHERS,
INC., ON BEHALF OF ST. CROIX V.I.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION SCHOOL
PSYCHOLOGISTS, SOCIAL WORKERS, AND
EDUCATION DIAGNOSTICIANS, CASE NO. SX-2014-CV-00352
ACTION FOR CONFIRMATION
Plaintiff, OF ARBITRATION AWARD
V.

GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
OF THE UNITED STATES,

Newel eee le ie SS”

Defendant.

Cite as: 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

ql THIS MATTER is before the Court on competing actions regarding an Arbitrator’s
Award and Order issued on August 28, 2013. The Department of Education of the Government of
the Virgin Islands (“Government”) seek the issuance of a declaratory judgment confirming the
award. The St. Croix Federation of Teachers, Inc. AFT Local 1826 (“Union”) want the Award
vacated. The Award was issued after the Government and the Union grieved an action in
accordance with their Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) and the matter proceeded to
arbitration in June 2013. The resulting Decision and Award of Arbitrator, U.S. Virgin Islands
Gov’t of the V.I. v. Am. Fed’n of Teachers, Local 1826 

Case No. SX-2013-CV-00491

St. Croix Fed’n of Teachers, Inc. v. Gov’t of the V.I.

Case No. SX-2014-CV-00352

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PERB NO. RA-132-12 (herein “Arbitration Award and Order’) partially upheld the grievance,
granted the Union’s request for their employees to be compensated for extra hours worked during
the 2012-2013 school year. The Government contends that the Arbitrator’s decision alters
provisions of the parties’ agreement and requests this Court to set aside his decision favoring the
Union.

q2 The for reasons set forth below, the Court finds no reason to disturb the Arbitrator’s
Award and Order.

Il. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

43 On August 30, 2012, Nicole Jacobs, the Department of Education’s Assistant Director for
Human Resources, issued a memorandum mandating longer working hours for certain employees
within the Virgin Islands Department of Education.' Specifically, “social workers, psychologists,
and diagnosticians shall be required to work an eight (8) hour day with one (1) hour lunch and
shall observe the legal holidays and vacation period associated with the school calendar....”* The
Union asserted that requiring school psychologists and social workers to “work from 8 a.m. to 5
p.m. without any increase in pay [where] previously their working hours had been 8 a.m. to 3 p.m.
for at least 32 straight years” violated the collective bargaining agreement.’ After following the
CBA’s grievance procedure, the parties brought their dispute before Arbitrator Steven G.
Hoffmeyer at a hearing on June 24 and 27, 2013. After the parties submitted post-hearing briefs,
the Arbitrator issued an Award and Order on August 28, 2013, which held that the “Union’s request
to have the Employer compensate the affected employees at their NOPAs‘* regular hourly rate for
the extra hours of 3:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. for the time period of school year 2012-2013 is
GRANTED” and “the Union’s request for this compensation to be continued as long as the extra
hours are required is GRANTED.”> Finally, the Arbitrator ordered the Employer “with all
deliberate speed, [to] undertake an action(s) to accomplish payment to the affected employees.’

q4 On November 27, 2013, the Government filed a Complaint requesting that this Court issue
a declaratory judgement stating that the Government is not bound by the Arbitration Award and
Order. On August 27, 2014, the Union filed a “Counterclaim Complaint” seeking a declaratory
judgment confirming the enforceability of the Arbitration Award and Order.

q5 During a status conference held on March 21, 2016, this Court stated it would allow the
parties to file briefs on the merits of their respective applications for declaratory judgment and
ordered the parties to file a joint appendix supporting their positions. On December 14, 2017, this
Court ordered the parties to file briefs addressing the following questions: (1) Does the Federal

'T.A. at 204-06.

> Td.

3 J.A. at 62.

4 Notice of Personnel Action (“NOPA”).
> J.A. at 60.

6 Td.
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Case No. SX-2013-CV-00491

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Arbitration Act (“FAA”) preempt local statues affording this Court jurisdiction over these matters;
(2) Assuming this Court retains jurisdiction, is further discovery necessary in order for this Court
to issue a declaratory judgment; (3) What standard of review should this Court apply to determine
whether it should vacate the Arbitration Award and Order; and (4) Whether this Court should
vacate the Arbitration Award and Order.

