For Publication
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
C QUANJ CELESTINE ) S Ct Crim No 2024 0015
Appellant/Defendant ) Re Super (t Crim No S1 2016 CR
) 00195 (STT)
v )
)
PEOPLE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS ;
Appellee/Plaintiff )
)
On Appeal from the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands
Division of St Thomas & St John
Considered July 16 2024
Filed September I6 2024
Cite as 2024 V] 29
BEFORE RHYS S HODGE Chief Justice IVE ARLINGTON SWAN Associate
Justice, and, HAROLD W L WILLOCKS, Associate Justice
APPEARANCES
David J Cattie, Esq
The Cattie Law Firm, P C
St Thomas U S V I
Attorneyfor Appellant
Sean P Bailey, Esq
Assistant Attorney General
St Croix U S V I
Attorneyfor Appellee
OPINION OF THE COURT
WILLOCKS, Associate Justice
1]] Appellant C’Quan J Celestine (“Celestine”) appeals the Superior Court’s March 14,
2024 Judgment and Commitment, for failing to conduct a full re sentencing hearing upon
Celestmet People 2024 V l 29
S Ct Crim No 2024 0015
Opinion 01 the Court
Page 2 of 12
remand, in violation of this Court’s Opinion and Judgment ' For the reasons that follow we
affirm
I BACKGROUND
112 Afler a trial by jury in May 2017, Celestine was convicted of seven counts, including
attempted murder in the second degree, assault in the first and third degree and unauthorized
possession ofa firearm during the commission ofeach of those crimes Thereafter, the Superior
Court sentenced him to 40 years imprisonment “0n the Habitual Offender Information ”
Judgment and Commitment (People v Celestine ST 2016 CR 00195, Docket No 84), entered
August 17, 2017 2 at 3 The trial court stayed the sentences on the individual charges, but
explained what those sentences would be if imposed Celestine timely appealed both his
convictions and sentence to this Court
113 In the previous appeal (referred to herein as Celestine I), Celestine claimed (1) that his
due process rights were violated during trial and thus that his convictions should be
overturned; (2) that the Superior Court erred in applying the habitual offender sentencing
enhancement, and (3) that based upon this Court’s holding in Titre v People, 70 V I 797 (V 1
2019), his convictions on the “lesser” counts should be vacated
{[4 Upon consideration, this Court affirmed the Superior Court’s sentencing order, but
ordered the case be REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING in accordance with this Court 5
Titre decision ” Judgment (Celestine v People, S Ct Crim No 2017 0066, Docket No 51),
entered June 17, 2020, at 2 (emphasis in original) 3
‘ Celestine v People 73 V 1 500 (V 1 2020)( Celestmc 1’ )
2 In what appears to be a typographical error this Court 5 opinion and order in Celestine 1 refer
to the Superior Court’s “August 9, 2017 judgment and commitment However that original
Judgment and Commitment is dated August 17, 2017
3 9
This Court 3 written opmlon In the previous appeal IS recorded at Celestine v People 73 V I
500 (V I 2020), however, the accompanying Judgment was not included
Celestine v People 2024 V I 29
S Ct Crim No 2024 0015
Opinion 01‘ the Court
Page 3 of 12
1[5 The Superior Court convened for such resentencing on March 7, 2024, but it did not
conduct a full sentencing hearing The Superior Court simply vacated Celestine’s convictions
on Counts Three through Seven of the information, inclusive, and imposed sentence on Counts
One and Two as outlined by the trial court, clarified the enhancement of the sentence under
the Habitual Offender statute, and reiterated the other provisions contained in the August 17,
2017, Judgment and Commitment 4
4 The original judgment sentenced Celestine “to a term of imprisonment in the Bureau of
Corrections for forty (40) years on the Habitual Offender information,” with the trial judge
noting that
with regard to Count One of the June 21 2016 Information Attempted Murder
in the Second Degree the imposition of sentence is stayed but were the Court to
impose a separate sentence thereon the Court would sentence Defendant to a
term of imprisonment in the Bureau of Corrections for twenty five (25) years
and with regard to Count Two Unauthorized Possession of a Firearm during
the Commission or Attempted Commission of a Crime of Violence Attempted
Murder in the Second Degree the imposition of sentence is stayed but were the
Court to impose a separate sentence thereon the Court would sentence
Defendant to fifieen (15) years with said sentence to run consecutive to the
sentence imposed on Count One and a fine ofTwenty five thousand dollars ($25
000 00)
Judgment and Commitment (People v Celestine ST 2016 CR 00195 Docket No 84), entered
