

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
DIVISION OF ST. CROIX

ADELBERT M. BRYAN,	)	
	)	Case No. SX-14-CV-144
v.	)	
CAROLINE FAWKES, in her Official	)	ACTION FOR WRIT OF
Capacity as Supervisory of Elections,	)	MANDAMUS, PRELIMINARY
Respondent,	)	AND PERMANENT
	)	INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND
ALICIA "CHUCKY" HANSEN,	)	DAMAGES
Intervening Respondent.	)	

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER AWARDING COSTS IN PART

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Petitioner Adelbert M. Bryan's Amended Motion for Bill for Costs (Amended Motion), filed February 9, 2015; Respondent Caroline F. Fawkes' Opposition to Petitioner's Amended Motion for Bill for Costs (Fawkes Opposition), filed March 3, 2015; Intervening Respondent Alicia "Chucky" Hansen's Response in Opposition to Amended Motion for Attorney Fees & Costs (Hansen Opposition), filed March 10, 2015; and Plaintiff's Reply, filed May 22, 2015.¹ Petitioner's Amended Motion came on for hearing on February 8, 2017, following which Fawkes filed Respondent's Supplemental Brief in Opposition on February 17, 2017. For the reasons that follow, Petitioner's Amended Motion (which incorporates the costs and fees sought in his Verified Motion) will be granted in part and denied in part.

Discussion

Bryan seeks an award of \$35,700.00 in attorney's fees and \$587.63 in costs against Fawkes and Hansen, jointly and severally, arising from the two separate appeals he filed from Orders of this

¹ Bryan's Amended Motion followed his second expedited appeal to the Supreme Court in this matter (S. Ct. Civ. No. 2014-0066), filed October 15, 2014, appealing this Court's October 10, 2014 Order denying Petitioner's Emergency Motion for Enforcement of Judgment and Contempt Sanctions. Opinion and Order of the Supreme Court reversing the October 10, 2014 Order was filed October 24, 2014.

Bryan's first expedited appeal (S. Ct. Civ. No. 2014-0046) was filed August 4, 2014, resulting in Order of the Supreme Court filed August 28, 2014 reversing this Court's July 30, 2014 Order. Bryan filed Appellant's Verified Motion for Bill of Costs (Verified Motion) in the Supreme Court on September 26, 2014, seeking an award of costs, including attorney's fees. Fawkes filed Appellee/Respondent Motion in Opposition to Motion for Bill of Costs on October 6, 2014; and Hansen filed Response in Opposition to Motion for Costs on October 14, 2014. Bryan's Verified Motion was referred to this Court in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 30(b) by Order of the Supreme Court filed October 29, 2014.

No application has ever been presented for an award of costs relative to the underlying action prosecuted in the Superior Court.

Court in this matter. Amended Motion, at 2. In her Opposition, Fawkes argues that neither Bryan nor his counsel were “compelled by any authority — judicial or otherwise — to initiate or even to continue to engage in this litigation.” Fawkes Opposition, at 1-2. Fawkes cites persuasive case law to support her proposition that attorney’s fees should not be granted when courts are considering a novel issue of law because doing so would “punish parties for taking a rational stance on an unsettled legal issue.” *Id.* at 3 (quoting *State ex rel. Olander v. French*, 79 Ohio St. 3d 176, 179 (Ohio 1997)). Fawkes contends that her actions were reasonable and that she acted in good faith; therefore, the Court should deny Bryan’s Amended Motion. *Id.*

Hansen argues that Bryan’s Amended Motion should be denied as untimely. Hansen Opposition, at 1. Hansen further contends that in the event the Court considers the Amended Motion to be timely filed, 18 V.I.C. § 412 controls, and Bryan is not entitled to costs or fees because the appeals were not dismissed.² *Id.* Hansen argues that:

costs and fees are not allowed for the lower court action because (1) Section 412 governs and costs are only allowed if the appeal is dismissed; (2) the amount requested is unreasonable in light of the type of action and (3) public policy dictates that no fees be allowed.

Id.

VISCR 30 Legal Standard

The prevailing party on appeal is entitled to recover costs of the appeal, including attorney’s fees, pursuant to VISCR 30(a). *See Kalloo v. Estate of Small*, 62 V.I. 571, 577 (V.I. 2015).