46 On January 25, 2018, the Government filed its brief addressing questions outlined in the
Court’s December 14, 2017 Order. In Response, the Union filed its brief on December 12, 2018.
The Government filed a Reply to the Union’s Brief on February 28, 2018.

q7 Having reviewed the parties’ briefs, joint appendix, exhibits and pleadings on file herein,
the Court makes the following findings of fact as relevant to deciding the issues presented: first,
whether the FAA preempts contrary local law; second, whether further discovery is necessary for
this Court to issue a declaratory judgement; third, if further discovery is not needed, the Court
must determine what law governs its review of a binding arbitration award; and lastly decide
whether this Court should vacate the Arbitration Award and Order.

Il, ANALYSIS

1. The Federal Arbitration Act Does Not Preempt Local Statutes Affording this
Court Jurisdiction

48 The parties correctly agree that the Federal Arbitration Act “(FAA”) does not preempt
local law. Accordingly, the common law of arbitration and this jurisdiction governs the extent to
which this Court can review the Arbitrator’s Award.

q9 In providing their analysis, both parties assume that citing to federal case law or the
Restatement of Law establish the Court’s jurisdiction over arbitral matters. However, arbitration
in the Virgin Islands is not governed by statute, so the decisions and application of federal rules
represent only persuasive authority and are not binding on this Court.’ Until the decision in
Government of the Virgin Islands, Department of Education v. St. Thomas/ St. John Educational
Administrators’ Association, Local 101,° the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands had not
previously addressed the extent to which arbitration awards are subject to judicial review.

q10 In Gov't of Virgin Islands, Dep't of Educ. the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands cited
authority from the Supreme Court of the United States as persuasive guidance to determine the
Superior Court’s jurisdictional authority.” In doing so, the V.I. Supreme Court first considered

’ Gov't of Virgin Islands, Dep't of Educ. v. St. Tomas/St. John Educ. Administrators’ Ass'n, Local 101, 0.b.0. Forde,

 (V.I. 2017).

8 Td.

? 

 at 629-30 (citing “United Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 

 (1987), the Supreme
Court instructs that a trial court plays “only a limited role” when reviewing an arbitration award, in that trial courts
“are not authorized to reconsider the merits of an award even though the parties may allege that the award rests on
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“whether section 10 [of the FAA] preempts contrary local law” and then elected to follow
“jurisdictions that have concluded that section 10 of the FAA does not preempt local law in
proceeding instituted in local courts.’””!°

ql1 Section 10 of the FAA generally delineates the specific grounds upon which a trial court
may vacate an arbitration award.'' In Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., “the Supreme
Court of the United States concluded that the grounds for vacating or modifying an award set forth
in sections 9 through 11 of the FAA are the exclusive bases for vacating or modifying awards
under the FAA.”!? Further recognized in United Industrial, “the Supreme Court of the United
States confirmed that in creating the [FAA], ‘Congress’ principal purpose [was] ensuring that
private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms.”!? Accordingly, the Supreme
Court in Gov't of Virgin Islands, Dep't of Educ. concluded that “given the practices of other
jurisdictions since Hall Street was decided, and in light of the fact that we have previously
questioned the preemptive effect (see United Industrial, 64 V.I. at 325—26(collecting cases)), we

errors of fact or on misinterpretation of the contract” because they “do not sit to hear claims of factual or legal error
by an arbitrator as an appellate court does in reviewing decisions of lower courts.” /d. at 36, 38.”; citing also “United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 

 (1960)). “a [trial] court should not reject an
award on the ground that the arbitrator misread the contract.”)”; ( “A contrary conclusion undermines the
strong federal policy favoring arbitration by permitting trial judges to substitute their opinion for those of the
arbitrators.”); citing Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 

)) (“The federal policy of settling labor disputes
by arbitration would be undermined if courts had the final say on the merits of the awards.”)).