August 17, 2017, at 3 The judgment also deemed Counts Three through Seven merged with
Count Two and stayed the sentences for those counts In addition, the trial court gave Celestine
credit for time served and imposed restitution and court costs
At resentencing, the Superior Court ordered
[t]hat with regard to Count One of the June 21 2016, Information Attempted
Murder in the Second Degree, Defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment
for twenty five (25) years, and with regard to Count Two, Unauthorized
Possession of a Firearm during the Commission or Attempted Commission of a
Crime of Violence, Attempted Murder in the Second Degree, Defendant is
sentenced to fifieen (15) years imprisonment, with said sentence to run
consecutive to the sentence imposed on Count One and Defendant shall pay a
fine of Twenty five thousand dollars ($25 000 00)
Judgment and Commitment (People v Celestine ST 2016 CR 00195 Docket No 105)
entered March 14 2024 at4
Celestine v People 2024 V I 29
S Ct Crim No 2024 0015
Opinion of the Court
Page 4 of 12
116 Celestine filed his notice of appeal on March 15, 2024, which was amended on March
18, 2024 He seeks to vacate the Superior Court’s Judgment and Commitment and have the
matter “remanded for a full rehearing ” (App’ant Br at I4 ) 5
II JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
117 Title 4, section 32(a) of the Virgin Islands Code vests this Court with “jurisdiction over
all appeals arising from final judgments, final decrees or final orders of the Superior Court or
as otherwise provided by law 4 V I C § 32(a) Because the Superior Court’s March I4, 2024,
order sentencing Celestine disposed of the matters submitted to it upon remand, the order
constitutes a final judgment within the meaning of 4 V l C § 32
118 We review the trial court’s factual findings for clear error and exercise plenary review
over its legal determinations Thomas v People 63 V I 595 602 03 (V l 20l5) (citing
Simmonds v People 53 V l 549, 555 (V I 2010)) “However, in ruling on the correctness of
discretionary rulings, such as those granting or denying motions to suppress evidence or for
severance, we review only for abuse of discretion ” Ponce v People, 72 V l 828, 833 (V I
2020) (citations omitted)
III DISCUSSION
119 In Celestine I, we found that our holding in Titre v People 70 V I 797 (V I
20l9), applied to ( elestine ° and agreed that the secondary convictions should be vacated ’
it further ordered that “Defendant is sentenced as a Habitual Offender pursuant to 14
VIC § 61, therefore, he shall serve not less than ten (I0) years and his sentence shall not be
suspended, nor shall probation be granted neither shall parole or any other form of release be
granted for the minimum period of incarceration”, it vacated Counts Three, Four, Five, Six and
Seven; and, it gave Celestine the same credit for time served and imposed the same restitution
and court costs as the trial judge in the original judgment Id at 4 5 (footnote omitted)
l Initially, Celestine contended that the Superior Court’s order also violated [4 V l C § [04
However, he withdrew this portion of this appeal in his reply brief Thus, we do not address
that issue herein
6 There, we declared
Celestine v People 2024 V I 29
S Ct Crim No 20240015
Opinion of the Court
Page 5 of 12
Celestine 73 V | at 51 1 Ourjudgment in ( elestme I ordered the case to be “REMANDED
FOR RESENTENCING in accordance with this Court 5 Titre decision ’ Judgment (Celestine
v People S Ct Crim No 2017 0066 Docket No 51) entered June 17 2020 at 2 (emphasis
in original) Celestine avers that this order required the Superior Court to conduct a hearing as
set forth in V 1 R CRIM P 32 and that the Superior Court erred in failing to do so 7 However,
In Titre v Pe0ple 2019 V1 3 70 V I 797 (V I 2019) this Court examined title
14, section 104 of the Virgin Islands Code, which provides that [a]n acquittal
0r conviction and sentence under any [provision of Virgin Islands law] bars a
prosecution for the same act or omission under any other ” 14 V 1 C § 104 We
had previously held that the appropriate remedy under this provision was the
“merger and stay” remedy, under which convictions under multiple statutes are
‘merged” and any lesser sentences stayed Williams v People, 56 V 1 821, 834
n 9 (V 1 2012) However, in Tztre we determined that the “merger and stay”
remedy “on1y creates confusion and the possibility of more errors at the trial
court level which then need to be corrected by this Court,” and that vacatur of
any lesser convictions was a more appropriate remedy
Celestine 73 V I at 511
7 Rule 32 0f the Virgin Islands Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, in relevant part
(i) Sentencing
(1) In General