Virgin Islands Supreme Court Rule 30 provides, in pertinent part:

- (a) To Whom Allowed. ...if a judgment is reversed or a petition granted, reasonable costs [which may include attorney’s fees] shall be taxed against the appellee or the respondent unless otherwise ordered.... If the side against whom costs are assessed includes multiple parties, the Supreme Court may apportion the assessment or impose it jointly and severally. In cases involving the Government of the Virgin Islands or an agency or officer thereof, reasonable costs shall only be awarded as authorized by law. The Supreme Court shall, in its discretion, determine whether costs are reasonable....
- (b) Bill of Costs; Objections; Costs to Be Inserted in Mandate or Added Later. A party who desires such costs to be taxed shall state them in an itemized and verified bill of costs, including attorney’s fees, which the party shall file with the Clerk of the Supreme Court, with proof of service, within 14 days after the

² “... In case a petition under this section is dismissed, the court shall make such order as to the payment of the cost of the proceeding, including witness fees, as it shall deem just. ...” 18 V.I.C. § 412.

entry of judgment. The Supreme Court shall deny untimely bills of costs unless a motion showing extraordinary circumstances is filed with the bill. Objections to the bill of costs must be filed within 14 days after service on the party against whom costs are to be taxed unless the time is extended by the Supreme Court. An answer to objections to a bill of costs may be filed within 14 days after service of the objections. Issuance of the mandate shall not be delayed for taxation of costs, but if the mandate has been issued before final determination of costs, the statement, or any amendment thereof, shall be added to the mandate upon request by the Clerk of the Supreme Court to the Clerk of the Superior Court. However, if a party seeks attorney's fees as among the costs to be taxed, the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded -- if any -- shall be determined by the Superior Court on remand.

Pursuant to VISCR 30(b), on remand the Superior Court must determine the amount of costs to which the prevailing party is entitled, including attorney's fees. *Beachside Assoc's., LLC, v. Fishman*, 54 V.I. 418, 422 (V.I. 2010); *Hodge v. Bluebeard's Castle, Inc.*, 62 V.I. 671, 700 (V.I. 2015).

By October 29, 2014 Order (in S. Ct. Civ. No. 2014-0046), the Supreme Court referred Bryan's September 26, 2014 Verified Motion to this Court, without evaluating the arguments of Fawkes and Hansen in opposition that the Verified Motion was untimely. Those arguments note that the final Order of the Supreme Court reversing this Court's July 30, 2014 Order was filed August 28, 2014, such that the 14 day period within which Bryan was entitled to seek an award of his costs as to the appeal expired September 11, 2014. On September 11, 2014, with no such filing by Bryan, Fawkes filed her timely Petition for Rehearing,³ which was denied by Supreme Court Order filed September 12, 2014. Bryan's initial Verified Motion was filed September 26, 2014, 14 days from date of the Order denying Fawkes' Petition for Rehearing.

The issue of timeliness of a motion seeking costs under VISCR 30 in the context of a timely filed petition for rehearing is one of first instance.

Verified Motion – Appeal of Superior Court's July 30, 2014 Order (S. Ct. Civ. No. 2014-0046)

Bryan denies that his initial Verified Motion was filed out of time. Reply, at 2. Bryan states that the Verified Motion was timely in light of the fact that, following the Supreme Court's August 28, 2014 judgment, Hansen and Fawkes "immediately requested a rehearing on the decision." Reply, at 2. Bryan argues that "It is only after the Supreme Court unfavorably decided [Hansen's] motion

³ "A petition for rehearing may be filed within 14 days after the entry of judgment." VISCR 31(a).

for rehearing in her efforts to alter the Supreme Court's Judgment, did the August 28, 2014 [sic] decision become final." *Id.* at 3.⁴

Bryan cites a 175 year old U.S. Supreme Court case relating to the timeliness of an appeal bond for the proposition that "The time for taking an appeal from a final decree runs from the denial of a motion to reopen the case on the merits instead of from the entry of the decision." *Brockett, et al. v. Brockett*, 43 U.S. 238, 240 (1844). He further cites *Slep-Tone Entm't Corp. v. Karaoke Kandy Store, Inc.*, 782 F.3d 313, 316-17 (6th Cir. 2015) (concluding that defendant's motion for attorney's fees filed in a trademark infringement action was not untimely under the 14 day time limit of Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B)(i) until after the plaintiff's Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(b) motion for additional findings had been decided).