'° Td. at 632. (citing Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 

 (Cal. 2008) (“The [Supreme Court]
unanimously left open other avenues for judicial review, including those provided by state statutory or common law....
While the court, of course, decided nothing about the viability of these alternatives, their mention in the majority
opinion indicates that Hall Street's holding on the effect of the FAA is a limited one.) See, e.g., Raymond James Fin.
Servs. v. Honea, 

 (Ala. 2010) (interpreting Hall Street, treating section 10 of the FAA as
“procedural as opposed to substantive law,” and retreating from the position that Alabama courts may only
apply section 10 when determining whether to vacate or modify an arbitration award); Finn v. Ballentine Partners,
LLC, 

 (N.H. 2016)(same, with respect to New Hampshire law); Humitech Dev. Corp. v.
Perlman, 

 (Tex. App. 2014) (same, with respect to Texas law); cf’ Davies v. Waterstone Capital
Memt., 

, 715—16 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014) (concluding that “Minnesota courts may apply state law to
motions to confirm or vacate arbitration awards” so long as doing so does not conflict with section 2 of the FAA), cert.
denied, — US. , 1368S. Ct. 78 (2015); Trombetta v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., 

 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2006) (concluding that section 10 of the FAA did not preempt the provision for vacating or modifying an award
contained in Pennsylvania's arbitration act))).

'!

. Section 10(a) of the FAA provides: “ (a) In any of the following cases the United States court in
the district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to
the arbitration-- (1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where there was evident
partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in
refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material
to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) where
the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon
the subject matter submitted was not made.”).

"2 Gov't of Virgin Islands, Dep't of Educ. v. St. Tomas/St. John Educ. Administrators’ Ass'n, Local 101, 0.b.0. Forde,

 (2017) (citing Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 

 (2008)).

3 United Industrial, 64 V1. at 326 (recognizing (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford
Junior Univ., 

 (1989))).

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elect to follow those jurisdictions that have concluded that section 10 of the FAA does not preempt
local law in proceedings instituted in local courts.” '4

412 Indetermining the best rule for this territory, the V.I. Supreme Court further explained that
“this does mean that parties may not contract for the provisions in section 10 to govern the judicial
review of an arbitrator's award.”'° Citing Volt Info. Scis., the Supreme Court reasoned “[t]here is
no federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of procedural rules; the federal policy is
simply to ensure the enforceability, according to their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate.”!®
Therefore, the FAA does not preempt local statutes affording this Court jurisdiction over this
matter.

q13 In this case, the agreement to arbitrate contained in the CBA! does not explicitly contract
for the procedures set forth in section 10 of the FAA to govern judicial review. The parties agreed
in Article III, Section IV that “the arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the Voluntary
Labor Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association.” '® Thus, the Arbitrator had
authority to process disputes that first advanced through the grievance process and the parties
agreed that his decision would be final and binding.!”

2. Further Discovery is Not Necessary for this Court to Consider the Issuance of
a Declaratory Judgment

414 Both parties agree that there is no need for additional discovery for this Court to consider
whether to vacate the Arbitration Award and Order. The Court finds the record sufficient to address
the parties’ request for declaratory relief.

415 On April 1, 2016, the Union filed a Notice which in part, informed the Court of the Union’s
unsuccessful attempt to retrieve the arbitration hearing’s audio recording. In the Notice, the Union
requested that this Court accept the post-arbitration hearing briefs as a satisfactory substitution for
the audio recordings when determining what evidence was admitted during the arbitration hearing.
On January 11, 2018, the Government and the Union filed a comprehensive joint appendix
consisting of over six hundred (600) pages of exhibits, oral testimony, and documents introduced
into evidence at the arbitration hearing. The joint appendix also includes both parties’ post-
arbitration hearing briefs and the Arbitrator’s complete Award and Order. Therefore, the Court
finds that further discovery is not necessary.

Gov't of Virgin Islands Dep't of Edu., 67 V.1. 623 at 632.

'6 

 (citing Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 

 (1989) at
476.)).

"7A. at 233.

18]. A. at 234 (CBA at 14, Step IV, Article III).