At sentencing, the court
(A) must verify that the defendant and the defendant's attorney
have read and discussed the presentence report and any
addendum to the report;
(B) must allow the parties' attorneys to comment on the
probation officer's determinations and other matters relating
to an appropriate sentence, and
(C) may, for good cause, allow a party to make a new objection
at any time before sentence is imposed
(2) Introducing Evidence, Producing a Statement
The court may permit the parties to introduce evidence If a witness
testifies at sentencing, Rule 26 2 (a) (d) and (0 applies If a party fails
to comply with a Rule 26 2 order to produce a witness's statement, the
court must not consider that witness's testimony
Celestme v People 2024 V I 29
S Ct Crim No 2024 0015
Opinion of the Court
Page 6 of 12
a review of subparagraph (i) of the rule does not indicate whether the provision applies equally
to resentencing
(3) Court Determinations
At sentencing, the court
(A) may accept any undisputed portion of the presentence report
as a finding of fact,
(B) must for any disputed portion of the presentence report or
other controverted matter rule on the dispute or determine that
a ruling is unnecessary either because the matter will not affect
sentencing or because the court will not consider the matter in
sentencing and
(C) must append a copy of the court's determinations under this
rule to any copy of the presentence report made available to the
Bureau of Corrections
(4) Opportunity to Speak
(A) By a Party
Before imposing sentence the court must
(i) provide the defendant's attorney an opportunity to
speak on the defendant's behalf,
(ii) address the defendant personally in order to permit
the defendant to speak or present any information to
mitigate the sentence, and
(iii) provide an attorney for the government an
opportunity to speak equivalent to that of the defendant's
attorney
(B) By a Victim
Before imposing sentence, the court must address any victim of
the crime who is present at sentencing and must permit the
victim to speak or submit any information about the sentence
(C)In Camera Proceedings
Upon a party 5 motion and for good cause, the court may hear in
camera any statement made under Rule 32(i)(4)
V I R CRIM P 32(i)
Celestine v People 2024 V I 29
S Ct Crim No 2024 0015
Opinion of the Court
Page 7 of 12
1110 Subparagraph (b) of Rule 32 is the only provision which contains the term resentencmg,
however, nothing in this portion of the rule indicates that subparagraph (i) applies to
resentencing It only requires that a resentencing be held “forthwith,” providing “Where a
sentence has been opened and vacated, the defendant shall be re sentenced forthwith except
wherea new trial is granted V] R CRIM P 32(b)(1)
1|] l Celestine argues that the Superior Court violated this Court 5 order requiring
resentencing because it merely vacated the lesser convictions without conducting a full
sentencing hearing as outlined in Rule 320) Celestine maintains that the term resentencmg is
a ‘term of art’ and, by ordering a resentencing, the Court intended the Superior Court ‘to
conductafull sentencing hearing,” as outlined inV I R CRIM P 32 (App ant Br at7 (quoting
J A 68) (internal quotation marks omitted» He further posits that, if vacatur of the lesser
offenses was the sole objective, the Court simply could have ordered the Superior Court to
vacate those convictions like the instructions given in Titre Thus he concludes that by
employing the word resentencmg we meant that the Superior Court hold a comprehensive
sentencing hearing
1|12 In support of his position Celestine relies primarily upon State v Stezmle, 2002 Ohio
2238
2002 WL 973076 (Ohio Ct App 2002) However that case is not analogous to the matter
at bar, and Celestine s reliance thereon is misplaced In Stezmle, the Ohio Court of Appeals
decision is based upon a particular Ohio statute requiring a “sentencing hearing before
resentencing an offender who was convicted of a felony and whose case was remanded
” Ohio Rev Code Ann § 2929 I9 (West) The Virgin Islands has no corresponding statute
Celestine also cites State v Smegal, 444 So 2d “84 (La 1984) But that case is
inapposite as well because the court in Smegal gave specific instructions that the resentencing
be “alter a full hearing and affording defendant opportunity to contravene allegations in [a
Celestine v People 2024 V I 29
S Ct Crim No 20240015
Opinion of the Court
Page 8 of 12
pretrial services] report ’ 1d at 1184 Likewise, United States v Collem 984 F 2d 1339 (3d
Cir 1992) does not support Celestine’s position In Collem, the United States Court ofAppeals
for the Third Circuit specifically ordered that the “new sentencing hearing be conducted