At issue here under Supreme Court Rule 30 is whether the filing of Fawkes' Petition for Rehearing on September 11, 2014, the fourteenth day following the Supreme Court's August 28, 2014 final judgment on Bryan's first appeal, acts to toll the bill of costs limitation period to give Bryan an additional 14 days to file his motion following the Supreme Court's September 12, 2014 Order denying Fawkes' petition. By its language, VISCR 30(b) provides a bright-line rule: the "Supreme Court shall deny untimely bills of costs unless a motion showing extraordinary circumstances is filed with the bill." Yet, the Supreme Court in an analogous context has explained the meaning of a "final judgment" with regard to a motion seeking an award of attorney's fees in the trial court while an appeal is pending. A "final judgment, decision, or order is one that 'ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing ... to do but execute the judgment.'" *V.I. Gov't Hosps. & Health Facilities Corp. v. Gov't of the V.I.*, 50 V.I. 276, 279 (V.I. 2008) (quoting *Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Rivera*, 333 F.3d 143, 150 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting *Catlin v. United States*, 324 U.S. 229, 233, (1945))). With regard to motions for attorney's fees, the Supreme Court states:

The ripeness doctrine applies to motions. ... A ruling on a motion for attorney's fees must be vacated on ripeness grounds when the presence of ongoing litigation precludes an informed determination of whether the moving party is in fact entitled to attorney's fees under the relevant law.

Id. at 280-81 (citations and internal quotations omitted).

⁴ With neither his Verified Motion nor his Amended Motion did Bryan file "a motion showing extraordinary circumstances" seeking a determination that the untimely filing of his motions for bill of costs should be excused due to "extraordinary circumstances." VISCR 30(b). In Bryan's Reply, without elaboration, he urges that "there are extraordinary circumstances under which the court should permit the filing." Reply, at 4.

Under 5 V.I.C. § 541, an award of costs, including attorney's fees, may "be allowed to the prevailing party in the judgment." *V.I. Gov't Hospitals* holds that a motion for attorney's fees filed during the pendency of an appeal "was not ripe, for the prevailing party cannot be ascertained" prior to a ruling on the appeal. *Id.* at 281.

In the Superior Court, "a motion for attorney's fees is not ripe for adjudication while an appeal is pending. ... The reason for this rule is obvious: the Superior Court has no way to determine which party is the 'prevailing party' while the litigation is ongoing." *Hodge v. Bluebeard's Castle, Inc.*, 62 V.I. at 700 (citing *V.I. Gov't Hospitals*, 50 V.I. at 281).

In *Beachside Assocs., LLC v. Fishman*, where "Beachside prevailed in having the order appealed from vacated, with this Court also denying Fishman's request for rehearing," Beachside was deemed to be "the prevailing party on appeal," and its motion for bill of costs on appeal was granted. 54 V.I. at 421. Significantly, the Supreme Court considered the denial of the motion for rehearing a necessary prerequisite to its determination that Beachside was the prevailing party entitled to an award of costs. In light of the guidance of the Supreme Court in *V.I. Gov't Hospitals* and *Beachside Associates*, the Court deems a VISCR 30 motion for bill of costs timely if filed within 14 days of the Supreme Court's ruling on a timely petition for rehearing.

Here, while Fawkes' Petition for Rehearing was pending, there was no way to determine whether the "judgment is reversed"⁵ and Bryan was "the prevailing party on appeal." *Id.* That is, Bryan's motion for bill of costs on the judgment entered on the appeal from the Supreme Court's August 28, 2014 Order was not ripe for determination until that Order became final by the Supreme Court's September 12, 2014 denial of Fawkes' Petition for Rehearing. Accordingly, Bryan's Verified Motion, filed 14 days later on September 26, 2014 seeking an award of costs incurred in S. Ct. Civ. No. 2014-0046, the appeal of the Superior Court's July 30, 2014 Order, is deemed timely.⁶

Hansen argues further that 18 V.I.C. § 412 relating specifically to objections to election nomination petitions and papers governs Bryan's Verified Motion, rather than 5 V.I.C. § 541, the general statutory provision relating to an award of costs in a civil action. Hansen Opposition, at 4 (citing *V.I. Public Services Commission v. V.I. Water and Power Authority*, 49 V.I. 478, 485 (V.I.