19 Td.
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3. Scope of Superior Court Review

a. Vacating an Arbitration Award

416 Since arbitration in the Virgin Islands is not governed by statute, the Court must consider
the common law to ascertain the extent to which the Superior Court may review a binding
arbitration award. The Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands in Gov't of Virgin Islands, Dep't of
Educ. conducted a Banks analysis and determined that “under the common law, the Superior Court
may only vacate an arbitrator's award if: (1) the arbitrator exceeded his or her authority in rendering
the award (which may include ignoring limits in the arbitration agreement itself on issues to be
arbitrated or remedies the parties agreed to make available); (2) if the award was the product of
fraud, partiality, or malfeasance on behalf of the parties or the arbitrator—or if the award was
predicated upon a mistake flowing from such conduct; or (3) the arbitrator manifestly disregards
the law.”?°

417 The Union argues this Court should apply the standard of review in Gov't of Virgin Islands,
Dep't of Educ. to determine whether this Court should vacate the Arbitration Award and Order.
But, the Union asserts that this Court’s scope of review should be narrower than that of the
appellate court in Gov't of Virgin Islands, Dep't of Educ. 7!

418 | Conversely, the Government contends that “the Union’s argument that the ...decision
somehow creates an even narrower standard of review...is misplaced.” They claim this Court
“must uphold an award that ‘draws is essence from the collective bargaining agreement.’”** The
Government explains that “in the essence test, an award draws its essence from a collective
bargaining agreement if ‘its interpretation can in any rational way be derived from the agreement,
viewed in light of its language, context, and any other indicia of the parties’ intention’.””? The
Government also argues Section 10 of the FAA authorizes this Court to vacate an arbitrator’s
award. However, in their Reply, the Government acknowledges that the standard of review in Gov't
of Virgin Islands, Dep't of Educ. “provides the same parameters as the essence test where it
provides the Superior Court under common law the authority to vacate an arbitrator’s award...” in
a somewhat restricted scope.

419 Therefore, this Court’s standard of review in vacating an arbitration award is determined
by the common law of the Virgin Islands as set forth in Gov't of Virgin Islands, Dep't of Educ.

0 Gov't of Virgin Islands Dep't of Edu., 67 V.1. 623 at 642.

*! Union Brief at 10. (citing Gov't of Virgin Islands Dep't of Edu., 67 V.1. 623, (explaining that “unless otherwise
bargained for, a mistaken application of the law does not expose an award to judicial review” and “a clause indicating
that an arbitration shall ‘proceed in accordance with the laws of the US Virgin Islands’ would signal that the parties
intended for the arbitrator to apply those laws and not others.”)).

»? Gov’t Brief at 4 (referencing Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. United Indus. Workers, 

 (V.L
2016)).

3 

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b. Declaratory Judgment

q20 Section 1261 of the Virgin Islands Code governs the scope of a declaratory judgment.
When ruling on an action for declaratory judgment, the Court “shall have power to declare rights,
status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed...The
declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect; and such declarations shall
have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree.”* However, the “Virgin Islands
Declaratory Judgment Act did not vest the court with jurisdiction over an action seeking
declaratory judgment absent another independent jurisdictional basis.””> Thus, the Court must have
an independent jurisdictional source to consider an action for declaratory judgment.

421 In this case, the underlying action is based on the parties’ request of this Court to confirm
or vacate the Arbitrator’s Award and Order under the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act
(“FAA”). Because the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands has previously granted the Superior
Court the ability to review a binding arbitrator’s award,”° and the FAA applies substantively to the
proceedings of this Court without preempting local laws, the Court finds that an independent
jurisdictional basis exists to rule on the pending motion and underlying Complaint.

4. The Court Finds No basis for Vacating the Arbitrator’s Award and Order

422 Finally, the Court finds no basis for vacating the Arbitrator’s Award and Order in this case.
The Arbitrator did not exceed his authority in rendering his award, nor did his decision in favor of
the Union manifestly disregard the law.