in full compliance with Rule 32(c)(3)(a), and that the appellant be afforded an adequate
opportunity to present, by appropriate means all pertinent information 1d at 1350 In the
matter at bar, the language that was included in both of those cases is absent from our remand
order
1113 The People counter that Celestine ‘focuses too narrowly on the single use of the word
‘resentencing’ in the Court’s Order while wholly ignoring the context in which that word
is used Indeed, this Court did not merely remand this matter ‘for resentencing’ generally
but specifically for ‘resentencing in accordance wzth Titre App ee Br at 3 (emphasis in
original) We agree The Court’s qualifying phrase “in accordance with this Court 3 Titre
decision ” supports the Superior Court 3 interpretation of the remand order In Titre we
specifically held that “vacatur shall be the remedy in cases in which section 104 is implicated
Titre 70 V I at 809
114 In Celestine I, we explained that in Titre we determined that the ‘merger and stay’
remedy ‘only creates confusion and the possibility of more errors at the trial court level which
then need to be corrected by this Court,’ and that vacatur of any lesser convictions was a more
appropriate remedy ” Celestine, 73 V l at 51 1 We then concluded that in Celestine’s case,
‘Ture applies, and Celestine's lesser convictions should be vacated ’ 1d Thus, the mandate of
our remand order was that Celestine be resentenced by having his lesser convictions vacated 8
3 Since our holding in Titre, we have remanded numerous cases with instructions to vacate
convictions of lesser included offenses in accordance therewith See e g Williams v People,
S Ct Crim No 2019 0068 2024 V l 27 (V 1 August 16 2024) (remanding with instructions
to vacate convictions and sentences pursuant to Titre) Thomas v Gov (ofthe Virgin Islands,
Celestine v People 2024 V l 29
S Ct Crim No 2024 0015
Opinion of the Court
Page 9 of 12
1|15 Moreover, in his prior appeal, Celestine did not take issue with the length or propriety
of the sentences imposed as to Counts 1 and II or the other provisions of the judgment and
commitment nor did this Court’s remand order address those matters 9 In fact the remand
order affirmed the August 17, 2017, judgment and commitment entered by the Superior Court
1H6 In Rawlms v People ofthe Virgin Islands 59 V I 1069 1073 (V I 2013) we adopted
the “rule that ‘[a] defendant does not receive a second chance to support an argument he failed
to support in a first appeal simply because he is resentenced ’ (quoting Untied States v
Stuckey 255 F 3d 528 531 (8th Cir 2001)) As support for that principle we cited United
States v Marmolejo, 139 F 3d 528, 531 (5th Cir 1998), where the court stated ‘This case was
remanded for resentencing The fact that the appellate court did not expressly limit the scope
of the remand order did not imply that a full blown sentencing hearing was permissible for a
second time, allowing evidence on all issues that would affect the sentencing guidelines ” Here,
the Court did limit the scope of the remand order in Celestine 1 nothing in the remand order
implied that a full blown sentencing hearing was permissible for a second time
1|l7 In United States v Stanley, 54 F 3d 103 (2d Cir 1995) another case we relied upon in
Rawlms the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit states “Our decision
in Stanley] did not call for de novo resentencing Instead we identified a narrow issue for
remand ” Stanley, 54 F 3d at 108 Like the Stanley court, this Court’s remand order in
77 V l 503 (V l 2022) (where the matter was remanded with instructions to vacate consistent
with Titre v People 2019 V I 3) Roberts v People 76 V l 555 (V l 2022) (where this Court
remanded with instructions to vacate to comport with our decision in Titre); Cascen v Gov I
ofthe Virgin Islands 74 V l 512 (V I 2021) (matter remanded and the Superior Court directed
to apply the ruling in Titre) Flores v People 70 V l 958 962 n 3 (V l 2019) (where the Court
notes that “[i]n light of TIIre , the proper procedure where 14 V l C § 104 is implicated
would be to vacate the conviction of the lesser included offense”) At this stage, the application
of Tllre is clear
9 Celestine did object to the application of the habitual offender enhancement, and the Court
found that the Superior Court 5 sentencing was proper Celestine, 73 V l at 510
( eleslme v People 2024 V l 29
s Ct Crim No 2024 0015
Opinion of the Court
Page 10 of 12
Celestine 1 identifies a narrow issue for remand, namely, that resentencing be “in accordance
with this Court’s Titre decision ” Judgment (( elestme v People, S Ct Crim No 2017 0066,