⁵ VISCR 30(a).

⁶ Because Bryan's Verified Motion was not untimely in connection with S. Ct. Civ. No. 2014-0046, there was no need to include a showing of "extraordinary circumstances." VISCR 30(b).

2008) (“it is a well-established canon of statutory construction that when two statutes cover the same situation, the more specific statute takes precedence over the more general one, unless it appears that the Legislature intended for the more general to control.”)).

Section 412 states: “In case a petition under this section is *dismissed*, the court shall make such order as to the payment of the cost of the proceeding, including witness fees, as it shall deem just.” 18 V.I.C. § 412 (emphasis added). The statute is silent as to an award of costs where, as here, a meritorious petition is filed. Hansen argues that the statute’s silence requires a finding that no costs may be awarded where an election challenge was not dismissed.

When interpreting multiple sections of the Virgin Islands Code that apply to the same issue, “we must first determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning. If the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, no further inquiry is needed. Furthermore, a statute must be read in relation to other statutory provisions, making sure to avoid interpreting any provision in a manner that would render it - or another provision – wholly superfluous and without an independent meaning or function of its own.” *Alexander v. Alexander*, 2016 V.I. Supreme LEXIS 35, *11-12 (V.I. 2016) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Here, 18 V.I.C. § 412 and 5 V.I.C. § 541 may be read together without either rendering the other “wholly superfluous.” Accordingly, the Court will not read Section 412 to include the unstated but implied meaning that no costs may be awarded in election law cases that are not dismissed. Rather, 18 V.I.C. § 412 will be strictly construed according to its express language, such that it does not preclude a grant of costs and attorney’s fees to a prevailing party in an election law challenge, as in a civil action generally, pursuant to 5 V.I.C. § 541.

Fawkes and Hansen further argue that Bryan incurred these legal expenses purely upon his own volition and that Fawkes and Hansen should not be “punished” for taking a rational stance on unsettled legal issues. Fawkes Opposition, at 2. Hansen argues that awarding costs and fees would be unjust; that public policy dictates that the Court should decline to award fees and costs in “matters of first impression under Virgin Islands election law and no party was at fault in the litigation.” Hansen Opposition, at 5-6.

The award issued herein is not punishment against the non-prevailing Respondents, nor does it constitute a finding that any party was at fault. Rather, this order simply recognizes that Virgin

Islands law provides for an award of costs to the prevailing party in a civil action. A citizen who successfully challenges Virgin Islands election laws to no personal economic gain should not be deprived of the indemnification for the costs of litigation afforded by statute to other successful civil litigants. Such a ruling as is urged by Respondents may chill taxpayers or other citizens from challenging laws or governmental actions deemed unlawful. The fact that only a successful challenge may result in an award of indemnification for costs, and that a frivolous or unsuccessful election law challenge may result in an award of costs against such a citizen litigant, should act to dissuade such actions that are not well founded.

Finding unpersuasive Respondents' arguments as to public policy considerations and as to the exclusive applicability of 18 V.I.C. § 412 with regard to an award of costs in election cases, and finding that Bryan's Verified Motion was timely filed, the Court determines that Bryan is entitled to an award of appropriate costs, including attorney's fees, with regard to the appeal concluded by the final Order of the Supreme Court filed August 28, 2014 in S. Ct. Civ. No. 2014-0046.