423 As previously discussed, the Superior Court may only vacate an arbitrator's award if: (1)
the arbitrator exceeded his or her authority in rendering the award (which may include ignoring
limits in the arbitration agreement itself on issues to be arbitrated or remedies the parties agreed to
make available); (2) if the award was the product of fraud, partiality, or malfeasance on behalf of
the parties or the arbitrator—or if the award was predicated upon a mistake flowing from such
conduct; or (3) the arbitrator manifestly disregards the law.’’ In this case, the first and third
subsections of this standard are at issue in this case. Accordingly, the Court will limit its review of
the Award and Order to address whether the Arbitrator exceeded his authority in rendering the
decision and whether he manifestly disregards the law.

45 V.LC. § 1261.

5 Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. AFT, Local 1825, 

, 

 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2014) (finding that
a plaintiff's cause of action pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act was untimely, and because plaintiff asserted no
other basis for the court’s jurisdiction, the court dismissed the complaint).

6 Gov't of Virgin Islands Dep't of Edu., 67 V.1. 623; See also Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. United Indus. Workers, 

 (V.I. 2016)).

27 Id. at 642.
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a. The Arbitrator Did Not Exceed His Authority in Rending the Award

q24 The Court finds that the Arbitrator did not exceed his authority in rending the Award in
favor of the Union. Courts in this jurisdiction evidence a history of deference to an arbitrator’s
decision.”* In Mustafa, an arbitrator exceeds his power of authority under Section 10 of the FAA
only “when he decides an issue not submitted to him, grants relief in a form that cannot be
rationally derived from the parties' agreement and submissions, or issues an award that is so
completely irrational that it lacks support altogether.””? Also, “as the best indication of the parties’
intent, the language of the contract itself defines the scope of an arbitrator’s authority.’”°° Echoed
in Gov't of Virgin Islands Dep't of Edu, arbitration awards that do not reflect the parties’ bargain
are subject to judicial impeachment for exceeding “the scope of authority conferred by the
contract.”?! Here, the Court finds that the Arbitrator did not exceed his scope of authority. As
evidenced by detailed reasoning in the Award and Order, his decision is based on a reasonable
interpretation of the CBA and was in accordance with the parties’ agreement.*” Further, the Court
finds that the Arbitrator’s decision considers the parties’ intent when interpreting the language of
the contract itself. Therefore, the Court finds his Award and Order is sufficiently derived from the
parties’ submissions.

425 The Government argues that “the arbitrator in this case simply acted outside the scope of
his contractually delegated authority...”°> In support, the Government claims that 1) the
Arbitrator’s award invented new or inconsistent obligations based on his own sense of fairness or
non-binding past practices that was against clear and unambiguous CBA language; and that 2) the

°8 

.

?° Mustafa v. Amore St. John, LLC, 58 V.1. 74, 80 (V.I. Super. Mar. 4, 2013) (citing Sutter v. Oxford Health Plans 

 (3d Cir.2012) (“By contractually restricting the issues they will arbitrate, the individuals with whom
they will arbitrate, and the arbitration procedures that will govern, parties to an arbitration agreement may place limits
upon the arbitrator's powers that are enforceable by the courts.... But when the arbitrator ‘strays from interpretation
and application of the agreement and effectively ‘dispenses his own brand of industrial justice,’ he exceeds his powers
and his award will be unenforceable.”’) (internal citations omitted). The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
on December 7, 2012, but only to resolve the circuit split on the arbitrator's scope of authority to authorize
class arbitration.).

°° Gov't of Virgin Islands Dep't of Edu., 67 V.1. 623 at 638 (citing “See Water Pipe Ext. & Bureau of Eng'g Laborers’
Local 1092 v. City of Chicago, 

 (III. Ct. App. 2000)”).

31 

2 JA. at 233.

33 Gov’t Brief at 11. (referencing United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO vy. Misco, Inc., 

, 

, 

 (1987); Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 

 (3d Cir. 1969) (noting
limited review but stating that arbitrator’s interpretation must still be derived from the agreement)); Newark Morning
Ledger Co. v. Neward Typographical Union Local 103, 

 (3d Cir. 1986) (an award may be set aside
when an arbitrator manifested a disregard of his authorization, and instead ‘dispensed his own brand of industrial
justice’)); Pa. Power Co. v. Local Union No. 272, 

 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that arbitrator’s award
was improper personal brand of justice where arbitrator overrode clear and specific terms of agreement by importing
inapplicable anti-discrimination policy into employee benefit policy)); and Brentwood Med. Assocs. V. United Mine
Workers of Am., 

 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that ‘arbitrators quotation of language not present in the
agreement’ was improper but even then finding that vacatur was unwarranted))).
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Arbitrator acted outside the scope of his delegated authority by not drawing his decision from the
essence of the agreement.