Docket No 5|), entered June 17, 2020, at 2 Given our accompanying opinion, where we
declared that, under Titre, “vacatur of any lesser convictions was [the] appropriate remedy”
and that “Titre applies, and Celestine s lesser convictions should be vacated,” Celestine, 73
V l at 511, the order is abundantly clear and capable of only one interpretation the lesser
convictions should be vacated Thus, the Superior Court’s understanding of the order was
correct
‘118 The Superior Court further noted that in Celestine 1 neither Celestine nor this Court
suggested that the sentence of 40 years incarceration was excessive
I do not find that they that this the Court 5 decision was intended to have an
entire new hearing with I think the Court to me the Court is clear, the Court
decision at least its clear on that part that the purpose is to have the Court
vacate the lesser convictions That is my understanding of the Court's decision,
and those and those lesser convictions and enter and to ensure that the
sentence, not the not to do this all over again and decide on a new period of
incarceration It was to ensure that the sentence as it is handed down that
whatever needs to be corrected is corrected so that it conforms with Titre That's
my understanding of the Court 5 order of the Supreme Court's order I don't see
the Supreme Court order as asking the Court this Court to go back and revisit
all the testimony and or considerations that the Court took into account when
it sentenced Mr Celestine My job is to just ensure that the order, whatever
errors were in this order in terms of the formulation of it, is corrected to make
it consistent with Titre That's my understanding of this order It's a resentence
to ensure that the and to vacate the lesser convictions And the lesser
convictions in this case are Counts Four, Five, Six, and Seven So the Court is
just going to at this point the Court is just going to impose the sentence
consistent with what its understanding is of the Supreme Court 5 order Because
there was no during this appeal there was no claim that the at least there is
nothing in the Supreme Court's order that suggest that the sentence of 40 years
incarceration is excessive There is nothing in the Court's order, the Supreme
Court's decision to suggest that, otherwise this Court would look at that, but
there is nothing that would do that
J A 73 74
Celestine v People 2024 V l 29
S Ct Crim No 2024 0015
Opinion 0! the Court
Page I l of 12
1H9 This Court, in Irons v People 57 V I 473 (V I 20l2) held that where a resentencing
results in a reduction of sentence, the absence of the defendant does not violate his or her
constitutional rights We noted that a “defendant only has a constitutional right to be present at
stages of the trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings ”’ 1d at
479 (quoting Faretta v California 422 U S 806 819 n [5 (1975) (internal citation omitted»
The defendant in Irons had been present at the original sentencing hearing and
was given the opportunity to challenge the accuracy and reliability of the
information the trial court used, to argue the weight the information should be
given and to present mitigating circumstances The subsequent proceeding was
conducted for the limited purpose of correcting lronss sentence so that it
comported with the plea agreement It was not a ‘ critical stage of sentencing
as the sentence had already been imposed, nor did her ‘ absence frustrate the
fairness of the proceedings ” Thus, her absence from the subsequent hearing did
not affect the fairness of the procedure and was not unconstitutional
Irons, at 57 V] 479 80 In the present case, Celestine was present and was given the
opportunity to participate fully in the initial sentencing hearing His resentencing for the
purpose of vacating the convictions of the lesser included offenses to compon with this
Court’s holding in Titre technically a reduction of sentence was not a critical stage of the
proceedings against” him 1d at 479 (quoting United States v Parrish 427 F 3d 1345 1347
(I Ith Cir 2005) (internal citation omitted)) Therefore, and particularly since Celestine was
present, a lack of a full hearing did not “frustrate the fairness of the proceedings ” Faretta, 422
U S at 8l9 n 15 (citing Snyder v Massachusetts 29l U S 97 (1934))
IV CONCLUSION
1120 To conclude, we affirm the March I4, 2024, J udgment and Commitment ofthe Superior
Court
Celestine v People 2024 V l 29
S Ct Crim No 2024 0015
Opinion of the Court
Page 12 of 12
Dated this 16th day of September, 2024
BY THE COURT
HAROé W L WILLOCKS 3
Associate Justice
ATTEST
VERONICA J HANDY ESQ
Clerk of the Court
By M“—
Deputy Clerk I
Dated q I [a O? 0 (7? 6L