Amended Motion – Appeal of Superior Court's October 10, 2014 Order (S. Ct. Civ. No. 2014-0066)

Bryan's expedited appeal of the Superior Court's October 10, 2014 Order was determined by the Supreme Court's Opinion and Order filed October 24, 2014. Hansen timely filed her Emergency Motion to Reconsider on October 30, 2014, which was denied by Order of the Supreme Court the same date. Accordingly, as the appeal in S. Ct. Civ. No. 2014-0066 reversed the Superior Court's judgment, Bryan was entitled to an order awarding reasonable costs to be taxed against the respondents per VISCR 30(a). A prevailing party on appeal "who desires such costs to be taxed shall state them in an itemized and verified bill of costs, including attorney's fees, which the party shall file with the Clerk of the Supreme Court, with proof of service, within 14 days after entry of judgment." VISCR 30(b).

Here, the appeal was finally concluded by the Supreme Court's denial of Hansen's Motion to Reconsider on October 30, 2014, such that Bryan's verified bill of costs was to be submitted in connection with S. Ct. Civ. No. 2014-0066 no later than November 13, 2014. However, Bryan's Amended Motion was filed in the Superior Court, not with the Clerk of the Supreme Court, on February 9, 2015. Bryan's Amended Motion does not acknowledge its untimeliness, nor does it cite the existence of extraordinary circumstances justifying a three month extension of the time limit for filing. In his Reply to the arguments of Respondents, without citation to authority, Bryan states that

“The issued [sic] in both appeals relate to the same matter nd [sic] issues, and the second appeal was only made necessary when the Superior Court did not follow the court’s instruction on the first appeal. Bryan amended his earlier pending motion for fees and costs on February 5, 2015 to include the fees and costs incurred in the second related appeal. Neither Superior Court nor Supreme Court rules preclude an amendment of the fees and costs in instances where there was no responsive pleading to the request, and the amendment relates to services rendered on the same issues/matter(s).” Reply, at 4.

Yet, Bryan seeks by his Amended Motion not to amend his Verified Motion submitted relative to S. Ct. Civ. No. 2014-0046, but rather to accompany that originally filed bill of costs with an entirely new bill of costs relative to S. Ct. Civ. No. 2014-0066, submitted well past the permitted time for such filing. Pursuant to VISCR 30(b), “The Supreme Court shall deny untimely bills of costs unless a motion showing extraordinary circumstances is filed with the bill.”

The Court finds that the February 9, 2015 Amended Motion failed to comply with VISCR 30(b) as it was filed grossly out of time, without showing of extraordinary circumstances. As such, the Court is constrained to deny his untimely bill of costs as to S. Ct. Civ. No. 2014-0066, and Bryan’s Amended Motion seeking costs for that second appeal will be denied.

Award of Costs and Attorney’s Fees on Verified Motion (S. Ct. Civ. No. 2014-0046)

Under VISCR 30(a), “in order to be valid, costs awards must be ‘reasonable.’” *Kaloo v. Estate of Small*, 62 V.I. at 584. Reasonableness is not defined within the Rule. While “Supreme Court Rule 30 can be interpreted independent of title 5, section 541, this Court will not award on appeal what is strictly unavailable at the trial level.” *Williams v. United Corp.*, 2009 V.I. Supreme LEXIS 1, *7 (V.I. 2009). Here, because the any award of costs in the underlying civil action would be subject to interpretation under 5 V.I.C. § 541, standards developed under that statute are considered to assess the reasonableness of Bryan’s permitted submission set out in the Verified Motion.

Costs

Bryan seeks reimbursement for costs incurred, other than attorney's fees, in the total amount of \$376.65, as follows:

08/01/14	Substitution of Counsel - photocopy and postage expense (12 pgs @ \$0.25)	\$	4.47
08/04/14	Notice of Appeal - photocopy and postage expense	\$	2.49

	(8 pgs @ \$0.25)	
08/05/14	Notice of Filing Superior Court Order - photocopy and postage expense (30 pgs @ \$0.25)	\$ 7.99
08/12/14	Appellant's Brief (13 copies) and Joint Appendix (8 copies) – copied and bound at A Better Copy, Inc.	\$ 261.00
08/20/14	Appellant's Reply Brief (13 copies) – Copied and bound – A Better Copy, Inc.	\$ 102.70
	TOTAL	\$ 378.65