426 Based on a complete reading of the Arbitration Award and Order, the Court determines
that his findings were rational and derived from the parties’ submissions as demonstrated by the
detailed level of reasoning. Specifically, the arbitrator acknowledges “the disputed M(4)(d)
section [of the CBA] does not self-identify what it relates to; it leaves many aspects of ‘who, what,
when, where, why’ unanswered. Thus, the language is subject to multiple interpretations, which
is, ironically, supported by the multiple Employer offerings of defense to this action.”>4 The
Arbitrator explains that the “lack of internal identification, definition, and multiple interpretations
results in ambiguity. Other evidence needs to be considered to resolve this language’s meaning.”
Therefore, the Court finds that the Arbitrator did not exceed his scope of authority by concluding
that the language of the CBA was not clear and unambiguous.

427 Although the Government contends that the arbitrator “ignored the expressed bargained
for provision in the CBA” by considering “past practice,” the Court finds that he had the authority
to determine whether the disputed section of the CBA obliged the Government to compensate
affected employees for additional hours of work. His decision did not “essentially [write] into the
contract that past practices prevail ...no matter what the parties bargained for in the CBA,” as the
Government claims. Instead, the Arbitrator carefully reviewed the parties’ arguments regarding
the multiple applications of the disputed section and exercised his authority to interpret it
accordingly.*° The Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands found “as the best indication of the parties
intent, the language of the contract itself defines the scope of an arbitrator’s authority...but, by
consenting to binding arbitration, parties relinquish the legal and procedural safeguards that
accompany judicial proceedings.”*’ Similarly, “so long as an award derives from the legitimate
exercise of an arbitrator’s power, a court may not alter an award based on its own notions of justice
or sounds policy, as doing so evidences a judicial disregard for the parties’ chosen form of dispute
resolution.”°8

428 |The Government also claims “that the arbitrator’s award is not rationally derived from the
CBA [because] the CBA between the parties is clear as to the number of hours the professionals
are to work during a workday.”*’ However, “the fact that a party—or even a reviewing court—

4 J.A at 51.

35 Td.

36 JA. 48-60.

*7 Td. at 641 (referencing Doe, 900 S.W.2d at 584). See J.A. at 234 (Article III, Step IV of the CBA “The decision of
the arbitrator will be accepted as final by the parties to the dispute. No decision shall be binding which, by its terms,
alters amends or varies provisions of the contract.”).

38 Td. at 640 (referencing Cf. Antilles Sch., Inc. v. Lembach, 64 V.1. 400, 433-39 (V.I. 2016)).

>? Gov’t Brief at 10.
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merely disagrees with how an arbitrator interprets a contract is not sufficient grounds to vacate the
arbitrator’s decision.’

429 In this case, the Arbitrator determined that the language and application of the disputed
section of the CBA was ambiguous enough to require interpretation. It is within his scope of
authority to conclude as such. Therefore, the Court perceives no basis for vacating his award
merely because the Government disputes how the Arbitrator considered section M(4)(d) of the
CBA.

b. The Award and Order issued by the Arbitrator Did Not Manifestly Disregard
the Law

430 Contrary to the Government’s argument, the Court finds that the Arbitrator did not
manifestly disregard the law when issuing his order in favor of the Union. Virgin Islands common
law permits a court to vacate an arbitration award when the arbitrator manifestly disregards the
law.*! An “arbitrator’s interpretation of an undefined term does not constitute a manifest disregard
of the CBA’s contractual provisions, or of the applicable law.’*? Additionally, “a mistaken
application of the law does not expose an award to judicial review.”?

431 Here, the Government argues “the arbitrator accepting and using extrinsic evidence is in
direct violation of the parties’ CBA and in contradiction to the parol evidence rule.”** The
Government explains “under the parol evidence rule, a written instrument that is intended to be
the parties final complete [integrated] agreement cannot be varied by any prior statements or
agreements, oral or written or by and contemporaneous oral statement or agreements.”

432 The Court agrees that “a writing intended as the entire understanding of the parties is then
subject to the parol evidence rule which precludes consideration of extrinsic evidence of prior or
contemporaneous agreements extending or altering the authority granted in a writing.”*° However,
the parol evidence rule does not bar all subsequent proof that additional agreements of the parties
intent exist and could be given force. Specifically addressing this issue, “the United States
Supreme Court noted in dicta,

Yet even a written contractual provision declaring that the contract contains the
complete agreement of the parties, and that no antecedent or extrinsic
representations exist, does not conclusively bar subsequent proof that such
additional agreements exist and should be given force. The provision denying the

40 Td.

"| Gov't of Virgin Islands Dep't of Edu., 67 V.1. 623 at 642.

” Td. at 641.

* 

 (referencing Goodwine v. Miller, 

 (1896) (“[I]f judges chosen by the parties erroneously
decide a question of law, the court will abide the decision.”)).

4 Gov’t Brief at 4.

45 Td.

“© Phillips v. Andrews, 

 (D.V.1.2004) (citing Finley v. Mole (D.V.L. 2015)).
Gov’t of the V.I. v. Am. Fed’n of Teachers, Local 1826 

Case No. SX-2013-CV-00491

St. Croix Fed’n of Teachers, Inc. v. Gov’t of the V.I.

Case No. SX-2014-CV-00352

Memorandum Opinion

Page 11 of 11

existence of such agreements, of course, carries great weight, but it can be set aside
by a court on the grounds of fraud, mistake, duress, or on some ground that is
sufficient for setting aside other contracts.”

433 Further, the Government contends the Arbitrator violated the law by “applying the
provisions of the Personnel Merit System of Title 3 of the Virgin Islands Code, Section 561 which
requires Government employees to work a 40-hour week [and replacing it] with the collective
bargaining agreement.”** However, it is not the role of the Court to determine whether the
arbitrator mistakenly applied Section 561 of Title 3 because mistaken application of the law does
not expose an arbitral award to judicial review.*® Therefore, the Court finds that the Arbitrator did
not manifestly disregard the law in his Award and Order.

IV. CONCLUSION

434 After considering the parties’ briefs, joint appendix, exhibits and pleadings on file herein,
the Court finds that 1) the FAA does not preempt local statutes affording this Court jurisdiction;
2) further discovery is not necessary for this Court to issue a declaratory judgment; and 3) there is
no basis to vacate the Arbitrator’s Award. The Arbitrator did not exceed his authority in rending
the Award in favor of the Union as demonstrated by his detailed reasoning in the Award and Order,
the parties’ agreement to arbitrate, and his interpretation of the disputed section of the CBA. In
finding that the disputed language and application was ambiguous enough to require interpretation,
the Arbitrator appropriately reviewed the parties’ arguments and decided accordingly.
Additionally, the Government has failed to convince the Court that the Arbitrator manifestly
disregarded the law when issuing his award. The Court finds his analysis appropriate and therefore
has no basis to vacate his decision. The Arbitration Award and Order issued on August 28, 2013,
in the matter of In re Arbitration between American Federation of Teachers, Local 1826 School
Psychologists and Social Workers and United States Virgin Islands Department of Education, U.
S. Virgin Islands, PERB No. RA-132-12 will be confirmed.

A judgment consistent with this Memorandum Opinion follows.

DATED: t\ [24{2020 LLM Pawuno

DENISE M. FRANCOIS

8 Rae Judge of the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands

DONNA D. pong
Coyrt Clerk pond isor VAN) ay , 2000

47 Finley v. Mole (D.V.I. Apr. 1, 2015) (citing Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 75 n.6).
48 Gov’t Reply at 5.
” Supra at n.41.