While costs associated with “necessary expense[s] of copying any public record, book, or document used as evidence on the trial,” are allowable under the language of 5 V.I.C. §541, general office overhead expenses are generally disallowed. “[L]ocal courts have consistently held that expenditures for messenger services, photocopying, phone calls and other normal office overhead expenses are not awardable pursuant to § 541.” *Pedro v. Huggins*, 53 V.I. 98, 106 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2010 (citations omitted); *see also Diamond Crest, Ltd. v. FNA Serv. Station, Inc.*, 2006 V.I. LEXIS 42, *10-11 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2006) (“numerous charges claimed by the Plaintiff are not recoverable under the statute including, overhead costs such as photocopying, telephone calls, postage, and computer research charges.”)(citations omitted). Yet, “costs for copying and other types of reproductions should be allowed when they are shown to be necessary or they are introduced in evidence.” *Id.* *11 n.7.

In keeping with the foregoing guidance, costs claimed will be disallowed as overhead, except for those necessary costs for copying and binding Appellant’s Brief, Joint Appendix and Reply Brief, which will be permitted in the total amount of \$363.70.

Attorney’s Fees

Bryan seeks to recover attorney’s fees based upon an hourly rate for Attorney Emile A. Henderson III of \$250.00. Neither Fawkes nor Hansen has challenged the hourly rate, which the Court accepts as reasonable.

Bryan seeks an award of attorney’s fees incurred at that rate for 71.40 hours over the period August 1 through August 26, 2014. Verified Motion, Exhibit A. By 5 V.I.C. § 541(b), “there shall be allowed to the prevailing party in the judgment such sums as the court in its discretion may fix by way of indemnity for his attorney’s fees in maintaining the action or defenses.”

In determining the reasonableness of Bryan’s request, Supreme Court Rule 211.1.5(a) is instructive:

- (a) The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
- (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
 - (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
 - (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
 - (4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
 - (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
 - (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
 - (7) the experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
 - (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

Factors (1), (4), and (5) above are of particular note in this analysis. The litigation and appeal involved novel issues not previously litigated under Virgin Islands election laws and 18 V.I.C. § 412. Bryan prosecuted the litigation and his subsequent successful appeal without realizing any personal economic benefit. As Hansen concedes (Hansen Opposition, at 6), the appeal addressed questions of first impression regarding the interpretation of Virgin Islands statutory law and the Revised Organic Act. The appeal was prosecuted on an expedited basis to determine issues necessary to conducting the impending territorial election.

In this light, the Court cannot say that the time expended on substantive legal research and brief writing during the period of the appeal in S. Ct. Civ. No. 2014-0046 is unreasonable. The Court will disallow time reflecting ministerial tasks that could have been accomplished by clerical staff: i.e. 08/01/14 Prepare Notice of Substitution of Counsel and Notice of Appeal (0.30 hour); 08/05/14 Review Order Granting Expedited Scheduling (0.10 hour); 08/06/14 Prepare letter to counsel re Joint Appendix (0.20 hour); 08/11/14 Prepare and file Motion to permit Brief in excess of page limits (0.30 hour). However, with the exception of the noted 0.90 hour disallowed, the Court does not find the remaining substantive time, consisting of 70.50 hours, as unreasonable or unnecessary to maintain Bryan's appeal in S. Ct. Civ. No. 2014-0046. Accordingly, an award of attorney's fees will enter in favor of Bryan on his Verified Motion, against Fawkes and Hansen jointly and severally, in the amount of \$17,625.00.

Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, it is hereby

ORDERED that Bryan's Amended Motion is DENIED with regard to an award of costs in S. Ct. Civ. No. 2014-0066. It is further


ORDERED that Bryan's Verified Motion Is GRANTED, in part, with regard to S. Ct. Civ. No. 2014-0046. It is further

ORDERED that an award of indemnification for costs incurred in S. Ct. Civ. No. 2014-0046 is entered in favor of Bryan and against Fawkes, in her official capacity, and Hansen, jointly and severally, in the amount of \$363.70 for costs and \$17,625.00 for attorney's fees.


April 20, 2017

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
ESTRELLA GEORGE
Clerk of the Court

By: 

Court Clerk Supervisor
4/20/17



DOUGLAS A. BRADY
Judge of the Superior Court

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY
This 21 day of April 20 17

CLERK OF THE COURT

By  Court Clerk